For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Bill Holdings Inc. (BILL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -38 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 3 · Value -71 · Sentiment -70 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $36.08 vs $45.39 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Bill Holdings Inc.
BILL NYSEBill Holdings Inc. is a technology company that provides cloud-based software for automating financial workflows for small and midsize businesses. Its platform focuses on streamlining accounts payable and accounts receivable, enabling users to generate and process invoices, manage approvals, and send and receive payments digitally. The software integrates with popular accounting systems, helping customers synchronize financial data and enhance cash flow visibility and control. Bill Holdings Inc. also offers spend and expense management tools that reduce reliance on manual processes and traditional expense reports, improving back-office efficiency. The company serves businesses directly as well as through partnerships with major financial institutions, accounting firms, and accounting software providers, embedding its solutions into broader financial ecosystems. Founded in 2006 and headquartered in San Jose, California, Bill Holdings Inc. plays a significant role in the digital transformation of financial operations for smaller enterprises seeking scalable, software-as-a-service solutions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.07
Total Equity: $3.91B
Shares: 103,912,000
Total Debt: $1.71B
Cash: $1.04B
EBITDA: -$53.10M
Total Debt: $1.71B
Cash: $1.04B
Revenue: $1.46B
Revenue: $1.46B
Revenue: $1.46B
Total Equity: $3.91B
Tax Rate: 21.7%
Equity: $3.91B
Total Debt: $1.71B
Cash: $1.04B
Current Liabilities: $4.59B
Long-Term Debt: $1.71B
Total Debt: $1.71B
Total Equity: $3.91B
Shares: 103,912,000
Shares: 103,912,000
CapEx: -$4.34M
Shares: 103,912,000
Stock Price: $45.39
Net Income: $23.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:05pm (42d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $238.3M | $642.0M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $61.8M | $145.0M | $194.0M | $234.6M | $272.1M |
| Gross Profit | $176.5M | $497.0M | $864.5M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $290.4M | $813.8M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Operating Income | -$114.0M | -$316.8M | -$295.8M | -$174.2M | -$80.6M |
| Net Income | -$98.7M | -$326.4M | -$223.7M | -$28.9M | $23.8M |
| EBITDA | — | -$305.3M | -$280.3M | -$151.0M | -$53.1M |
| EPS | $-1.19 | $-3.21 | $-2.11 | $-0.27 | $0.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.19 | $-3.21 | $-2.11 | $-0.27 | $-0.07 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:53pm (42d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $509.6M | $1.6B | $1.6B | $985.9M | $1.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.6B | $6.3B | $6.7B | $6.3B | $7.2B |
| Total Assets | $6.0B | $9.3B | $9.6B | $9.2B | $10.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.3B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $989.4M | $1.8B | $1.8B | $914.0M | $1.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.4B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $5.0B | $6.1B |
| Total Equity | $2.5B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$247.5M | -$544.8M | -$856.2M | -$1.1B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:05pm (42d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.6M | -$18.1M | $187.8M | $278.8M | $350.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$18.9M | -$5.4M | -$7.6M | $-976,000 | -$4.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$14.3M | -$23.5M | $180.2M | $277.8M | $346.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$556.1M | -$144.3M | -$28.9M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.1B | $560.1M | $0 | $0 | $1.4B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$87.6M | -$211.9M | -$430.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $217.3M | $1.7B | $682.1M | -$873.4M | $199.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:05pm (42d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +169.4% | +64.9% | +21.9% | +13.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +181.6% | +74.0% | +22.1% | +12.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -178.0% | +6.6% | +41.1% | +53.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -230.6% | +31.4% | +87.1% | +182.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | +8.2% | +46.1% | +64.8% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-11 02:04A +1σ run of quarters pays -105%; a −1σ run costs 100%. Ratio -1.1:1 (μ 16.1%, σ 12.6% floored by longrun, 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($45.39) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +20% | 17.3% | $38.69 | -15% |
| Base — stabilizes | +13% | 15.0% | $27.26 | -40% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 12.8% | $18.59 | -59% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +29% | -0.7% | $-2.19 | -105% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +3% | -0.7% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw trajectory first: quarterly revenue went $343.7M → $358.5M → $362.6M → $358.2M → $383.3M → $395.7M → $414.7M → $406.6M. That's a sequential decline in the most recent quarter (-1.9% QoQ) and YoY growth compressing to 13.4% from the ~17.6% trailing CAGR. Net income swings from +$33.5M (Dec-24) to four consecutive losses to +$12.8M — the profitability story is noisy, not linear. FCF of $346M on $1.46B revenue (23.7% FCF margin) is genuinely impressive and is the strongest bull data point in the file. But operating income is still -$80.6M annually; the GAAP "profit" of $23.8M is entirely interest/float income on the $1.04B cash balance plus payment float, which is exactly what the market-forces model flagged. Strip out float income in a lower-rate environment and this is still an unprofitable operating business.
