Business Description
Range Resources Corporation operates as an independent natural gas, natural gas liquids (NGLs), and oil company in the United States. The company engages in the exploration, development, and acquisition of natural gas and oil properties. As of December 31, 2021, the company owned and operated 1,350 net producing wells and approximately 794,000 net acres under lease located in the Appalachian region of the northeastern United States. It markets and sells natural gas and NGLs to utilities, marketing and midstream companies, and industrial users; petrochemical end users, marketers/traders, and natural gas processors; and oil and condensate to crude oil processors, transporters, and refining and marketing companies. The company was formerly known as Lomak Petroleum, Inc. and changed its name to Range Resources Corporation in 1998. Range Resources Corporation was founded in 1976 and is headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 3:06pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:46pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.76
Total Equity: $4.32B
Shares: 239,789,000
Total Debt: $1.27B
Cash: $204,000
EBITDA: $1.34B
Total Debt: $1.27B
Cash: $204,000
Revenue: $2.99B
Revenue: $2.99B
Revenue: $2.99B
Total Equity: $4.32B
Tax Rate: 20.9%
Equity: $4.32B
Total Debt: $1.27B
Cash: $204,000
Current Liabilities: $661.15M
Long-Term Debt: $1.21B
Total Debt: $1.27B
Total Equity: $4.32B
Shares: 239,789,000
Shares: 239,789,000
CapEx: -$581.49M
Shares: 239,789,000
Stock Price: $39.10
Net Income: $658.02M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.6B | $5.3B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $3.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.0B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Gross Profit | $1.6B | $3.2B | $778.1M | $574.8M | $1.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $222.6M | $230.2M | $215.0M | $220.6M | $184.6M |
| Operating Income | $1.4B | $3.0B | $563.1M | $354.1M | $835.6M |
| Net Income | $411.8M | $1.2B | $871.1M | $266.3M | $658.0M |
| EBITDA | $993.9M | $1.9B | $1.6B | $727.7M | $1.3B |
| EPS | $1.65 | $4.79 | $3.61 | $1.10 | $2.76 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:06pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $214.4M | $207,000 | $212.0M | $304.5M | $204,000 |
| Total Current Assets | $736.7M | $539.6M | $870.1M | $721.5M | $444.5M |
| Total Assets | $7.4B | $7.3B | $7.2B | $7.3B | $7.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.2B | $1.0B | $583.1M | $1.3B | $661.2M |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.7B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.4B | $4.4B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.1B |
| Total Equity | $2.1B | $2.9B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $4.3B |
| Retained Earnings | -$3.6B | -$2.5B | -$1.7B | -$1.5B | -$909.2M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $792.9M | $1.9B | $977.9M | $944.5M | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$417.4M | -$487.4M | -$606.2M | -$628.6M | -$581.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $375.5M | $1.4B | $371.7M | $315.9M | $589.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $518,000 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$399.7M | -$19.0M | -$65.3M | -$230.6M |
| Net Change in Cash | $214.0M | -$214.2M | $211.8M | $92.5M | -$304.3M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:03pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.8B $3.6B – $4.1B
|
$4.0B $3.9B – $4.0B
|
$4.6B $4.2B – $5.0B
|
$4.1B $3.8B – $4.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.5B $1.4B – $1.6B
|
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.6B
|
$1.9B $1.7B – $2.0B
|
$1.7B $1.5B – $1.8B
|
| Net Income |
$1.0B $923.7M – $1.4B
|
$1.1B $776.9M – $1.8B
|
$1.9B $1.7B – $2.1B
|
$1.3B $1.2B – $1.4B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +48.9% | -52.3% | -7.6% | +27.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +101.6% | -75.9% | -26.1% | +77.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +117.5% | -81.2% | -37.1% | +136.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +187.4% | -26.4% | -69.4% | +147.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +94.4% | -18.5% | -53.8% | +83.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-14 | Cline Brenda A | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-13 | Cline Brenda A | A-Award | 4,967.00 | $41.27 | $205,010 |
