Business Description
Amentum Holdings, Inc. is a provider of critical, technology-driven services, serving both governmental and commercial sectors. Its operations are structured around two distinct segments: Critical Mission Solutions and Cyber & Intelligence. The Critical Mission Solutions (CMS) segment delivers comprehensive support across various domains. This includes testing, training, and operational oversight for advanced missile defense systems. It also furnishes IT and engineering expertise to both defense organizations and the burgeoning space sector. Moreover, CMS offers technological solutions to energy clients, encompassing installation, decommissioning, and vital environmental remediation efforts, in addition to specialized technical consulting services. Meanwhile, the Cyber & Intelligence (C&I) segment focuses on advanced cyber training and sophisticated data analytics for government professionals. It also deploys cutting-edge communication systems and aerial mapping technologies for national security applications, alongside other specialized technical support for U.S. defense and intelligence agencies. Established on November 26, 2019, the company maintains its corporate headquarters in Chantilly, VA.
Business History
Generated: Jun 12, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (21h ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.27
Total Equity: $4.51B
Shares: 244,000,000
Total Debt: $3.94B
Cash: $437.00M
EBITDA: $987.00M
Total Debt: $3.94B
Cash: $437.00M
Revenue: $14.39B
Revenue: $14.39B
Revenue: $14.39B
Total Equity: $4.51B
Tax Rate: 48.7%
Equity: $4.51B
Total Debt: $3.94B
Cash: $437.00M
Current Liabilities: $2.35B
Long-Term Debt: $3.90B
Total Debt: $3.94B
Total Equity: $4.51B
Shares: 244,000,000
Shares: 244,000,000
CapEx: -$27.00M
Shares: 244,000,000
Stock Price: $22.05
Net Income: $66.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:05am (20h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.1B | $7.7B | $7.9B | $8.4B | $14.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.3B | $6.9B | $7.1B | $7.6B | $13.4B |
| Gross Profit | $787.0M | $771.0M | $782.0M | $798.0M | $1.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $452.0M | $650.0M | $725.0M | $507.0M | $531.0M |
| Operating Income | $335.0M | $121.0M | $57.0M | $291.0M | $503.0M |
| Net Income | $199.0M | -$84.0M | -$314.0M | -$82.0M | $66.0M |
| EBITDA | $364.0M | $381.0M | $382.0M | $566.0M | $987.0M |
| EPS | $2.21 | $-0.93 | $-3.49 | $-0.90 | $0.27 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:02am (20h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $207.0M | $305.0M | $452.0M | $437.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.4B | $1.9B | $3.1B | $3.1B |
| Total Assets | $4.2B | $6.4B | $12.0B | $11.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $713.0M | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $4.1B | $4.6B | $3.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $919.0M | $6.0B | $7.4B | $6.8B |
| Total Equity | $3.3B | $375.0M | $4.5B | $4.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $0 | -$445.0M | -$527.0M | -$461.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:05am (20h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $245.0M | $126.0M | $67.0M | $47.0M | $543.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$34.0M | -$18.0M | -$12.0M | -$11.0M | -$27.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $211.0M | $108.0M | $55.0M | $36.0M | $516.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$207.0M | -$1.8B | -$3.0M | $487.0M | $258.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$8.0M | $57.0M | -$61.0M | $147.0M | -$15.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (21h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$14.7B $14.6B – $14.7B
|
$15.2B $15.2B – $15.2B
|
$16.1B $16.0B – $16.3B
|
$16.8B $16.6B – $16.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$929.0M $925.3M – $931.5M
|
$963.6M $963.4M – $963.7M
|
$1.0B $1.0B – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
| Net Income |
$676.1M $644.3M – $708.0M
|
$759.9M $635.3M – $884.5M
|
$817.4M $807.9M – $826.0M
|
$878.4M $868.1M – $887.7M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:05am (20h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +50.7% | +2.5% | +6.6% | +71.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -2.0% | +1.4% | +2.0% | +29.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -63.9% | -52.9% | +410.5% | +72.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -142.2% | -273.8% | +73.9% | +180.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +4.7% | +0.3% | +48.2% | +74.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:05am (20h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-06 | Heller John E. | M-Exempt | 18,145.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Heller John E. | F-InKind | 8,184.00 | $24.89 | $203,700 |
