Business Description
Axalta Coating Systems Ltd. is a leading global enterprise focused on the development, sale, and distribution of advanced, high-performance coating solutions. Its operations extend across North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Asia Pacific region, and Latin America. The company's business is organized into two principal divisions: Performance Coatings and Transportation Coatings. Within its Performance Coatings segment, Axalta provides a wide array of water-borne and solvent-borne products specifically designed for the repair of damaged vehicles. These products serve a diverse clientele, including independent body shops, multi-shop operators, and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) dealership body shops. This segment also supplies functional and decorative liquid and powder coatings for an extensive range of industrial uses. These applications include architectural cladding and fittings, various automotive components, general industrial processes, job coating services, energy sector solutions, HVAC systems, appliances, industrial wood products, coil coatings, and oil and gas pipelines. Furthermore, it offers specialized coatings for building materials, cabinetry, wood and luxury vinyl flooring, and furniture, marketed under liquid coating brands like Voltatex, AquaEC, Durapon, Hydropon, UNRIVALED, Tufcote, and Ceranamel, as well as powder coating brands such as Alesta, Nap-Gard, Abcite, Teodur, and Plascoat. The Transportation Coatings segment is dedicated to engineering and supplying crucial layers—including electrocoat, primer, basecoat, and clearcoat—to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for both light-duty and commercial vehicles. This division also furnishes sophisticated coating systems for various commercial transport applications, such as heavy-duty trucks (HDT), buses, and rail vehicles, under well-known brands like Imron, Imron Elite, Centari, Rival, Corlar epoxy undercoats, and AquaEC. Axalta’s comprehensive product portfolio is additionally sold under numerous other brand names, including Audurra, Challenger, Chemophan, ColorNet, Cromax, Cromax Mosaic, Durapon 70, Duxone, Harmonized Coating Technologies, Imron ExcelPro, Lutophen, Nason, Spies Hecker, Standox, Stollaquid, Syntopal, Syrox, Raptor, U-POL, and Vermeera. Established in 1866, Axalta Coating Systems Ltd. maintains its corporate headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The company officially adopted its current name in August 2014, having previously operated as Axalta Coating Systems Bermuda Co., Ltd.
Business History
Generated: Jun 11, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:00am (1d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.75
Total Equity: $2.35B
Shares: 217,000,000
Total Debt: $3.26B
Cash: $660.00M
EBITDA: $1.06B
Total Debt: $3.26B
Cash: $660.00M
Revenue: $5.12B
Revenue: $5.12B
Revenue: $5.12B
Total Equity: $2.35B
Tax Rate: 30.6%
Equity: $2.35B
Total Debt: $3.26B
Cash: $660.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.37B
Long-Term Debt: $3.21B
Total Debt: $3.26B
Total Equity: $2.35B
Shares: 217,000,000
Shares: 217,000,000
CapEx: -$196.00M
Shares: 217,000,000
Stock Price: $32.10
Net Income: $378.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:05am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.4B | $4.9B | $5.2B | $5.3B | $5.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.0B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.4B |
| Gross Profit | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $966.5M | $995.0M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $906.0M |
| Operating Income | $462.4M | $423.0M | $588.0M | $706.0M | $764.0M |
| Net Income | $263.9M | $192.0M | $267.0M | $391.0M | $378.0M |
| EBITDA | $791.2M | $700.0M | $844.0M | $981.0M | $1.1B |
| EPS | $1.14 | $0.87 | $1.21 | $1.78 | $1.75 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:00am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $840.6M | $654.9M | $703.1M | $593.0M | $660.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.7B | $2.8B |
| Total Assets | $7.2B | $7.1B | $7.3B | $7.2B | $7.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.7B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.7B | $5.6B | $5.5B | $5.3B | $5.2B |
| Total Equity | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $827.2M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:05am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $558.6M | $293.8M | $575.3M | $576.0M | $649.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$121.6M | -$150.9M | -$137.9M | -$140.0M | -$196.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $437.0M | $142.9M | $437.4M | $436.0M | $453.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$649.0M | -$3.0M | -$106.3M | -$301.0M | -$48.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$243.8M | -$200.1M | -$50.0M | -$100.0M | -$165.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$512.8M | -$196.3M | $48.2M | -$107.0M | $64.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:00am (1d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$5.2B $5.2B – $5.3B