| 2026-05-14 | Cline Brenda A | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-14 | Spiller Reginal | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-13 | Spiller Reginal | A-Award | 4,967.00 | $41.27 | $205,010 |
| 2026-05-14 | Spiller Reginal | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-14 | Maxwell Greg G | J-Other | 7,182.00 | $41.49 | $297,981 |
| 2026-05-13 | Maxwell Greg G | A-Award | 6,784.00 | $41.27 | $280,006 |
| 2026-05-14 | Maxwell Greg G | J-Other | 7,182.00 | $41.49 | $297,981 |
| 2026-05-14 | Kendall Christian S | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-13 | Kendall Christian S | A-Award | 4,967.00 | $41.27 | $205,010 |
| 2026-05-14 | Kendall Christian S | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-14 | Griffie Charles G. | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-13 | Griffie Charles G. | A-Award | 4,967.00 | $41.27 | $205,010 |
| 2026-05-14 | Griffie Charles G. | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-14 | DORMAN MARGARET K | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-05-13 | DORMAN MARGARET K | A-Award | 4,967.00 | $41.27 | $205,010 |
| 2026-05-14 | DORMAN MARGARET K | J-Other | 5,258.00 | $41.49 | $218,154 |
| 2026-04-07 | Cline Brenda A | S-Sale | 7,000.00 | $44.40 | $310,832 |
| 2026-03-27 | Degner Dennis | A-Award | 76,334.00 | $47.65 | $3.6M |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:03pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12 | $0.10 | 2026-05-29 | 2026-06-12 | 2026-06-26 |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.10 | 2026-02-24 | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-27 |
| 2025-12-12 | $0.09 | 2025-11-28 | 2025-12-12 | 2025-12-26 |
| 2025-09-12 | $0.09 | 2025-08-29 | 2025-09-12 | 2025-09-26 |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.09 | 2025-05-30 | 2025-06-13 | 2025-06-27 |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.09 | 2025-02-28 | 2025-03-14 | 2025-03-28 |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.08 | 2024-11-29 | 2024-12-13 | 2024-12-27 |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.08 | 2024-08-30 | 2024-09-13 | 2024-09-27 |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.08 | 2024-05-31 | 2024-06-14 | 2024-06-28 |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.08 | 2024-03-01 | 2024-03-15 | 2024-03-29 |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.08 | 2023-12-01 | 2023-12-15 | 2023-12-29 |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.08 | 2023-08-31 | 2023-09-15 | 2023-09-29 |
| 2023-06-15 | $0.08 | 2023-05-31 | 2023-06-16 | 2023-06-30 |
| 2023-03-14 | $0.08 | 2023-03-01 | 2023-03-15 | 2023-03-31 |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.08 | 2022-12-01 | 2022-12-15 | 2022-12-30 |
| 2022-09-14 | $0.08 | 2022-08-30 | 2022-09-15 | 2022-09-30 |
| 2019-12-12 | $0.02 | 2019-12-02 | 2019-12-13 | 2019-12-30 |
| 2019-09-12 | $0.02 | 2019-08-30 | 2019-09-13 | 2019-09-30 |
| 2019-06-13 | $0.02 | 2019-05-31 | 2019-06-14 | 2019-06-28 |
| 2019-03-14 | $0.02 | 2019-03-01 | 2019-03-15 | 2019-03-29 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more bullish near-term story than the synthesis allows. Q1 2026 revenue of $1.03B with $341.6M net income (33% margin) is the strongest print in the series, and it's not a one-off — the prior four quarters show margins of 22.7%, 22%, 34%, 11.5%, with revenue stair-stepping from $510M (Q2'24) to $1.03B (Q1'26), a 102% increase in seven quarters. Full-year 2025 revenue of $2.99B (+27% YoY) with op margin expanding from 15% to 28% and FCF of $590M against a $9.2B market cap implies a ~6.4% FCF yield on trailing numbers, and the Q1'26 run-rate suggests 2026 FCF could push $900M-$1.0B if Henry Hub stays north of $3.50. That is not a "value trap" footprint — that is operating leverage working in the producer's favor.
Where I push back on the prior models: the "Market Headwinds / sell into strength" call from Market Forces is doing pattern-matching on commodity-cyclical fade, not on what's actually in the trajectory. The synthesis frames $39 as pricing in a "Goldilocks" outcome, but 10.2x TTM P/E and 6.7x EV/EBITDA for a low-cost Marcellus operator with structural LNG demand tailwinds (Plaquemines ramping, Corpus Christi Stage 3, Golden Pass in 2026) is not a premium multiple — it's a mid-cycle multiple at a moment when the forward gas curve is in contango through 2027. The narrative-economics layer correctly flags fragility, but "fragile narrative" plus "improving fundamentals" plus "cheap multiple" is closer to asymmetric upside than to a sell. The bear case requires a gas price reversion the strip doesn't currently support.
