Business Description
Bill.com Holdings, Inc. provides cloud-based software that simplifies, digitizes, and automates back-office financial operations for small and midsize businesses worldwide. The company provides software-as-a-service, cloud-based payments, and spend management products, which allow users to automate accounts payable and accounts receivable transactions, as well as enable users to connect with their suppliers and/or customers to do business, eliminate expense reports, manage cash flows, and improve office efficiency. It also offers onboarding implementation support, and ongoing support and training services. The company serves accounting firms, financial institutions, and software companies. Bill.com Holdings, Inc. was incorporated in 2006 and is headquartered in San Jose, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 5, 2026 12:53pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 5, 2026 12:50pm (7d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.23
Total Equity: $3.91B
Shares: 103,912,000
Total Debt: $1.71B
Cash: $1.14B
EBITDA: $138.42M
Total Debt: $1.71B
Cash: $1.14B
Revenue: $1.46B
Revenue: $1.46B
Revenue: $1.46B
Total Equity: $3.91B
Tax Rate: 21.7%
Equity: $3.91B
Total Debt: $1.71B
Cash: $1.14B
Current Liabilities: $4.59B
Long-Term Debt: $1.50B
Total Debt: $1.71B
Total Equity: $3.91B
Shares: 103,912,000
Shares: 103,912,000
CapEx: -$40.97M
Shares: 103,912,000
Stock Price: $35.23
Net Income: $23.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:11pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $238.3M | $642.0M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $61.8M | $145.0M | $194.0M | $234.6M | $272.1M |
| Gross Profit | $176.5M | $497.0M | $864.5M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $290.4M | $813.8M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Operating Income | -$114.0M | -$316.8M | -$295.8M | -$174.2M | -$80.6M |
| Net Income | -$98.7M | -$326.4M | -$223.7M | -$28.9M | $23.8M |
| EBITDA | -$100.2M | -$225.2M | -$102.5M | $96.0M | $138.4M |
| EPS | $-1.19 | $-3.21 | $-2.11 | $-0.27 | $0.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:04pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $509.6M | $1.6B | $1.6B | $985.9M | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.6B | $6.3B | $6.7B | $6.3B | $7.2B |
| Total Assets | $6.0B | $9.3B | $9.6B | $9.2B | $10.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.3B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $989.4M | $1.7B | $1.7B | $914.0M | $1.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.4B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $5.0B | $6.1B |
| Total Equity | $2.5B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$247.5M | -$544.8M | -$856.2M | -$1.1B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:11pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.6M | -$18.1M | $187.8M | $278.8M | $350.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$21.2M | -$15.6M | -$31.2M | -$20.9M | -$41.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$16.6M | -$33.7M | $156.6M | $257.9M | $309.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$556.1M | -$144.3M | -$28.9M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$87.6M | -$211.9M | -$430.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $217.3M | $1.7B | $682.1M | -$873.4M | $199.5M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 5, 2026 12:50pm (7d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.9B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.1B
|
$2.7B $2.6B – $2.8B
|
$3.2B $3.1B – $3.3B
|
| EBITDA |
$968.0M $941.8M – $988.9M
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.5B
|
$1.7B $1.6B – $1.7B
|
| Net Income |
$349.9M $296.8M – $403.1M
|
$471.1M $371.5M – $570.7M
|
$602.5M $580.3M – $623.0M
|
$770.0M $741.7M – $796.2M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:11pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +169.4% | +64.9% | +21.9% | +13.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +181.6% | +74.0% | +22.1% | +12.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -178.0% | +6.6% | +41.1% | +53.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -230.6% | +31.4% | +87.1% | +182.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -124.8% | +54.5% | +193.6% | +44.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 5, 2026 12:56pm (7d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | Cieri Michael | M-Exempt | 51,591.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 6,660.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 24,626.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | F-InKind | 15,922.00 | $34.85 | $554,882 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 8,309.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 7,300.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Cieri Michael | M-Exempt | 51,591.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Cieri Michael | F-InKind | 18,716.00 | $34.85 | $652,253 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 6,660.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | Cieri Michael | S-Sale | 5,600.00 | $35.68 | $199,834 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 3,658.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Lacerte Rene A. | M-Exempt | 5,359.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | Cieri Michael | S-Sale | 23,775.00 | $36.80 | $874,982 |
| 2026-05-29 | Cieri Michael | S-Sale | 3,500.00 | $37.10 | $129,847 |
| 2026-05-28 | Moss Kenneth A | M-Exempt | 1,982.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Moss Kenneth A | M-Exempt | 23,347.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Moss Kenneth A | F-InKind | 12,889.00 | $34.85 | $449,182 |
