Business Description
Levi Strauss & Co. stands as a prominent global clothing enterprise, actively involved in the conceptualization, promotion, and distribution of an extensive collection of apparel and related accessories. Their comprehensive product line includes denim, casual and formal trousers, athletic wear, tops, shorts, skirts, dresses, jackets, footwear, and various other accessories, all designed to appeal to men, women, and children across the Americas, Europe, and Asia. The company markets its offerings under several renowned brands, such as Levi's, Dockers, Signature by Levi Strauss & Co., and Denizen. Furthermore, Levi Strauss & Co. extends its reach by granting licenses for its Levi's and Dockers trademarks to be utilized across an expanded array of product categories, including footwear, belts, small leather goods, outerwear, knitwear, dress shirts, children's apparel, sleepwear, and hosiery. The distribution of its merchandise occurs through a multifaceted approach: via independent retailers like major department stores, specialized boutiques, third-party e-commerce platforms, and franchised outlets dedicated to its brands. Concurrently, the company fosters a direct relationship with consumers through its own network of mainline and clearance stores, proprietary online sales portals, and select in-store concessions situated within larger retail environments. In total, Levi Strauss & Co. directly manages approximately 3,100 brand-specific stores and shop-in-shops. Established in 1853, the firm maintains its corporate headquarters in San Francisco, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 10, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.46
Total Equity: $2.28B
Shares: 399,749,260
Total Debt: $1.04B
Cash: $757.90M
EBITDA: $888.90M
Total Debt: $1.04B
Cash: $757.90M
Revenue: $6.28B
Revenue: $6.28B
Revenue: $6.28B
Total Equity: $2.28B
Tax Rate: 20.8%
Equity: $2.28B
Total Debt: $1.04B
Cash: $757.90M
Current Liabilities: $2.03B
Long-Term Debt: $1.04B
Total Debt: $1.04B
Total Equity: $2.28B
Shares: 399,749,260
Shares: 399,749,260
CapEx: -$221.40M
Shares: 399,749,260
Stock Price: $23.57
Net Income: $578.10M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.8B | $6.2B | $6.2B | $6.4B | $6.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.4B |
| Gross Profit | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $3.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $3.2B |
| Operating Income | $686.2M | $646.5M | $353.3M | $264.1M | $677.6M |
| Net Income | $553.5M | $569.1M | $249.6M | $210.6M | $578.1M |
| EBITDA | $796.3M | $834.2M | $476.4M | $454.0M | $888.9M |
| EPS | $1.38 | $1.43 | $0.63 | $0.53 | $1.46 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $810.3M | $429.6M | $398.8M | $690.0M | $757.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Total Assets | $5.9B | $6.0B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $6.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.0B | $984.5M | $1.0B | $994.0M | $1.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $4.2B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $4.6B |
| Total Equity | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $737.3M | $228.1M | $435.5M | $898.4M | $545.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$166.9M | -$267.1M | -$313.6M | -$227.5M | -$221.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $570.4M | -$39.0M | $121.9M | $670.9M | $324.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$390.9M | $0 | -$12.1M | -$34.4M | $217.8M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$85.9M | -$175.7M | -$8.1M | -$90.1M | -$150.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$687.3M | -$380.7M | -$30.8M | $291.2M | $67.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$6.2B $6.2B – $6.2B
|
$6.7B $6.7B – $6.7B
|
$7.0B $7.0B – $7.1B
|
$7.4B $7.4B – $7.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$701.8M $700.7M – $702.9M
|
$754.3M $752.0M – $756.5M
|
$791.2M $787.8M – $798.0M
|
$838.2M $838.2M – $838.2M
|
| Net Income |
$529.9M $525.2M – $534.5M
|
$603.5M $592.2M – $620.2M
|
$668.9M $640.2M – $696.6M
|