The contrarian case against me: Range's 2022 comparison is brutal — $5.33B revenue and $2.99B operating income that year vs. $2.99B/$836M in 2025 means current "strength" is still less than 30% of peak earnings power, and the share count/buyback story doesn't fully compensate. Insider activity is all awards and J-Other (likely tax withholding on vested awards) — zero open-market buying, which for a stock the C-suite presumably believes is undervalued at 10x P/E is a tell. The balance sheet data is missing (no debt, no equity figures populated), which is a genuine gap — Range historically carried $1.5-2B net debt, and without confirming current leverage I can't fully underwrite the FCF yield. Current ratio of 0.67 is consistent with a working-capital-light producer but worth verifying. Also: Q3'25 margin of 22% vs Q2'25's 34% shows the quarter-to-quarter volatility is real; one warm winter and the Q1'26 print becomes the anomaly, not the new baseline.
I dissent from "Market Headwinds" and from the synthesis's implied caution. The data supports a constructive view: revenue accelerating (Q1'26 +21% YoY), margins expanding, FCF compounding 26%, and the multiple sitting at 10x earnings / 6.7x EBITDA on numbers that are still mid-cycle, not peak. The narrative layer's "fragile" tag is correct but priced in — at $39 you're not paying for the bull story, you're paying for the bear story and getting optionality on LNG. Fair value on 2026E FCF of ~$850M at a 7% yield (appropriate for cyclical commodity producer) is ~$12B equity or ~$51/share; on 8x EV/EBITDA mid-cycle, similar. The catalyst path is concrete and dated (LNG capacity additions through 2026-2027), which is more than most "value" setups offer. The risk is a warm winter + recession double-hit that pushes Henry Hub below $2.75, which would compress Q3-Q4 2026 margins back toward the 8-11% range seen in early 2024 — a real but not base-case scenario.
GPT Critique
Range Resources Corporation presents a compelling yet complex investment case when analyzing its recent performance metrics. The quarterly revenue growth, with a significant jump to $1.03 billion in Q1 2026 and a net income of $341.6 million (a 33% margin), is impressive and suggests strong operational leverage. This pattern of revenue and profit growth, from $510 million in Q2 2024 to over $1 billion in Q1 2026, indicates an upward trajectory that highlights the company's ability to capitalize on favorable market conditions. However, the volatility seen in quarterly margins—ranging from 5.6% to 34%—underscores the inherent risks associated with commodity-driven businesses. The annual figures reveal a solid recovery from 2024, with substantial improvements in operating and net income, but 2022's peak performance remains a benchmark that the current figures have yet to match.
Opus argues that Range Resources is undervalued, citing the company's recent revenue growth and improving margins as evidence of an "improving trajectory." I agree with Opus on the positive implications of the Q1 2026 results and the potential for further gains, especially with the LNG export demand potentially driving future growth. However, I am more cautious about labeling the company as undervalued. The narrative of "sell into strength" suggested by the Market Forces is not entirely without merit. The cyclical nature of the energy market, particularly natural gas, does introduce risks that are not fully mitigated by current performances or future projections. The company's reliance on favorable gas prices and the expectation of continued LNG demand could be disrupted by macroeconomic factors such as a global recession or rapid shifts in energy policy favoring renewables.
I also diverge from Opus's dismissal of the "Market Headwinds" call. While the current valuation multiples—10.2x TTM P/E and 6.7x EV/EBITDA—do not suggest a premium, they reflect the market's cautious optimism about the company's future amidst potential volatility. The absence of debt and equity figures in the balance sheet data is a significant oversight, as understanding the company's leverage is crucial for assessing its financial health and risk profile. Additionally, the insider activity being neutral with no open-market purchases raises questions about the internal confidence in the stock's undervaluation.
A careful skeptic would argue that despite the recent positive trends, Range Resources remains vulnerable to external shocks. The historical peak in 2022 and the inability to reach those heights again highlight the fragility of its current growth story. The lack of insider buying might suggest that the management is not entirely convinced of the stock's undervaluation, and the missing balance sheet details could obscure potential liabilities that may affect future cash flows. Additionally, the company's heavy reliance on natural gas prices and LNG export demand could backfire if market conditions shift unfavorably.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses don't fight here, they confirm the verdict: this is a genuinely well-run commodity business (+22, real FCF, actual buybacks shrinking the float) priced exactly like a well-run commodity business (-11, mid-band, no margin of safety). I respect the operator — clean cash conversion, ~20% FCF margin, net share shrinker in a sector that habitually dilutes — but I'm not paying full freight for a name whose operating margin can go from 56% to 15% on a Henry Hub move while sitting on $1.27B of net debt and $204K of actual cash. At $39.10 the market is already underwriting a healthy mid-cycle gas strip; I'd be paying for the LNG thesis, not getting it for free.
