Business Description
The Carlyle Group Inc. is a leading global investment firm that employs both direct investment and fund-of-fund strategies. Its direct investment expertise is extensive, encompassing management-led leveraged buyouts, privatizations, and divestitures, as well as strategic minority equity investments. The firm also allocates capital to structured credit opportunities, global distressed and corporate situations, and small-to-middle market enterprises. Its venture and growth capital activities span the full spectrum, from seed/startup and early-stage funding to emerging growth, turnaround situations, mid-venture, late-venture, and Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPES). Carlyle structures its investments across four primary segments: Corporate Private Equity, Real Assets, Global Market Strategies, and Solutions. Carlyle's investment interests are remarkably broad, covering an extensive array of sectors worldwide. These include major industries like industrials (such as manufacturing, building products, chemicals, and metals), consumer and retail (including food and beverage, consumer products, and services), aerospace and defense, technology (covering software, semiconductors, and communications infrastructure), healthcare (services, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices), energy and power, real estate (from office and hotel properties to residential and specialized segments like student housing and senior living), financial services, transportation, telecommunications, media, business services, agribusiness, fintech, utilities, and gaming. The firm actively seeks out growing businesses, including those with overleveraged balance sheets. Typically, Carlyle aims to hold its investments for four to six years, although some may be held for three to five years, with specific mandates for automotive and transportation sector holdings also falling within the four-to-six-year range. With a significant global footprint, Carlyle actively invests across North America (including specific U.S. regions, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru), Europe (encompassing Western, Central-Eastern, and Nordic regions), Asia (including India, Southeast Asia, Korea, Japan, and China), Australia, New Zealand, the Middle East, and both Sub-Saharan and North Africa. The firm has particular geographic interests, such as focusing on the food, financial, and healthcare industries in Western China, and in Japan, it specifically targets companies valued between $100 million and $150 million, avoiding those with over 1,000 employees. Financially, Carlyle typically commits $1 million to $50 million for venture investments and $50 million to $2 billion for buyouts. It targets companies with an enterprise value between $31.57 million and $1 billion, sales ranging from $10 million to $500 million, a market capitalization exceeding $50 million, and EBITDA between $5 million and $25 million. Carlyle is flexible regarding its ownership stake, often taking either a majority or a minority position, and frequently acts as the lead equity investor, originating and structuring transactions. The Carlyle Group Inc. was founded in 1987 and is headquartered in Washington, D.C. It maintains a robust global presence with additional offices in 21 countries across five continents: North America, South America, Asia, Australia, and Europe.
Business History
Generated: Jun 10, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.25
Total Equity: $5.76B
Shares: 370,900,000
Total Debt: $13.89B
Cash: $3.21B
EBITDA: $1.34B
Total Debt: $13.89B
Cash: $3.21B
Revenue: $4.90B
Revenue: $4.90B
Revenue: $4.90B
Total Equity: $5.76B
Tax Rate: 18.5%
Equity: $5.76B
Total Debt: $13.89B
Cash: $3.21B
Current Liabilities: $203.90M
Long-Term Debt: $13.89B
Total Debt: $13.89B
Total Equity: $5.76B
Shares: 370,900,000
Shares: 370,900,000
CapEx: -$99.40M
Shares: 370,900,000
Stock Price: $45.14
Net Income: $808.70M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.8B | $3.7B | $1.9B | $4.1B | $4.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $291.8M | $322.0M | $542.9M | $685.9M | $1.7B |
| Gross Profit | $5.5B | $3.4B | $1.3B | $3.4B | $3.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.9B |
| Operating Income | $4.0B | $1.6B | -$600.9M | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| Net Income | $3.0B | $1.2B | -$608.4M | $1.0B | $808.7M |
| EBITDA | $4.1B | $1.7B | -$420.3M | $1.6B | $1.3B |
| EPS | $8.37 | $3.39 | $-1.68 | $2.85 | $2.25 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.6B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $3.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.2B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.2B |
| Total Assets | $21.3B | $21.4B | $21.2B | $23.1B | $29.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $388.1M | $362.5M | $459.0M | $241.9M | $203.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.5B | $8.7B | $8.4B | $9.5B | $13.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $15.5B | $14.6B | $15.4B | $16.8B | $22.1B |