|
$5.4B $5.3B – $5.5B
|
$5.6B $5.6B – $5.6B
|
$5.5B $5.5B – $5.6B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.3B $1.3B – $1.3B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
| Net Income |
$555.4M $527.1M – $583.7M
|
$611.2M $582.1M – $640.3M
|
$669.3M $635.3M – $703.3M
|
$753.0M $739.6M – $774.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:05am (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +10.6% | +6.1% | +1.8% | -3.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -0.8% | +14.1% | +11.1% | -7.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -8.5% | +39.0% | +20.1% | +8.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -27.2% | +39.1% | +46.4% | -3.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -11.5% | +20.6% | +16.2% | +8.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:04am (1d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-03 | Tufano Amy | A-Award | 23,674.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tufano Amy | M-Exempt | 426.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tufano Amy | F-InKind | 219.00 | $31.68 | $6,938 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tufano Amy | M-Exempt | 283.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tufano Amy | F-InKind | 145.00 | $31.68 | $4,594 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tufano Amy | M-Exempt | 426.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tablin-Wolf Alex | A-Award | 33,143.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tablin-Wolf Alex | M-Exempt | 369.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tablin-Wolf Alex | F-InKind | 191.00 | $31.68 | $6,051 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tablin-Wolf Alex | M-Exempt | 245.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tablin-Wolf Alex | F-InKind | 127.00 | $31.68 | $4,023 |
| 2026-03-03 | Tablin-Wolf Alex | M-Exempt | 369.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | M-Exempt | 52,487.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-04 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | M-Exempt | 6,805.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-04 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | F-InKind | 3,125.00 | $31.40 | $98,125 |
| 2026-03-03 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | F-InKind | 23,099.00 | $31.68 | $731,776 |
| 2026-03-03 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | M-Exempt | 27,598.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | A-Award | 55,239.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | F-InKind | 12,674.00 | $31.68 | $401,512 |
| 2026-03-04 | Anderson Carl Douglas II | M-Exempt | 6,805.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue has rolled from $1.35B (Q2'24) to $1.25B (Q1'26) — a clean -7.4% top-line erosion over seven quarters with no inflection. Net income is choppier but trending down: TTM NI ≈ $369M vs. FY24's $391M and FY25's $378M. The Q4'25 print (NI $60M, 4.8% margin) was ugly and the Q1'26 rebound to $90M is below year-ago $99M. Operating margin at the annual level is the real story — 8.7% (2022) → 11.4% (2023) → 13.4% (2024) → 14.9% (2025) — a genuine 600bp expansion that explains why the stock isn't at $22. But quarterly revenue is decelerating into that margin, which is exactly the pattern that breaks in a downturn: cost leverage works both ways. FCF of $453M on a $6.87B cap is a 6.6% yield — not cheap, not expensive for a cyclical at presumed mid-to-late cycle.
The synthesis verdict of $23.90 fair value (-25.5%) strikes me as too punitive and the market-forces "neutral" read is closer to right. A 9.2x EV/EBITDA on a coatings business with 33% gross margins and demonstrated pricing discipline is not where mature specialty chemicals trade — peers like PPG and Sherwin sit at 12-15x. The synthesis appears to be DCF-anchoring on a -0.7% revenue CAGR and extrapolating, which double-counts the cyclical weakness already in consensus. That said, the synthesis flags "high debt risk — interest coverage dangerously low" and the data file conspicuously shows total debt as "—". Axalta carries roughly $3.4B of net debt historically; at ~7% blended rates that's ~$240M of interest against $764M operating income — coverage of ~3.2x, tight but not "dangerous." I'd want that number verified before dismissing the red flag, but the synthesis's framing feels overstated.