Playbook: zero position today. My line in the sand is $32 — that's where the FCF yield, buyback math, and quality score start compounding in my favor instead of just defending the price. I'd open a 1% starter at $33–34 on a gas-driven flush, scale to a 3% core down to $28, and reserve a 4–5% full weight only if we get a panic print into the mid-$20s with the business unchanged. On the upside, I'm a buyer of nothing above $40 and an active passer above $44 — that's the zone where the market is paying me to wait. Catalyst that flips me earlier: a structural step-up in the gas strip (LNG export pull-through actually showing in realized prices) combined with continued buyback execution. Until then, this is a watchlist name with a price alert, not a position.
Range Resources is a mature Appalachian natural gas E&P that generates real cash — $589.8M FCF in 2025 on $2.99B revenue (~20% FCF margin), OCF/NI of 1.99x, and negative accruals (-6.4% of assets) all point to clean earnings conversion. The company is a net buyer of its own stock (diluted shares down from 249.3M in 2021 to 239.8M in 2025, buyback/SBC ratio 178%), and SBC is a modest 1.6% of revenue. That's a respectable capital-allocation profile for the sector.
The business itself, though, is unmistakably commodity-exposed: revenue swung from $5.33B (2022) to $2.54B (2023) to $2.99B (2025), with operating margins collapsing from 56.1% to 15.1% before recovering to 27.9%. Net income similarly whipsawed from $1.18B → $266M → $658M. This is gas-price beta, not operating decay, but it means 'earnings power' is a moving target. Net debt of $1.27B against $204K (!) of liquid cash and $58.8M short-term debt means the balance sheet is functional but not a cushion — Altman Z of 2.35 sits in the grey zone.
The Beneish M of 29.73 looks alarming on its face but, combined with OCF/NI of 1.99x and negative accruals, almost certainly reflects the large commodity-driven swings in margins and asset turnover rather than manipulation — the M-score is notoriously noisy for cyclical E&Ps. Insider tape is non-directional: award grants (A) immediately followed by J-Other entries of identical size, almost certainly tax/withholding mechanics around vesting, with zero open-market buys or sells. No signal either way.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Hedging book — % of 2025/2026 gas production hedged and at what strikes; this drives whether the FCF profile is durable through a price downcycle
- Debt maturity ladder and covenant structure on the $1.27B net debt position
- Reserve life (R/P ratio) and PV-10 of proved reserves to assess long-term resource base
- Confirm the J-Other insider codes around 5/13–5/14 are tax-withholding or net-settlement against the same-day A-Awards (typical pattern)
- Capex trajectory and maintenance vs. growth capex split — is the $590M FCF sustainable or a function of underinvestment?
- Drivers of the gross margin swing 60.5% → 24.5% → 34.1% — pure realized price, or mix/hedge gains rolling off?
Without an e2e fair-value composite to lean on, I have to back into deserved value from the business itself. RRC is a ~$9.2B market cap Appalachian gas E&P with real FCF, a shrinking share count, and ~$1.27B net debt. At $39.10, the enterprise is being valued around $10.5B. For a commodity-levered gas producer where operating margin can halve on Henry Hub moves, that's a reasonable — not generous, not punitive — multiple. The market appears to be pricing in a normalized gas strip somewhere in the mid-$3s/MMBtu with continued buyback discipline. That's not heroic.
The quality lens grades the business 'Solid' (22) — better-than-average capital discipline supports a deserved value modestly above a generic E&P comp, but the commodity exposure and net debt cap how far you can stretch. Earnings quality is good, so no haircut. Net: deserved value sits in a wide band around the current price, maybe $34–$44. $39.10 is mid-band. There's no margin of safety here, and equally no obvious overpayment. This is the boring, correct 'fairly valued' answer.
To get genuinely interested, I'd want either a gas-price-driven drawdown to the low-$30s (where FCF yield expands and buybacks compound faster) or evidence that LNG-driven Henry Hub strength is structural rather than cyclical. Neither is in hand today.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Latest realized gas price and hedge book — how much of 2025/2026 production is locked in and at what strike
- FCF guidance at strip pricing and buyback pace vs authorization remaining
- Net debt trajectory and any refinancing windows
- Unit cost trends (LOE, G&A per Mcfe) to confirm the discipline narrative