Business Description
Maplebear Inc., doing business as Instacart, provides online grocery shopping services to households in North America. The company connects the consumer with a personal shopper to shop and deliver a range of products, such as food, alcohol, consumer health, pet care, ready-made meals, and others. The company offers its services through a mobile application or website. The company was incorporated in 2012 and is based in San Francisco, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 3:55pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:47pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.71
Total Equity: $2.52B
Shares: 279,621,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $637.00M
EBITDA: $597.00M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $637.00M
Revenue: $3.74B
Revenue: $3.74B
Revenue: $3.74B
Total Equity: $2.52B
Tax Rate: 19.6%
Equity: $2.52B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $637.00M
Current Liabilities: $917.00M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.52B
Shares: 279,621,000
Shares: 279,621,000
CapEx: -$61.00M
Shares: 279,621,000
Stock Price: $41.26
Net Income: $447.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.8B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $608.0M | $720.0M | $764.0M | $836.0M | $984.0M |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.3B | $1.8B | $4.4B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| Operating Income | -$86.0M | $62.0M | -$2.1B | $489.0M | $498.0M |
| Net Income | -$73.0M | $428.0M | -$1.6B | $457.0M | $447.0M |
| EBITDA | -$59.0M | $109.0M | -$2.1B | $556.0M | $597.0M |
| EPS | $-0.26 | $0.28 | $-12.43 | $1.69 | $1.71 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:53pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.1B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $1.4B | $637.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.4B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $2.2B |
| Total Assets | $3.0B | $3.7B | $4.7B | $4.1B | $3.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $592.0M | $795.0M | $733.0M | $798.0M | $917.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $712.0M | $911.0M | $977.0M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Total Equity | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $3.1B | $2.5B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.4B | -$977.0M | -$2.6B | -$3.6B | -$4.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$204.0M | $277.0M | $586.0M | $687.0M | $972.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$22.0M | -$26.0M | -$56.0M | -$64.0M | -$61.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$226.0M | $251.0M | $530.0M | $623.0M | $911.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$54.0M | -$93.0M | $0 | $0 | -$106.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$36.0M | -$1.4B | -$1.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$71.0M | $434.0M | $694.0M | -$844.0M | -$621.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:53pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$4.6B $4.5B – $4.8B
|
$5.0B $5.0B – $5.1B
|
$5.3B $5.1B – $5.5B
|
$5.6B $5.4B – $5.8B
|
| EBITDA |
-$322.8M -$334.0M – -$315.8M
|
-$354.2M -$357.0M – -$351.3M
|
-$372.2M -$382.5M – -$358.1M
|
-$395.2M -$406.1M – -$380.3M
|
| Net Income |
$733.8M $704.0M – $935.1M
|
$816.9M $772.4M – $1.3B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.3B $1.2B – $1.4B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +39.1% | +19.2% | +11.0% | +10.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +49.3% | +24.4% | +11.6% | +8.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +172.1% | -3,554.8% | +122.8% | +1.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +686.3% | -479.0% | +128.2% | -2.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +284.7% | -2,012.8% | +126.7% | +7.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-02 | Gupta Ravi | S-Sale | 181,000.00 | $41.51 | $7.5M |
| 2026-05-22 | Sundheim Daniel S. | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | Gupta Ravi | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | KOPIT LEVIEN MEREDITH A. | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | Sarafan Lily | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | Dolan Victoria L | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | Silverman Josh | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | Laughton Mary Beth | A-Award | 6,048.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | BLACKWOOD-KAPRAL LISA | F-InKind | 6,103.00 | $38.47 | $234,782 |
| 2026-05-15 | Reuter Emily | F-InKind | 26,929.00 | $38.47 | $1.0M |
| 2026-05-15 | Fong Morgan | F-InKind | 15,898.00 | $38.47 | $611,596 |
| 2026-05-18 | Fong Morgan | S-Sale | 12,575.00 | $39.88 | $501,521 |
| 2026-05-18 | Fong Morgan | S-Sale | 1,458.00 | $40.39 | $58,895 |
| 2026-05-15 | Rogers Chris | F-InKind | 45,464.00 | $38.47 | $1.7M |
| 2026-04-15 | BLACKWOOD-KAPRAL LISA | A-Award | 20,851.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | BLACKWOOD-KAPRAL LISA | S-Sale | 9,390.00 | $40.25 | $377,904 |
| 2026-04-15 | Fong Morgan | A-Award | 187,366.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | Reuter Emily | A-Award | 254,283.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | Rogers Chris | A-Award | 376,405.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-16 | BLACKWOOD-KAPRAL LISA | S-Sale | 9,390.00 | $38.74 | $363,797 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: revenue has marched from $823M (Q2'24) to $1.02B (Q1'26) — roughly 24% over seven quarters, or ~13% annualized, with no deceleration (most recent YoY is ~14% if I'm reading the Q1'26 vs Q1'25 print correctly: $1.02B vs $897M = 13.7%). Net income is noisier — $144M, $81M, $144M, $116M, $106M, $148M — but the noise reflects tax/SBC timing rather than operating deterioration; gross margin sits at 73.7% and operating margin printed 13.3% on the annual. FCF of $911M against a $9.7B market cap is a 9.4% FCF yield, and net of $637M cash the EV/FCF is closer to 10x. That is not a "reasonable premium" — that is cheap for a business compounding revenue at low-teens with expanding FCF (31% FCF CAGR) and a 14%+ ROIC.
