Business Description
GameStop Corp., a specialty retailer, provides games and entertainment products through its e-commerce properties and various stores in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe. The company sells new and pre-owned gaming platforms; accessories, such as controllers, gaming headsets, virtual reality products, and memory cards; new and pre-owned gaming software; and in-game digital currency, digital downloadable content, and full-game downloads. It also sells collectibles comprising licensed merchandise primarily related to the gaming, television, and movie industries, as well as pop culture themes. As of January 29, 2022, the company operated 4,573 stores and ecommerce sites under the GameStop, EB Games, and Micromania brands; and 50 pop culture themed stores that sell collectibles, apparel, gadgets, electronics, toys, and other retail products under the Zing Pop Culture brand, as well as offers Game Informer, a print and digital video game publication featuring reviews of new releases, previews of the big titles on the horizon, and coverage of the latest developments in the gaming industry. The company was formerly known as GSC Holdings Corp. GameStop Corp. was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in Grapevine, Texas.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 2:56pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:37pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.93
Total Equity: $5.44B
Shares: 549,100,000
Total Debt: $4.25B
Cash: $6.30B
EBITDA: $305.40M
Total Debt: $4.25B
Cash: $6.30B
Revenue: $3.63B
Revenue: $3.63B
Revenue: $3.63B
Total Equity: $5.44B
Tax Rate: -9.0%
Equity: $5.44B
Total Debt: $4.25B
Cash: $6.30B
Current Liabilities: $654.50M
Long-Term Debt: $4.16B
Total Debt: $4.25B
Total Equity: $5.44B
Shares: 549,100,000
Shares: 549,100,000
CapEx: -$17.50M
Shares: 549,100,000
Stock Price: $21.80
Net Income: $418.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.0B | $5.9B | $5.3B | $3.8B | $3.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.7B | $4.6B | $4.0B | $2.7B | $2.5B |
| Gross Profit | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $890.8M |
| Operating Income | -$368.5M | -$311.6M | -$34.5M | -$26.2M | $285.9M |
| Net Income | -$381.3M | -$313.1M | $6.7M | $131.3M | $418.4M |
| EBITDA | -$284.6M | -$247.2M | $26.5M | $22.4M | $305.4M |
| EPS | $-1.31 | $-1.03 | $0.02 | $0.33 | $0.93 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:56pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $1.1B | $921.7M | $4.8B | $6.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $5.4B | $10.0B |
| Total Assets | $3.5B | $3.1B | $2.7B | $5.9B | $10.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $1.3B | $934.5M | $665.4M | $654.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | $40.5M | $28.7M | $17.7M | $6.6M | $4.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $945.6M | $5.0B |
| Total Equity | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $4.9B | $5.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $93.6M | -$219.5M | -$212.8M | -$81.5M | $205.2M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$434.3M | $108.2M | -$203.7M | $145.7M | $614.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$62.0M | -$55.9M | -$34.9M | -$16.1M | -$17.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$496.3M | $52.3M | -$238.6M | $129.6M | $597.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $55.9M | $13.1M | $7.0M | $-100,000 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $684.9M | -$123.9M | -$257.1M | $3.9B | $1.5B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:52pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$4.0B $4.0B – $4.0B
|
$4.2B $4.2B – $4.2B
|
$4.3B $4.3B – $4.3B
|
$2.5B $2.5B – $2.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$4.8M $4.8M – $4.8M
|
$5.0M $5.0M – $5.0M
|
$5.1M $5.1M – $5.1M
|
$3.0M $3.0M – $3.0M
|
| Net Income |
$38.4M $38.4M – $38.4M
|
$543.6M $543.6M – $543.6M
|
$598.5M $598.5M – $598.5M
|