The synthesis's $27.77 fair value looks aggressive on the downside to me, and I'd partially dissent on magnitude while agreeing on direction. At $4.52B market cap with $346M FCF, the stock trades at 13x FCF — that's not a demanding multiple for a software business with 81.4% gross margins even if growth is decelerating to the low teens. EV/revenue of 3.7x is below the SaaS median. The bear case that gets you to $28 requires either (a) FCF collapse as float income normalizes, or (b) revenue growth breaking below 10% and staying there. Both are plausible but not base case. A more defensible fair value is $35-40: apply 15x sustainable FCF (haircut float income by ~30%, giving ~$240M normalized FCF) and you get $3.6B, or ~$36/share. That's still ~20% downside from $45.39, not 39%.
The narrative layer is the sharpest piece of the prior work. "Feature not platform" is the correct bear framing — Bill's core AP automation genuinely is being commoditized by Ramp, Brex, embedded finance from Stripe, and NetSuite native workflows. The Divvy acquisition was supposed to make this a spend-management platform but hasn't produced the network-effect flywheel the bull thesis requires. Meanwhile insider activity is unambiguously one-sided: 10 recent transactions, every open-market disposition is a sale, and the option exercises are followed by F-InKind tax withholdings suggesting further net dispositions. "Neutral insider activity" is too generous — this is quiet, consistent selling into strength off the recent rally. A contrarian bull would counter that this is routine 10b5-1 activity at what are still depressed prices vs. 2021 highs ($348), and that a 13x FCF software business with 24% FCF margins and mid-teens growth is being mispriced by SaaS-fatigued generalists — not a crazy argument, but it requires believing the float-driven earnings are durable.
Where I think the models are weakest: the classification confidence of 0.3 for "high_growth_profitable" is honest — this company doesn't fit cleanly anywhere, and the pre-flight "traditional" tag understates that the entire profitability picture depends on interest rate regime. The rate-sensitivity of the P&L is a structural risk that none of the prior models quantified. Every 100bps of Fed cuts probably takes $30-40M off annual net income given the cash + customer float balances. That's a real earnings headwind that makes forward P/E projections particularly hazardous — hence the pe_ratio anomaly flag is directionally right but for a different reason than "negative earnings." The revenue deceleration (17.6% CAGR → 13.4% YoY → -1.9% QoQ) is also underweighted in the synthesis; if Q4 prints below $410M, the "mid-teens grower" narrative breaks and the multiple compresses further. I'd agree with overvalued but land at a fair value closer to $36 than $28, with the caveat that a rate-cut cycle plus a soft print could get you into the low $30s in a hurry.
GPT Reading
At $45.39, BILL is being valued less like a broken fintech and more like a still-respected software compounder: roughly 3.2x trailing sales on a $4.52B market cap and about 2.7x enterprise value to sales after netting the $1.04B cash against $1.71B debt. That is not expensive in absolute software terms, but the underlying operating story is weaker than the “high-growth profitable” label implies. Revenue grew from $1.29B to $1.46B in FY2025, just 13%, and the quarterly run-rate since then shows continued moderation: $358.2M in Mar-2025 to $383.3M in Jun-2025 to $395.7M in Sep-2025 to $414.7M in Dec-2025, then down sequentially to $406.6M in Mar-2026. On a trailing basis that latest quarter is still up 13.5% year over year, but the shape matters: this is no longer a clean high-20s growth SaaS name, and the first negative sequential quarter at this scale suggests the valuation has to lean much more heavily on margin durability than growth reacceleration.
The biggest positive in the numbers is cash generation. FY2025 free cash flow was $346.3M on $1.46B of revenue, a striking 23.7% FCF margin, with only $4.3M of capex. Gross margin of 81.4% confirms the core software economics are strong. But there is a real contradiction between that cash profile and the income statement quality. FY2025 operating income was still negative $80.6M, and annual net income was only $23.8M. The quarterly profit pattern is also choppy: +$33.5M in Dec-2024, then losses of $11.6M, $7.1M, $3.0M, and $2.6M across the next four quarters before a modest +$12.8M in Mar-2026. That is not “sustained profitability”; it is near-breakeven with occasional positive quarters. So the stock is cheap if you underwrite FCF as durable owner earnings, but not obviously cheap if you insist that true earnings power should be visible in operating margin by now. I lean toward the latter because software businesses with 81% gross margins should not still be struggling to produce consistent operating profit once growth has slowed into the low teens.
