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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for monday.com Ltd. (MNDY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-14): Designation Watch · Cairn score +45 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 61 · Value 31 · Sentiment -62 (timing only, not weighted) · Flagged: Valuation methods disagree 5.7x — too uncertain to confirm as a Gem. · Composite fair value $132.49 vs $87.15 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
monday.com Ltd.
MNDY NASDAQmonday.com Ltd. is a technology company that provides a cloud-based work management platform used by organizations to plan, track, and manage workflows across teams and departments. Its core product is a highly visual Work OS built from modular building blocks that allow users to create customized applications and work management tools without needing extensive technical expertise. The platform supports a wide range of use cases, including project and portfolio management, marketing campaigns, software development, customer relationship tracking, IT service management, and operations coordination. Delivered as software-as-a-service, monday.com integrates with numerous third-party tools and serves as a connective layer that centralizes data, collaboration, and automation across an organization’s digital ecosystem. Customers typically pay on a per-seat basis across different pricing tiers, making the platform adaptable for small teams through to large enterprises. Headquartered in Tel Aviv, Israel, monday.com operates globally and serves customers across multiple regions and industries seeking greater transparency, coordination, and efficiency in their day-to-day work.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 14| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 10, 2026 | $1.11 | $1.48 +33.3% | — | — |
| May 11, 2026 | $0.93 | $1.15 +23.7% | — | — |
| Feb 3, 2026 | $3.32 | $3.33 +0.3% | — | — |
| Jan 23, 2026 | $1.61 | $1.87 +16.1% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 10, 2026 | SCHEDULE 13G | View |
| Aug 10, 2026 | 6-K | View |
| Aug 6, 2026 | 6-K | View |
| Jul 22, 2026 | 6-K | View |
| Jul 17, 2026 | 6-K | View |
| Jul 2, 2026 | 6-K | View |
| Jun 16, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 16, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Jun 3, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 11, 2026 | 6-K | View |
| Apr 6, 2026 | SCHEDULE 13G/A | View |
| Mar 18, 2026 | 3 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
monday.com Ltd. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 5 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-03-13, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.24
Total Equity: $1.25B
Shares: 53,086,984
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.50B
EBITDA: $12.06M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.50B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Total Equity: $1.25B
Tax Rate: -100.2%
Equity: $1.25B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.50B
Current Liabilities: $714.87M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.25B
Shares: 53,086,984
Shares: 53,086,984
CapEx: -$20.36M
Shares: 53,086,984
Stock Price: $87.15
Net Income: $118.74M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $308.2M | $519.0M | $729.7M | $972.0M | $1.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $39.0M | $66.5M | $80.6M | $103.7M | $133.1M |
| Gross Profit | $269.1M | $452.5M | $649.1M | $868.3M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $395.3M | $604.5M | $687.6M | $889.3M | $1.1B |
| Operating Income | -$126.1M | -$152.0M | -$38.6M | -$21.0M | -$1.7M |
| Net Income | -$129.3M | -$136.9M | -$1.9M | $32.4M | $118.7M |
| EBITDA | -$123.4M | -$143.4M | -$29.6M | -$9.2M | $12.1M |
| EPS | $-4.53 | $-2.99 | $-0.04 | $0.65 | $2.31 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-4.53 | $-2.99 | $-0.04 | $0.62 | $2.24 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $886.8M | $885.9M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $913.5M | $923.8M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $933.2M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $228.2M | $298.2M | $416.0M | $575.6M | $714.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $229.8M | $359.3M | $462.1M | $655.3M | $859.8M |
| Total Equity | $703.4M | $679.7M | $813.5M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$445.7M | -$582.5M | -$584.4M | -$552.0M | -$433.3M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $16.4M | $27.1M | $215.4M | $311.1M | $333.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$11.6M | -$16.0M | -$7.9M | -$13.2M | -$20.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.8M | $11.1M | $207.5M | $297.9M | $313.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$135.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $755.0M | $-918,000 | $230.2M | $295.5M | $91.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +68.4% | +40.6% | +33.2% | +26.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +68.1% | +43.4% | +33.8% | +26.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -20.5% | +74.6% | +45.5% | +91.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -5.9% | +98.6% | +1,824.7% | +266.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -16.3% | +79.4% | +69.0% | +231.4% |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers: MNDY did $1.23B in 2025 revenue, up 26.8% YoY from $972M, with GAAP net income swinging from $32M to $119M and FCF at $313M (25.5% FCF margin). Gross margin is 89.2%. Operating margin is still essentially zero (-$1.7M) — the $119M NI is largely tax benefits and interest income on the $1.5B cash pile, not operating leverage. Zero debt, current ratio 2.5, no capex intensity ($20M). At $3.68B market cap, subtract $1.5B cash → ~$2.2B EV against $313M FCF is ~7x EV/FCF and ~1.8x EV/sales. That is genuinely cheap for a 27%-growing, 89% gross margin SaaS business with real cash generation. The revenue 3-yr CAGR of ~30% is decelerating (26.8% most recent) but not collapsing.