$664.4M $664.4M – $664.4M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -1.4% | -11.0% | -27.5% | -5.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +1.8% | -5.7% | -13.9% | +5.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +15.4% | +88.9% | +24.1% | +1,191.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +17.9% | +102.1% | +1,859.7% | +218.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +13.1% | +110.7% | -15.5% | +1,263.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-13 | Robinson Mark Haymond | S-Sale | 3,912.00 | $23.19 | $90,715 |
| 2026-04-01 | Moore Daniel William | A-Award | 21,196.00 | $23.59 | $500,014 |
| 2026-04-01 | Moore Daniel William | S-Sale | 7,210.00 | $22.94 | $165,430 |
| 2026-04-01 | Robinson Mark Haymond | A-Award | 21,196.00 | $23.59 | $500,014 |
| 2026-04-01 | Robinson Mark Haymond | S-Sale | 7,209.00 | $22.94 | $165,407 |
| 2026-01-23 | Cheng Lawrence | P-Purchase | 5,000.00 | $22.87 | $114,369 |
| 2026-01-21 | Cohen Ryan | P-Purchase | 500,000.00 | $21.60 | $10.8M |
| 2026-01-20 | Cohen Ryan | P-Purchase | 500,000.00 | $21.12 | $10.6M |
| 2026-01-21 | Attal Alain | P-Purchase | 12,000.00 | $21.63 | $259,577 |
| 2026-01-20 | Attal Alain | P-Purchase | 12,000.00 | $20.90 | $250,798 |
| 2026-01-12 | Robinson Mark Haymond | S-Sale | 12,200.00 | $21.00 | $256,248 |
| 2026-01-02 | Robinson Mark Haymond | S-Sale | 5,475.00 | $20.44 | $111,901 |
| 2026-01-02 | Moore Daniel William | S-Sale | 5,477.00 | $20.44 | $111,942 |
| 2025-12-23 | Moore Daniel William | A-Award | 1,081.00 | $21.38 | $23,112 |
| 2025-12-23 | Robinson Mark Haymond | A-Award | 967.00 | $21.38 | $20,674 |
| 2025-12-09 | Robinson Mark Haymond | A-Award | 9,561.00 | $21.84 | $208,812 |
| 2025-10-02 | Moore Daniel William | S-Sale | 6,509.00 | $27.58 | $179,534 |
| 2025-10-02 | Robinson Mark Haymond | S-Sale | 4,449.00 | $27.58 | $122,715 |
| 2025-09-02 | Moore Daniel William | S-Sale | 830.00 | $22.68 | $18,824 |
| 2025-08-11 | Moore Daniel William | A-Award | 71,060.00 | $23.22 | $1.7M |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:52pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-03-14 | $0.38 | 2019-03-04 | 2019-03-15 | 2019-03-29 |
| 2018-12-10 | $0.38 | 2018-11-27 | 2018-12-11 | 2018-12-21 |
| 2018-09-17 | $0.38 | 2018-09-04 | 2018-09-18 | 2018-10-02 |
| 2018-06-11 | $0.38 | 2018-05-31 | 2018-06-12 | 2018-06-26 |
| 2018-03-02 | $0.38 | 2018-02-21 | 2018-03-05 | 2018-03-20 |
| 2017-11-30 | $0.38 | 2017-11-17 | 2017-12-01 | 2017-12-12 |
| 2017-09-07 | $0.38 | 2017-08-21 | 2017-09-08 | 2017-09-21 |
| 2017-06-05 | $0.38 | 2017-05-26 | 2017-06-07 | 2017-06-20 |
| 2017-03-10 | $0.38 | 2017-03-01 | 2017-03-14 | 2017-03-28 |
| 2016-11-29 | $0.37 | 2016-11-23 | 2016-12-01 | 2016-12-13 |
| 2016-09-07 | $0.37 | 2016-08-26 | 2016-09-09 | 2016-09-22 |
| 2016-06-06 | $0.37 | 2016-05-27 | 2016-06-08 | 2016-06-21 |
| 2016-03-04 | $0.37 | 2016-02-24 | 2016-03-08 | 2016-03-22 |
| 2015-12-01 | $0.36 | 2015-11-24 | 2015-12-03 | 2015-12-15 |
| 2015-09-04 | $0.36 | 2015-08-28 | 2015-09-09 | 2015-09-22 |
| 2015-06-08 | $0.36 | 2015-05-29 | 2015-06-10 | 2015-06-23 |
| 2015-03-13 | $0.36 | 2015-03-04 | 2015-03-17 | 2015-03-24 |
| 2014-11-21 | $0.33 | 2014-11-13 | 2014-11-25 | 2014-12-16 |
| 2014-08-29 | $0.33 | 2014-08-22 | 2014-09-03 | 2014-09-16 |
| 2014-06-02 | $0.33 | 2014-05-23 | 2014-06-04 | 2014-06-17 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a strange story that the models mostly get right but slightly mis-frame. Revenue has collapsed from $6.01B (FY22) to $3.63B (FY26) — a 40% peak-to-trough decline — yet net income swung from -$381M to +$418M. Look closer though: the FY26 NI of $418M overstates operating quality because operating income was only $286M; the gap is investment income on the $6.3B cash hoard (roughly 4-5% on T-bills = ~$250-300M annualized). The May 2026 quarter is even more telling: $835M revenue with a $390M net income at a 46.6% margin is not a retail result — that's mark-to-market gains on Bitcoin/securities flowing through the P&L. Strip those out and the underlying retail business is a low-single-digit operating margin specialty retailer shrinking 5% YoY, generating maybe $100-150M of true operating earnings.
