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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Skyworks Solutions Inc. (SWKS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-14): Designation Low · Cairn score -18 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 6 · Value -38 · Sentiment -35 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $65.56 vs $61.30 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Skyworks Solutions Inc.
SWKS NASDAQSkyworks Solutions Inc. is a semiconductor company that develops, manufactures, and markets analog and mixed-signal semiconductor products and connectivity solutions for global electronics manufacturers. Its core focus is on radio-frequency and analog components that enable wireless networking and communications across a wide range of devices and systems. Skyworks Solutions Inc. serves industries such as aerospace, automotive, broadband, cellular infrastructure, connected home, defense, entertainment and gaming, industrial, medical, as well as consumer electronics including smartphones, tablets, and wearables. The company’s portfolio includes high-performance amplifiers, filters, switches, front-end modules, and related connectivity solutions used by major original equipment manufacturers in their communication platforms and connected devices. Skyworks Solutions Inc. operates globally with engineering, manufacturing, sales, and support facilities across Asia, Europe, and North America, distributing its products through direct sales, electronic component distributors, and independent representatives. Founded in the United States and headquartered in Irvine, California, Skyworks Solutions Inc. plays a significant role in enabling reliable wireless connectivity and advanced communication capabilities across modern digital infrastructure and consumer technology.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 14| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 28, 2026 | $1.03 | $1.08 +4.9% | — | — |
| Jun 4, 2026 | $1.45 | $1.64 +13.1% | — | — |
| May 5, 2026 | $1.04 | $1.15 +10.6% | — | — |
| Feb 3, 2026 | $1.40 | $1.54 +10.0% | — | — |
| Nov 4, 2025 | $1.53 | $1.76 +15.0% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 10, 2026 | 425 | View |
| Aug 10, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Aug 6, 2026 | 424B5 | View |
| Aug 4, 2026 | FWP | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | 424B5 | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | S-3ASR | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | 425 | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | 425 | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Jul 29, 2026 | 425 | View |
| Jul 29, 2026 | 425 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.08
Total Equity: $5.76B
Shares: 155,100,000
Total Debt: $995.80M
Cash: $1.16B
EBITDA: $778.70M
Total Debt: $995.80M
Cash: $1.16B
Revenue: $4.09B
Revenue: $4.09B
Revenue: $4.09B
Total Equity: $5.76B
Tax Rate: 9.4%
Equity: $5.76B
Total Debt: $995.80M
Cash: $1.16B
Current Liabilities: $1.32B
Long-Term Debt: $496.40M
Total Debt: $995.80M
Total Equity: $5.76B
Shares: 155,100,000
Shares: 155,100,000
CapEx: -$195.00M
Shares: 155,100,000
Stock Price: $61.30
Net Income: $477.10M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:34pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | — | $5.5B | $4.8B | $4.2B | $4.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.4B |
| Gross Profit | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $899.7M | $1.1B | $982.3M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Operating Income | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $637.4M | $500.0M |
| Net Income | $1.5B | $1.3B | $982.8M | $596.0M | $477.1M |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $902.2M | $778.7M |
| EPS | $9.07 | $7.85 | $6.17 | $3.72 | $3.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.97 | $7.81 | $6.13 | $3.69 | $3.08 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:17pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $882.9M | $566.0M | $718.8M | $1.4B | $1.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.1B |
| Total Assets | $8.6B | $8.9B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $7.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $658.5M | $1.2B | $955.7M | $602.7M | $1.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.2B | $1.7B | $992.9M | $994.3M | $496.4M |