| Total Equity | $5.3B | $6.2B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $5.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.8B | $3.4B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.8B | -$379.3M | $204.9M | -$759.5M | $1.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$41.4M | -$40.6M | -$66.6M | -$77.7M | -$99.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.7B | -$419.9M | $138.3M | -$837.2M | $1.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $9.2M | -$150.2M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$161.8M | -$185.6M | -$203.5M | -$554.6M | -$686.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.5B | -$1.1B | $80.6M | -$175.6M | $1.1B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.9B $3.5B – $4.3B
|
$5.2B $4.8B – $5.6B
|
$6.1B $5.8B – $6.3B
|
$5.9B $5.4B – $6.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.3B $1.1B – $1.4B
|
$1.7B $1.6B – $1.8B
|
$1.9B $1.9B – $2.0B
|
$1.9B $1.7B – $2.1B
|
| Net Income |
$1.6B $1.3B – $1.7B
|
$1.8B $1.6B – $2.1B
|
$1.9B $1.7B – $2.6B
|
$2.3B $2.0B – $2.5B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -36.9% | -49.2% | +119.0% | +19.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -39.3% | -60.5% | +156.9% | -5.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -61.0% | -138.2% | +331.9% | -8.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -58.8% | -149.7% | +267.7% | -20.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -57.8% | -124.4% | +475.4% | -15.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | LoBue Lindsay | A-Award | 3,120.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Jenkins Mark David | A-Award | 7,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Plouffe Justin | A-Award | 4,077.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Andrews Charles Elliott Jr. | A-Award | 409.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Nedelman Jeffrey | A-Award | 7,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Redett John C. | A-Award | 10,830.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Ferguson Jeffrey W. | A-Award | 1,274.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | SCHWARTZ HARVEY M | A-Award | 20,743.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | Cherwoo Sharda | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | HANCE JAMES H JR | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | FILLER LINDA | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | SHAW WILLIAM JOSEPH | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | ORDAN MARK S | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $49.44 | $220,008 |
| 2026-05-01 | ORDAN MARK S | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | WELTERS ANTHONY | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | FITT LAWTON W | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | Rice Derica W | A-Award | 2,933.00 | $49.44 | $145,008 |
| 2026-05-01 | Rice Derica W | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | BESCHLOSS AFSANEH MASHAYEKHI | A-Award | 4,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Rubenstein David M. | G-Gift | 100,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-18 | $0.35 | 2026-04-23 | 2026-05-18 | 2026-05-28 |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.35 | 2026-02-05 | 2026-02-16 | 2026-02-20 |
| 2025-11-10 | $0.35 | 2025-10-23 | 2025-11-10 | 2025-11-19 |
| 2025-08-18 | $0.35 | 2025-07-24 | 2025-08-18 | 2025-08-28 |
| 2025-05-19 | $0.35 | 2025-04-23 | 2025-05-19 | 2025-05-27 |
| 2025-02-21 | $0.35 | 2025-02-05 | 2025-02-21 | 2025-02-28 |
| 2024-11-18 | $0.35 | 2024-10-24 | 2024-11-18 | 2024-11-25 |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.35 | 2024-07-24 | 2024-08-16 | 2024-08-26 |
| 2024-05-13 | $0.35 | 2024-04-24 | 2024-05-14 | 2024-05-21 |
| 2024-02-22 | $0.35 | 2024-02-06 | 2024-02-23 | 2024-03-01 |
| 2023-11-20 | $0.35 | 2023-11-07 | 2023-11-21 | 2023-11-29 |
| 2023-08-14 | $0.35 | 2023-08-02 | 2023-08-15 | 2023-08-23 |
| 2023-05-15 | $0.35 | 2023-04-25 | 2023-05-16 | 2023-05-23 |
| 2023-02-21 | $0.33 | 2023-02-01 | 2023-02-22 | 2023-03-01 |
| 2022-11-17 | $0.33 | 2022-11-08 | 2022-11-18 | 2022-11-25 |
| 2022-08-08 | $0.33 | 2022-07-21 | 2022-08-09 | 2022-08-16 |
| 2022-05-09 | $0.33 | 2022-04-21 | 2022-05-10 | 2022-05-17 |
| 2022-02-14 | $0.25 | 2022-02-02 | 2022-02-15 | 2022-02-23 |
| 2021-11-08 | $0.25 | 2021-10-21 | 2021-11-09 | 2021-11-17 |
| 2021-08-09 | $0.25 | 2021-07-22 | 2021-08-10 | 2021-08-17 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue oscillates between $189M and $1.84B quarter-to-quarter, which is not "accelerating growth" — it's performance-fee lumpiness being mistaken for a trend by the momentum module. The most recent print (Q1 2026) is $189.6M with a $132M net loss. That's a brutal data point the synthesis layer glides past. The 62% "revenue CAGR" and 214% "FCF CAGR" are artifacts of comparing a 2023 trough ($1.87B rev, -$608M NI) to 2025 — not organic compounding. Normalize across 2021-2025 and you get revenue going from $5.82B → $4.90B and NI from $2.97B → $809M. That's a *decline*, not growth. The classification engine tagging this "high_growth_profitable" is simply wrong for an alt-asset manager with carry-driven earnings.
