Business Description
Omada Health is an American virtual health company that delivers evidence-based digital programs designed to manage common chronic ailments, including cardiometabolic, musculoskeletal, and behavioral health conditions, offering continuous support that bridges the gap between in-person medical appointments.
Business History
Generated: Jun 5, 2026 1:15pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 12:08am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.22
Total Equity: $229.68M
Shares: 58,429,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $222.04M
EBITDA: -$4.75M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $222.04M
Revenue: $260.21M
Shares: 58,429,000
Revenue: $260.21M
Revenue: $260.21M
Revenue: $260.21M
Total Equity: $229.68M
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $229.68M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $222.04M
Current Liabilities: $75.73M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $229.68M
Shares: 58,429,000
Shares: 58,429,000
CapEx: -$1.32M
Shares: 58,429,000
Stock Price: $17.14
Net Income: -$12.78M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 12:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $89.2M | $122.8M | $169.8M | $260.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | $46.4M | $52.8M | $66.9M | $89.3M |
| Gross Profit | $42.8M | $70.0M | $102.9M | $170.9M |
| Operating Expenses | $115.1M | $136.0M | $146.5M | $182.9M |
| Operating Income | -$72.4M | -$66.0M | -$43.7M | -$12.0M |
| Net Income | -$72.5M | -$67.5M | -$47.1M | -$12.8M |
| EBITDA | -$64.0M | -$58.4M | -$37.8M | -$4.8M |
| EPS | $-1.30 | $-1.21 | $-0.85 | $-0.22 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 12:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $168.1M | $115.6M | $76.4M | $222.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $188.6M | $142.9M | $113.1M | $272.9M |
| Total Assets | $221.8M | $175.1M | $150.9M | $305.4M |
| Current Liabilities | $34.5M | $43.8M | $54.0M | $75.7M |
| Long-Term Debt | $28.9M | $29.4M | $29.8M | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $66.2M | $76.2M | $86.3M | $75.7M |
| Total Equity | $155.6M | $98.9M | $64.6M | $229.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$329.3M | -$396.8M | -$444.0M | -$456.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 12:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$69.0M | -$49.7M | -$34.2M | $18.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.7M | -$2.9M | -$3.9M | -$1.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$71.7M | -$52.7M | -$38.0M | $16.9M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$55.4M | -$52.5M | -$39.3M | $145.6M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 9:09pm (2h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$392.5M $388.7M – $396.3M
|
$467.0M $466.7M – $467.4M
|
$505.0M $497.7M – $514.4M
|
$577.0M $568.7M – $587.7M
|
| EBITDA |
-$140.7M -$142.0M – -$139.3M
|
-$167.4M -$167.5M – -$167.3M
|
-$181.0M -$184.4M – -$178.4M
|
-$206.8M -$210.7M – -$203.9M
|
| Net Income |
$12.1M $11.8M – $12.3M
|
$40.4M $39.6M – $41.3M
|
$0 | $0 |
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 12:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +37.7% | +38.3% | +53.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +63.5% | +47.0% | +66.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +8.8% | +33.9% | +72.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +6.9% | +30.2% | +72.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +8.8% | +35.2% | +87.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 9:09pm (2h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | Duffy Sean P. | F-InKind | 4,422.00 | $17.93 | $79,286 |
| 2026-06-05 | Duffy Sean P. | G-Gift | 9,450.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-05 | Cook Steven L. | F-InKind | 2,010.00 | $17.93 | $36,039 |
| 2026-06-05 | Shao Wei-Li | F-InKind | 1,843.00 | $17.93 | $33,045 |
| 2026-04-08 | Shao Wei-Li | S-Sale | 2,829.00 | $12.71 | $35,946 |
| 2026-04-05 | HILLEMAN JERYL L | A-Award | 1,544.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-05 | ROOT JONATHAN D | A-Award | 882.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-05 | Klapstein Julie D | A-Award | 698.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-05 | FETTER TREVOR | A-Award | 955.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-13 | Cook Steven L. | S-Sale | 1,884.00 | $13.94 | $26,263 |
| 2026-03-05 | Gracey Craig | A-Award | 16,470.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Cook Steven L. | A-Award | 147,058.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Shao Wei-Li | A-Award | 264,705.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Duffy Sean P. | A-Award | 323,529.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-09 | Duffy Sean P. | S-Sale | 3,863.00 | $14.32 | $55,299 |
| 2026-03-09 | Duffy Sean P. | S-Sale | 200.00 | $14.89 | $2,977 |
| 2026-03-05 | Shao Wei-Li | F-InKind | 2,105.00 | $13.60 | $28,628 |
| 2026-03-05 | Cook Steven L. | F-InKind | 2,228.00 | $13.60 | $30,301 |
| 2026-03-05 | Duffy Sean P. | F-InKind | 4,983.00 | $13.60 | $67,769 |
| 2026-01-12 | Duffy Sean P. | M-Exempt | 230,479.00 | $2.55 | $587,721 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw trajectory here is genuinely striking and I want to lead with what the numbers actually show before grading the models. Quarterly revenue went $41.2M → $45.5M → $48.0M → $55.0M → $61.4M → $68.0M → $75.8M → $78.0M, which is roughly 89% growth over seven quarters with sequential acceleration through Q4 2025 and then a notable deceleration to +2.9% QoQ in Q1 2026. Net margin compressed from -25.9% to -3.8% over the same window, and 2025 delivered $18.3M operating cash flow and $16.9M FCF against a $12.8M GAAP net loss — so the cash conversion is actually better than GAAP, not worse as "Poor Cash Flow Quality" suggests (likely SBC-driven, which is real dilution but not a quality flag in the traditional working-capital-games sense). Gross margin sits at 65.7%, up from 48% in 2022. This is a legitimate inflection, not a manufactured one.