| Total Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.4B | $2.3B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| Total Equity | $5.3B | $5.5B | $6.1B | $6.3B | $5.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $5.2B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $6.0B | $5.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:34pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$637.8M | -$489.4M | -$210.3M | -$157.0M | -$195.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.1B | $935.2M | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.2B | -$50.0M | -$900.0M | -$300.0M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$340.6M | -$373.1M | -$405.2M | -$439.1M | -$432.6M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$195.6M | -$886.8M | -$175.3M | -$77.3M | -$830.2M |
| Net Change in Cash | $316.2M | -$316.9M | $152.8M | $649.8M | -$207.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:34pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | — | -13.0% | -12.5% | -2.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.7% | -19.1% | -18.3% | -2.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -5.3% | -26.3% | -43.3% | -21.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -14.9% | -22.9% | -39.4% | -19.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -1.2% | -21.3% | -40.4% | -13.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:17pm (10d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-24 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-18 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-26 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-27 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-24 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-03 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-20 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-20 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-16 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-20 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-28 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-21 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-24 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-23 | $0.56 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-18 | $0.56 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-22 | $0.56 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-16 | $0.56 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a genuinely ugly trajectory that the "fully priced" synthesis under-weights. Revenue has collapsed from $5.49B (FY22) to $4.09B (FY25), a 25% peak-to-trough decline, and the most recent quarter (Apr 2026) at $943.7M with a 3.8% net margin is the worst print in the visible series — down from 15.2% net margin just five quarters earlier. That is not a stable "mature earner" cadence; that's a business whose operating leverage is unwinding in real time. Trailing four quarters annualized: ~$4.04B revenue and roughly $361M net income, which puts the real forward P/E closer to 25x, not the stated 19.9x. FCF of $1.11B on $9.22B cap looks cheap at 8.3x — until you notice op income fell from $1.53B to $500M in three years, meaning FCF conversion is being propped up by depreciation and working capital, not earnings power.
Where I part ways with the models: the "steady-compounder / anchored narrative" framing feels stale. This isn't a compounder — earnings CAGR is -30% and the payout ratio is 91%, which mathematically forecloses reinvestment and makes the 4.6% dividend structurally at risk if the Apr-quarter margin (3.8%) is the new run-rate rather than a one-off. At $35.6M quarterly NI annualized ($142M) versus a dividend obligation north of $400M/year, the payout math breaks within 12 months absent a rebound. Market Forces' "structurally deteriorating" read is closer to the truth than Pre-Flight's "mature, profitable" framing — those two priors contradict each other and synthesis papered over it by landing at fair-value. The Apple concentration risk (~65-70% of revenue historically) combined with Apple's known in-housing of cellular modems and RF front-end is the elephant; none of the models quantify it, but it's the entire thesis.
The contrarian case worth stress-testing: SWKS has $1.16B cash against $996M debt (net cash), a 2.3x current ratio, tangible balance sheet strength, and semiconductor cycles do turn. If you believe the Apr-2026 quarter is trough seasonality plus inventory correction rather than structural, then normalized earnings power might be closer to the FY24 $596M level, implying ~15x normalized P/E and a defensible 4-5% yield while you wait. Insider activity is neutral-to-negative (option exercises with no visible open-market buying at $61 — telling given executives presumably know the Q3 order book). No insider is stepping up here, which for a "cheap" stock is a quiet tell. The narrative engine's claim that "price and DCF are nearly identical" assumes a DCF input set that likely uses normalized rather than trailing cash flow — swap in the actual -18% FCF CAGR and $60 looks generous.
