Business Description
Embraer S.A. is a leading Brazilian firm operating within the aerospace and defense sectors. Its extensive activities encompass the full lifecycle of various aircraft, from their initial design and development through manufacturing and ongoing servicing. This includes a diverse fleet of commercial airliners, executive private jets, and specialized agricultural planes. Beyond its aviation portfolio, the company also delivers advanced defense and security solutions and is a key player in the emerging field of eVTOL (electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing) technologies.
Business History
Generated: Jun 10, 2026 3:03amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.52
Total Equity: $18.87B
Shares: 183,284,992
Total Debt: $14.21B
Cash: $10.68B
EBITDA: $3.97B
Total Debt: $14.21B
Cash: $10.68B
Revenue: $41.50B
Revenue: $41.50B
Revenue: $41.50B
Total Equity: $18.87B
Tax Rate: -34.2%
Equity: $18.87B
Total Debt: $14.21B
Cash: $10.68B
Current Liabilities: $26.08B
Long-Term Debt: $13.63B
Total Debt: $14.21B
Total Equity: $18.87B
Shares: 183,284,992
Shares: 183,284,992
CapEx: -$2.65B
Shares: 183,284,992
Stock Price: $56.30
Net Income: $1.93B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:07am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.2B | $4.5B | $5.3B | $6.4B | $41.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.5B | $3.6B | $4.4B | $5.2B | $34.2B |
| Gross Profit | $655.9M | $912.2M | $909.6M | $1.2B | $7.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $458.3M | $1.0B | $595.1M | $485.6M | $3.9B |
| Operating Income | $201.3M | -$110.5M | $314.5M | $667.5M | $3.3B |
| Net Income | -$44.7M | -$185.4M | $164.0M | $352.5M | $1.9B |
| EBITDA | $479.9M | $228.4M | $598.2M | $1.0B | $4.0B |
| EPS | $-0.24 | $-1.00 | $0.88 | $1.92 | $10.52 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $10.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $5.9B | $5.8B | $6.1B | $6.5B | $39.2B |
| Total Assets | $10.2B | $10.1B | $10.8B | $11.8B | $70.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.8B | $3.2B | $3.7B | $4.4B | $26.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.5B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $13.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $7.4B | $7.3B | $7.7B | $8.5B | $49.9B |
| Total Equity | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $18.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:07am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $515.3M | $751.3M | $617.0M | $871.2M | $4.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$268.2M | -$256.0M | -$430.8M | -$466.2M | -$2.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $247.1M | $495.3M | $186.2M | $405.0M | $2.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.1M | $-400,000 | -$24.0M | -$18.3M | -$67.4M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.5M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$44.5M | -$23.0M | -$189.3M | -$63.3M | $2.1B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$9.6B $9.4B – $9.7B
|
$10.4B $10.1B – $11.1B
|
$10.1B $9.8B – $10.8B
|
$10.8B $10.4B – $11.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.0B $998.2M – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.1B $1.0B – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
| Net Income |
$665.8M $596.9M – $758.3M
|
$786.4M $756.2M – $852.2M
|
$753.3M $724.4M – $816.3M
|
$844.9M $812.5M – $915.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:07am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.1% | +16.0% | +21.4% | +549.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +39.1% | -0.3% | +26.8% | +531.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -154.9% | +384.6% | +112.2% | +399.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -314.8% | +188.5% | +114.9% | +446.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -52.4% | +161.9% | +69.4% | +291.5% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-23 | Chaves Roberto de Deus | A-Award | 6,222.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-23 | Silva Luis Carlos Marinho da | A-Award | 9,540.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-23 | Neto Francisco Gomes | A-Award | 41,279.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2029-04-23 | de Lima Felipe Santana Santiago | 5,600.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | McAllister Kevin Gregory | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Pedreiro Nelson | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Calfat Raul | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Pego Maria A. Rosina Tedesco de Oliveira | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Freeman Todd Messer | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2028-03-13 | Neto Francisco Gomes | 48,769.