Business Description
Primo Water Corporation provides water direct to consumers and water filtration services in North America and Europe. It offers bottled water, purified bottled water, premium spring, sparkling and flavored water, mineral water, filtration equipment, and coffee; as well as water dispensers, and self-service refill drinking water. The company offers its products under the Primo, Alhambra, Crystal Rock, Mountain Valley, Deep Rock, Hinckley Springs, Crystal Springs, Kentwood Springs, Mount Olympus, Pureflo, Nursery, Sierra Springs, Sparkletts, Clear Mountain Natural Spring Water, Earth2O, Renü, Water Event Pure Water Solutions, Canadian Springs, Labrador Source, Decantae, Eden, Eden Springs, Chateaud'eau, and Mey Eden brands. It provides its services to residential customers, small and medium-sized businesses, and regional and national corporations and retailers. The company was formerly known as Cott Corporation and changed its name to Primo Water Corporation in March 2020. Primo Water Corporation was incorporated in 1955 and is headquartered in Tampa, Florida.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 4:00pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:57pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.16
Total Equity: $2.99B
Shares: 374,869,000
Total Debt: $5.12B
Cash: $376.90M
EBITDA: $1.08B
Total Debt: $5.12B
Cash: $376.90M
Revenue: $6.66B
Revenue: $6.66B
Revenue: $6.66B
Total Equity: $2.99B
Tax Rate: 44.6%
Equity: $2.99B
Total Debt: $5.12B
Cash: $376.90M
Current Liabilities: $1.28B
Long-Term Debt: $4.95B
Total Debt: $5.12B
Total Equity: $2.99B
Shares: 374,869,000
Shares: 374,869,000
CapEx: -$377.40M
Shares: 374,869,000
Stock Price: $22.95
Net Income: $60.10M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:03pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.1B | $1.7B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $6.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $915.9M | $674.0M | $3.3B | $3.5B | $4.5B |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.0B | $883.8M | $929.1M | $1.1B | $1.4B |
| Operating Income | $125.5M | $135.4M | $422.9M | $564.4M | $751.5M |
| Net Income | -$3.2M | $29.6M | $92.8M | -$16.4M | $60.1M |
| EBITDA | $294.2M | $328.0M | $711.7M | $693.6M | $1.1B |
| EPS | $-0.02 | $0.18 | $0.40 | $-0.07 | $0.16 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:00pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $128.4M | $78.8M | $47.0M | $614.4M | $376.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $509.8M | $538.0M | $698.0M | $1.5B | $1.2B |
| Total Assets | $3.7B | $3.7B | $5.2B | $11.2B | $10.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $709.8M | $690.6M | $782.8M | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.2B | $1.2B | $3.4B | $4.9B | $5.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.4B | $5.2B | $7.8B | $7.6B |
| Total Equity | $1.3B | $1.3B | $2.7M | $3.4B | $3.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $16.4M | -$9.4M | -$1.0B | -$1.5B | -$2.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:03pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $247.1M | $281.6M | $320.9M | $467.2M | $687.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$152.0M | -$162.1M | -$203.6M | -$150.2M | -$377.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $95.1M | $119.5M | $117.3M | $317.0M | $310.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$81.5M | $42.7M | $0 | $0 | -$29.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$48.1M | -$27.7M | -$183.6M | -$10.4M | -$421.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $13.3M | -$49.6M | -$31.8M | $567.4M | -$237.5M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:57pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$7.0B $7.0B – $7.1B
|
$7.3B $7.2B – $7.3B
|
$7.6B $7.5B – $7.6B
|
$7.8B $7.8B – $7.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.2B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.2B
|
| Net Income |
$556.1M $472.1M – $640.1M
|
$653.4M $646.7M – $660.0M
|
$772.2M $764.9M – $780.6M
|