I dissent from the synthesis "fully priced at $60.72." The composite is anchoring on backward-looking multiples applied to deteriorating fundamentals, and the methods "disagreeing" is itself the signal — when a DCF, comps, and yield model diverge on a business with -7.5% revenue CAGR and Apple in-housing risk, the honest answer is the range is $40-$70 depending on whether the terminal decline is 2% or 8%. My fair value is $48-$54: 12x a normalized $350-400M earnings, haircut for customer concentration, credit for net cash and optionality on a cyclical turn. The dividend is the swing factor — if management cuts it 30-50% (which the payout ratio essentially demands), the stock drops to $45 on the announcement regardless of fundamentals. If they maintain it and burn the balance sheet, you get a value trap with a 12-month clock. Neither path supports paying $61 today. I'd want $50 or a Q1-2027 print showing margins back above 10% before committing capital.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not just that Skyworks has shrunk, but how badly profitability has compressed relative to revenue. Annual sales fell from $5.49B in 2022 to $4.09B in 2025, a 25% decline, but net income fell from $1.28B to $477M, down 63%. Operating income has been cut from $1.53B to $500M over the same period. That is the real story: this business has lost the margin structure that once justified a premium as a high-return analog/RF franchise. Even in the quarterly run-rate, revenue has hovered in a narrow band around $950M-$1.10B for seven quarters, yet net margin has swung from 15.2% to 3.8%. The latest quarter at $943.7M of revenue produced just $35.6M of net income. A business earning under 4% net margin in a decent revenue quarter should not be waved through as merely “cyclical”; something in pricing, mix, utilization, or customer leverage is structurally worse than before.
The market is not obviously misreading that deterioration. At $61.3, the stock trades at about 19.9x trailing earnings, 2.3x sales, and roughly 11.9x EV/EBITDA. Those are not distressed multiples for a company with a three-year revenue CAGR of roughly -7.5% and earnings CAGR of about -30%. The apparent cheapness is almost entirely on free cash flow: $1.11B of FCF against a $9.22B market cap is attractive on the surface, around an 8.3x P/FCF. But that cash flow sits awkwardly beside only $477M of annual net income and a 90.7% dividend payout ratio. When cash generation is far above earnings in a shrinking semiconductor name, I do not assume hidden strength; I first ask whether working capital, stock comp, or temporarily light capex are flattering the number. With capex only $195M and operating cash flow $1.30B, cash conversion is excellent, but if the earnings base has genuinely reset lower, the stock deserves to be valued more like a no-growth cash harvester than a recovery story.
I also think some of the machine outputs overstate the bear case by calling the business “existentially” threatened. The balance sheet is fine: $1.16B of cash against $995.8M of debt is net-cash-ish, current ratio is 2.33, and book equity is $5.76B. Gross margin at 41.2% is down from prior peaks but still respectable; this is not a broken commodity supplier. Return on equity and ROIC around 8% are uninspiring, yet still positive enough to support ongoing shareholder returns. The dividend yield of 4.6% gives the shares some floor, and the business is still producing over $1B of annual FCF despite the downturn. So I do not buy a wipeout narrative. I buy a rerated-franchise narrative: Skyworks has gone from a high-quality compounder to a lower-multiple income stock unless and until it proves margins can recover meaningfully.
The strongest pushback to my skepticism is straightforward: earnings are likely depressed well below normalized cash earnings, and if quarterly revenue merely stabilizes around $1.0B while net margins recover from high-single digits back into the low-to-mid teens, trailing P/E is the wrong anchor. We have seen that earning power recently enough to take it seriously: in the 2024-12 quarter, $1.07B of revenue yielded $162M of net income, a 15.2% margin, and in 2025-10, $1.10B produced $141.4M, or 12.9%. If those margins are even half-repeatable, annualized earnings power is materially above the latest $35.6M quarter, and the current multiple compresses quickly. On that view, 8x FCF with a solid balance sheet and nearly 5% dividend is attractive, especially because the stock already reflects years of disappointment. I weigh that argument less heavily because the pattern is not one clean cyclical dip followed by recovery; it is repeated margin instability across multiple quarters and years, with each annual step down in revenue accompanied by a disproportionate hit to operating profit.