The contrarian case the models underweight: this is a textbook private equity / strategic takeout target. Carlyle owned it, Berkshire took a stake years ago, and the company has been "exploring strategic alternatives" rhetoric repeatedly. At 9x EBITDA with $453M FCF, a strategic acquirer (Nippon Paint, AkzoNobel, PPG) could pay $40-42 and make it accretive. The market-forces note flags this; I'd weight it more heavily. Conversely, the genuine bear case isn't EVs (refinish is body-shop work, agnostic to powertrain — bulls are right there) but rather that auto refinish volumes are structurally declining as ADAS reduces accident frequency 2-3% annually, and that's a slow bleed the margin story can't outrun forever. The insider activity is uninformative — all March 3 award/exempt/in-kind clusters are routine RSU vesting mechanics, not signal. "No Insider Transactions" in the secondary signals is correct in spirit.
Data quality concerns: the missing debt and equity lines are a real gap given the synthesis is keying off leverage. The TTM-vs-annual metric provenance flags are noise here — 18.6x P/E and 9.2x EV/EBITDA are directionally right regardless of window. Revenue confidence "adequate/steady" understates the seven-quarter decline; I'd call this "deteriorating but slowly." The "Lagging Sector Peers" signal aligns with my read — SHW and PPG have outperformed AXTA YTD, suggesting the market is already discounting cycle position. Net: I dissent from the synthesis overvalued verdict but agree the stock isn't a screaming buy. Fair value at 10-11x EV/EBITDA on normalized $850M EBITDA → ~$36-38 equity value, with takeout optionality adding $2-4 of expected value. At $32.10 you're paying roughly fair price for the standalone business and getting the M&A call option close to free, but with the revenue trajectory still negative and Q4'25 having printed a 4.8% margin scare, there's no urgency. I'd be a buyer in the high $20s, a holder here, and a seller above $40 absent a confirmed deal.
GPT Critique
From my analysis of Axalta Coating Systems Ltd., several key points stand out. Revenue has notably declined from $1.35B in Q2'24 to $1.25B in Q1'26, demonstrating a steady decrease of about 7.4% over seven quarters without signs of a recovery. This issue is compounded by a drop in net income, which has been inconsistent but shows a general downward trend—most notably, the significant decrease in net income margin from 10.5% in Q4'24 to just 4.8% in Q4'25 before a slight rebound. Despite these challenges, Axalta has managed to expand its operating margin significantly from 8.7% in 2022 to 14.9% in 2025, highlighting some success in cost management or pricing power. However, this margin expansion doesn't fully mitigate the risks posed by declining revenues, especially in a cyclical industry heavily tied to automotive demand. The cash flow situation seems solid, with a free cash flow of $453M and a strong operating cash flow of $649M, but the lack of detailed debt data in the current balance sheet is concerning and limits confidence in assessing financial stability.
I partially agree with Claude Opus's analysis in the Delvantic AI Findings. Opus suggests that the synthesis fair value of $23.90 is too bearish, and I concur that this assessment might be overly punitive given the company's operational improvements. I also agree with Opus that Axalta could be an attractive acquisition target, which could justify a premium over its standalone valuation, especially given its strong free cash flow generation and strategic relevance to larger players like PPG or AkzoNobel. However, I diverge from Opus when they downplay the synthesis's red flag about debt risk. The absence of clear debt figures is indeed a significant gap, but historical data showing roughly $3.4B of net debt suggests that debt servicing could be tighter than Opus implies, potentially impacting financial flexibility amidst declining revenues.
Opus also argues that the market's current pricing reflects skepticism about the sustainability of recent margin improvements and structural challenges in the automotive sector. I agree with this sentiment, seeing the valuation as reflecting both the cyclical risks and potential acquisition premiums. The market's valuation at 9.2x EV/EBITDA seems reasonable for a specialty chemicals firm, given historical and peer trading multiples. This suggests that while the stock might not be undervalued, it isn't overly expensive either, aligning with Opus's view that the stock is a hold at current prices.