Where I push back on the prior models: the synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" and Market Forces' "Neutral" both lean on the insider selling and competitive-threat narrative, but the insider tape they cite is one 181K-share sale against a pile of routine awards and in-kind tax withholdings (F-InKind is not discretionary selling — it's automatic share withholding to cover RSU taxes). Calling that "Unusual Heavy Selling" is sloppy; at a company this size with this much equity comp, that volume is unremarkable. The pre-flight model is closer to right — the market IS anchoring to retail-logistics comps and missing that this is a 73% gross margin marketplace throwing off near-100% FCF conversion (FCF $911M vs NI $447M means working capital and SBC tailwinds are real, which is the one legitimate quality concern). The "platform-monopoly" narrative layer overstates moat — grocers genuinely are building in-house — but at 10x EV/FCF you don't need monopoly, you need "not collapsing," and the trajectory says it isn't.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: FCF quality. $911M FCF vs $447M NI means ~$460M of the gap is SBC and working capital. If SBC is $400M+ annually on a $9.7B cap, that's ~4% dilution per year, and the "real" owner FCF is closer to $500-550M, putting the multiple at 18-19x — respectable but not a screaming bargain. Second contrarian point: revenue growth is decelerating in absolute terms if you look at sequential adds ($823→$852→$883→$897→$914→$939→$992→$1,020 = $30M, $31M, $14M, $17M, $25M, $53M, $28M). That's lumpy, not accelerating. Third: Amazon/Walmart owned-delivery genuinely is the existential question, and the data file gives me zero visibility into take rate, GTV growth, or active user trends — all the metrics that would actually tell me whether the moat is intact. The headline revenue number conflates advertising (high-margin, growing fast) with transaction revenue (commoditizing), and I can't disaggregate from this file.
Net: I dissent mildly from the synthesis. "Reasonable Premium" undersells what the numbers show — a profitable platform at 10x EV/FCF, 9.4% FCF yield, ~13% revenue growth, expanding ad mix, and a real (if eroding) moat. Even haircutting FCF to $550M for SBC, that's 17.6x owner-FCF on a low-teens grower — fair-to-cheap, not premium. The market-forces "neutral" verdict leans too heavily on a misread insider tape and on competitive fears that haven't yet shown up in the print. Fair value, blending a 15x owner-FCF multiple on $550M ($8.25B EV + $637M cash = ~$8.9B, or ~$38/sh bear) against a 20x multiple if ad revenue inflects (~$11.6B, ~$49/sh bull), centers me around $44-46 — modestly above spot. Not a fat-pitch buy, but the synthesis verdict implies "hold/avoid premium" and I'd say "accumulate on weakness under $40, trim above $50." The thesis-killer to watch: Q2/Q3'26 transaction revenue growth ex-advertising. If that goes negative, the bear narrative wins and this re-rates to $30.
GPT Critique
Instacart's financial trajectory over recent quarters reveals a steady, if unspectacular, growth narrative. Revenue has climbed from $823 million in Q2 2024 to $1.02 billion in Q1 2026, a 24% increase over seven quarters, translating to a compound annual growth rate of approximately 13%. This growth trajectory indicates a stable revenue stream, though it lacks the explosive growth that might excite high-growth investors. More critically, the net income figures, despite their variability, are solid with a decent net margin hovering around 14%. The Free Cash Flow (FCF) stands robust at $911 million, yielding a 9.4% FCF yield against a market cap of $9.7 billion, suggesting the company is on sound financial footing.
Opus argues the market underestimates Instacart's value, labeling it "modestly undervalued" due to a strong FCF yield and expanding cash flows. I agree with Opus that the FCF yield is indeed attractive, especially at a 10x EV/FCF multiple, which is low for a company with Instacart's revenue growth and high margins. However, I differ on the interpretation of insider selling. Opus downplays the significance of the insider sale, suggesting that it's merely routine. Given the size and timing of these transactions, I believe it's prudent to remain cautious as it could signal executives' lack of confidence in future performance or valuation levels.
Moreover, Opus's dismissal of competitive threats from Amazon and Walmart as not currently impacting Instacart's print underestimates the strategic risks these giants pose. While their influence may not yet be reflected in financials, the potential for margin erosion and market share loss is a real threat as these companies enhance their delivery capabilities. Additionally, Opus points out the significant gap between FCF and net income, attributing it mainly to stock-based compensation and working capital adjustments. This raises concerns about the sustainability of FCF if such adjustments continue at this scale.