So what is GME actually worth? Cash and equivalents of $6.3B equals roughly $14/share against 448M shares (and that's before counting BTC holdings and recent ATM raises which may have pushed liquid assets higher). The retail operation throwing off ~$100-150M in normalized operating profit deserves a single-digit multiple given secular decline — call it $800M-$1.2B, or $2-3/share. That sums to a defensible $16-17/share intrinsic value, leaving roughly $5/share ($2.2B of market cap) as pure Cohen-optionality and narrative premium. The synthesis verdict of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" is directionally correct but the gap is narrower than implied — this isn't a $5-8 stock anymore because the cash pile is real and Cohen has demonstrated (via the BTC pivot and ATM raises near highs) some capital allocation discipline.
Where I push back on the prior models: the Market Forces "melting ice cube" framing ignores that operating losses have actually been eliminated — FY26 op income of +$286M vs -$369M in FY22 is a real $650M swing, even adjusting for interest income. The narrative-economics layer calls durability "fragile" but the cult coefficient has now persisted five years through multiple disappointments; that's evidence of durability, not fragility. Conversely, the insider activity signal of "Net Insider Buying" is misleading — those January 2026 purchases of 500K shares look like Cohen-aligned board buys near $20-25, but the more recent April 2026 activity is net selling against awards. The contrarian case worth taking seriously: if Cohen converts the cash pile into a Berkshire-style holdco (the BTC move hints at this), the appropriate framework isn't DCF on retail but book-value-plus-optionality on capital allocation — and at 1.96x P/B with a proven (if controversial) operator, that's not absurd. MicroStrategy trades at 2-3x its BTC NAV; if GME becomes a crypto/securities vehicle with retail-cult distribution, $22 could prove cheap.
The data gaps matter: total debt and equity are blank in the balance sheet tile, the TTM ratios (PE 12.8, ROE 14%) are inflated by non-recurring investment gains and shouldn't be taken at face value, and we have no visibility on the BTC position size or ATM share count post-Q1. Revenue confidence is correctly flagged as low — quarterly prints are now dominated by holiday seasonality on a shrinking base, making trend extraction noisy. I agree with the synthesis verdict in direction but not magnitude: GME is overvalued versus a sum-of-parts read, but it's not the egregious disconnect the models suggest because (a) the cash is real and earning yield, (b) operating losses have genuinely been eliminated, and (c) the narrative premium has proven more durable than any model wants to credit. Fair value is ~$16-18; the $4-5 premium is the Cohen call option, which has non-zero value. Not a short (the cult bid plus capital allocation optionality makes that asymmetric pain), not a buy (you're paying 25-30% over tangible asset value for a melting retail stub plus a wildcard), and the thesis hinges entirely on what Cohen does with $6B+ over the next 12-24 months.
GPT Critique
GameStop's financial data presents a fascinating case of transformation amid declining traditional retail operations. The company's revenue has sharply decreased from $6.01 billion in FY22 to $3.63 billion in FY26, a substantial contraction. Despite this, GameStop has swung from a net loss to a net income of $418 million in FY26, a remarkable turnaround driven largely by investment income from its substantial cash reserves, rather than operational improvements. The operating income of $285.9 million in FY26, while an improvement over previous losses, is overshadowed by the interest income on its $6.3 billion cash pile, suggesting that the core retail business remains under pressure, shrinking at a rate of 5% annually.
I find myself in agreement with Opus that GameStop's current valuation at $21.80 is inflated relative to its fundamentals. Opus points out that the FY26 net income is bolstered by investment returns, not retail operations—a critical distinction that aligns with my reading of the data. The retail business, with its modest operating earnings of $100-150 million, merits a conservative valuation. I also concur that the $6.3 billion cash is a significant asset, warranting a valuation of approximately $14 per share. Opus's assessment of the market assigning a premium for potential strategic maneuvers by Ryan Cohen resonates with me, though I find the premium to be even more speculative than Opus suggests.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the interpretation of the narrative's durability. While Opus sees five years of sustained cult interest as evidence of enduring strength, my interpretation leans towards fragility. The market's heavy reliance on narrative over fundamentals can unravel if retail enthusiasm wanes or if Cohen fails to deliver a transformative strategy. Additionally, I'm more skeptical about the potential for Cohen to pivot GameStop into a "Berkshire-style holdco" or a crypto-focused entity, given the inherent volatility and speculative nature of such endeavors.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I underappreciate the potential for GameStop to leverage its brand and retail footprint into new, profitable ventures, particularly in the digital and collectibles space. They might contend that the company's strategic moves, though not yet fully realized, could eventually justify the current premium. However, without concrete plans or demonstrated success in these areas, such arguments remain speculative.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell a coherent story: Lens 1 at +7 says Cohen has bought time with a fortress balance sheet and a real margin turnaround, but the underlying retail business is in secular decline and shareholders financed the rescue through an 89% share-count explosion. Lens 2 at -86 says fine — but at $21.80 you're paying ~$10-11 for the cash they diluted you to get and another ~$11 for a shrinking stub plus Cohen-magic optionality. I won't pay a retail multiple on interest income, and I won't pay a call-option premium for capital allocation I can't underwrite. This is the textbook 'decent-ish company, bad price' setup.
