Business Description
Hecla Mining Company, together with its subsidiaries, discovers, acquires, develops, and produces precious and base metal properties in the United States and internationally. The company mines for silver, gold, lead, and zinc concentrates, as well as carbon material containing silver and gold for sale to custom smelters, metal traders, and third-party processors,; and doré containing silver and gold. It owns 100% interests in the Greens Creek mine located on Admiralty Island in southeast Alaska; the Lucky Friday mine situated in northern Idaho; the Casa Berardi mine located in the Abitibi region of northwestern Quebec, Canada; and the San Sebastian mine situated in the city of Durango, Mexico. The company also holds 100% interests in the Fire Creek mine located in Lander County, Nevada; and the Hollister and Midas mines situated in Elko County, Nevada. Hecla Mining Company was incorporated in 1891 and is headquartered in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 2:44pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:37pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.49
Total Equity: $2.59B
Shares: 655,768,000
Total Debt: $268.63M
Cash: $241.56M
EBITDA: $686.33M
Total Debt: $268.63M
Cash: $241.56M
Revenue: $1.42B
Revenue: $1.42B
Revenue: $1.42B
Total Equity: $2.59B
Tax Rate: 32.9%
Equity: $2.59B
Total Debt: $268.63M
Cash: $241.56M
Current Liabilities: $231.56M
Long-Term Debt: $268.63M
Total Debt: $268.63M
Total Equity: $2.59B
Shares: 655,768,000
Shares: 655,768,000
CapEx: -$252.39M
Shares: 655,768,000
Stock Price: $14.78
Net Income: $321.71M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $807.5M | $718.9M | $720.2M | $929.9M | $1.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $589.7M | $602.7M | $607.3M | $731.7M | $800.8M |
| Gross Profit | $217.8M | $116.2M | $112.9M | $198.2M | $622.2M |
| Operating Expenses | $134.4M | $128.6M | $157.6M | $91.9M | $85.5M |
| Operating Income | $83.4M | -$12.4M | -$44.7M | $106.3M | $536.7M |
| Net Income | $35.1M | -$37.3M | -$84.2M | $35.8M | $321.7M |
| EBITDA | $220.1M | $143.0M | $124.0M | $313.4M | $686.3M |
| EPS | $0.06 | $-0.07 | $-0.14 | $0.06 | $0.49 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:42pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $210.0M | $104.7M | $106.4M | $26.9M | $241.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $341.6M | $267.7M | $260.3M | $214.2M | $629.3M |
| Total Assets | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $160.4M | $178.5M | $157.5M | $197.8M | $231.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | $515.9M | $517.7M | $653.1M | $508.9M | $268.6M |
| Total Liabilities | $968.0M | $948.2M | $1.0B | $941.5M | $969.0M |
| Total Equity | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.6B |
| Retained Earnings | -$353.7M | -$403.9M | -$503.9M | -$493.5M | -$182.1M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $220.3M | $89.9M | $75.5M | $218.3M | $562.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$109.0M | -$149.4M | -$223.9M | -$214.5M | -$252.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $111.3M | -$59.5M | -$148.4M | $3.8M | $310.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $1.1M | -$16.0M | $228,000 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$4.5M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $-885,000 |
| Net Change in Cash | $80.2M | -$105.2M | $1.6M | -$79.5M | $214.7M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:42pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.5B $1.2B – $1.8B
|
$1.5B $1.2B – $1.9B
|
$2.7B $2.2B – $3.5B
|
$3.2B $2.6B – $4.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$428.6M $351.1M – $540.0M
|
$442.2M $362.2M – $557.1M
|
$802.9M $657.7M – $1.0B
|
$946.1M $775.0M – $1.2B
|
| Net Income |
$695.4M $598.2M – $1.0B
|
$684.5M $493.5M – $824.6M
|
$406.6M $311.0M – $544.0M
|