Where I part ways with the models: the synthesis verdict of $162 signal-adjusted fair value (+86%) is directionally right but overstated. A more disciplined frame — 25x FCF on $313M growing to ~$400M in 2026 — gets you to ~$8-10B EV, or roughly $230-250 per share on the current share count. But that assumes FCF conversion holds, growth stays >20%, and stock-based compensation doesn't dilute the story. SBC is the elephant nobody named: for SaaS at this scale, SBC typically runs 20-25% of revenue, meaning $250-300M/year — which would swamp the reported $313M FCF if you adjusted for it. The GAAP operating loss of -$1.7M despite $119M net income tells you SBC is doing real economic damage that the FCF number papers over. Neither the synthesis nor the narrative layer engaged with this, and it's the single biggest reason the market is pricing this at 12x FCF rather than 25x.
The narrative layer's "fallen angel" framing is accurate but the bear case is stronger than they credit. Growth deceleration from ~30% CAGR to 26.8% recent YoY is the beginning, not the end, of the S-curve descent — Asana, Smartsheet, and Atlassian have all shown that mid-20s growth becomes mid-teens fast once you saturate the mid-market. Microsoft Loop and Planner bundled into M365 is a genuine structural threat that a standalone $1.2B revenue tool cannot out-distribute. The insider activity shown is all small sales and option exercises — neutral is fair, but I'd note the absence of open-market buying at $87 despite the stock being 69% off its $280 peak; if management thought $162 was fair value, we'd see a buyback authorization or insider accumulation. Neither has materialized meaningfully. The pre-flight note about "founder departure in 2023" mentioned in the narrative deserves more weight than assigned — Roy Mann's reduced role is real and the co-CEO structure creates ambiguity.
Contrarian read that no model made: what if 2025's $119M NI is a peak-flatter, not a launching pad? The tax rate normalizing, interest income compressing if they deploy cash, and SBC continuing to grow with headcount could mean 2026 GAAP NI is flat or down even on 20% revenue growth. The 38.9x P/E is not obviously cheap in that scenario. Also, "Below Sector Benchmarks" in secondary signals is a real flag the synthesis brushed past — if peers are trading at similar or better multiples with better growth, MNDY isn't uniquely mispriced, it's fairly priced within a compressed cohort. I dissent from the +86% call but agree with the directional undervalued read. Fair value on FCF-times-multiple math is closer to $120-135, not $162, and the path there requires (a) 2026 revenue >$1.5B (22%+ growth), (b) FCF margin holding above 22%, and (c) SBC growth decelerating. Miss any two and you're stuck at $85-95. I'd take a starter position here with the acknowledgment that the asymmetry is favorable but not the layup the synthesis implies. The 26.8% growth on $1.2B base with $313M FCF and $1.5B net cash is a legitimately good business at a legitimately reasonable price — just not a screaming bargain.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is how radically the valuation changes once you stop treating monday.com like a conventional SaaS multiple story and instead treat the balance sheet as part of the equity value. At $3.68B market cap against $1.50B of cash and no debt, enterprise value is only about $2.18B. On 2025 revenue of $1.23B, that is just 1.8x EV/revenue for a business still growing 26.8% and converting that revenue into $333.6M of operating cash flow and $313.3M of free cash flow. That is not a normal setup for a software company with 89.2% gross margin. The income statement says “barely breakeven” at the operating line, but the cash flow statement says this business has already crossed into real economic profitability. Even if stock-based comp is helping that gap, the scale of cash generation relative to EV is hard to dismiss: FCF is roughly 14% of EV and 8.5% of market cap.
The operating story is also better than the headline “high-growth profitable” label suggests, because the improvement has been both fast and consistent. Revenue went from $308.2M in 2021 to $1.23B in 2025, almost a 4x increase, while operating loss narrowed from -$126.1M to just -$1.7M. Net income moved from -$129.3M to +$118.7M over that period. Importantly, this is not a company needing leverage or financial engineering to get there; it carries zero debt and still built a cash pile equal to about 41% of its market cap. The market is effectively saying the core operating business is worth barely more than 6.5x 2025 FCF, which would make sense for a low-growth, ex-growth software asset, not one still compounding revenue around 30% annually over four years. The contradiction I see is that the stock is priced as though growth durability is badly impaired, but the reported numbers do not yet show that kind of impairment.
