Business Description
Best Buy Co., Inc. operates as a prominent technology retailer across the United States and Canada. Its business structure is segmented into Domestic and International operations. The company's extensive product selection includes a wide array of computing devices such as desktops, notebooks, and associated peripherals, alongside mobile phones (which generate commissions from network carriers), networking equipment, and tablets (including e-readers). Customers can also find smartwatches and various consumer electronics, encompassing digital imaging devices, health and fitness gadgets, home theater systems, portable audio solutions (like headphones and speakers), and smart home products. Beyond electronics, Best Buy also supplies household appliances such as dishwashers, laundry machines, ovens, refrigerators, blenders, coffee makers, and vacuum cleaners. For entertainment, their offerings range from drones, movies, music, and toys to gaming hardware and software, including virtual reality products. Additionally, the company stocks miscellaneous items like baby products, food and beverages, luggage, outdoor living essentials, and sporting goods. In terms of services, Best Buy provides consultation, delivery, design assistance, health-related programs, installation, membership benefits, repair work, product setup, technical support, and warranty services. Products are distributed through both physical stores and online platforms, operating under various brand names including Best Buy, Best Buy Ads, Best Buy Business, Best Buy Health, CST, Current Health, Geek Squad, Lively, Magnolia, Best Buy Mobile, Pacific Kitchen, Home, and Yardbird. Their primary online presence is via bestbuy.com, currenthealth.com, lively.com, yardbird.com, and bestbuy.ca. As of January 30, 2022, the company maintained a network of 1,144 retail locations. Originally established in 1966 as Sound of Music, Inc., the corporation is headquartered in Richfield, Minnesota.
Business History
Generated: Jun 9, 2026 7:14pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.06
Total Equity: $2.96B
Shares: 212,100,000
Total Debt: $1.80B
Cash: $1.74B
EBITDA: $2.28B
Total Debt: $1.80B
Cash: $1.74B
Revenue: $41.69B
Revenue: $41.69B
Revenue: $41.69B
Total Equity: $2.96B
Tax Rate: 23.9%
Equity: $2.96B
Total Debt: $1.80B
Cash: $1.74B
Current Liabilities: $7.68B
Long-Term Debt: $1.17B
Total Debt: $1.80B
Total Equity: $2.96B
Shares: 212,100,000
Shares: 212,100,000
CapEx: -$704.00M
Shares: 212,100,000
Stock Price: $75.12
Net Income: $1.07B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $51.8B | $46.3B | $43.5B | $41.5B | $41.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $40.1B | $36.4B | $33.8B | $32.1B | $32.3B |
| Gross Profit | $11.6B | $9.9B | $9.6B | $9.4B | $9.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $8.6B | $8.1B | $8.0B | $7.6B | $8.0B |
| Operating Income | $3.0B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.4B |
| Net Income | $2.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $927.0M | $1.1B |
| EBITDA | $3.9B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.2B | $2.3B |
| EPS | $9.94 | $6.31 | $5.70 | $4.31 | $5.06 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.9B | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $10.5B | $8.8B | $7.9B | $8.2B | $8.5B |
| Total Assets | $17.5B | $15.8B | $15.0B | $14.8B | $14.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $10.7B | $9.0B | $7.9B | $8.0B | $7.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $14.5B | $13.0B | $11.9B | $12.0B | $11.7B |
| Total Equity | $3.0B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $2.8B | $3.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.3B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$737.0M | -$930.0M | -$795.0M | -$706.0M | -$704.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.5B | $894.0M | $675.0M | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$468.0M | $0 | $14.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.5B | -$1.0B | -$340.0M | -$500.0M | -$273.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.4B | -$952.0M | -$460.0M | $75.0M | -$130.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$42.5B $42.3B – $42.8B
|
$43.3B $43.2B – $43.4B
|
$43.3B $42.9B – $43.6B
|
$44.0B $43.6B – $44.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.6B $2.6B – $2.6B
|
$2.6B $2.6B – $2.6B
|
$2.6B $2.6B – $2.6B
|
$2.7B $2.6B – $2.7B
|
| Net Income |
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.6B
|