$862.2M $854.0M – $871.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:03pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -18.3% | +177.5% | +9.7% | +29.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -11.9% | +32.7% | +19.9% | +32.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +7.9% | +212.3% | +33.5% | +33.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +1,025.0% | +213.5% | -117.7% | +466.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +11.5% | +117.0% | -2.5% | +56.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:01pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | Brimmer Andrea C | A-Award | 7,197.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | Brimmer Andrea C | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-28 | Cates Susan E. | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | STANBROOK STEVEN P | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | PAK MINSOK | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Cramer Michael John | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Fowden Jeremy SG | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Metropoulos C. Dean | A-Award | 429.00 | $19.69 | $8,447 |
| 2026-04-28 | Bomhard Britta | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Prim Billy D | A-Award | 8,887.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Metropoulos C. Dean | A-Award | 1,460.00 | $18.83 | $27,492 |
| 2026-03-31 | STANBROOK STEVEN P | A-Award | 1,593.00 | $18.83 | $29,996 |
| 2026-01-23 | Hass David W. | F-InKind | 2,719.00 | $19.26 | $52,368 |
| 2026-01-15 | PAK MINSOK | A-Award | 2,683.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-15 | PAK MINSOK | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-01-03 | Ausher Jason R | F-InKind | 3,814.00 | $16.19 | $61,749 |
| 2026-01-03 | Hass David W. | F-InKind | 18,052.00 | $16.19 | $292,262 |
| 2025-12-31 | STANBROOK STEVEN P | A-Award | 2,193.00 | $16.35 | $35,856 |
| 2025-12-31 | Metropoulos C. Dean | A-Award | 1,681.00 | $16.35 | $27,484 |
| 2025-12-10 | FOSS ERIC J | A-Award | 129,770.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:57pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | $0.12 | 2026-04-29 | 2026-06-04 | 2026-06-15 |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.12 | 2026-02-19 | 2026-03-06 | 2026-03-23 |
| 2025-11-25 | $0.10 | 2025-11-06 | 2025-11-25 | 2025-12-05 |
| 2025-08-21 | $0.10 | 2025-08-07 | 2025-08-21 | 2025-09-04 |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.10 | 2025-05-01 | 2025-06-06 | 2025-06-17 |
| 2025-03-07 | $0.10 | 2025-02-20 | 2025-03-07 | 2025-03-24 |
| 2024-11-22 | $0.09 | 2024-11-08 | 2024-11-22 | 2024-12-05 |
| 2024-11-05 | $0.82 | 2024-10-15 | 2024-11-05 | 2024-11-21 |
| 2024-08-22 | $0.09 | 2024-08-07 | 2024-08-22 | 2024-09-05 |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.09 | 2024-05-09 | 2024-06-07 | 2024-06-18 |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.09 | 2024-02-22 | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-25 |
| 2023-11-20 | $0.08 | 2023-11-02 | 2023-11-21 | 2023-12-01 |
| 2023-08-23 | $0.08 | 2023-08-10 | 2023-08-24 | 2023-09-07 |
| 2023-06-01 | $0.08 | 2023-05-04 | 2023-06-02 | 2023-06-14 |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.08 | 2023-02-22 | 2023-03-10 | 2023-03-27 |
| 2022-11-28 | $0.07 | 2022-11-09 | 2022-11-29 | 2022-12-09 |
| 2022-08-23 | $0.07 | 2022-08-10 | 2022-08-24 | 2022-09-07 |
| 2022-06-09 | $0.07 | 2022-05-11 | 2022-06-10 | 2022-06-22 |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.07 | 2022-02-23 | 2022-03-11 | 2022-03-28 |
| 2021-11-22 | $0.06 | 2021-11-03 | 2021-11-23 | 2021-12-03 |
Narrative Economics
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Both lenses are telling me the same thing from different angles. Quality at -29 says this is a real but leveraged roll-up still digesting BlueTriton — $310M FCF is trustworthy, everything else (GAAP earnings, margin structure, share count) is still settling. Valuation at -46 says 27× FCF on an $8.3B cap already prices in the consolidation/synergy bull case, and the merger debt makes EV/FCF worse than it looks. There's no edge in paying a staples multiple for non-staples-quality margins on a balance sheet sitting in Altman distress zone. The setup where I'd be wrong is fast synergy capture lifting FCF to $400M+, but I don't have to underwrite that at today's price — the market already is.