$775.9M $739.8M – $812.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.0% | +0.2% | +2.9% | -1.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +6.0% | -0.9% | +8.5% | +1.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -5.8% | -45.4% | -25.2% | +156.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +2.8% | -56.1% | -15.6% | +174.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +4.8% | -42.9% | -4.7% | +95.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:05am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | Peter E. Haas Jr. Family Fund | C-Conversion | 145,662.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Peter E. Haas Jr. Family Fund | C-Conversion | 145,662.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Peter E. Haas Jr. Family Fund | S-Sale | 145,662.00 | $24.01 | $3.5M |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Margaret E. | C-Conversion | 47,721.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Margaret E. | C-Conversion | 47,721.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Margaret E. | S-Sale | 47,721.00 | $24.01 | $1.1M |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Robert D. | C-Conversion | 488,851.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Robert D. | C-Conversion | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Robert D. | C-Conversion | 488,851.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Robert D. | C-Conversion | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-10 | Haas Robert D. | C-Conversion | 3,182.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Robert D. | S-Sale | 488,851.00 | $24.11 | $11.8M |
| 2026-06-10 | Haas Robert D. | S-Sale | 3,182.00 | $24.00 | $76,368 |
| 2026-06-11 | Haas Robert D. | C-Conversion | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Haas Robert D. | J-Other | 361,468.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Haas Robert D. | J-Other | 361,468.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Haas Robert D. | J-Other | 419,815.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Haas Robert D. | J-Other | 591,753.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Haas Robert D. | J-Other | 591,753.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Haas Robert D. | J-Other | 419,815.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-22 | $0.14 | 2026-04-07 | 2026-04-22 | 2026-05-06 |
| 2026-02-10 | $0.14 | 2026-01-28 | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-25 |
| 2025-10-20 | $0.14 | 2025-10-09 | 2025-10-20 | 2025-11-04 |
| 2025-07-24 | $0.14 | 2025-07-10 | 2025-07-24 | 2025-08-08 |
| 2025-04-24 | $0.13 | 2025-04-07 | 2025-04-24 | 2025-05-09 |
| 2025-02-12 | $0.13 | 2025-01-29 | 2025-02-12 | 2025-02-28 |
| 2024-10-29 | $0.13 | 2024-10-02 | 2024-10-29 | 2024-11-14 |
| 2024-08-02 | $0.13 | 2024-06-26 | 2024-08-02 | 2024-08-20 |
| 2024-05-08 | $0.12 | 2024-04-03 | 2024-05-09 | 2024-05-23 |
| 2024-02-06 | $0.12 | 2024-01-25 | 2024-02-07 | 2024-02-23 |
| 2023-10-25 | $0.12 | 2023-10-05 | 2023-10-26 | 2023-11-09 |
| 2023-08-03 | $0.12 | 2023-07-06 | 2023-08-04 | 2023-08-17 |
| 2023-05-03 | $0.12 | 2023-04-06 | 2023-05-04 | 2023-05-18 |
| 2023-02-07 | $0.12 | 2023-01-25 | 2023-02-08 | 2023-02-23 |
| 2022-11-03 | $0.12 | 2022-10-05 | 2022-11-04 | 2022-11-21 |
| 2022-07-29 | $0.12 | 2022-07-07 | 2022-08-01 | 2022-08-17 |
| 2022-05-05 | $0.10 | 2022-04-06 | 2022-05-06 | 2022-05-24 |
| 2022-02-08 | $0.10 | 2022-01-26 | 2022-02-09 | 2022-02-24 |
| 2021-10-28 | $0.08 | 2021-10-06 | 2021-10-29 | 2021-11-17 |
| 2021-07-30 | $0.08 | 2021-07-08 | 2021-08-02 | 2021-08-18 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: TTM revenue runs roughly $6.51B (sum of last four quarters: 1.74+1.77+1.54+1.45), up from $6.28B FY25 and $6.36B FY24 — essentially flat for three years. The real story isn't growth, it's margin recovery. FY25 operating income hit $677.6M (10.8% op margin) vs $264.1M (4.2%) in FY24 — a 2.5x jump on flat revenue. Net income $578M vs $211M. That's the entire bull case in one line: SG&A discipline and DTC mix shift restored the operating model to roughly its FY21-22 level ($646-686M op income). The question isn't whether the turnaround happened — it did — it's whether 10.8% op margin is the new normal or a peak.
The synthesis verdict of $11.36 fair value (implying -52% downside) strikes me as too aggressive and likely anchored on a stale or punitive DCF. At $23.57 and TTM EPS in the ~$1.55-1.60 range, the P/E is ~15x; EV/EBITDA at 11.3x is mid-range for branded apparel. ROE 28% and ROIC 11% are legitimately good. A $11 fair value implies ~7x earnings on a brand-led business throwing off $324M FCF (3.5% FCF yield) with a 2.4% dividend. That's pricing in margin reversion AND secular decline AND multiple compression simultaneously. I dissent. The market-forces "neutral" read and the narrative layer's "fragile premium" framing are more honest than the DCF — Levi is fully priced, not 50% overvalued.