A skeptic might argue that both our analyses could underestimate the potential long-term impact of structural shifts in the automotive industry, such as the transition to electric vehicles and advancements in ADAS, which could reduce demand for Axalta’s core products more significantly than anticipated. They might also question whether the margin expansion is sustainable in the face of ongoing revenue declines, suggesting that the company's operational improvements could reverse if top-line pressures intensify.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
I like the business — quality came in at +51 with clean earnings, real margin expansion (8.7% to 14.9% op margin), $450M of steady FCF, and a shrinking share count. That's a legitimately well-run specialty coatings operator, gated only by $2.6B of net debt that keeps it out of fortress territory. But the value lens is screaming -88 / Rich at $32.10 against a $24-28 FV cluster, and I agree with it. The bull case — durable margin gains plus auto OEM/refinish recovery — is already in the print, and revenue actually rolled from $5.28B to $5.12B last year. Paying up for a Solid (not Fortress) name with leverage and flat top-line is exactly how you earn single digits.
Play: no position here, zero urgency. I set an alert at $27 for a starter (roughly 1% book) and reserve room to build to a full 3-4% position only if it trades into the $24-25 zone, which is at/below EPV floor and gives me actual margin of safety on a levered cyclical. Catalysts that flip me aggressive earlier: a guide-down or industrial-cyclical scare that takes the stock to a $26 handle without impairing the FCF run-rate, or evidence the margin gains are structural (two more clean quarters). What keeps me on the sidelines: any sign pricing is rolling over, since the entire P&L story is margin-driven right now. Not a short — quality is too clean for that — just a patient pass until price meets value.
Axalta is a steadily improving mature earner. Revenue grew from $4.42B (2021) to $5.12B (2025), but the real story is margin expansion: gross margin climbed from 29.0% in 2022 to 32.6% in 2025, and operating margin nearly doubled from 8.7% to 14.9% over the same window. Net income rose from $192M (2022) to $378M (2025), and FCF has stabilized at ~$436–453M for three consecutive years — earnings quality is high (OCF/NI 1.8x, accruals -3.2% of assets, Beneish -2.59), so the reported profits are real cash.
Capital discipline is a clear positive. Diluted share count fell from 231.9M to 217.0M (-1.7% CAGR), SBC is a trivial 0.5% of revenue, and buybacks run 6.5x SBC — per-share value is being concentrated. The drawback is leverage: net debt of ~$2.6B against $660M cash and an Altman Z of 2.4 (grey zone). At $453M FCF the debt is serviceable and the company is self-funding, but the balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion, and limits resilience in a cyclical chemicals downturn.
Insider tape shows only routine awards, exercises, and tax withholdings — no open-market buys or sells to signal anything. Overall this looks like a well-run, improving specialty coatings business whose primary blemish is the legacy LBO-style debt load.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Maturity schedule and rate structure on the $3B+ gross debt — is refinancing risk concentrated in any near year?
- Refinish vs. Mobility (light vehicle/commercial) segment mix and whether margin gains are concentrated in Refinish (the higher-quality, less cyclical business)
- Customer/end-market concentration in Mobility coatings given OEM cyclicality
- Whether the 2024→2025 revenue decline is volume, price, or FX, and management's guidance on volume trajectory
- Pension and any environmental/legacy liabilities not captured in headline net debt
The composite fair value pegs AXTA at $26.38 and the signal-adjusted FV at $23.90, with the EPV floor at $23.55 and DCF at $27.80 — a tight cluster that all sits well below the $32.10 quote. That implies the market is paying roughly a 22-34% premium to deserved value on methods that are not obviously runaway in either direction (the spread between EPV floor and DCF is only ~18%, so this isn't a single-method artifact).
The quality lens is Solid, not Fortress — earnings are clean but $2.6B net debt caps the multiple I'm willing to underwrite. I'll grant a quality uplift over EPV, but even generously splitting the difference toward DCF lands deserved value in the $26-28 zone. To justify $32, you need durable margin expansion AND volume recovery in auto OEM/refinish — the bull case — already in the price. That's exactly the 'priced for perfection' setup the bear flags.
Nothing here screams short — it's a good business — but there is no margin of safety, and earnings quality being high means I can't even hide behind a haircut adjustment to rationalize the gap.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY guidance on EBITDA margin trajectory — is the expansion already booked or still to come?
- Refinish volume trends and auto OEM build rates — bear's structural challenge thesis vs management commentary
- Buyback pace and capital allocation between debt paydown and repurchases
- Any one-time raw material tailwinds in recent margin prints that won't repeat