$1.7B $1.6B – $1.8B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.0B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -10.6% | -6.1% | -4.4% | +0.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -14.8% | -3.1% | -2.3% | -0.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -40.1% | -12.3% | +9.3% | -19.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -42.2% | -12.5% | -25.3% | +15.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -30.0% | -5.3% | -14.8% | +3.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:17pm (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-29 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | S-Sale | 27,132.00 | $77.69 | $2.1M |
| 2026-05-29 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | S-Sale | 133,778.00 | $75.09 | $10.0M |
| 2026-05-29 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | S-Sale | 147,868.00 | $76.96 | $11.4M |
| 2026-06-01 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | G-Gift | 350.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | S-Sale | 191,572.00 | $75.96 | $14.6M |
| 2026-06-01 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | G-Gift | 350.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | Watson Mathew | S-Sale | 1,784.00 | $73.80 | $131,659 |
| 2026-04-15 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | G-Gift | 20,975.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | G-Gift | 1,252.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | SCHULZE RICHARD M | G-Gift | 939.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-20 | Hartman Todd G. | A-Award | 15,924.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-23 | Hartman Todd G. | S-Sale | 5,339.00 | $64.02 | $341,797 |
| 2026-03-20 | Bonfig Jason J | A-Award | 23,886.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-23 | Bonfig Jason J | S-Sale | 6,336.00 | $64.02 | $405,624 |
| 2026-03-20 | Watson Mathew | A-Award | 5,972.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-23 | Watson Mathew | S-Sale | 3,298.00 | $64.02 | $211,135 |
| 2026-03-20 | Scarlett Kathleen | A-Award | 21,895.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-23 | Scarlett Kathleen | S-Sale | 8,049.00 | $64.02 | $515,289 |
| 2026-03-20 | Bilunas Matthew M | A-Award | 29,857.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-23 | Bilunas Matthew M | S-Sale | 11,356.00 | $64.02 | $727,000 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-18 | $0.96 | 2026-05-28 | 2026-06-18 | 2026-07-09 |
| 2026-03-24 | $0.96 | 2026-03-03 | 2026-03-24 | 2026-04-14 |
| 2025-12-16 | $0.95 | 2025-11-25 | 2025-12-16 | 2026-01-06 |
| 2025-09-18 | $0.95 | 2025-08-28 | 2025-09-18 | 2025-10-09 |
| 2025-06-18 | $0.95 | 2025-05-29 | 2025-06-19 | 2025-07-10 |
| 2025-03-25 | $0.95 | 2025-03-04 | 2025-03-25 | 2025-04-15 |
| 2024-12-17 | $0.94 | 2024-11-26 | 2024-12-17 | 2025-01-07 |
| 2024-09-19 | $0.94 | 2024-08-29 | 2024-09-19 | 2024-10-10 |
| 2024-06-20 | $0.94 | 2024-05-30 | 2024-06-20 | 2024-07-11 |
| 2024-03-20 | $0.94 | 2024-02-29 | 2024-03-21 | 2024-04-11 |
| 2023-12-11 | $0.92 | 2023-11-21 | 2023-12-12 | 2024-01-02 |
| 2023-09-18 | $0.92 | 2023-08-29 | 2023-09-19 | 2023-10-10 |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.92 | 2023-05-25 | 2023-06-15 | 2023-07-06 |
| 2023-03-22 | $0.92 | 2023-03-02 | 2023-03-23 | 2023-04-13 |
| 2022-12-12 | $0.88 | 2022-11-22 | 2022-12-13 | 2023-01-03 |
| 2022-09-19 | $0.88 | 2022-08-30 | 2022-09-20 | 2022-10-11 |
| 2022-06-13 | $0.88 | 2022-05-24 | 2022-06-14 | 2022-07-05 |
| 2022-03-23 | $0.88 | 2022-03-03 | 2022-03-24 | 2022-04-14 |
| 2021-12-13 | $0.70 | 2021-11-23 | 2021-12-14 | 2022-01-04 |
| 2021-09-13 | $0.70 | 2021-08-24 | 2021-09-14 | 2021-10-05 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting with the raw numbers: revenue went from $51.8B (FY22) to $41.7B (FY26) — a 19.5% decline over four years, with operating income collapsing from $3.0B to $1.39B (op margin 5.8% → 3.3%). That's not "managed decline," that's structural margin compression on top of revenue erosion. The most recent comparable quarters tell a more nuanced story though: Q1 FY26 (May 2026) rev $8.94B vs Q1 FY25 $8.77B is +1.9%, and the holiday quarter Jan 2026 at $13.81B vs $13.95B prior year is essentially flat (-1.0%) but with NI jumping from $117M to $541M — a real earnings recovery as the prior-year quarter was abnormally depressed. FY26 NI of $1.07B vs $927M prior is +15% even with revenue flat. So the trajectory has stabilized; the question is whether that's a cyclical bottom (PC/TV replacement cycle, AI-PC refresh) or a plateau before the next leg down.
