Business Description
monday.com Ltd., along with its affiliated entities, designs and provides software solutions for a global market, spanning the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and other international regions. Its flagship offering is Work OS, an intuitive cloud-native visual work operating system constructed from configurable modules. This platform empowers users to assemble bespoke software applications and effective work management tools. The company further supplies dedicated product solutions catering to various functions, including marketing, customer relationship management (CRM), project coordination, and software engineering. Additionally, monday.com delivers comprehensive business development, presales, and customer support services. Its client base is broad, encompassing diverse organizations, educational and governmental institutions, and specific business divisions within larger enterprises. Founded in 2012, the firm was initially known as DaPulse Labs Ltd. before rebranding to monday.com Ltd. in November 2017. It maintains its corporate headquarters in Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel.
Business History
Generated: Jun 9, 2026 7:14pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.31
Total Equity: $1.25B
Shares: 53,086,984
Total Debt: $168.77M
Cash: $1.50B
EBITDA: $12.06M
Total Debt: $168.77M
Cash: $1.50B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Total Equity: $1.25B
Tax Rate: -100.2%
Equity: $1.25B
Total Debt: $168.77M
Cash: $1.50B
Current Liabilities: $714.87M
Long-Term Debt: $142.95M
Total Debt: $168.77M
Total Equity: $1.25B
Shares: 53,086,984
Shares: 53,086,984
CapEx: -$20.36M
Shares: 53,086,984
Stock Price: $83.23
Net Income: $118.74M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $308.2M | $519.0M | $729.7M | $972.0M | $1.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $39.0M | $66.5M | $80.6M | $103.7M | $133.1M |
| Gross Profit | $269.1M | $452.5M | $649.1M | $868.3M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $395.3M | $604.5M | $687.6M | $889.3M | $1.1B |
| Operating Income | -$126.1M | -$152.0M | -$38.6M | -$21.0M | -$1.7M |
| Net Income | -$129.3M | -$136.9M | -$1.9M | $32.4M | $118.7M |
| EBITDA | -$123.2M | -$120.1M | $12.8M | $58.0M | $12.1M |
| EPS | $-3.09 | $-2.99 | $-0.04 | $0.65 | $2.31 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $886.8M | $885.9M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $913.5M | $923.8M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $933.2M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $228.2M | $298.2M | $416.0M | $575.6M | $714.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $142.9M |
| Total Liabilities | $229.8M | $359.3M | $462.1M | $655.3M | $859.8M |
| Total Equity | $703.4M | $679.7M | $813.5M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$445.7M | -$582.5M | -$584.4M | -$552.0M | -$433.3M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $16.4M | $27.1M | $215.4M | $311.1M | $333.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.8M | -$19.0M | -$10.5M | -$15.2M | -$20.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.6M | $8.1M | $204.9M | $295.8M | $313.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $129,000 | $0 | $0 | -$6.0M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$135.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $755.0M | $-918,000 | $230.2M | $295.5M | $91.5M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.0B
|
$2.3B $2.3B – $2.4B
|
$2.3B $2.3B – $2.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$662.7M $654.9M – $678.3M
|
$771.8M $771.8M – $771.8M
|
$888.5M $879.9M – $917.5M
|
$883.3M $874.8M – $912.1M
|
| Net Income |
$277.0M $232.8M – $321.1M
|
$329.2M $263.7M – $394.6M
|
$392.0M $387.1M – $408.7M
|
$476.2M $470.2M – $496.4M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +68.4% | +40.6% | +33.2% | +26.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +68.1% | +43.4% | +33.8% | +26.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -20.5% | +74.6% | +45.5% | +91.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -5.9% | +98.6% | +1,824.7% | +266.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +2.6% | +110.7% | +353.4% | -79.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:17pm (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | George James Case | M-Exempt | 2,948.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | George James Case | M-Exempt | 2,949.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | George James Case | M-Exempt | 5,897.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-02 | George James Case | S-Sale | 1,773.00 | $90.79 | $160,966 |
| 2026-03-18 | HORING JEFF | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | HORING JEFF | 707.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Iohan Gili | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Iohan Gili | 707.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Faier Ronen | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Faier Ronen | 707.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Nawi Shiran | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Nawi Shiran | 23,785.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Nawi Shiran | 5,329.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Nawi Shiran | 8,852.00 | $9.38 | $83,032 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Nawi Shiran | 12,550.00 | $211.78 | $2.7M | |
| 2026-03-18 | Nawi Shiran | 9,787.00 | $120.51 | $1.2M | |
| 2026-03-18 | Mann Roy | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Mann Roy | 1,229.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Mann Roy | 2,866.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Mann Roy | 36,537.00 | $211.78 | $7.7M |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent read first: this is a clean SaaS compounder with no debt, $1.5B cash (35% of market cap), 89% gross margins, and FCF that's gone from negative to $313M in four years. Q1'26 revenue of $351M is +24.4% YoY off Q1'25's $282M, but the more telling number is the sequential cadence: $268→$282→$299→$317→$334→$351M is decelerating on a percentage basis (sequential growth ~5-6% per quarter, down from ~7%). Annual revenue went $519→$730→$972→$1,230M — a 33% '25 print. That's the actual story: 25% forward growth with 25% FCF margins on a $4.3B EV-ex-cash basis. At ~$2.8B EV ex-cash against $313M FCF, you're paying ~9x FCF for a Rule-of-50 SaaS. That is not a premium; that is cheap if the trajectory holds.