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Medeiros Mauricio Augusto Silveira de | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Silva Luis Carlos Marinho da | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2028-03-13 | Silva Luis Carlos Marinho da | 10,889.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2028-03-13 | Chaves Roberto de Deus | 6,351.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Rosa Marcio Fernando Elias | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2028-03-13 | Garcia Antonio Carlos | 13,931.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Kern Junior Mauro | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Ramirez Claudia Sender | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Saes Edmilson | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Ioschpe Dan | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | $0.01 | 2026-05-05 | 2026-05-15 | 2026-05-28 |
| 2025-12-19 | $0.55 | 2025-12-09 | 2025-12-19 | |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.05 | 2025-05-06 | 2025-05-16 | 2025-06-02 |
| 2018-12-28 | $0.01 | 2018-12-17 | 2018-12-31 | 2019-01-18 |
| 2018-09-26 | $0.01 | 2018-06-13 | 2018-09-27 | 2018-10-18 |
| 2018-06-27 | $0.02 | 2018-06-18 | 2018-06-28 | 2018-07-20 |
| 2018-04-25 | $0.08 | 2018-04-16 | 2018-04-26 | 2018-05-29 |
| 2018-03-19 | $0.03 | 2018-03-07 | 2018-03-20 | 2018-04-18 |
| 2017-12-27 | $0.11 | 2017-12-14 | 2017-12-28 | 2018-02-02 |
| 2017-09-19 | $0.05 | 2017-09-07 | 2017-09-20 | 2017-10-16 |
| 2017-06-13 | $0.05 | 2017-06-06 | 2017-06-15 | 2017-07-20 |
| 2017-04-25 | $0.13 | 2017-04-17 | 2017-04-27 | 2017-05-17 |
| 2017-03-21 | $0.05 | 2017-03-09 | 2017-03-23 | 2017-04-20 |
| 2016-09-27 | $0.02 | 2016-09-16 | 2016-10-21 | |
| 2016-06-21 | $0.05 | 2016-06-10 | 2016-07-21 | |
| 2016-03-22 | $0.04 | 2016-03-11 | 2016-04-21 | |
| 2015-12-22 | $0.04 | 2015-12-11 | 2015-12-24 | 2016-01-21 |
| 2015-08-18 | $0.05 | 2015-10-21 | ||
| 2015-06-23 | $0.05 | 2015-06-12 | 2015-06-25 | 2015-07-20 |
| 2015-04-28 | $0.03 | 2015-04-17 | 2015-04-30 | 2015-05-20 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The data file is corrupted in ways that make every downstream model unreliable, and the synthesis layer's "priced for corporate death" verdict is essentially hallucinating off bad inputs. The 2025 annual revenue of $41.5B is nonsensical for a company whose quarterly prints sum to roughly $7.6B (Q1 $1.10B + Q2 $1.82B + Q3 $2.04B + Q4 $2.65B). The 2024 annual at $6.39B is the credible anchor. So actual 2025 revenue growth is roughly $7.6B vs $6.39B, or ~19% — solid for an aerospace OEM but nothing like the 549% YoY or 180% CAGR the momentum module spits out. Similarly, the Q1 2026 print of $7.44B is almost certainly a full-year figure or a cumulative line item misclassified as quarterly; Embraer doesn't do $7.4B in a quarter when it did $2.65B the prior one. Every model downstream of these numbers inherits the error. The "Disconnected from Fundamentals" thesis collapses once you realize the disconnect is in the data feed, not the tape.
Rebuilt from the clean quarterly trajectory: TTM revenue ~$7.6B, TTM net income ~$450M (Q2-25 through Q1-26: $78.5+$116.7+$83.3+$171.6 = $450M), implying a real P/E around 23x at $10.3B market cap — not the 5.4x the thesis evaluator cites, and not the 32x in the canonical metrics either (which is contaminated by the bogus annual). EV/sales of ~1.3x on clean revenue, with $10.7B cash on the balance sheet, is genuinely interesting if that cash figure is real — though I'd flag it as suspect too, since $10.7B cash against a $10.3B market cap would imply the operating business trades near zero, which is implausible for a profitable OEM with a real backlog. More likely the cash line includes customer deposits/advances tied to the order book, which is standard for aerospace and not freely distributable. Operating CF of $4.76B on the annual is also inflated by the same scaling error; real OCF is probably $700-900M and FCF closer to break-even or modestly positive after $400-600M of capex.
The narrative layer is the most useful artifact here because it doesn't depend on the broken numbers. The turnaround-bet framing is right: Embraer is a cyclical EM industrial with three real call options (E-Jet E2 backlog refresh, KC-390 defense traction, Eve eVTOL). The bear case — Brazilian domicile, cyclicality, eVTOL with no unit economics — is empirically grounded and the reason the stock should not trade at Boeing/Airbus multiples. A contrarian read: the 30% drawdown from 52-week highs likely reflects (a) tariff/trade noise on Brazilian exports into the US, (b) softening regional jet order momentum as US regional carriers face pilot/scope-clause issues again, and (c) Eve burn that is real cash out the door for revenue that is years away. None of the prior models engaged with the tariff risk, which for a Brazilian aerospace exporter to US customers is the single most underwritten near-term overhang.