I also think some of the uglier reported multiples are misleading rather than cautionary. The 38.9x P/E looks expensive until you remember that net income is still depressed by the transition period between growth-at-all-costs and scaled profitability, while EV/EBITDA at 180.9x is essentially useless because EBITDA is near zero by construction. EV/revenue is the cleaner lens here, and 1.77x for this quality of gross margin and cash generation is simply cheap. Price/book at 3.7x is also not stretched given that book value is inflated by cash rather than by fragile acquired intangibles. If the business merely sustains low-20s growth and keeps FCF margins in the mid-20s, the current valuation leaves room for material upside without requiring any heroic multiple expansion.
The best case against this view is that monday.com may be a classic “optically cheap because the moat is weaker than it looks” software name. The market narrative of a visual workflow tool facing pressure from Microsoft, Atlassian, Asana, and AI-native products is not trivial. Workflow software can be sticky, but it can also be bundled away or rationalized in tougher IT budgets. The fact that operating margin in 2025 was still slightly negative at -0.1% despite $1.23B of revenue tells you the business has not yet proven durable GAAP operating leverage. If recent growth of 26.8% is already on the way to the mid-teens, then 1.8x EV/revenue may not be a bargain but an appropriate multiple for a decelerating, competitively exposed application layer vendor. I also take seriously the warning signs embedded in the outside commentary: if retention is weaker than best-in-class SaaS and if enterprise concentration is meaningful, the cash generation could prove less resilient than the last year suggests.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual print shows revenue growth slipping below 20% while FCF falls materially from the current $313.3M run-rate or operating losses widen again from the near-breakeven 2025 level, then this deserves to stay cheap and possibly get cheaper. Likewise, if cash generation is being flattered by working-capital timing and not repeatable unit economics, that will show up quickly in OCF. On the other hand, if monday.com delivers another year around $1.5B revenue with even modest positive operating margin and sustains $350M+ of FCF, then the current valuation is too low by a wide margin. At that point, even a conservative 3x-4x EV/revenue framework would support a meaningfully higher equity value.
Grok Reading
monday.com just printed $1.23B in 2025 revenue at a 26.8% growth clip, 89.2% gross margins, and $313M of free cash flow, yet the market assigns it an enterprise value of roughly $2.2B—an EV/revenue multiple of 1.77x. That is the central absurdity in the tape. Five years ago this was a $308M revenue business losing $129M; the path from there is clean: revenue CAGR near 30%, operating losses collapsing from $152M in 2022 to essentially breakeven (−$1.7M) in 2025, and FCF converting at a 25%+ margin on sales. Net income flipped from −$1.9M to $118.7M in two years, though roughly half that swing is interest income on the $1.50B net-cash fortress (zero debt). Still, cash generation is real and high-quality—capex is a trivial $20M—so the $313M FCF figure is not accounting fiction. At $87 the stock trades at roughly 12x FCF and under 4x sales on a market-cap basis; strip the cash and you are paying mid-single-digit FCF multiples for a still-growing application software franchise. The valuation synthesis composite near $132–$162 is directionally right; the market is pricing permanent mid-teens growth decay and zero operating leverage from here, neither of which the last four years of P&L support.
The deceleration is real and must be respected: year-over-year growth has stepped down from 68% to 41% to 33% to 27%. That is the classic SaaS maturation curve, not a collapse. At $1.2B scale with 89% gross margins and a land-and-expand motion still intact, even 22–25% growth would leave the stock cheap on almost any normalized multiple. Rule-based classification correctly tags it high-growth profitable; the EV/EBITDA of 181 is noise because EBITDA is still hugging zero on the way through operating breakeven. ROE of 9.5% and ROIC of 1.4% look pedestrian only because the balance sheet is bloated with idle cash and the income statement has not yet reflected full operating leverage. Once that cash is either deployed or returned, reported returns will re-rate mechanically. Insider activity is noise—option exercises followed by modest sales, nothing systematic.