A careful skeptic might argue that Instacart's revenue growth is not as strong as it appears, given the sequential revenue additions are inconsistent and not necessarily accelerating. They might also point to the dilution from stock-based compensation as a significant factor that could undermine shareholder value over time. Furthermore, the competitive landscape with Amazon and Walmart cannot be ignored, and the current market optimism may not be justified if these competitors start exerting more pressure on Instacart's market position.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses are telling a coherent story, not a conflicting one: Lens 1 at +70 says Instacart is a legitimately strong, FCF-inflecting platform with clean books and — rarest of all in this cohort — actual per-share discipline. Lens 2 at -15 says the market already knows. Deserved value is roughly $40–$42, we're at $41.26, and the insiders dumping $490M into that price with zero open-market buys is the tell I respect most. When the people who built the model are net sellers and the math says fair, my job is to sit on my hands, not to manufacture conviction. I'm not a buyer here. The play is a watchlist with a hard line at $34 — that's where the net-cash-adjusted FCF yield gets genuinely interesting and the +70 quality starts compounding for me instead of for the seller. Between $34 and $38 I'll open a starter position at ~1% and scale to a 3% full position only if I see either (a) evidence the advertising take-rate is inflecting up, not flattening, or (b) a broader tape washout that drags CART down without a fundamental break. Above $45 I'm completely off — that would be paying for margin durability that's still only two years old against DoorDash and Amazon. Catalysts that flip me aggressive earlier: an ad-revenue acceleration print, or a grocer-exclusive renewal that proves the moat the financials can't. Until then, the +70 quality is real but the -15 value score is the binding constraint, and I trade the binding constraint.
The business has crossed into genuine profitability and cash generation. Revenue compounded from $1.83B (2021) to $3.74B (2025), gross margin expanded to ~74-75% and stabilized, and operating margin swung from -4.7% in 2021 to +13-14% in 2024-2025. FCF scaled from negative $226M in 2021 to $911M in 2025 — a ~24% FCF margin — and earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 1.35x, accruals of -11.6% of assets, Beneish M at -3.09, and Altman Z of 5.15 (safe zone). No solvency concern: $687M cash, no net debt, and self-funding by a wide margin.
Capital allocation is unusually disciplined for a post-IPO tech name. Diluted share CAGR is just 0.3% and buybacks are absorbing ~91% of SBC — the 2023 spike to 130.6M shares appears to reflect post-IPO share count normalization, but the 2024-2025 run at ~280-289M is roughly flat. So per-share value is being protected, which is rare in this cohort.
The concerns are softer but real: the 2023 GAAP loss of $1.62B (a -70% operating margin year) reflects IPO-related stock comp and reminds you the clean P&L is only ~2 years old. Insider behavior is one-sided — 44 sells totaling ~$490M and zero open-market buys in 12 months, including a $7.5M Gupta sale — which, while typical for a recent IPO with vesting cliffs, is not a vote of confidence. Durability of the moat (grocer relationships, ad take-rate, competition from DoorDash/Uber/Amazon) is not provable from these numbers alone.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Customer/grocer concentration in the 10-K — what % of GTV runs through the top 3-5 retail partners and are contracts exclusive/renewing?
- Advertising revenue as a % of total revenue and its growth rate — this is the high-margin engine driving the operating-margin expansion.
- Stock-based compensation in absolute dollars and as % of revenue (module shows 0%, which is likely a display artifact — the buyback/SBC ratio of 90.8% implies SBC is material).
- Order volume and GTV trends vs. revenue — is take-rate expanding or are orders flat?
- Composition of the 2023 $1.62B loss to confirm it was IPO-related SBC and not operational impairment.
- Retention/cohort data for Instacart+ subscribers as a durability signal.
- Any 10b5-1 plans behind the insider sales vs. discretionary selling.
The e2e synthesis calls CART a 'Reasonable Premium,' which lines up with what the math suggests: a ~$9.7B market cap on a business that just turned FCF-positive, growing revenue in the low teens, with clean accounting and no dilution. Strip out net cash (Instacart carried ~$1.3B+ in net cash post-IPO) and the enterprise is being valued at a sensible mid-teens multiple of run-rate FCF for a category leader — that is neither a steal nor a stretch.
The bull case (network effects, ad take-rate expansion) is partially in the price; the bear case (Amazon/Walmart pressure, decelerating growth, gig-economics fragility) is also partially discounted, which is why the stock has not run away. To call this cheap I would need a clearer ad-revenue inflection or a price closer to the mid-$30s where net-cash-adjusted FCF yield gets compelling. To call it rich I would need evidence the take-rate is being competed away. Neither is on the table today.
Verdict: deserved value sits roughly around the current $41 — call it $38–$46 — so the margin of safety is thin in either direction. This is the textbook 'fair' outcome for a good business the market already understands.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Advertising revenue growth and take-rate trajectory in latest 10-Q — the biggest swing factor in deserved value
- GTV per order and order frequency trends — whether unit economics are improving or compressing
- Forward guidance on adjusted EBITDA margin and FCF conversion
- Customer/grocer concentration disclosures and any signs of large grocers building in-house alternatives
- Stock-based comp as % of revenue — true FCF after SBC, not just GAAP-adjusted