At $75.12 with $15.83B market cap, on $1.26B FCF, that's a 12.5x P/FCF and a ~8% FCF yield, plus a 5.8% dividend yield. The synthesis is right that this is priced for decline, not growth — 13.8x TTM P/E and 0.33x P/S are deep-value retailer multiples. But I disagree with the synthesis label "Reasonable Premium" — the math says discount, and even the model's own prose contradicts its verdict. The honest read: BBY trades at a discount appropriate to its terminal-value risk, and whether that discount is sufficient depends on whether 2026 earnings ($1.07B) represent a sustainable floor or a cyclical peak before secular pressure resumes. The 36.5% FCF CAGR is largely working capital and capex normalization, not earnings power — capex dropped to $704M from historical $900M-1B+ levels, which is not sustainable for a 1,000-store footprint.
The contrarian-bear case the models underweight: 22.5% gross margin is the lowest in a decade and not obviously defended — Amazon's private-label electronics, Costco's pricing, and direct-to-consumer (Apple, Samsung, Dyson) all chip at the same SKUs. The "services pivot" remains a rounding error on consolidated margin; Geek Squad and Totaltech haven't moved the gross margin needle. Insider activity is unambiguously negative — five sales on May 29, 2026 totaling ~500K shares clustered right after the strong Q1 print is textbook "sell into strength," and there are zero open-market buys. The contrarian-bull case the bear models underweight: at 8% FCF yield + 5.8% dividend with buybacks shrinking the float (~$1B+ annually), shareholder yield is ~11-12% even with zero growth, and the balance sheet carries $1.74B cash with manageable lease-adjusted debt. That's a Graham-style return profile if earnings merely hold flat.
Data quality concerns: the balance sheet tile is missing total debt and equity entirely — that's a real gap for assessing leverage on a retailer with significant operating leases. The TTM-derived ROE of 40% is arithmetically suspicious (implies equity base of ~$2.7B, which would mean buybacks have nearly evaporated book equity — plausible but worth verifying before citing). The "2026" fiscal dates are Best Buy's fiscal calendar, not calendar 2026, so the most recent data is actually ~May 2025 by calendar — six months stale by the time anyone acts on this. I dissent from the synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" — the stock is reasonably valued to modestly cheap on current numbers, not premium. I agree with Market Forces on headwinds being real but disagree that they make the stock un-investable at this multiple. The honest verdict: this is a coin-flip between value trap and 11% shareholder-yield compounder, and the insider selling tilts the odds toward "fair value, not bargain." Fair value range $70-85 depending on whether you believe FY26 earnings hold; current price sits in the middle of that band.
GPT Critique
In analyzing Best Buy's financial data independently, several key points stand out. Best Buy's revenue has declined from $51.76 billion in FY22 to $41.69 billion in FY26, indicating a significant 19% drop over four years. This reflects a structural decline typical of a mature retailer facing intense competition, particularly from e-commerce giants like Amazon. However, the recent quarterly data shows a slight revenue stabilization, with Q1 FY26 revenue at $8.94 billion, a 1.9% increase from the previous year. The net income for the same quarter surged to $276 million from $202 million in Q1 FY25, suggesting some earnings recovery. The company's free cash flow remains robust at $1.26 billion, giving it an 8% FCF yield, and its 5.8% dividend yield is attractive to income-focused investors. Despite these positive cash flow metrics, the underlying revenue and margin pressures indicate significant challenges ahead.
Opus argues that Best Buy is not in a "managed decline" but rather experiencing structural margin compression and revenue erosion. I concur with this assessment, given the stark decline in operating income from $3.0 billion to $1.39 billion over four years, reflecting a massive margin compression. This highlights the challenges Best Buy faces in maintaining its profitability amidst declining revenues. However, I diverge from Opus on the synthesis's valuation label of "Reasonable Premium." Opus suggests that Best Buy trades at a discount appropriate to its terminal-value risk, and I agree. The TTM P/E of 13.8x and P/S of 0.33x indeed reflect a company priced for decline, not growth, aligning more with a deep-value perspective rather than a "reasonable premium."
Where I disagree with Opus is on the sustainability of the earnings recovery. Opus notes a potential cyclical bottom due to the recent earnings increase, but the broader revenue decline and low gross margins (22.5%) suggest continued vulnerability. The recent insider selling, totaling around 500,000 shares, further underscores concerns about future growth prospects and aligns with the "sell into strength" strategy, which is a red flag for potential investors. Moreover, the missing balance sheet data, particularly regarding total debt and equity, is a critical gap that prevents a comprehensive risk assessment. This omission should be addressed before making any investment decisions.