What would change my mind is evidence that the latest quarter was the trough rather than the new normal. Specifically, I would want to see at least two consecutive quarters above $1.0B of revenue with net income back above $120M per quarter, which would imply a return to roughly 12% net margins, not just a seasonal bounce. Annual operating income needs to move back toward $700M-$800M to justify a clear rerating; otherwise 2025’s $500M looks closer to the true base. If instead revenue stays sub-$1.0B and net margins remain mid-single-digit, then even $61 looks generous and the dividend becomes a bigger part of the thesis than the business itself.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a cash engine grinding lower, not a business falling off a cliff. Skyworks has watched revenue shrink from $5.49B in 2022 to $4.09B in fiscal 2025, with earnings collapsing from $1.28B to $477M—a –30% earnings CAGR that looks brutal on its face. Yet free cash flow still printed $1.11B against a $9.22B market cap, an 8.3x FCF multiple, while the balance sheet sits in a net-cash position ($1.16B cash versus $996M debt). Quarterly revenue has stabilized in a $940M–$1.10B band rather than continuing the freefall; the latest print of $944M at a 3.8% net margin is ugly, but the prior three quarters averaged closer to 10% and the annual gross margin remains a respectable 41%. At 20x trailing earnings, 12x EV/EBITDA and a 4.6% dividend yield, the market is capitalizing this franchise as if the cash conversion will permanently decay. I read the data differently: operating cash flow of $1.30B on only $195M of capex shows a capital-light analog business that can still throw off mid-teens free-cash-flow yields even while unit volumes and content are under pressure. The 90% payout ratio is high relative to GAAP earnings, but it is comfortably covered by FCF, which is the metric that actually matters here.
The valuation synthesis calling the stock fully priced at a $60.72 signal-adjusted fair value therefore feels too static. It under-weights the durability of the cash flow relative to the depressed earnings base and treats the –7.5% revenue CAGR as a permanent slope rather than the late stage of a smartphone content-cycle reset. Skyworks is still generating returns on equity and invested capital around 8%, carries almost no leverage (debt-to-equity 0.17), and trades at 1.65x book—hardly the multiples of a structurally impaired franchise. The recent margin compression looks more like operating deleverage on lower volumes plus mix than a permanent loss of pricing power; gross margin has held above 40% through the entire downcycle.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Earnings power has been cut by more than half in three years, free-cash-flow itself is declining at an 18% CAGR, and the most recent quarter’s 3.8% net margin shows the trough may not yet be in. Customer concentration (still heavily Apple-linked) plus the secular risk of RF content moving on-die or to lower-cost competitors is real; if quarterly revenue slips sustainably below $900M and FCF follows toward $700–800M, the 8x multiple becomes 11–12x and the dividend becomes vulnerable. The “strong market headwinds” framing and the low revenue-confidence flag are not baseless—they simply assume the current run-rate is the new normal rather than a cyclical trough with residual pricing and content upside in automotive and IoT. I weigh the net-cash balance sheet and the still-elevated absolute FCF more heavily because they give management years of runway to right-size the cost base and diversify, whereas the bears treat every lost dollar of mobile content as permanent and unrecoverable.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if the next two quarters show revenue stuck below $900M with free cash flow annualizing under $850M, or if the company cuts the dividend. Conversely, two consecutive quarters of revenue back above $1.05B and net margins re-expanding above 10% would make the current price look like an obvious mispricing and push me to high-conviction undervalued.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Claude — Second Response · overvalued revised
VERDICT: Modestly overvalued — fair value $52-58 on normalized $400-500M earnings; wait for a sub-$55 handle or two quarters proving >10% net margin before committing.
The disagreements crystallize around one question: is Q2 2026's 3.8% net margin the trough or the new normal? Both colleagues acknowledge the deterioration but treat FCF as more durable than earnings. I need to steelman that. Grok's point that $1.30B operating cash flow on $195M capex is capital-light analog behavior is fair — this isn't a business that needs to reinvent itself with capex. And GPT's stress test — that Dec-2024 and Oct-2025 quarters printed 15.2% and 12.9% margins on similar revenue — is the strongest argument against my "3.8% is the new run-rate" framing. Two out of the last four quarters were double-digit margin. My annualized $142M NI figure took the worst single print and extrapolated it, which is exactly the mistake I accused synthesis of making in reverse.