| 2026-05-06 | Heller John E. | M-Exempt | 18,145.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Mullen Sean Thomas | M-Exempt | 9,072.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Mullen Sean Thomas | F-InKind | 2,762.00 | $24.89 | $68,746 |
| 2026-05-06 | Mullen Sean Thomas | M-Exempt | 9,072.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Johnson Travis Barton | M-Exempt | 13,609.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Johnson Travis Barton | F-InKind | 4,097.00 | $24.89 | $101,974 |
| 2026-05-06 | Johnson Travis Barton | M-Exempt | 13,609.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Bruning Jill L | M-Exempt | 9,072.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Bruning Jill L | F-InKind | 2,731.00 | $24.89 | $67,975 |
| 2026-05-06 | Bruning Jill L | M-Exempt | 9,072.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Arnette Stephen A | M-Exempt | 13,609.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Arnette Stephen A | F-InKind | 3,314.00 | $24.89 | $82,485 |
| 2026-05-06 | Arnette Stephen A | M-Exempt | 13,609.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-04 | Bruning Jill L | G-Gift | 30,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Arnette Stephen A | M-Exempt | 2,808.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Arnette Stephen A | F-InKind | 750.00 | $30.70 | $23,025 |
| 2026-03-02 | Arnette Stephen A | M-Exempt | 2,808.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-17 | St. Mary Michele T | M-Exempt | 7,080.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The headline growth numbers are an artifact, not a signal. The 71.6% YoY revenue jump and 35% "CAGR" reflect the September 2024 close of the Amentum-Jacobs CMS+Cyber merger, not organic momentum. The cleanest read is sequential: quarterly revenue went $4.24B (Sep'24, deal close noise) → $3.42B → $3.49B → $3.56B → $3.93B → $3.24B → $3.48B. That's flat-to-slightly-up at a ~$14B run-rate with material lumpiness. Net margin has crept from 0.1% to 1.6% across the last five quarters, and TTM NI is roughly $150M annualized vs. the $66M reported FY25 — so there IS real margin normalization happening as integration costs roll off. FY25 FCF of $516M on $14.4B revenue is a 3.6% FCF margin, decent for gov services but not extraordinary (Leidos and Booz run 5-7%).
The synthesis verdict ("Reasonable Premium") and the Market Forces verdict ("Strong Headwinds — avoid") flatly contradict each other, and the synthesis is closer to right on multiples but wrong on framing. At $22, EV/Revenue of 0.70x and EV/EBITDA of 9x are discounts to LDOS (~1.3x sales, ~14x EBITDA) and BAH (~1.4x sales). The P/E of 36x is misleading because GAAP NI is still depressed by amortization of acquired intangibles — a standard post-merger artifact. On FCF, the stock trades at ~10x FY25 FCF, which is cheap for a sticky gov-services book. Market Forces' "dangerous interest coverage" claim is the one I'd take seriously but cannot verify: the data file shows total debt as "—", which is the single biggest gap here. Amentum carried ~$4.5B+ of debt post-merger per the S-4; if that's still roughly intact, net debt/EBITDA is ~3x and interest expense is eating a meaningful chunk of that $543M OCF. Without the debt line, any valuation call is partially blind.
The contrarian case: defense services is entering a procurement air-pocket. DOGE-style scrutiny of contractors, CR-driven budget delays, and re-competes on legacy CMS contracts (many inherited from Jacobs' lower-margin book) could compress the very margin expansion the bulls are extrapolating. Gross margin of 7.2% is genuinely thin — this is a pass-through-heavy services book, not a tech business — meaning a 100bp adverse mix shift wipes out a third of operating profit. The insider activity is all M-Exempt/F-InKind on the same day (May 6, 2026) — that's option exercise plus tax withholding on RSU vesting, not a signal in either direction. No open-market buying is mildly negative given the 42% drawdown; if management thought the stock were genuinely cheap, you'd expect at least one director to step up. The "platform-monopoly" narrative archetype tagged by the narrative layer is simply wrong — Amentum is a labor-arbitrage gov services roll-up, not a platform. I'd dismiss that classification.