A skeptic of both our views might argue that Best Buy's transformation into a service-oriented retailer through initiatives like Geek Squad and Totaltech could eventually stabilize and potentially grow its margins. They might also point to the company's strong cash flow generation and zero-net-debt position as buffers against industry headwinds. However, given the intense competitive pressures and margin erosion, these arguments would need to be substantiated by more concrete evidence of sustained margin improvements and revenue stabilization.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Quality at +20 tells me this is a clean, disciplined operator — real FCF, real buybacks, no accounting games — but it's a harvester in a shrinking category, not a compounder. Value at -11 (essentially fair, attractive below $62) tells me the market already knows all of that. When a +20 quality business trades at fair value, you don't get paid to own the decline risk; you get paid to wait for the dislocation. So I pass at $75.12. No starter, no nibble — the asymmetry isn't there.
My playbook: work a GTC bid around $62 for a starter (roughly 1% of book), and only scale to a full 2.5–3% position if it trades into the high-$50s on a tape-driven washout (holiday miss, guide-down, tariff scare) without the thesis actually breaking — i.e., FCF still north of $1B and buyback still running. Above $80 with no inflection in comps, I'm uninterested entirely; the deserved-value band caps the upside. The only thing that flips me to aggressive at current levels is evidence the top line has genuinely inflected — two consecutive quarters of positive comps plus services mix actually moving the margin line. Until then, BBY is a watchlist name, not a portfolio name.
Best Buy is a mature consumer-electronics retailer that throws off real cash: FY26 FCF of $1.26B on $41.69B of revenue, with OCF/NI of 1.58x, accruals at -4.5% of assets, Beneish M of -2.83 and Altman Z of 4.28. Earnings integrity looks high — there is no sign of accruals-driven or working-capital-driven profit. Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly: diluted share count has fallen from 249.3M (2022) to 212.1M (2026), a ~4% CAGR shrink, with buybacks running roughly 8x SBC, so per-share economics are genuinely being concentrated.
The quality concern is the underlying business trajectory. Revenue has contracted every year from $51.76B (2022) to $41.69B (2026) — roughly $10B of top-line gone — and operating margin has slipped from 5.8% to 3.3%, with net income falling from $2.45B to $1.07B. Gross margin held near 22.5%, so the damage is operating deleverage on a shrinking base, not pricing. Net debt is mildly negative ($-61M) against $1.74B liquid cash, so the balance sheet is adequate but not a fortress — much of the cushion sits in operating leases and inventory financing typical of big-box retail.
Insider tape is loud but mostly noise: of $238M sold over 12 months, the overwhelming bulk is founder Richard Schulze diversifying a legacy stake (four sales totaling ~$38M on 2026-05-29 alone, plus gifts), not operating management signaling. Operating insiders (Hartman, Bonfig, Watson) only sold small slivers tied to award vestings. So the 'unusual heavy selling' flag overstates management conviction concerns.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether FY26 revenue stabilization ($41.69B vs $41.53B) reflects category recovery (PC refresh, AI hardware) or one-off comps — segment/category disclosure in 10-K
- Operating lease obligations and true adjusted leverage vs. the headline net-cash figure
- Vendor/supplier concentration (Apple, Samsung, Microsoft) and gross-margin sensitivity to mix
- Whether Schulze's 10b5-1 plan continues and remaining stake size — is this an ongoing overhang on float?
- Membership program (Best Buy Plus/Total) economics and whether it's offsetting transactional revenue declines
- Services / Geek Squad / Best Buy Health contribution to operating profit vs. core retail
The e2e synthesis pegs BBY at a 'Reasonable Premium,' and that squares with the facts: ~$15.8B market cap on a mature retailer doing high-single-digit FCF yield, buying back stock, and paying a ~4% dividend. Deserved value for a clean-accounting operator harvesting a structurally flat-to-declining category sits in the $70–$85 range depending on whether you weight the services/membership optionality or the revenue erosion ($10B of top-line lost over four years, compressed op margins). $75.12 lands squarely in that band.
What's priced in: stable comps, continued buybacks, and modest services-mix benefit — not heroic AI-refresh-cycle growth, but not terminal decline either. The bull case (omnichannel moat + Geek Squad stickiness) and bear case (Amazon/DTC erosion + DIY pressure on services) roughly cancel at this multiple. Earnings quality is high (score 3), so no haircut to deserved value is warranted, but quality being good is already in the price. I don't see a gap worth swinging at.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward guidance on comparable sales and services-attach rates in the next earnings print
- Gross and operating margin trajectory — is the compression bottoming?
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization vs FCF
- Mix shift: services/membership revenue as % of total and its margin
- Any signal on a PC/AI hardware refresh cycle materially lifting unit demand