Now the skeptical read. That Q1 2026 sequential print is the single most important number in the file and the models are underweighting it. Going from +11.5% QoQ (Q4) to +2.9% QoQ (Q1) is a violent deceleration, and Q1 swung back to a net loss of $3.0M after a positive Q4. Digital health has Q1 seasonality (employer benefit cycles, enrollment timing), but a 75% sequential growth collapse plus margin reversal is exactly the kind of print that breaks pre-profit-platform narratives. The synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" hedges this; the Pre-Flight thesis of "rapidly improving unit economics" was written looking at the 2024→2025 arc and doesn't reckon with Q1 2026. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag in Secondary Signals is the only model that caught it, and it should be louder.
On valuation, $1.08B market cap on $260M of 2025 revenue is 4.15x P/S, and on a forward run-rate of ~$320M (annualizing Q1) it's ~3.4x. That is not cheap for a business that just printed a -3.8% margin and decelerated to sub-3% sequential growth. The Narrative layer is correct that this is "unanchored" — $222M cash is real and provides downside support (~$3.70/sh in net cash), but the remaining ~$14.50/sh of equity value is paying for the assumption that the Q4 2025 trajectory resumes. The contrarian argument writes itself: Teladoc trades at 1.5x sales after its growth broke, Hims at ~3x with higher growth, and if OMDA's growth has actually stepped down to a 15-25% annualized pace rather than 50%+, fair value compresses toward $11-13 fast. The insider activity (heavy March 2026 awards of 750K+ shares followed by small sales) is normal post-IPO comp vesting, not a signal either way, but the dilution is real.
I dissent modestly from the synthesis. The models collectively lean constructive-with-caveats; I think the caveats deserve top billing. The bull case requires Q2 2026 to reaccelerate above $85M and demonstrate that Q1 was a seasonality artifact — if that prints, the stock re-rates to $24-28 quickly. The bear case is that Q1 was the first honest look at a saturating employer-channel business with a one-time GLP-1 tailwind that's now lapping, and the company settles into 20% growth at breakeven, worth maybe $11-12. At $18.18 the risk/reward is roughly symmetric but the catalyst is entirely binary on the next print. I would not pay 3.4x forward sales for a business whose growth rate just halved in one quarter without seeing the next data point. Net cash floor caps downside around $12-13; story-driven upside caps around $25 absent a true breakout. That's a coin flip, not a high-conviction setup, and the synthesis label "High Conviction Required" essentially means "don't buy this unless you have non-public conviction" — which is the same as saying pass for most readers.
GPT Critique
Omada Health's financial trajectory reveals a company experiencing rapid revenue growth while battling profitability challenges. The sequential revenue growth from $41.2M in Q2 2024 to $78.0M in Q1 2026 is impressive, representing an 89% increase over seven quarters. This growth is accompanied by a significant narrowing of net margins from -25.9% to -3.8%, indicating improved operational efficiency. However, the Q1 2026 sequential growth of just 2.9% from the previous quarter's 11.5% raises concerns about sustained momentum. The swing back to a net loss of $3.0M after a profitable Q4 2025 also suggests volatility in earnings stability. Omada's gross margin improvement to 65.7% underscores its potential for eventual profitability, but the current negative EBITDA and net margins highlight the ongoing challenges in achieving consistent positive net income.
I align with Opus's emphasis on the critical importance of the Q1 2026 deceleration. Opus states, "That Q1 2026 sequential print is the single most important number," and I concur. The sharp drop in growth rate is indeed a red flag, potentially indicating a deeper issue beyond mere seasonality. Opus's skepticism about the "rapidly improving unit economics" narrative, given the recent financial setback, is well-founded. However, I diverge on the interpretation of Omada's cash flow quality. While Opus acknowledges better cash conversion due to positive operating cash flow, I see the "Poor Cash Flow Quality" flag as indicative of potential underlying issues such as significant stock-based compensation, which can dilute shareholder value over time despite positive cash flow metrics.