$360.7M $275.9M – $482.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -11.0% | +0.2% | +29.1% | +53.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -46.7% | -2.8% | +75.5% | +213.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -114.9% | -259.2% | +337.9% | +405.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -206.4% | -125.5% | +142.5% | +798.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -35.0% | -13.3% | +152.7% | +119.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-13 | Moyes Kari G. | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $19.85 | $301,879 |
| 2026-04-13 | Moyes Kari G. | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-02 | Aguiar Rodriguez Carlos Roberto | M-Exempt | 21,318.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Aguiar Rodriguez Carlos Roberto | F-InKind | 6,520.00 | $24.63 | $160,588 |
| 2026-03-02 | Aguiar Rodriguez Carlos Roberto | M-Exempt | 21,318.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Sienko David C | M-Exempt | 23,881.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Sienko David C | F-InKind | 7,294.00 | $24.63 | $179,651 |
| 2026-03-02 | Sienko David C | M-Exempt | 23,881.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Allen Kurt | M-Exempt | 21,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Allen Kurt | F-InKind | 5,541.00 | $24.63 | $136,475 |
| 2026-03-02 | Allen Kurt | M-Exempt | 21,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Brown Robert Denis | M-Exempt | 25,050.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Brown Robert Denis | F-InKind | 13,402.00 | $24.63 | $330,091 |
| 2026-03-02 | Brown Robert Denis | M-Exempt | 25,050.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Lawlar Russell Douglas | M-Exempt | 29,609.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Lawlar Russell Douglas | F-InKind | 14,377.00 | $24.63 | $354,106 |
| 2026-03-02 | Lawlar Russell Douglas | M-Exempt | 29,609.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-06 | Allen Kurt | S-Sale | 9,560.00 | $22.00 | $210,353 |
| 2026-01-06 | Allen Kurt | S-Sale | 42,659.00 | $21.89 | $933,656 |
| 2026-01-06 | Allen Kurt | J-Other | 23,774.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:42pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-22 | $0.00 | 2026-05-01 | 2026-05-22 | 2026-06-10 |
| 2026-03-09 | $0.00 | 2026-02-13 | 2026-03-09 | 2026-03-24 |
| 2025-11-24 | $0.00 | 2025-11-03 | 2025-11-24 | 2025-12-08 |
| 2025-08-22 | $0.00 | 2025-08-06 | 2025-08-22 | 2025-09-04 |
| 2025-05-23 | $0.00 | 2025-05-01 | 2025-05-23 | 2025-06-10 |
| 2025-03-10 | $0.00 | 2025-02-13 | 2025-03-10 | 2025-03-24 |
| 2024-11-21 | $0.01 | 2024-11-06 | 2024-11-21 | 2024-12-04 |
| 2024-08-26 | $0.01 | 2024-08-06 | 2024-08-26 | 2024-09-05 |
| 2024-05-23 | $0.01 | 2024-05-08 | 2024-05-24 | 2024-06-11 |
| 2024-03-11 | $0.01 | 2024-02-14 | 2024-03-12 | 2024-03-25 |
| 2023-11-22 | $0.01 | 2023-11-06 | 2023-11-24 | 2023-12-07 |
| 2023-08-23 | $0.01 | 2023-08-08 | 2023-08-24 | 2023-09-07 |
| 2023-05-19 | $0.01 | 2023-05-10 | 2023-05-22 | 2023-06-09 |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.01 | 2023-02-15 | 2023-03-09 | 2023-03-24 |
| 2022-11-23 | $0.00 | 2022-11-09 | 2022-11-25 | 2022-12-07 |
| 2022-08-18 | $0.01 | 2022-08-04 | 2022-08-19 | 2022-09-02 |
| 2022-05-24 | $0.01 | 2022-05-10 | 2022-05-25 | 2022-06-10 |
| 2022-03-08 | $0.01 | 2022-02-22 | 2022-03-09 | 2022-03-18 |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.01 | 2021-11-03 | 2021-11-19 | 2021-12-03 |
| 2021-08-20 | $0.01 | 2021-08-04 | 2021-08-23 | 2021-09-03 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw tape tells a clearer story than the synthesis is giving credit for, but also a more dangerous one. Hecla printed $1.42B in 2025 revenue versus $929.9M in 2024 and $720M in 2023 — that's not operational genius, it's silver going from ~$24 to ~$35 and gold ripping to record highs. The quarterly progression is the tell: rev climbed $261M → $304M → $409M → $448M through 2025 as metals re-rated, then Q1 2026 already snapped back to $411M with a $19M net *loss*. One quarter doesn't make a trend, but a swing from 30% net margin to -4.6% in a single quarter on flattish revenue screams either a write-down, hedge mark, or cost inflation hitting — and that is exactly the kind of print that exposes "high-growth profitable" as a misclassification. The rule-based archetype is wrong; pre-flight got it right calling this commodity-leveraged-cyclical.