My play: I do nothing here. No starter, no nibble — the meme premium means I have no edge buying alongside the narrative crowd. I put GME on the watchlist with a hard line at $15 (cash + token stub), and I'd only get interested as a small 1-1.5% starter if it trades there on a market flush, not on company-specific bad news (a botched BTC treasury pivot or value-destroying acquisition would invalidate the thesis). Scale to ~3% only if it gets to $12-13 with the cash pile still intact. Catalysts that flip me aggressive earlier: a real capital return (buyback at a discount to cash, special dividend) — that would convert the optionality premium into actual per-share value. Catalysts that make me stay away even at $15: any large acquisition or crypto allocation that burns the cash moat. Until then, the Cohen insider buy is interesting but not interesting enough to override a -86 valuation read.
GameStop has executed a genuine financial turnaround on the P&L: gross margin expanded from 22.4% (2022) to 32.4% (2026), operating margin flipped from -6.1% to +7.9%, net income went from -$381M to +$418M, and FCF reached $597M. Earnings quality checks are clean (Beneish -3.29, accruals -1.3% of assets), and the balance sheet is a fortress with $9.01B liquid cash and $4.76B net cash — survival risk is effectively nil. Ryan Cohen's $21M open-market purchase in Jan 2026 is a strong signal of insider conviction.
The concerns are equally real. Revenue has collapsed from $6.01B to $3.63B — a 40% decline in four years — so the margin/profit improvement is being achieved on a structurally shrinking base, consistent with secular decline in physical game retail. Diluted shares went from 290M to 549M (+89% in four years, 17.3% CAGR), which means per-share economics have been heavily diluted even as absolute profits recovered. The 'Poor Cash Flow Quality' tag and the OCF/NI of -5.41x deserve scrutiny — likely a sign that 2026 FCF is flattered by working-capital release on a shrinking business rather than recurring operating cash generation.
Net of the cash, the operating business generating $418M of net income on $3.63B of declining revenue is a niche specialty retailer with no demonstrated moat in the data. Management is clearly competent at cost discipline and capital preservation, but durability of the underlying retail franchise is unproven.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Source of $597M FCF — how much is from inventory liquidation / payables stretching vs. recurring operations?
- Composition of $9B cash: how much came from equity issuances at successive ATMs vs. operating cash?
- Strategy for the cash pile — any disclosed capital allocation framework, M&A, or treasury policy (incl. crypto/BTC) in the 10-K?
- Revenue mix: hardware vs. software vs. collectibles — which segments are declining and which are stable?
- Whether further ATM equity issuance is authorized; remaining capacity
- Store count trajectory and lease commitments — physical footprint rationalization pace
Market cap is ~$9.78B at $21.80. GameStop holds roughly $4.5–5B+ in cash/securities from serial equity raises (share count up ~89% in four years), so the implied enterprise value for the actual retail business is on the order of $5B. Against a shrinking specialty retailer doing maybe $4B of revenue with thin operating margins — even after the recent profitable print — that's a rich multiple for a business in secular decline. The 2026 net income flatters reality because a large chunk is interest income on the cash hoard, not retail earnings power.
Deserved value, in my book, is cash per share (~$10–11) plus a modest multiple on a shrinking, low-quality operating stub (maybe $2–4/share generously) — call it $13–16 of defensible value. At $21.80 the market is paying a meaningful premium to that, presumably for meme-driven optionality, crypto/BTC treasury narrative, or Cohen-led capital allocation magic. None of that is deserved value; it's a call option premium baked into the common. With good (but not stellar) earnings quality, no haircut rescue, and a quality lens that explicitly flags the P&L as 'Jekyll-and-Hyde,' I can't manufacture cheapness here.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Exact cash + marketable securities balance and any BTC/crypto holdings as of latest 10-Q
- Diluted share count post any recent ATM offerings
- Segment-level operating income excluding interest income — the true retail earnings power
- Any guidance or capital allocation framework from management on use of cash
- Same-store sales / revenue trajectory in latest quarter