The valuation math is less friendly than the synthesis lets on. At $45.14, 29.7x TTM P/E and 27.8x EV/EBITDA on a business whose 2025 net income ($809M) is 27% of its 2021 peak ($2.97B) is not "neither cheap nor expensive." Blackstone trades at similar multiples but with materially higher FRE growth and a fortress permanent-capital base. The 65% EV/FRE discount the pre-flight cites is doing real work — it exists because Carlyle's PE franchise has had succession churn, weaker fundraising (Carlyle Partners VIII was famously hard), and lower realized carry than peers. The bear case in the narrative layer is closer to reality than the bull. ROIC of 2.36% TTM is the tell — this is not a compounding machine right now, it's a fee collector waiting for an exit window that hasn't opened.
Where I'd push back on Market Forces' "value trap / accounting mirage" framing: it's too dramatic. Carlyle has $3.2B cash, $1.36B FCF, and a 2.38% dividend that's covered. This isn't going to zero, and the FRE base ($1B+ run-rate) is real recurring revenue. The insider activity is also being misread — those May 2026 entries are *all A-Awards* (grants/RSU vesting), not open-market sales. The "Unusual Selling Activity" tag appears to be a false positive; A-Awards are compensation, not conviction signals. That's a meaningful error in the secondary signals stack. A contrarian bull would argue: rate cuts unfreeze PE exits in 2026-2027, Carlyle's $80B+ of dry powder deploys into a cheaper vintage, and the stock re-rates to 18-20x normalized earnings of ~$1.2B = $22-24B market cap, or roughly $60-65/share.
Net: I dissent partially from the synthesis. "High Conviction Required" is a non-verdict. The honest read is that Carlyle is moderately overvalued on trailing numbers (29x P/E for a business earning a fraction of peak) but cheap on a normalized through-cycle basis *if* you believe the exit environment thaws within 18 months. The Q1 2026 loss and the deteriorating 2025 trajectory (NI down 21% YoY despite rev up 20%) suggest margin compression is real and the print risk is to the downside near-term. I'd anchor fair value at $38-42 on current run-rate, $55-60 on cycle-normalized. At $45 you're paying roughly fair price for a call option on PE re-acceleration, with negative carry from a deteriorating earnings trend. Not a buy here; the setup improves materially below $40 or after one clean quarter showing FRE inflection.
GPT Critique
In examining Carlyle Group's financial data, my attention is drawn to the significant volatility in quarterly revenue and net income figures. The recent sharp drop to $189.6M in revenue and a net loss of $132.2M in Q1 2026 is particularly concerning, indicating a potential structural issue rather than a mere blip. This is juxtaposed with prior quarters where revenue exceeded $1B, highlighting the inherent unpredictability of Carlyle's earnings, largely influenced by performance fees. The annual figures tell a similar story of decline: from a high of $5.82B revenue in 2021, dropping to $4.90B in 2025, with net income decreasing from $2.97B to $808.7M in the same period. This pattern contradicts the "high growth" narrative and suggests that Carlyle's revenue growth is not organic but rather cyclical and dependent on market conditions.
Regarding specific claims by Claude Opus, I agree that the portrayal of Carlyle as "high_growth_profitable" is misleading given the evident decline in revenue and net income over recent years. Opus's assessment of the valuation as "neither cheap nor expensive" is also questionable when considering the high P/E ratio of 29.7x and an EV/EBITDA of 27.8x, which are difficult to justify given the declining profitability. I concur with Opus's view that Carlyle's valuation is more aligned with a bearish narrative, with its ROIC of 2.36% indicating weak compounding potential rather than robust growth. However, I diverge from Opus on the insider activity interpretation. While Opus points out that the A-Awards are not open-market sales, the frequency and volume of these awards could still suggest a potential lack of confidence, indirectly supporting the "value trap" notion despite Opus's dismissal of it.