Regarding valuation, I agree with Opus's assessment that Omada's pricing at a 4.15x P/S ratio is not inexpensive, especially given the recent growth deceleration and margin challenges. The comparison to Teladoc and Hims is apt, highlighting the risk of a potential valuation compression if Omada's growth rate stabilizes at a lower trajectory. The market's reliance on narrative rather than fundamentals is a concern, as emphasized in the Delvantic AI Findings. However, I believe Opus underestimates the potential for narrative-driven re-rating if Q2 2026 shows a strong rebound, given the sector's propensity for rapid shifts based on sentiment and perceived future potential.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and my analysis overly focus on short-term fluctuations without adequately considering Omada's long-term strategic position in the healthcare information services industry. They might suggest that the company's cash reserves and improving unit economics provide a buffer against temporary setbacks, and that the true value lies in its potential to capitalize on the broader shift towards digital health solutions over the coming years.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
I like the business more than I like the setup. The quality work (66, Strong) is doing exactly what I want a Lens-1 to do: it caught a real operating-leverage inflection — gross margin to 65.7%, op margin from -81% to -4.6%, FCF positive a year before GAAP, and almost no dilution doing it. That combination in recent digital-health IPOs is rare; the comp set (TDOC, HIMS-ex, Hinge-private) mostly bought growth with shares. Fortress balance sheet ($222M cash, no debt, 20% of cap) means I'm not underwriting financing risk, just execution risk. Without a Lens-2 score in hand, I'm treating valuation as neutral-to-slightly-rich at $17.93 — sub-$1.1B EV on $260M revenue and a credible path to GAAP breakeven is not expensive, but it's not the screaming bargain that would let me skip the durability question.
Play: I open a starter at 25-33% of target weight here, sized so I'm happy if it drops 30%. I add aggressively in two cases — (1) pullback to $13-14 (roughly 0.8x sales, where the quality score does the heavy lifting on its own), or (2) one more print confirming the trajectory: a quarter with >25% revenue growth and a positive GAAP op line, which would validate moat-via-execution and let me pay up to $22-24 for a full position. I trim or exit if revenue growth decelerates below 20% while op margin stalls negative — that combination would mean the leverage story is topping out before profitability, and the unproven-moat finding from Lens-1 becomes the dominant fact. No options, straight equity; the insider sell tape is too small to act on but it's why I'm not front-loading.
Omada is a pre-profit growth story where the trajectory is doing the talking: revenue scaled from $89M (2022) to $260M (2025), a 43% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 48% to 65.7% and operating margin compressed from -81% to -4.6%. Net loss narrowed from -$72.5M to -$12.8M and FCF flipped from -$71.7M to +$16.9M in 2025. That is textbook operating leverage in a SaaS-like healthcare model, and it is happening without meaningful dilution — diluted share count went from 55.7M to 58.4M (1.6% CAGR) with SBC only 5% of revenue, which is unusually disciplined for a recently public digital-health name.
The balance sheet is a fortress for a company this size: $222M liquid cash, zero net debt, Altman Z of 7.97, and now self-funding. Earnings quality screens clean (Beneish -2.6, accruals -7.6% of assets — accruals are negative, meaning cash trails reported losses favorably, not the red-flag direction). The OCF/NI of 0.25x flagged by the module is mechanically noisy because NI is still negative; the more meaningful read is that FCF turned positive a full year ahead of GAAP profitability.
What keeps this from 'Fortress' grade: the business has only just crossed breakeven on cash, durability of the moat is unproven (chronic-care digital programs face employer/PBM channel risk and competition from Teladoc/Hinge/Virta), and insider activity is award-heavy with only token open-market sales — informative but not a strong positive signal. One year of positive FCF doesn't yet prove a durable model.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer/employer concentration and net revenue retention disclosed in the 10-K
- Whether the FCF turn is sustained or one-time helped by working-capital timing (deferred revenue swings)
- GLP-1 exposure — how much of 2025 revenue growth is GLP-1 companion program vs core diabetes/hypertension
- Contract renewal rates and pricing trends with PBMs and self-insured employers
- SBC trajectory in absolute dollars and whether 5% of revenue holds as growth normalizes
- Any convertible or preferred overhang from pre-IPO rounds not visible in basic share-count math
At $17.93 and a ~$1.08B market cap, Omada is being valued as a scaling digital-health platform that has already turned the operating-leverage corner (op margin -81% → -4.6%). The e2e synthesis flags 'High Conviction Required,' which is the polite way of saying the fair-value methods are noisy because the company isn't profitable yet — DCFs run on assumptions, and multiples on negative EBIT are meaningless. What I can anchor on: a fortress balance sheet (so cash-adjusted EV is meaningfully below the $1.08B cap) and a credible path to breakeven, against an unproven TAM-capture rate in a fragmented buyer market.
Deserved value for a clinically-validated, growing, nearly-breakeven digital-health name with clean earnings quality is plausibly in the $15–$20 zone — roughly where it trades. There is no obvious margin of safety, but there isn't an obvious bubble either. The market is paying for the inflection it can see and discounting the durability question it can't answer. That's a fair fight, not a mispricing.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward revenue guidance and implied growth rate — is the market paying >6x forward sales?
- Net cash position and quarterly burn to compute true EV and runway
- Customer concentration and net revenue retention — durability of the book
- Path to GAAP profitability timeline from management on the next call
- Any one-off items inflating the recent op-margin improvement