I dissent from the synthesis verdict of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" — that conclusion is an artifact of corrupted inputs, not a real market mispricing. On clean numbers, EMBJ at $56 trades around 23x TTM earnings, ~1.3x sales, with mid-single-digit net margins expanding off a turnaround base, a real but cyclical backlog, and an eVTOL option that's a coin flip. That's a reasonable-to-slightly-full price for a cyclical EM aerospace name, not a screaming bargain and not a death-spiral mispricing. Fair value is probably $50-65 depending on how you handicap Eve and tariff risk; the stock is roughly where it should be. The "high_growth_profitable" archetype classification is wrong — this is cyclical-recovery, not secular growth — and the rule-based confidence of 0.68 should have been overridden once the momentum numbers blew past 180% CAGR (which should have triggered a data-integrity halt, not a verdict).
GPT Critique
In my independent analysis of Embraer S.A., the key standout is the apparent misalignment between the raw data and typical market expectations. The reported 2025 revenue of $41.5 billion is clearly an anomaly, as it vastly exceeds the plausible quarterly figures that sum to approximately $7.6 billion. This suggests an input error rather than a genuine financial performance. The corrected growth trajectory, with 2025 revenue at ~$7.6 billion compared to $6.39 billion in 2024, places the real growth rate at around 19%. This is consistent with a solid, but not extraordinary, performance for an aerospace OEM. Furthermore, the Q1 2026 revenue figure of $7.44 billion seems misclassified, likely representing an annual or cumulative figure rather than a single quarter's earnings.
I agree with Claude Opus's assessment that the data corruption in the revenue figures significantly skews the analysis. The misreported annual revenue numbers drastically distort the calculated P/E and P/S ratios, leading the "Disconnected from Fundamentals" thesis to appear disconnected from reality. Opus's reconstruction of the corrected P/E at approximately 23x based on a $10.3 billion market cap and TTM net income of around $450 million aligns with a typical valuation for a company in Embraer's sector, given its cyclical nature and emerging market risks.
Opus's narrative on the turnaround-bet archetype is also persuasive. Embraer's positioning as a cyclical EM industrial with call options on regional jets, defense, and eVTOL is a credible strategic framing. The bear case, emphasizing Brazilian domicile risks, cyclicality, and speculative eVTOL economics, is well-argued and rightly tempers the bullish narrative. I agree that the market's current pricing likely reflects these risks, particularly given the recent 30% drawdown from its 52-week high, which could be attributed to geopolitical trade concerns and regional jet market dynamics.
Where I diverge slightly from Opus is on the interpretation of the cash figures. While he suggests the $10.7 billion cash position might be inflated by customer deposits, the relative pricing still indicates a significant cash buffer, albeit not freely distributable. This financial structure, typical for aerospace companies, aligns well with the operational cash flow figures he recalibrated to $700-900 million, supporting a more balanced view of Embraer's liquidity and investment capacity.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my assessment underplay the potential upside of the eVTOL market. If Embraer can successfully capitalize on its first-mover advantage in this area, the speculative TAM could provide a significant long-term growth driver, challenging the current valuation. Conversely, the geopolitical and macroeconomic risks inherent in operating as a Brazilian aerospace company could be more severe than either assessment has accounted for, potentially justifying a more conservative valuation.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses are telling a coherent story, not a contradictory one: Lens 1 at +25 says yes, Embraer is genuinely a better business than it was — margins inflected, FCF positive, zero dilution, $14B liquid cash, #3 global commercial OEM with defense and Eve optionality. Lens 2 at -86 says the market already knows all of that and then some, having tripled the stock and capitalized the eVTOL dream on top of peak-recovery A&D earnings whose quality is flagged (Beneish 1.96, an implausible 2025 revenue print, distorted OCF/NI). When a Solid-not-Elite business trades at a Rich multiple with no insider buying to validate it, I don't chase. I sit.