That said, the synthesis verdict ("Disconnected from Fundamentals," 60% growth implied, priced like a tech stock) overstates the case in one important way. EV/EBITDA of 11.3x is not a tech multiple — it's roughly in line with where Pan American, First Majestic, and other silver primaries trade at mid-cycle. The 36x P/E and 8.8x P/S look terrifying only because they're calculated against either the depressed Q1 print or the peak 2025 numbers respectively; on normalized mid-cycle earnings (call it $150-200M NI assuming silver settles $28-30), you're at 50-65x, which IS rich, but the market isn't pricing a 60% perpetual growth rate — it's pricing the option value of silver staying elevated. Market Forces calling for a short is too aggressive: $562M operating CF and $310M FCF in 2025 are real, the balance sheet has $241M cash, and the current ratio of 2.7 says no near-term distress. "Weak cash flow quality" is wrong on the 2025 print — OCF/NI was 1.75x, which is excellent for a miner.
The contrarian case nobody's voicing: if silver actually does break $40 and hold (plausible given central bank gold buying, solar demand at ~200Moz/yr, and a structural mine supply deficit), Hecla's operating leverage means 2026 could print $1.7B+ revenue and $450M+ NI, and the stock is suddenly 22x forward earnings on a primary silver producer with Greens Creek — which is genuinely a top-tier asset. The bear synthesis is treating the silver thesis as obviously wrong; it isn't obviously wrong, it's just unknowable. The insider activity is also being misread as neutral — what I see is exclusively M-Exempt option exercises with F-InKind tax withholdings and an A-Award grant. There are zero open-market sells in this list. That's not "insiders selling at highs" as Market Forces claimed; that's routine comp vesting. Market Forces is factually wrong on that point.
Where I land: the synthesis is directionally right that this is mispriced to the upside of a silver thesis that may not hold, but the magnitude of the dislocation is overstated and the Q1 2026 loss is the more important data point everyone is glossing over. A $9.91B market cap on a company that just printed a quarterly loss while silver is still near cycle highs is the actual red flag — it suggests cost structure is deteriorating (labor, diesel, lower-grade ore) and the 2025 margin peak may already be in the rearview. Mid-cycle fair value on 4-5% FCF yield against normalized $250-300M FCF is roughly $6-7.5B equity, or $9-11/share. You only get to $14.78 by underwriting sustained $32+ silver. I dissent partially from the synthesis: not "disconnected from fundamentals" — more like "priced for a commodity scenario that's possible but not probable, with a fresh quarterly miss the market hasn't digested." Don't short a silver miner into a potentially extending metals cycle, but don't own it here either.
GPT Critique
In examining Hecla Mining's recent financial data, what strikes me is the dramatic rise in revenue from $720.2 million in 2023 to $1.42 billion in 2025, a jump of nearly 97%. This growth aligns with the significant increase in silver prices, highlighting Hecla's sensitivity to commodity prices rather than operational improvements. The Q1 2026 results, however, show a concerning reversal with a net loss of $19 million despite revenues remaining robust at $411.4 million, suggesting either a temporary hiccup or a sign of cost pressures, perhaps from operational inefficiencies or increased input costs. The 2025 free cash flow of $310.2 million and operating cash flow of $562.6 million indicate strong cash generation, but the negative net income in Q1 2026 can't be ignored as it might foreshadow future issues if silver prices don't remain elevated.
Opus argues that Hecla is overvalued based on normalized metal assumptions, pegging fair value at $9-11 per share. I concur with this assessment, primarily because the company's high earnings in 2025 seem unsustainable without continued high commodity prices. The AI's analysis points out that while Hecla's current pricing is consistent with other silver producers like Pan American and First Majestic, its P/E of 36x and P/S of 8.8x are high. I agree with Opus here, as these multiples reflect a market pricing in continued high silver prices rather than a stable business model. The suggestion that Hecla is priced for a growth rate that cannot be maintained without a sustained high in silver prices is also valid.
However, I diverge from Opus's dismissal of the synthesis's narrative of "Disconnected from Fundamentals." While Opus rightly notes that Hecla's EV/EBITDA multiple is in line with peers, the broader narrative of a company being priced like a tech stock isn't entirely misplaced given the high P/E and P/S ratios and the market's speculative nature on silver's future. Furthermore, Opus’s counterargument regarding insider transactions being routine does not fully dispel concerns about market sentiment being overly optimistic. The absence of open-market sales doesn't negate the fact that insider moves can still reflect strategic positioning rather than confidence in the current valuation.