That said, neither colleague grapples with the payout math on a GAAP basis or the Apple in-housing timeline, and both lean on FCF that is flattered by working capital release in a shrinking-revenue environment (receivables and inventory unwinding as sales drop generates one-time cash that doesn't repeat). Grok's "years of runway to right-size" is true but assumes management will right-size rather than defend the dividend — the 91% payout ratio suggests the opposite institutional preference. GPT's landing point (mid-$50s, wait for two quarters >$1.0B revenue and >$120M NI) is actually very close to my $48-54 range once you strip the rhetorical gap. We're arguing about $6 of fair value, not direction.
Where I revise: my $48-54 range was too tight and over-weighted the single worst quarter. A fairer range is $52-58, acknowledging that normalized earnings power is probably $400-500M rather than $350-400M given the recent quarterly variance. I still dissent from "fully priced" at $61 — the asymmetry favors waiting — but the gap is narrower than I first claimed, and the FCF-durability argument deserved more weight than I gave it. I'm not moving to fairly-valued; I'm tightening my overvalued call.
GPT — Second Response · overvalued changed direction
VERDICT: Somewhat overvalued at $61.3; fair value is closer to $52-56 absent clear evidence margins can recover back above ~10-12%, with sub-$50 risk on a dividend cut or another weak quarter.
Claude’s push on the dividend math and customer concentration risk moved me somewhat more bearish, but not all the way to his $48–54 fair value. The key point I underweighted is that the latest quarter’s earnings power, if not a one-off, makes the payout look far less “supported” than FCF alone suggests: a ~$400M+ annual dividend against a $35.6M quarter is uncomfortable, and a 91% trailing payout ratio leaves little margin for error. I also agree the market should haircut the stock for Apple dependence even if the briefing doesn’t quantify it cleanly; when a franchise is shrinking and one customer historically dominates, you do not get paid a full “stable analog cash cow” multiple. That said, Claude’s implied normalization to only $350–400M earnings while also assuming high dividend-cut odds feels a bit double-counted, because the company still has a net-cash-ish balance sheet, 41%+ gross margins, and over $1B of annual FCF today.
What did not move me is Grok’s confidence that FCF is the “metric that actually matters here” without a tougher adjustment for quality of that cash flow. When operating income has fallen from $1.53B to $500M in three years, I cannot simply capitalize current FCF as durable. Still, Grok is right that the balance sheet and capital-light model make a wipeout thesis too aggressive. So I’m revising modestly: instead of “fair to slightly overvalued,” I think the stock is plainly somewhat overvalued at $61 because the market is still giving meaningful credit for a margin recovery that has not been demonstrated, while the downside from another weak quarter or dividend reset is material. But I stop short of a hard-bear call because the asset is not broken; if margins merely recover to low double digits, today’s price is not absurd. My center of gravity shifts down to the low-to-mid $50s, with sub-$50 plausible if management signals the current earnings run-rate is sticky.
Grok — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Fairly valued at $61 — FCF yield intact but margin reset and payout risk leave little margin of safety; mid-$50s more appropriate absent recovery proof
The payout-ratio and trailing-earnings math from Claude, and the disproportionate operating-income collapse highlighted by GPT, are the specific points that moved me. I had treated the $1.11B FCF and 8.3x multiple as durable evidence of a cash-compounder trough; both colleagues correctly force the recognition that this FCF now sits atop only ~$360–480M of current earnings power and a 91% payout that is already strained by the $35.6M April quarter. That combination makes the 4.6% yield a potential liability rather than a free floor, and it converts my earlier “modest undervaluation” into a tighter call. Revenue stabilization in the $940–1.10B band remains real and the net-cash balance sheet still buys time, but those facts no longer outweigh the evidence that margin structure has reset lower for longer than a simple smartphone-cycle narrative implies.