My play: zero position today at $56.30. I set an alert at $46 and a real buy zone $40-44 — that's where the value lens says margin of safety appears and where I'd treat any commercial aviation wobble, defense budget scare, or Eve disappointment as a gift rather than a thesis break. Entry style is scale-in thirds: starter at $44, add at $40, full weight only below $38 or on a clean quarter that resolves the earnings-quality flags. Target full position ~2-3% of book given it's a cyclical OEM with speculative optionality, not a compounder I'd anchor a portfolio on. What flips me aggressive earlier: an open-market insider P-buy of size, or a clean reconciled 10-F that kills the 2025 revenue anomaly and confirms normalized ~$6-7B revenue with sustained 8-10% op margins. What keeps me on the sidelines indefinitely: price drifting higher on Eve hype without the underlying numbers cleaning up. Right now the trade is patience.
Embraer's operating trajectory has clearly inflected: gross margin sits at 17-18%, operating margin climbed from -2.4% in 2022 to 8-10% in 2024-2025, and net income swung from -$185M to positive $352M (2024) on a normalized revenue base around $6.4B. Free cash flow has been positive every year shown ($186M-$495M in the normal years), and the diluted share count is essentially flat at ~183.7M — no dilution drag, which is rare for an aerospace OEM coming out of a downcycle. Liquid cash of $14.4B against a modest net cash position of $176M indicates the company runs with massive gross cash but also substantial gross debt — typical for aerospace working capital (customer advances, program financing).
The 2025 revenue line of $41.5B is almost certainly a data artifact (BRL vs USD mixing, or a reporting unit error) — a 6.5x YoY jump with margins unchanged is not operationally credible for an aerospace OEM. I'm treating the underlying business as the ~$6-7B revenue franchise with ~8-10% operating margins and ~$400M-$2B FCF range. Earnings quality flags (Beneish 1.96, accruals -5.5%, OCF/NI -1.37x) and Altman Z of 1.09 deserve weight, though Altman is notoriously unreliable for aerospace given the working-capital structure (customer deposits inflate liabilities). The Beneish flag combined with the suspicious 2025 revenue line is what keeps me from a 'Strong' grade.
Insider tape shows only equity awards (A-codes) and zero open-market buys or sells — neutral signal. The duopoly+1 position in regional jets (E-Jets E2), growing defense (KC-390) and Eve eVTOL optionality give the business real durability, but the quality verdict hinges on cleaning up the financial-data integrity issues.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Reconcile 2025 revenue figure — verify whether $41.5B is a BRL-denominated figure mistakenly tagged USD; true 2025 USD revenue likely $7-8B
- Customer concentration in commercial backlog (American, Porter, SkyWest exposure) and KC-390 export contracts
- Working capital mechanics — split of customer advances vs trade payables to properly interpret Altman Z and accruals
- Revenue recognition policy on long-cycle aircraft contracts to address Beneish flag
- Gross debt vs cash composition — duration and currency mix of the $14B+ liquid cash and offsetting debt
- Eve Air Mobility cash burn and dilution exposure to parent
- FX hedging policy given BRL cost base vs USD revenue base
EMBJ has roughly tripled from its multi-year base on a genuine operational turnaround, and the e2e synthesis itself flags the stock as 'Disconnected from Fundamentals.' At $56.30 (≈$10.3B market cap), the shares are capitalizing not just the recovered commercial/exec aviation franchise but also a meaningful slug of Eve eVTOL optionality whose unit economics are unproven. The bull case requires all three legs — regional jet revival, defense expansion, and eVTOL — to land; the bear case (cyclical A&D manufacturer, shrinking regional jet TAM, speculative eVTOL TAM) is at least as plausible.
Deserved value is hard to pin precisely because the Company-Quality lens explicitly flags the 2025 revenue print as not believable, a Beneish red flag, and an OCF/NI distortion — earnings quality is weak, which argues for a HAIRCUT to any DCF/multiple-based fair value, not a premium. On a cleaner mid-cycle A&D multiple (~12-14x EV/EBIT) applied to normalized — not peak — earnings, deserved value sits closer to the mid-$40s, with the eVTOL call option worth a few dollars on top. That puts price modestly above deserved, not screamingly expensive but with no margin of safety for a cyclical, capital-intensive turnaround.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Reconciliation of the questionable 2025 revenue print — is it a reporting/segment-restatement artifact or real growth?
- Eve eVTOL: latest order book, certification timeline, and any capital commitments from Embraer parent
- Commercial backlog composition and pricing — how much is firm vs options, and book-to-bill trajectory
- Defense segment margins and contract mix to test whether the recent margin step-up is structural
- Any one-time items (FX gains, tax benefits, deferred revenue) inflating recent EBIT/FCF