The synthesis call of "Reasonable Premium" understates how dislocated this is. A 33x TTM P/E on GAAP earnings is misleading because GAAP net income is whipsawed by SBC and tax items — note Q4'25 NI of $76.7M vs Q3'25 of $13.1M and Q2'25 of $1.6M, which screams discrete items rather than operating volatility (Q1'26 op margin still essentially zero on the annual basis, NI $28M). The right frame is EV/FCF and EV/sales ex-cash: ~9x and ~2.3x respectively. Compare to ASAN (unprofitable, ~3x sales), TEAM (~10x sales), HUBS (~10x sales) — MNDY is trading like the market thinks growth is going to 15% within 18 months. The pre-flight read that the market is pricing deceleration is correct; the synthesis verdict that this is a "reasonable premium" is the part I dissent from. At 25%+ growth and 25% FCF margins, fair multiple is 6-8x sales, implying $130-170/share.
The contrarian case I'd actually take seriously: (1) Q1'26 sequential growth of 5.2% ($334→$351M) is the slowest sequential print in the dataset — if Q2'26 prints ~$365M, you're at 22% YoY and the deceleration narrative becomes the dominant one, and SaaS multiples compress hard in that regime (see ASAN, DOCU, ZM precedents). (2) The 89% gross margin and "platform" framing obscures that monday competes with Atlassian, Asana, Smartsheet, ClickUp, Notion AND increasingly with AI-native agents that could compress workflow-tool TAM. The bear narrative — "best-of-breed in a function, not an OS" — is empirically supported by NRR trends every SaaS analyst tracks (not in this file, which is a real gap). (3) GAAP operating margin of -0.14% in 2025 despite $1.23B revenue means SBC is doing massive work; the $313M FCF includes the SBC addback. On a true economic basis (FCF minus SBC), this company is materially less profitable than the headline suggests. That single adjustment can cut "fair value" by 30-40%.
Data gaps that matter: no NRR/DBNR, no customer count trajectory, no enterprise vs SMB mix, no SBC figure, no debt line (likely zero, but unconfirmed), no equity line, and the insider data is uninterpretable (no insider names, no dollar values, mostly option exercises with one tiny 1,773-share sale — calling this "neutral" is generous; it's actually no-signal). The "Macro Headwinds" and "Below Sector Benchmarks" tags contradict the bullish synthesis without explanation. The Q4'25 NI spike to $76.7M (23% margin) followed by Q1'26 reverting to 8% suggests the TTM P/E is flattered by a one-time item — strip it out and trailing GAAP P/E is closer to 50-60x, which reframes the "33x is cheap" view. I'd want the SBC number before committing capital.
Net: I dissent from "Reasonable Premium" but only halfway toward "Undervalued." The fundamentals support $110-130 fair value if you trust 22-25% forward growth and FCF holds. The sequential deceleration in Q1'26 and the unknown SBC drag are the two things that could break the thesis. At $83, you're being paid to take that risk, but it's not a fat pitch — it's a 30-50% upside trade
GPT Critique
My independent analysis of monday.com reveals a nuanced story characterized by strong financial fundamentals but some concerning trends in growth metrics. The company has demonstrated impressive revenue growth over the years, with a CAGR of nearly 30%, and has turned its financials around, moving from a net loss of $136.9M in 2022 to a net income of $118.7M in 2025. The gross margins remain remarkably high at 89%, and the free cash flow has increased significantly, marking a strong shift toward profitability. However, the sequential revenue growth is showing signs of deceleration, with recent quarters reflecting a slowdown in percentage growth from 7% to around 5-6%, suggesting potential challenges in maintaining its high growth momentum.
In examining the claims made by Claude Opus, I find agreement in several areas. Opus highlights the company's robust cash position and lack of debt, which indeed provides a solid foundation for future investment and stability. The note on the company's high gross margins and the transition to profitability aligns with my findings, indicating strong operational efficiency. I also concur with Opus's assessment that the market is pricing in growth deceleration, as evidenced by the significant price drop from $317 to $83 and the modest P/S multiple of 3.5x. However, where I diverge from Opus is in the valuation outlook. While Opus sees the current EV/FCF and EV/sales ex-cash multiples as indicative of significant undervaluation, I remain cautious due to the sequential growth slowdown and the competitive pressures that could impact future earnings.