| 2026-05-28 | Moss Kenneth A | M-Exempt | 8,374.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Moss Kenneth A | M-Exempt | 3,561.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Moss Kenneth A | M-Exempt | 11,412.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more interesting story than the synthesis credits. Revenue went $343.7M → $358.5M → $362.6M → $358.2M → $383.3M → $395.7M → $414.7M → $406.6M — that's a sequential dip in the most recent quarter, and YoY growth has compressed to ~12% in Q1 FY26 from ~18% earlier in the trajectory. Full-year FY25 revenue of $1.46B on FY24 $1.29B is 13.2% growth, well below the headline 17.6% CAGR which is backloaded by the 2021–2023 hypergrowth phase. More telling: net income went *negative* for four straight quarters (Q3 FY25 through Q2 FY26) before snapping to +$12.8M last quarter. The 9.3% margin in Dec-2024 was almost certainly tax/one-time inflated — strip it out and BILL is a barely-breakeven business on GAAP, propped up by $309.7M FCF that is heavily SBC-financed (the M-Exempt insider grants are a tell). The 81% gross margin is real; the operating leverage thesis is not yet proven.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the "high_growth_profitable" archetype is wrong — this is a decelerating-growth, GAAP-marginal company, and the rule-based classifier's own 0.5 confidence concedes it. Pre-Flight's "pre-profit-platform" is closer to truth. Market Forces calling this "structural competitive displacement disguised as cyclical slowdown" is the most provocative claim and probably overstated — 13% revenue growth with 81% gross margins isn't displacement, it's SMB-cycle sensitivity plus the deliberate de-emphasis of float revenue as rates normalize. But Market Forces is directionally right that the profitability improvement is partly retreat: BILL has cut S&M intensity, which props up margins but caps the growth re-acceleration the bull thesis needs. The Synthesis's "High Conviction Required" verdict is intellectually honest but operationally useless — it's a punt.
The contrarian read worth taking seriously: at $3.51B market cap against $309.7M FCF, BILL trades at ~11x FCF. That's cheap for any SaaS business with 81% gross margins and double-digit growth, *if* FCF is real. The catch is that SBC likely runs $250–300M annually (typical for BILL historically), so FCF ex-SBC is closer to breakeven — meaning the 11x multiple is illusory and the EV/Revenue of 3.7x is the honest anchor. At 3.7x EV/S for a 13% grower decelerating toward 10%, BILL is priced roughly in line with mature SaaS comps (Paycom, Paylocity trade 4–6x but grow faster). The de-rating from $57 to $35 has already absorbed most of the disappointment. Insider activity is neutral-to-mildly-negative (option exercises with F-InKind tax withholding, one small open-market sale) — not a signal either way at this scale.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. "High Conviction Required" implies the stock is fairly priced for a narrow scenario; I think it's modestly *undervalued* for a wider scenario. The bear case (Intuit/Stripe displacement, SMB churn) requires growth to crater below 8%, which isn't visible in the data — Q3 FY26 still printed +13% YoY. The bull case (platform monopoly) requires re-acceleration that also isn't visible. The base case — 10–13% revenue growth, GAAP margins drifting to 5–10% by FY27, FCF ex-SBC turning genuinely positive — supports a fair value around $42–48, or 4.0–4.5x EV/S. The data is thin on two fronts the models underweight: (1) the float-revenue tailwind/headwind from rate changes isn't broken out, and (2) the SBC drag on true FCF needs sharper accounting than FMP provides. Watch the next print for sequential revenue (>$415M would break the deceleration narrative) and GAAP operating margin trend. The Market Forces "value trap absent acquisition catalyst" framing is too dark — BILL is a credible take-out target for Intuit or a PE roll-up at $45–55, which puts a soft floor under the stock.
GPT Critique
Bill.com Holdings, Inc. presents a complex narrative as it transitions from a high-growth phase to a more stable, albeit challenged, growth trajectory. The company has shown a consistent increase in revenue from $238.3M in 2021 to $1.46B in 2025, marking a notable 17.6% CAGR. However, the sequential revenue dip in the most recent quarter to $406.6M from $414.7M is concerning and hints at potential growth deceleration. Despite its impressive gross margin of 81%, the company's net income margins have fluctuated significantly, recently stabilizing at a modest 3.1% after several quarters of losses. This inconsistency suggests that while Bill.com has achieved some degree of profitability, its financial health remains precarious, and its high P/E ratio reflects an earnings base that is still too small to justify its valuation under traditional metrics.
I disagree with Opus's assertion that Bill.com is modestly undervalued at $35, pegging fair value at $42–48. Opus points to a potential upside based on a 4.0–4.5x EV/S valuation, which seems optimistic given the company's current performance and market dynamics. The narrative of Bill.com as a "pre-profit-platform" resonates more accurately given its marginal GAAP profitability and reliance on stock-based compensation, which inflates its free cash flow. The competitive landscape, notably from players like Stripe and Intuit, poses a substantial risk that could cap Bill.com's growth potential and justify the current market skepticism.