That said, the contrarian-to-the-bulls case is real and the prior models underweight it. Recent revenue YoY is -1.2% with FY25 down from FY24; the 52% earnings CAGR is mathematically meaningless because it's bouncing off a depressed 2024 base (Q2/Q3 2024 net margins were 1.3-1.4% — clearly one-time inventory/restructuring charges). Normalize and you get a company that has grown revenue ~2% annually since 2021 ($5.76B → $6.28B = 2.2% CAGR over four years) while op margin oscillated between 4% and 11%. The Q1 FY26 print (10.1% margin on $1.74B) is encouraging but Q2 FY26 already shows margin compression to 8.9% on higher revenue — exactly the pattern you'd expect if tariff costs and promotional intensity are starting to bite. The insider activity is also a red flag the models flagged but didn't quantify: eight J-Other transactions on 2026-06-04 totaling ~3.9M shares is substantial — at $23.57 that's ~$92M. J-Other is ambiguous (could be trust distributions, not open-market sales), but the cluster timing right after the margin-recovery narrative crystallized deserves more skepticism than the models give it.
Where the data is thin: no total debt or total equity figures provided, which makes the EV calculation and the 3.87 P/B unverifiable from the tile alone. Capex of $221M against $545M OCF gives a 40% reinvestment rate that's reasonable but doesn't leave huge room for buybacks alongside the dividend (~$95M annually). Macro headwinds flag matters: apparel is discretionary, tariff exposure on Asian sourcing is real, and consumer cyclical names typically de-rate before fundamentals roll. The "accelerating quarterly trend" signal is misleading — Q1 FY26 was strong but Q2 already softened sequentially in margin terms. I'd anchor fair value at 12-14x normalized earnings of ~$1.50-1.70 = $18-24, putting current price at the top of fair range, not 2x overvalued. The synthesis is directionally right (no upside) but the magnitude is wrong, and that matters because it implies a short thesis the fundamentals don't support.
GPT Critique
In evaluating Levi Strauss & Co., my analysis of the raw data focuses on the consistent revenue figures juxtaposed with fluctuating profit margins. The revenue of $6.51B over the past TTM shows stability, but not growth, which is critical in a mature market like apparel. The standout metric is the dramatic recovery in net income from $210.6M in 2024 to $578.1M in 2025, driven by operational efficiency rather than top-line growth. The margin recovery from 4.2% to 10.8% highlights significant SG&A cost control and the benefits of a direct-to-consumer (DTC) strategy. However, the sequential decline in margins from 10.1% to 8.9% in the recent quarter signals potential headwinds, possibly from increased tariffs or promotional pressures.
Regarding Opus's analysis, I agree with the assertion that the $11.36 fair value from the synthesis seems overly pessimistic. Levi's current P/E ratio of ~15x and EV/EBITDA of 11.3x are not indicative of a company in distress, especially with a robust ROE of 28% and a respectable FCF yield. The strong financial metrics suggest that Levi's is not grossly overvalued, as Opus rightly concludes. However, Opus's fair value range of $18-22 seems slightly conservative given the brand's historical resilience and recent financial performance. My valuation would place fair value slightly higher, closer to $20-24, reflecting the stabilized operational performance and brand strength.
Disagreeing with Opus's dismissal of the insider transactions, I believe these deserve more scrutiny. The significant volume of J-Other transactions totaling approximately $92M, even if they are not direct market sales, suggests a strategic shift or distribution that could indicate insider uncertainty about the future. This aligns with my concerns about potential margin pressures and macroeconomic headwinds, such as tariff impacts and consumer spending volatility.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my views underestimate the potential for continued margin expansion through DTC channels and international growth opportunities. They might also point to the possible undervaluation of the brand's cultural and historical significance, which could sustain a premium valuation despite short-term challenges.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell a coherent story: Lens 1 says this is a clean, self-funding, mildly shrinking-share-count denim franchise (+28, Solid) — exactly the kind of name I'm happy to own, just not at any price. Lens 2 says the tape is already paying for the bull case (-79, Rich): every honest method lands $11–$19, and even crediting the quality premium I get to ~$18-19 deserved, against $23.57 today. That's a 'great brand, wrong entry' setup, not a buy and not a short. The 2023–24 OpM air pocket (4.2%) is too recent for me to underwrite the 10.8% as a new floor, and flat ~2% revenue CAGR means I'm not getting bailed out by growth.