The balance sheet is acceptable, not pristine. Net debt is about $670M, cushioned by $3.91B of equity and a 1.58 current ratio, so this is not a solvency problem. But that debt does matter when the equity case increasingly rests on steady-state cash generation rather than hypergrowth optionality. If BILL were compounding revenue at 25%-30%, I would tolerate weak GAAP profitability and a levered balance sheet more easily. At 13%-17% top-line growth, I want cleaner conversion from gross profit to operating income. Instead, investors are being asked to pay a fair-to-full multiple for a business that has clearly improved, but has not yet proven that the post-boom model deserves a premium. The insider tape does not help the bull case much either; what we see is mostly option exercises and associated sales, not the kind of open-market buying that would signal management sees the current level as compelling.
The strongest argument against my caution is straightforward: the market may already have done the derating, and at this point BILL can work even without heroic assumptions. A business with $1.46B of revenue, 81% gross margin, and $346M of free cash flow trading at about 13x trailing FCF is not demanding if that FCF is real and scalable. Revenue is still growing double digits, net income has improved dramatically from losses of $223.7M in FY2023 and $28.9M in FY2024 to positive $23.8M in FY2025, and the latest quarter returned to profitability. On that view, the Dec-2025 to Mar-2026 sequential dip is noise, not a trend break, and BILL is simply transitioning from a messy fintech growth story into a disciplined software platform with meaningful embedded workflows. If management can hold even mid-teens revenue growth while converting more of that 81% gross margin into operating income, today’s 3.2x sales could look cheap in hindsight.
What would change my mind is not a narrative update but a few hard datapoints. I would turn constructive if BILL can show two or three consecutive quarters with revenue back above the prior peak—say, pushing from $406.6M to $420M+ and then $430M+—while keeping GAAP net income positive and demonstrating that operating losses are narrowing decisively toward breakeven or better on an annualized basis. Sustained FCF above $350M with cleaner earnings quality would also matter. Conversely, if revenue growth slips into single digits, or if another couple of quarters reveal that profitability depends on non-operating tailwinds while core operating margin stays negative, then even 3x sales is too high for what would amount to an ex-growth, only intermittently profitable fintech software vendor.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a former hypergrower that has already crossed into maturity, and the market has only half-accepted it. Revenue scaled from $238M to $1.46B over four years, but the slope has flattened hard: the trailing revenue CAGR is 17.6% while the most recent year-over-year print is only 13.4%, and the latest quarter actually declined sequentially from $414.7M to $406.6M. GAAP operating income is still negative at –$80.6M even in the “profitable” FY2025, and net margin is a wafer-thin 1.6%. What rescues the fundamental picture is free cash flow: $346M on $1.46B of revenue, a 24% FCF margin with almost no capex, supported by 81% gross margins. That cash generation is real and is the single best argument for ownership. At a $4.52B market cap the FCF yield is roughly 7.7%; on an EV basis (net debt ~$670M) you are paying about 15× trailing FCF. Those are not bubble multiples. They are, however, full multiples for a software franchise whose growth has decelerated into the low teens, whose operating leverage has not yet shown up in GAAP earnings, and whose recent profitability is still fragile enough that three of the last five quarters posted net losses.
The valuation synthesis’s $28 fair-value anchor looks too punitive given the cash-flow yield, but the direction of the signal is correct. A 3.2× sales / 3.7× EV/revenue multiple would be cheap for a durable 25%+ grower; it is not cheap for a 13% grower that is still burning operating dollars and is flagged as losing share inside a still-expanding SMB payments market. The 63% narrative premium the engine identifies—platform-monopoly optionality versus a feature that ERPs and payment networks can replicate—is doing real work at $45. Insider activity is net selling into strength, revenue confidence is explicitly “decelerating,” and the company sits behind sector peers on relative performance. The balance sheet is adequate (D/E 0.44, current ratio 1.58) but not a fortress once you net the $1.71B of debt against $1.04B of cash.
The strongest case against this read is the FCF itself. If the $346M is largely sustainable and not an artifact of elevated float income from customer funds in a high-rate regime, then 15× EV/FCF for a still-growing, 81%-gross-margin software business with land-and-expand dynamics is defensible, and a re-acceleration or even stable mid-teens growth plus operating-margin expansion could justify $50–55. Bulls will also note that annual net income flipped from –$29M to +$24M and that the most recent quarter finally printed a clean $12.8M profit. I weigh this less heavily because Market Forces explicitly tags the profitability gains as float-driven and therefore rate-sensitive, because sequential revenue already rolled over, and because the operating line remains deeply negative—classic signs that the earnings power is not yet structural.