I dissent from both the "Reasonable Premium" framing (too generous — implies you're paying up) and the "avoid" framing (too categorical given the multiple). At $22, you're paying ~10x FCF for a $14B-revenue defense services incumbent with improving margins and a known post-merger deleveraging path. The risk is real: thin gross margins, opaque debt, budget headwinds, and a Q2 print ($3.24B) that broke the sequential uptrend. But the price already reflects skepticism — 0.44x sales is not a "premium" by any peer comp. Fair value on normalized 4.5% FCF margins and an 11x multiple is roughly $27-30; downside to $16-18 if a re-compete cycle goes badly or debt service surprises. The asymmetry is mildly favorable but not screaming. The right move is a starter position sized for the debt-disclosure gap, with adds contingent on (a) seeing the actual leverage ratio and (b) one more quarter confirming the margin trajectory isn't just integration-cost roll-off.
GPT Critique
From my independent analysis of Amentum Holdings, Inc., the primary aspect that stands out is the company's recent revenue growth juxtaposed with its volatile net income margins. The quarterly revenue has shown significant fluctuations, with a notable peak at $4.24 billion in late 2024, followed by a dip and then a recovery to $3.48 billion by April 2026. This volatility suggests that while the company has expanded its top line, likely due to the merger with Jacobs CMS+Cyber, consistent profitability remains a challenge. The net margin has improved from a concerning -6.4% in September 2024 to a modest 1.6% recently, indicating some post-merger integration success. However, the low net margins across the board, averaging well below industry standards, highlight structural weaknesses, likely due to the company's heavy reliance on government contracts which tend to have lower margins.
Opus asserts that the revenue growth numbers are misleading, attributing the 71.6% YoY increase primarily to the merger rather than organic growth. I concur with this assessment as the sequential revenue figures—oscillating around $3.5 billion—corroborate a lack of organic momentum. I also share Opus's view that the P/E ratio of 36x is skewed by amortization of acquired intangibles, which artificially depresses net income. This aligns with my observation of the company's thin margins and suggests potential undervaluation on a cash flow basis.
However, I diverge from Opus regarding the debt concerns. Opus mentions a post-merger debt load of approximately $4.5 billion, indicating potential financial strain. While this debt is indeed a critical factor, the absence of a current debt figure in the data limits the ability to fully assess the risk. Despite this, Amentum's free cash flow of $516 million and operating cash flow of $543 million suggest a degree of financial flexibility that might mitigate some of the debt-related risks, though not entirely eliminate them.
A careful skeptic could argue that both my analysis and Opus's place too much emphasis on the post-merger dynamics without adequately considering the broader market conditions. Given the defense industry's susceptibility to government budget fluctuations and procurement cycles, any assumptions about margin improvements or revenue stability could be overly optimistic. Additionally, the company's low gross margin of 7.2% signals potential vulnerability to cost pressures or shifts in contract terms, which could significantly impact profitability.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Quality screens at -42 (Mixed) and value at -35 (Fairly Valued) — both lenses are telling me the same thing from different angles: this is a leveraged, thin-margin services roll-up trading right on top of its deserved value. The quality lens flags 7% gross margins, 3.5% operating margins, $3.5B net debt, and a share count that tripled overnight; the value lens says the market already credits the integration thesis, leaving no margin of safety. When a mediocre business trades at fair value, you don't own it — you wait for it to get cheap or for the operating story to inflect. There's no asymmetry at $22.