Playbook: zero position here, on the watchlist with real intent. I start a 25-bp starter nibble at $18 (anchored-PE deserved value, also a ~25% pullback), scale to a 75-bp position at $16 (the value lens's 'interesting' line), and go to a full 150–200 bp position below $14 where the composite FV and EPV floor give me genuine margin of safety. What flips me aggressive earlier: two more quarters confirming OpM holding double-digits plus continued GM expansion toward 62%+ — that would let me raise deserved value and meet the price partway. What keeps me sidelined or pushes me to trim if I ever own it: any consumer-discretionary wobble or wholesale destock that reopens the margin air pocket. Not shorting — buybacks and brand are real, and shorting +28 quality names rarely pays.
Levi's is a mature, self-funding consumer brand: FY2025 revenue of $6.28B, gross margin expanded to a multi-year high of 61.7% (from 58.1% in 2021), and operating margin recovered to 10.8% after collapsing to 4.2% in FY2024. Earnings quality looks clean — OCF/NI of 1.74x, accruals at -2.2% of assets, Beneish M of -2.38, and Altman Z of 3.05 all sit firmly in the safe zone. Net income of $578M on $324M FCF in FY2025 is normal for a working-capital-heavy apparel business.
Capital discipline is a genuine positive: diluted shares fell from 409.8M (2021) to 399.7M (2025), a -0.6% CAGR, with buybacks running 150% of SBC and SBC at just 1.3% of revenue — per-share value is being concentrated, not leaked. Liquidity is adequate ($849M cash) but the company carries $190M net debt, so the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion. The biggest quality wart is the FY2023–2024 margin air pocket (OpM 5.7% then 4.2%, FCF swinging from -$39M to +$671M to $324M), which suggests the franchise is still cyclically and inventory-sensitive despite the brand heritage.
The insider tape looks alarming at first glance (11 sells, 0 buys) but is dominated by Haas family trust J-Other transfers and small C-Conversion/S-Sale pairs — estate/trust mechanics on a founding family, not informed selling. Worth noting but not a quality red flag in itself.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- What drove the FY2023–24 operating margin collapse to 4.2% — promotional pressure, wholesale destocking, or one-time restructuring?
- Wholesale vs. DTC mix and whether the 2025 GM of 61.7% is sustainable or boosted by DTC mix shift / lower freight
- Customer concentration with major wholesale partners (Kohl's, Macy's, Amazon)
- Inventory days and aging — to confirm the FY2024 FCF surge was a healthy unwind, not a markdown bridge
- Dual-class share structure and Haas family voting control implications
- Detail on the 2026-06-04 Robert D. Haas J-Other transactions (estate planning vs. economic disposition)
- Debt maturity ladder behind the $190M net debt position
The composite fair value sits at $11.30 (signal-adjusted $11.36), implying ~52% downside from $23.57. Even the most generous method — anchored P/E at $18.97 — still sits ~20% below the current price, while DCF ($8.02) and EPV floor ($10.19) suggest the cash-generative reality of a mid-single-digit-margin apparel business is worth far less than the tape. Earnings quality is high, so I don't get to haircut the FV further — the gap is real, not a quality illusion.
The Company-Quality lens calls this 'Solid' (28) — mature, clean, improving gross margins, shrinking share count — which legitimately raises deserved value toward the anchored-PE figure near $19. But $19 is still below $23.57. To justify today's price you have to underwrite a sustained re-rating: DTC mix continuing to lift gross margin, operating margin recovering well past the 4.2% air pocket, and Gen-Z heritage-denim demand persisting through a consumer slowdown. That's the bull narrative priced as fact.
Margin of safety is negative on every method. This isn't an obvious short — the brand is real and buybacks help — but at $23-24 you're buying the renaissance, not the business. Fairly-priced-to-rich, with the asymmetry tilted down.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for operating margin — does management underwrite a return to 8%+ OpM, and on what timeline?
- DTC vs wholesale mix trajectory and the gross-margin contribution split
- Inventory and promotional cadence — any sign of channel stuffing or markdown pressure that would haircut earnings quality
- Pace and price of buybacks vs SBC dilution; net debt trajectory
- Same-store/comparable sales by region, especially US wholesale where fast-fashion competition bites hardest