I agree with Opus that the "high_growth_profitable" archetype is misleading. The company's decelerating growth rate and reliance on cost-cutting rather than operational excellence to achieve profitability paint a picture of a business under competitive pressure. The claim that Bill.com is experiencing "structural competitive displacement" is somewhat overstated; however, the reality of increased competition and SMB cycle sensitivity cannot be ignored. Opus's critique of the "High Conviction Required" verdict as a non-committal stance is valid; the scenario requires careful scrutiny of upcoming financial results to validate any bullish outlook.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the potential for Bill.com to leverage its platform into a more entrenched position within its niche. They might point to the company's robust gross margins and the potential for operational leverage as it scales. However, until there is clear evidence of sustainable growth beyond the current 10-13% range and genuine GAAP profitability independent of SBC, the stock remains a speculative play.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell a coherent story: quality at +21 (Mixed, but improving) says this is a real, self-funding SaaS platform with a fortress balance sheet and genuine operating leverage — not a great business yet, but graduating. Value at -31 (Fairly Valued) says the market already knows. That combination is not a buy; it's a watchlist name. I'm not paying full freight for a 13%-growth business that still bleeds 16.6% of revenue in SBC and dilutes me ~5.8% a year, even with the encouraging 2025 share-count tick down. There's no gap to press and no catalyst forcing my hand.
My play: zero starter today at $36. I set a scaled buy plan beginning at $28 (1/3 position), adding at $24 (another 1/3), and reserving the last third for sub-$21 or a clean print showing SBC dropping below ~12% of revenue with continued net share retirement. Full position target is modest — 1.5-2% of book max, because even at a good price this is a good-not-great business with Intuit/Xero breathing on the moat. What flips me aggressive: a tape-driven flush to the mid-$20s, or fundamental evidence that the 2025 buyback-outpacing-SBC dynamic is durable. What keeps me on the sidelines: this exact price with growth still decelerating. The quality lens earned the right to a position; the value lens hasn't given me the entry. I wait.
The business itself is on a clear improvement arc: revenue scaled from $238M (2021) to $1.46B (2025), gross margin expanded from 74% to a steady ~81%, and operating margin compressed losses from -47.8% to -5.5% with the first GAAP net income ($23.8M) in 2025. FCF has gone from -$17M to $310M in four years — that is real operating leverage, not an accounting artifact (OCF/NI 0.85x and accruals -3.2% are clean, Beneish M -2.68 shows no manipulation flags). Liquidity is a non-issue: $2.32B liquid, $606M net cash, and self-funding. The Altman Z of 0.57 is a false positive — the model misreads asset-light software, not a distress signal.
The quality drag is per-share economics. Diluted shares grew from 82.8M to ~106M (5.8% CAGR), SBC runs 16.6% of revenue (~$242M), and buybacks recapture only 68% of that — so reported FCF overstates owner cash by a meaningful chunk. Share count finally ticked down in 2025 (106.1M→103.9M), which is encouraging but not yet a trend. Insider tape is benign-to-mildly-negative: pure option-exercise-and-sell mechanics (~$1.2M in 12 months), no open-market buys, no conviction signal either way.
Durability is plausible — AP automation with embedded payments has network effects and switching costs — but the data alone doesn't prove a moat; growth is decelerating (170%→65%→22%→13%) and that deceleration matters for the durability read.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer concentration and take-rate trends in the payments/float revenue line — is the margin expansion driven by interest float that could reverse?
- Net revenue retention and active customer counts to confirm the moat narrative behind decelerating growth
- SBC trajectory in the 10-K — is the 16.6% trending down as the company scales, or structurally sticky?
- Buyback authorization size and pace post-2025 to confirm dilution is genuinely reversing
- Any convertible notes or off-balance-sheet float liabilities that could re-introduce dilution risk
BILL is a real SaaS business that has reached GAAP profitability with a fortress balance sheet, but the per-share economics are taxed by 16.6% SBC and ~5.8% annual share-count creep. That dilution drag means the equity-holder's deserved value is materially below the enterprise-value story the bulls tell. The e2e synthesis flagged 'High Conviction Required' — i.e. no clean fair value print — which itself is a signal that the price is in the zone of reasonable rather than obviously wrong.
At $35.23 and ~$3.5B market cap, the market is paying a moderate platform multiple for a mid-teens grower with credible network effects in SMB AP/AR but unresolved competitive pressure from Intuit/Xero. To justify today's price you need durable double-digit revenue growth, continued FCF expansion, AND for dilution to taper — heroic but not absurd. There's no margin of safety here, but there's also no clear overpayment. This is the textbook 'fairly valued good-not-great business the market already understands.'
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward revenue growth guidance — is it stabilizing in the mid-teens or decelerating toward 10%?
- Take-rate trends on payment volume — the real monetization lever
- SBC trajectory and whether buybacks will finally outpace issuance
- Net revenue retention by cohort — proof of platform stickiness vs the bear's 'replaceable tool' thesis
- Any guide-down or competitive commentary referencing Intuit's encroachment