I still reject Claude’s $48–54 fair-value band and existential dividend-cut framing; gross margin has held above 40%, ROIC is positive, and absolute FCF remains large enough that management can right-size without an immediate cut. GPT’s mid-$50s anchor is closer to the mark once the latest-quarter run-rate is given proper weight. The stock is therefore no longer a clear buy at $61; it is a fairly-valued cash harvester whose upside requires two clean quarters of >$1.0B revenue and double-digit net margins that have not yet appeared.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
Skyworks is a financially sturdy business: $1.37B liquid cash, $378M net cash, and $1.11B FCF in the latest year against a $9.2B market cap (12% FCF yield on cap). Earnings integrity looks clean - accruals -8.1% of assets, OCF/NI ~2x, Beneish M -2.89, Altman Z 4.55 in the safe zone. Capital returns are disciplined: diluted shares down at a -1.8% CAGR with buybacks running 220% of the 5.7%-of-revenue SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated. No insider open-market buying or selling of note - the recent tape is entirely routine director awards and option exercises.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Apple revenue concentration in latest 10-K and any commentary on content-per-device trend
- Mobile vs. Broad Markets segment mix and margins - is Broad Markets growing enough to offset Mobile decline?
- Design-win pipeline commentary and any disclosure of socket losses at key customers
- Inventory days and channel inventory - is the revenue decline demand-driven or destocking-driven?
- Debt maturity schedule and any covenants tied to the $1.0B+ gross debt implied by net-vs-liquid cash gap
The composite fair value of $65.56 implies ~7% upside and the signal-adjusted $60.72 implies ~1% downside - the price is sitting inside a tight band around deserved value. The DCF at $78.70 looks generous given four years of revenue declines (-25%) and halved operating income, so I discount it; the EPV floor at $39.29 marks the downside if the RF franchise keeps eroding. Splitting the difference lands close to today's $61.30. High earnings quality and a strong balance sheet earn Skyworks the top of that band, but not more - the business is contracting, and paying full deserved value for a shrinking franchise is not an edge. What is priced in: a stable-to-slowly-declining smartphone RF business with cash returns intact. What is not priced in as a bargain: any re-acceleration or content-share win. To get a real margin of safety against the EPV floor and the bear thesis (customer in-sourcing, pricing pressure), I want a mid-to-high single-digit FCF yield entry, not today's fair-value print.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next-print revenue trajectory and whether smartphone RF content per device is stabilizing or declining
- Largest-customer concentration and any signals of in-sourcing or share loss
- Gross margin direction cycle-over-cycle - is the mix shift to auto/IoT accretive or dilutive
- Buyback pace vs share count reduction to confirm per-share value creation
- Free cash flow conversion and capex intensity guidance
Sentiment on Skyworks is quietly negative rather than dramatically so. The narrative is a low-intensity, low-cult 'steady compounder' that the market largely ignores, and the bear framing (Apple concentration, on-die integration, commoditizing analog) is the louder half of the conversation. With price and DCF essentially on top of each other, there is no narrative premium doing any work here; the stock has to earn every dollar on fundamentals while the tape rewards AI-adjacent semis, not legacy RF. That is a persistent, low-grade drag rather than an acute press. The macro overlay makes it worse than the +22 regime score suggests for THIS name. Beta 1.51 means SWKS moves harder than the tape in both directions, and with the 10y at 4.68% and market PE at 26.9, capital is flowing toward AI/compute semis and away from smartphone-cycle RF suppliers. The -7.5% long-term CAGR and -8.9pp three-year drawdown reflect exactly that rotation. The one bright spot - the July 21 pre-earnings pop on 'positioned to beat' chatter - shows the setup is oversold enough that any incremental good news travels, but that is a tactical flicker, not a narrative turn.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Upcoming earnings print and any Apple content-share commentary - the single biggest sentiment pivot for this name
- Analyst target revisions post-print: are numbers still drifting down or stabilizing?
- Any sign of AI-edge/IoT design-win narrative catching on that would give SWKS a story to ride
- 10y yield direction - a break below 4.3% would ease the high-beta pressure meaningfully
- Sector rotation signals: money moving from AI-compute semis toward broader semi cohort would disproportionately help SWKS
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