What would flip me is two consecutive quarters of re-accelerating organic revenue growth back above 18–20% with operating margins turning sustainably positive, or clear disclosure that float income is a minority and declining share of the FCF bridge while core software take-rates expand. A material drop in the Fed funds rate that crushes net interest income without an offsetting volume surge would confirm the bear case faster.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
BILL has executed a credible operational turn: revenue grew from $238M (2021) to $1.46B (2025), gross margin expanded from 74.1% to a durable ~81%, operating margin improved from -49.4% to -5.5%, and net income crossed into the black at $23.8M in 2025. FCF has scaled from negative to $346M/yr, and OCF/NI of 0.85x plus accruals of -3.2% of assets suggest earnings are cash-backed, not accounting-manufactured. Beneish M at -2.55 shows no manipulation flags. This is a business that has clearly earned operating leverage. The soft spots are structural. SBC at 16.6% of revenue (~$242M) dwarfs GAAP net income of $23.8M - the 'profitability' is fragile once stock comp is treated as the real cost it is. Diluted shares grew from 82.8M to 103.9M (5.8% CAGR), and buybacks recover only 68.2% of SBC, so per-share economics lag business economics materially. The company carries net debt of -$676M against $1.04B cash - workable given FCF, but not a fortress. The Altman Z of 0.67 flagging distress is largely a model artifact for an asset-light software firm and I discount it heavily, but net debt plus convertible exposure means the balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative: exercises with tax withholding and modest sales from Cieri (~$1.2M), no open-market buys. Normal for a profitable-ish tech company, not a red flag.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Convertible note terms and maturity schedule driving the $676M net debt
- Take-rate and customer/TPV concentration in the payments segment
- Whether SBC as % of revenue is trending down (guidance/10-K disclosure)
- Organic vs. inorganic (Divvy, Invoice2go) contribution to the revenue ramp
- Any goodwill/intangible impairment risk given past M&A
The e2e synthesis pins composite fair value at $29.07 and signal-adjusted at $27.77, implying roughly 39% downside from $45.39. The methods disagree wildly: DCF says $50 (the only bull-supporting anchor), EPV is negative at -$2.62, and anchored P/E lands at $4.69. That spread tells me deserved value depends almost entirely on believing the growth trajectory — the steady-state and earnings-power views say this business earns essentially nothing today after SBC. With 16.6% of revenue paid in stock and shares compounding ~5.8% annually, the per-share economics are worse than the headline FCF suggests, which pulls deserved value toward the composite, not the DCF.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward revenue growth guidance and whether take-rate on payment volume is holding vs eroding
- SBC as % of revenue trend — is it moderating or entrenched near 16-17%
- Net share count change and pace of buybacks vs dilution
- Segment margin trajectory (core, Divvy, Invoice2go) to test if the platform thesis is showing up in unit economics
- Any commentary on competitive pressure from NetSuite/Sage/Stripe on pricing
The macro tape is actively hostile to exactly this profile: VIX north of 20, S&P rolling over, and 10y at 4.61% - a stress regime that punishes high-beta, high-multiple SaaS names first. With a 1.18 beta and a narrative premium priced into the stock, BILL takes the tape harder than the index does; every risk-off session compresses multiples on unprofitable-to-modestly-profitable SMB software before it touches defensives. The platform-monopoly narrative is rated strong but only moderate durability, which is the vulnerable configuration - the story is loud but not yet cemented, and the recent SaaS-skeptic press ('rich prices make re-ratings harder', competition from NetSuite/Sage/Stripe as bear framing) is the kind of drumbeat that erodes conviction holders. No fresh company-specific tailwind in the news flow to fight back with; the stock is drifting in a tape that fades its cohort. Momentum has been strong on a multi-year basis, which is a mild cushion, but momentum names get sold first when VIX pops. Net: this is a headwind setup - not a collapse, but a real persistent press against the name until either the tape calms or a catalyst re-validates the platform story.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- VIX compressing back below 18 and S&P reclaiming its high - would flip the tape pressure off high-beta SaaS
- Any BILL-specific platform proof point (large customer win, take-rate expansion, banking-adjacency traction) that re-validates the platform narrative
- Competitive news from NetSuite, Sage, Stripe, or Square that either confirms or refutes the 'feature not platform' bear frame
- Analyst target revisions or downgrades - a wave of cuts would confirm the narrative is cracking rather than just wobbling
- Next earnings print: NRR and payment monetization trends are the story's load-bearing walls
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 1, 2026, BILL was $45.13. We expect it to be $37.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $28.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.