My play: zero position today. I put AMTM on the watchlist with a hard line at $18.50 — roughly a 15-16% drawdown — where the value lens says the gap to deserved value finally compensates for integration and leverage risk. At $18-19 I'd open a 1% starter, and only scale to a 2.5-3% full position if I see two consecutive quarters of margin expansion, debt paydown ahead of schedule, or concrete synergy realization from Jacobs CMS. What flips me to aggressive sooner is a clear margin print — say operating margin pushing toward 5% — even at a higher price; what keeps me sidelined indefinitely is gross margin continuing to compress or any leverage covenant noise. Until one of those shows up, this is a 'show-me' name and my capital works harder elsewhere.
Amentum is a government services / defense engineering prime that more than doubled in scale in 2025 (revenue $8.39B → $14.39B), almost entirely via the Jacobs CMS combination. That same transaction blew diluted share count from ~91M to 244M (+168% in one year), so the optically large revenue and FCF jump (FCF $36M → $516M) are largely a function of inheriting another business, not organic compounding. The 28.3% diluted CAGR flagged by the dilution module is essentially one merger-issuance event, not chronic SBC abuse (SBC is only 0.2% of revenue), but per-share value was unquestionably reset.
Margin structure is characteristic of a cost-plus / services prime: gross margin has actually compressed from 15.5% (2021) to 7.2% (2025), and operating margin sits at 3.5%. Net income is barely positive at $66M on $14.4B of revenue (0.5% net margin), and the company has printed cumulative net losses across 2022–2024. Earnings quality on mechanical checks is clean (OCF/NI 1.49x, accruals -4%, Beneish -2.23), and 2025 FCF of $516M on a $5.4B cap is genuine — but Altman Z of 1.9 (grey) and net debt of $3.51B against only $437M cash mean the balance sheet is a constraint. This is a leveraged roll-up of a low-margin services book, not a fortress.
Insider tape shows only option exercises and tax-withholding (M/F codes) around May 2026 — no open-market buys or sells, so no directional signal. No buybacks offset the dilution. Quality reads as a credible, cash-generative defense services platform with scale advantages, but structurally thin-margin, debt-funded, and with per-share economics that depend heavily on executing the Jacobs integration.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Confirm 2025 share count increase is from the Jacobs CMS spin-merger and quantify any further issuance/earn-out shares pending
- Maturity ladder, covenants, and floating-rate exposure on the ~$3.95B gross debt stack
- Organic vs acquired revenue and margin contribution in 2025; underlying organic growth rate
- Customer/contract concentration — % revenue from top 5 contracts and DoD vs intel vs civil mix
- Backlog and book-to-bill, plus recompete risk on largest programs
- Synergy realization vs plan on the CMS combination and integration costs still to be incurred
- Goodwill and intangibles as % of assets; impairment risk given prior net losses
The e2e synthesis pegs AMTM at a 'Reasonable Premium' to deserved value, and that lines up with what the fundamentals support. A $5.4B equity cap sits on top of ~$3.5B net debt for an EV of roughly $8.9B against a thin-margin services business (7% GM, 3.5% OM). For a defense services prime with sticky contracts and real FCF, an EV/EBITDA in the high single digits is defensible, but it leaves no obvious margin of safety at $22.05.
What's priced in: that the Jacobs integration delivers synergies, leverage comes down on schedule, and DoD/space budgets remain supportive. None of that is heroic, but none of it is a bargain either. The 170% share count jump (91M → 244M) means per-share value creation has to fight dilution, and high earnings quality (which I credit) doesn't offset the structural reality of 3.5% operating margins on a leveraged balance sheet.
Net: this is a 'show me' stock at a fair price. I'd want roughly a 15–20% discount before calling it actionable on valuation alone — the gap to deserved value just isn't wide enough to bet on today.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for organic revenue growth and EBITDA margin post-integration
- Deleveraging trajectory — net debt/EBITDA glide path and any refinancing terms
- Realized Jacobs synergies vs targets in next 2-3 quarters
- Backlog and book-to-bill — any contract losses or DoD program cancellations
- Free cash flow conversion ex-integration costs