A skeptic might argue both analyses overestimate the risks and potential of Hecla's dependency on silver prices. The Q1 loss might be an anomaly, or a short-term reaction to operational adjustments rather than a long-term trend. Additionally, the potential for silver to rise above $40 is not entirely off the table given geopolitical tensions and increasing industrial demand, which could justify higher valuations.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell a coherent story: Lens 1 at -5 says this is an honestly-run, balance-sheet-fine cyclical with no moat and a 4.9% dilution drag, and Lens 2 at -68 says the market is paying a franchise multiple for peak-cycle silver economics. I don't fight that combination. A 'Solid' business at 25–30% above through-cycle fair value, where the bull case is essentially 'silver keeps ripping,' is not a position I want to initiate — that's a commodity bet dressed up as a stock pick, and if I want silver leverage I can express it more cleanly.
Playbook: zero position today, on the watchlist with a hard alert at $11. I get interested with a starter (roughly 0.5% of book) at $11, scale to a full ~1.5–2% position into the $8–9 zone if we get a silver pullback that takes HL down with the tape but the balance sheet stays pristine — that's where the cyclical-trough trade actually pays. I do NOT chase strength here; the only thing that flips me to buying up is structural evidence silver has re-rated (sustained $40+ silver with producer discipline holding), and even then I'd rather pay up for proven quality than reach for HL. Until price or the commodity moves, this is a pass.
Hecla's 2025 numbers are extraordinary: revenue jumped from $929.9M to $1.42B (+53%), gross margin expanded from 21.3% to 43.7%, operating margin hit 37.7%, and net income swung to $321.7M with $310.2M of FCF. Earnings quality screens clean — OCF/NI of 2.16x, accruals at -5.9% of assets, and an Altman Z of 7.1 indicate the reported profits are backed by cash and the balance sheet is sturdy (net cash $32.6M, no external funding required). The Beneish flag at -1.1 is the kind of false positive you'd expect when a miner's margins inflect violently on commodity prices, not a manipulation signal in isolation.
The trouble is the four-year context: 2022 and 2023 were money-losing years (-$37.3M and -$84.2M net income, negative FCF both years), and 2024 FCF was a token $3.8M. This is a price-taking silver/precious metals producer whose 'high-growth profitable' label is really 'silver-price profitable.' Layer on a 4.9% diluted share CAGR (542M → 656M shares, +21% over four years) with buybacks recovering just 14.1% of SBC, and a large chunk of the per-share benefit from the 2025 windfall is being quietly siphoned to the share count. Insider tape is neutral-to-soft: zero open-market buys, only routine option exercises with tax-withholding and small awards, plus $9.4M of sales over 12 months — nothing screaming conviction at the top.
Durability is fundamentally tied to silver/gold prices and mine-level execution, not a defensible moat. The business is well-run within its category — clean accounting, self-funded, safe Z-score — but it is cyclical, dilutive, and only recently profitable on a sustained basis.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Decomposition of the 2025 margin expansion: how much is realized silver/gold price vs. volume vs. AISC reduction vs. inventory revaluation?
- AISC (all-in sustaining cost) trend by mine — is the cost structure structurally lower or just benefiting from price leverage?
- Reserve/resource life and replacement: is the company replacing reserves or harvesting them?
- Hedging book and any forward sales that could cap or distort realized prices
- Composition of 4.9% share growth — what portion is SBC vs. M&A equity issuance vs. ATM offerings?
- Detail behind the Beneish flag: DSRI, GMI, and TATA components for 2025
- Capex sustainability: $310M FCF is after what level of sustaining vs. growth capex?
Hecla is a cyclical silver miner whose gross margin swung from 15.7% to 43.7% on the silver rally. The market cap of ~$9.9B implies investors are capitalizing peak-cycle earnings as if they're durable. On a normalized basis — averaging the boom margin with mid-cycle reality — deserved value sits meaningfully below the current quote. The Company-Quality lens explicitly flagged this is commodity leverage, not franchise value, which means peak EPS deserves a low-to-mid single-digit multiple, not a growth multiple.
Without an e2e fair-value print, I anchor on the structure: silver miners historically trade at wide P/NAV and EV/EBITDA bands tied to the metal price. Buying at $14.78 requires silver to stay near current strength indefinitely — that's the heroic assumption. A sober deserved value, blending current cash flows with a mid-cycle silver deck and recognizing per-share dilution history, lands somewhere in the $10–12 zone. That's a ~15–30% overpay, not a screaming short, but no margin of safety.
High earnings quality (score 2) helps — the reported numbers are believable — but believable peak earnings still shouldn't be extrapolated. Net: fairly-to-richly priced, leaning rich.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Realized silver price assumptions in guidance vs spot
- All-in sustaining cost (AISC) per ounce trend
- Share count trajectory — historical dilution to fund growth
- Reserve life and grade trend at Greens Creek and Lucky Friday
- Hedging book — how much of the uplift is locked in vs spot-exposed