Opus contends that the market's narrative of deceleration is correct but underestimates the implied undervaluation. I disagree here, suggesting that the fair value range of $110-130 may be optimistic given the data. The sequential decline in growth rates and potential competitive threats from AI-native agents are significant risks that could further compress multiples. Moreover, the absence of specific metrics such as NRR and SBC figures makes it challenging to assess the true economic profitability accurately. I believe that the "Reasonable Premium" verdict is more appropriate, given these uncertainties.
A careful skeptic might argue that both perspectives overlook the potential impacts of broader macroeconomic factors and sector-specific headwinds, which the analysis flags but does not fully explore. Additionally, the lack of transparency in insider transactions and key customer metrics could suggest hidden vulnerabilities not captured in the financials.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses are telling me exactly what I'd expect from a beloved SaaS name: a 100 quality score (fortress balance sheet, ~89% gross margins, FCF > net income, 41% revenue CAGR) colliding with a -18 valuation score that says the market already knows. At $83 vs a deserved ~$85–90, I'm getting maybe a 5% cushion against deceleration risk, competitive pressure from Asana/Jira/Smartsheet/HubSpot, and a quiet ~4.5%/yr SBC tax on per-share value. That's not enough. The 'attractive below $65' line is the real number — that's where a 20%+ discount opens up and the platform optionality becomes a free call rather than something I'm paying for.
My play: open a quarter-weight starter here (~25% of target, call it 1% of book on a 4% full position) just so I'm on the tape and forced to do the work each quarter — I don't want to be the PM who watched a compounder run from the sidelines waiting for a perfect print. Then I scale: add another quarter in the low-$70s, go to half-weight at $68, and back up the truck toward full weight in the low-$60s. I flip aggressive earlier only if NDR re-accelerates or enterprise mix visibly inflects — that's the platform thesis becoming real instead of optionality. I trim or pause adds if SBC dilution accelerates past 5% or growth prints sub-20% without margin offset. Net-net: high-quality name, fair price, patient hand.
monday.com is a textbook high-quality SaaS compounder by the numbers. Revenue has gone from $308M (2021) to $1.23B (2025) — a ~41% CAGR — with gross margin stable in an elite ~89% band. Operating margin has marched from -40.9% to roughly breakeven (-0.1%) while net income flipped to $118.7M and FCF scaled from $2.6M to $313.3M. That is real operating leverage on a software cost structure, not financial engineering.
The balance sheet is a fortress: $1.67B liquid cash, $1.50B net cash (~39% of market cap), Altman Z 3.9, and FCF that fully self-funds growth. Earnings quality looks clean — FCF ($313M) actually exceeds GAAP net income ($119M), the inverse of the manipulation profile the Beneish flag hints at; the M-score flag is almost certainly an artifact of rapid revenue/asset growth in a scaling SaaS, not real aggressiveness.
The one genuine quality drag is per-share economics. Diluted share count grew from 44.5M to 53.1M (~4.5% CAGR), and buybacks recover only ~33% of SBC, meaning repurchases are partial mop-up rather than capital return. Insider tape is benign — mostly option exercises, awards and tax withholding, with one small $161K sale; no directional signal.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- SBC as % of revenue and trend — module shows 0%, which is implausible and likely a data error; check 10-K for true SBC intensity
- Net revenue retention / dollar-based retention disclosure to confirm growth is expansion-driven, not pure new-logo
- Customer concentration and enterprise vs SMB mix — durability of moat depends on it
- DSO and deferred revenue trends to confirm Beneish flag is benign scaling, not channel stuffing
- Buyback authorization size and cadence — whether management intends to neutralize dilution going forward
- International/geographic exposure given Israeli HQ — any operational risk concentration
monday.com at $83.23 (~$4.3B market cap) carries roughly $1.5B in net cash, so the enterprise is being valued near $2.8B against a business growing revenue in the high-20s/low-30s% with ~89% gross margins and positive FCF. On EV/sales terms that's a mid-single-digit multiple — not demanding for a self-funding SaaS at this scale, but also not a steal. The e2e synthesis labels this a 'Reasonable Premium,' which matches my read: deserved value sits roughly in line with the current price, perhaps slightly above given the cash cushion and FCF trajectory.
What's priced in: continued mid-20s% growth, sustained best-of-breed positioning, and gradual FCF margin expansion. What's NOT obviously priced in: the 'visual OS / platform monopoly' bull case — meaning if monday truly becomes a horizontal work platform, there's upside, but that's optionality, not a margin of safety. Offsetting: ~4.5% annual share dilution from SBC quietly taxes per-share value, which I treat as a real haircut to deserved price.
Net: I see maybe a single-digit % gap at best, well inside the noise band. This is the textbook 'good company the market understands.' No edge to press at $83; I'd want a real discount before calling it cheap.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for revenue growth and FCF margin — any deceleration below ~25% would meaningfully cut deserved value
- Net dollar retention trend — bull case dies if NDR drops below ~110%
- SBC as % of revenue and net dilution rate in latest 10-Q
- Enterprise (>$50K ARR) customer count growth — the platform thesis lives or dies here
- Operating margin trajectory ex-SBC vs reported