The strongest bear case starts with the same deceleration chart and adds competitive reality. Microsoft Teams/365, Atlassian, and Asana are not theoretical threats; they have deeper enterprise distribution and can bundle workflow for free. If net retention slips materially below the cited ~67% or top-customer concentration (flagged near 20% of ARR) produces a visible churn event, the 27% growth rate can gap down into the teens faster than the model assumes. Operating margin is still −0.1%; the leap to the 30–40% EBITDA margins bulls sketch requires continued sales efficiency and no AI-native disruptor repricing the category. The “fallen angel” narrative is sticky for a reason—the stock is down roughly 70% from its $280 peak, founder visibility faded after 2023, and SaaS multiple compression has been indiscriminate. A smart opponent would also note that $119M of net income is flattered by the cash yield; true operating earnings power is closer to the FCF line only if growth investment can be dialed back without killing the top line. Those points have merit, but they are already more than discounted at 1.8x EV/sales and an 8.5% FCF yield on market cap. I weigh the cash-flow trajectory and fortress balance sheet more heavily than the competitive overhang because the numbers have already demonstrated operating leverage while growth remained above 25%.
Growth sustaining above 22% with FCF margins holding north of 20% through 2026 would confirm the re-rating case; a print below 18% revenue growth or FCF dropping under $250M would force a reset toward fair value nearer the current price. Enterprise win-rate data and any clarity on capital return (buybacks against $1.5B cash) are the near-term swing factors.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
monday.com is executing at a high level operationally. Revenue compounded from $308M (2021) to $1.23B (2025) - roughly 4x in four years - while gross margin held at an elite ~89%. Operating margin climbed from -40.9% to essentially breakeven (-0.1%), and net income turned positive at $118.7M with FCF of $313.3M (a ~25% FCF margin). The balance sheet is a fortress: $1.67B liquid cash, zero net debt, Altman Z of 3.48, and the business is self-funding. Earnings quality checks are clean (Beneish -2.4, no accrual red flags noted).
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net revenue retention and customer concentration disclosed in the 10-K
- SBC trajectory and whether management has guided to declining SBC as a percent of revenue
- Details of any convertible or warrant instruments contributing to share count growth
- Segment/geographic mix and enterprise vs SMB customer trends
- Whether the 15% diluted share CAGR is decelerating in the most recent quarters
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $132 and the signal-adjusted at $162, implying 51-86% upside from $87.15. I trust the DCF anchor ($152) more than the EPV floor ($26) - EPV punishes a company still investing heavily for growth and materially understates a business generating $313M of cash on 89% gross margins. Sanity-checking: at $3.68B market cap, netting out $1.67B cash gives an EV near $2.0B on a business that is growing rapidly and produces $300M+ in cash - that is roughly 6-7x EV/FCF for a Rule-of-40 SaaS, which is objectively low.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next-quarter net revenue retention and enterprise ARR growth - to test whether deceleration is stabilizing or accelerating
- SBC as a percent of revenue and net share count trajectory - key to per-share value math
- Operating margin guidance and free cash flow conversion - to validate the DCF trajectory
- Enterprise segment growth vs SMB - customer mix shift affects durability
The macro tape is nominally neutral-to-mildly-positive, but that read is deceiving for a name like MNDY. With a 1.25 beta, a 10y at 4.68%, and a market PE of 26.9, high-multiple SaaS is exactly the cohort that gets penalized whenever the tape wobbles — and the S&P sitting 1.6% off highs with VIX creeping to 16 is the kind of low-grade pressure that leaks straight into unprofitable-narrative software. The dominant force here is the 'fallen-angel' narrative: moderate intensity, moderate durability, low cult. Translation — nobody is defending this stock with a story. It is stuck in the SaaS de-rating cohort where multiples were reset and have not re-expanded, and the bear case (Microsoft encroachment, AI-native disruptors, growth deceleration) is the ambient framing investors default to. Recent tape confirms this: MNDY drifted down 3.4% on 7/21 on no news, and slid again into a rising market on 7/30. Drifting lower on green days is a classic negative-sentiment tell. The Aug 1 earnings print is the immediate pressure point — pre-print positioning looks defensive, and in a de-rated SaaS cohort the market punishes any deceleration far more than it rewards a beat. Momentum is technically strong on a multi-year view, but the near-term flow is against the name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Aug 1 earnings reaction — beat-and-raise punished vs rewarded tells you if the SaaS de-rating is still active
- Net retention print (currently ~67% NRR headline in bear case) — any further slippage feeds the deceleration narrative
- Any sector rotation back into unprofitable/high-multiple SaaS (ARKK, IGV relative strength)
- VIX behavior above 18 would meaningfully amplify pressure on a 1.25-beta name
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.