From a skeptical perspective, one might argue that both my analysis and Opus's overlook the potential for Carlyle to leverage its significant cash reserves ($3.21B) and free cash flow ($1.36B) to navigate through the current downturn and capitalize on future opportunities. A careful skeptic might also point to Carlyle's current ratio of 15.72 as a sign of strong liquidity, which could buffer against near-term financial challenges and support strategic initiatives that may not yet be reflected in the financials.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Reconciling the two lenses: quality at -33 (Mixed) tells me this is a real alt-manager franchise with brand, scale, and no dilution leak, but volatile GAAP, OCF/NI of 0.2x, two negative FCF years out of five, and ~$10.7B net debt mean it doesn't earn a premium multiple. Value at -25 (Fairly Valued, attractive <$38) says the market already knows that — CG trades at a discount to BX/APO/ARES/KKR for legitimate reasons, and at $45 I'm not being paid to take on the messiness. The two scores agree: this isn't a great business and it isn't cheap. There's no edge here.
My play: do nothing at $45. I'm not chasing a peer-discount-quality manager at a peer-ish multiple when the cash conversion is this ugly. I put CG on the watchlist with a starter-buy trigger at $38 (≈15% lower) — that's where the fee-stream floor and the discount-to-peers actually compensate me for the earnings-quality haircut. I'd scale in: 1/3 position at $38, another 1/3 at $34, final third reserved for a vintage-cycle washout into the high $20s. What flips me bullish earlier: a clean FRE quarter showing OCF/NI normalizing toward 0.6x+, or a credible fundraising re-acceleration that narrows the gap to APO/ARES. What keeps me out forever: another negative FCF year or further GM compression below 60%. Above $50, I'd actively consider it a short candidate against a long-BX pair, but that's a separate trade. Today: pass, set the alert at $38, move on.
Carlyle's top-line and margin profile swings violently year to year — revenue went $5.82B → $3.68B → $1.87B → $4.09B → $4.90B, with operating margin oscillating from 69% in 2021 to -32% in 2023 and back to 26% in 2025. That's the nature of a PE/credit manager booking performance fees and investment income, but it makes any single-year P&L hard to trust as a run-rate. Gross margin has compressed from 95% in 2021 to 66% in 2025, suggesting mix shift toward lower-margin (likely credit/insurance/secondaries) AUM.
Cash quality is uneven. OCF/NI at 0.2x and accruals at 2.9% of assets are unflattering, and FCF has been all over the map (+$1.75B, -$420M, +$138M, -$837M, +$1.36B). Across five years FCF totals roughly $2.0B against ~$5.4B of cumulative net income — meaningful slippage. Altman Z of 0.96 flags 'distress' but the model is misapplied here; Carlyle is an alt manager with on-balance-sheet investments and CLO consolidation, not an industrial. Still, net debt of ~$10.7B against $3.2B liquid cash is a real constraint.
Dilution discipline is the genuine bright spot: diluted share CAGR of 0.6% (362.6M → 370.9M over four years) means per-share value isn't being quietly eroded by SBC. Insider tape over the window shown is entirely A-awards (grants), not open-market activity, so the '6 sells / $77M' flag from the module isn't visible in the most recent 15 transactions and needs to be checked against earlier filings before being weighed.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Fee-Related Earnings (FRE) and Distributable Earnings trend — the right quality metrics for an alt manager, not GAAP net income
- AUM, fee-paying AUM, and dry powder trajectory — the actual moat indicator
- How much of the $10.7B net debt is recourse to Carlyle Group Inc. vs CLO/fund consolidation under VIE accounting
- Composition and timing of the $77.8M insider sales — 10b5-1 plans, executives involved, vs prior years
- Performance fee accrual vs realization gap (driver of OCF/NI <1)
- Why GM dropped from 95% to 66% — segment/mix detail
- Dividend policy and capital return cadence given variable FCF
Carlyle's $16.2B market cap at $45.14 prices it at a mid-teens multiple on normalized fee-related earnings, broadly in line with the alt-manager peer set (KKR, APO, ARES trade richer; BX much richer; BAM/TPG nearby). The e2e synthesis flagged 'High Conviction Required' — i.e. the model itself isn't confident in a fair value, which tells me the per-method outputs are scattered enough that I shouldn't anchor on a single number. The franchise (brand, LP relationships, ~$400B+ AUM, fee stream) supports a deserved value in the low-to-mid $40s, but the earnings-quality haircut (poor cash conversion, OCF/NI ~0.2x, two negative FCF years, leveraged balance sheet) pulls deserved value back down meaningfully from where a clean-quality alt manager would trade.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Fee-related earnings (FRE) trajectory and margin in latest quarter — is the fee engine actually growing?
- Fundraising pace vs prior flagship vintages — any slippage on next PE/credit fund close?
- Realizations and net accrued performance fees — what's the embedded carry value vs prior periods?
- Cash conversion: does OCF/NI normalize ex-investment activity, or is the 0.2x ratio structural?
- Net debt and any buyback authorization — capital return as a signal on management's view of value