My play: zero position here, put it on the sheet with an alert at $19 and a real buy zone sub-$18.50 (the value lens's attractive-below line), conditional on FCF run-rate holding $300M+ and net debt actually coming down. At $18 with confirmed deleveraging I'd take a 1.5–2% starter and scale to 3–4% on a second leg lower or a clean post-integration quarter. Above $22 I'm not interested; chasing this into the low-$20s is paying full price for execution risk on a name where the per-share math is structurally diluted. Discipline call — patience, not conviction.
Primo Brands is the product of the Primo Water / BlueTriton merger, and the financials show it: revenue jumped from $1.69B (2022) to $4.70B (2023) to $6.66B (2025), with gross margin resetting from ~60% pre-merger to ~32% post-merger and operating margin expanding from 6% (2021) to 11.3% (2025). FCF is genuine and rising — $310M in 2025 on top of $317M in 2024 — and the business clearly self-funds at the operating level. As a regional bottled-water + delivery operator (Poland Spring, Deer Park, Mountain Valley, Primo, etc.), the franchise has scale and recurring volume, which is a defensible if not elite consumer-staples profile.
The quality concerns are structural. Net debt of ~$4.74B against $377M cash and ~$610M of normalized net income gives an Altman Z of 1.25 (distress zone for an asset-heavy bottler), and diluted shares went from 160.6M (2023) to 242.3M (2024) to 374.9M (2025) — a 23.6% CAGR that reflects merger consideration rather than ongoing SBC abuse (SBC is only 0.8% of revenue, buyback/SBC 1350%). Still, per-share value creation lags reported growth dramatically: 2025 net income of $60M across 375M shares is only ~$0.16/sh, and the OCF/NI ratio of -16x reflects how noisy GAAP earnings are versus the cleaner ~$310M FCF.
Insider activity is almost entirely director equity awards (A-codes); the lone open-market purchases by Metropoulos (~$36K total) are small enough to be symbolic rather than a conviction signal — the 'significant insider buying' framing overstates it. Net-net: a credible, cash-generating staples operator with real scale, but levered and digesting a transformational merger, with earnings quality and per-share math both still unproven post-deal.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom on the ~$4.74B net debt — when do the merger-financing tranches come due?
- Confirm 2025 share count is fully post-merger and pro-forma stable (i.e., dilution should stop, not continue at 23%/yr)
- Synergy targets and realization timeline from the Primo/BlueTriton combination — is the 11% op margin a stepping stone or near-terminal?
- Sustainability of $310M FCF: capex intensity for route trucks, water rights, and bottling capacity
- Customer/channel concentration (retail vs. direct-delivery mix) and pricing power vs. private label
- Any material legal/environmental liabilities tied to bottled-water sourcing (a recurring industry risk)
- Whether the negative OCF/NI ratio reflects merger purchase-accounting noise that will normalize
At $22.95 the market cap is ~$8.3B against ~$310M of trustworthy FCF, putting the stock around 27× FCF and ~17–18× on an EV/FCF basis once you add the merger-loaded debt. That's a full multiple for a leveraged roll-up still digesting Primo/BlueTriton, even one with genuine recurring water-delivery cash flows. The e2e read of 'Reasonable Premium' lines up with that: deserved value is close to, not far above, today's print.
The quality lens flags the real catch — 23.6% diluted share CAGR and a leveraged balance sheet — which I use to lower deserved value, not raise it. Combined with the 'Adequate/Mixed' earnings-quality haircut, I won't pay up for GAAP optics that haven't settled. The bull case (consolidation, at-home shift, margin leverage) is plausible but is already the consensus narrative embedded in a 27× FCF multiple; the bear case (commodity water, thin margins, capex) keeps deserved value from running away. Net: no meaningful margin of safety either way. I need a clear discount before this is interesting.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Run-rate post-synergy FCF guidance and merger integration cost cadence
- Net debt and leverage ratio trajectory — covenants and refi schedule
- Organic volume/price split in water delivery vs. retail bottled
- Diluted share count stabilization — any further equity issuance tied to deals
- Segment margin disclosure separating delivery (recurring) from retail (commodity)