Business Description
Operating globally, Terex Corporation specializes in the production and distribution of aerial work platforms and a diverse range of materials processing equipment. Its operations are structured into two primary divisions: Aerial Work Platforms (AWP) and Materials Processing (MP). The AWP segment is responsible for the design, manufacturing, servicing, and marketing of access equipment, utility machinery, and telehandlers, primarily under the well-known Terex and Genie brands. This range encompasses items such as portable material and aerial lifts, articulating and telescopic booms (both trailer-mounted and self-propelled), scissor lifts, utility vehicles, and telehandlers. Additionally, it supplies essential components and spare parts. These products serve a broad spectrum of uses, including construction and upkeep of industrial, commercial, institutional, and residential structures, maintaining utility and telecommunication infrastructure, supporting construction and foundation drilling, general commercial activities, tree maintenance, and various infrastructure developments. The MP segment offers an extensive portfolio of materials processing and specialized machinery, distributed under numerous brands and business lines, including Terex, Powerscreen, Fuchs, EvoQuip, Canica, Cedarapids, CBI, Simplicity, Franna, Terex Ecotec, Finlay, Terex Washing Systems, Terex MPS, Terex Jaques, Terex Advance, ProStack, Terex Bid-Well, MDS, and Terex Recycling Systems. Its offerings include crushers, screening and washing systems, trommels, apron feeders, material handlers, a variety of cranes (pick and carry, rough terrain, tower), equipment for wood processing, biomass, and recycling, concrete mixer trucks, concrete pavers, and conveyors, along with necessary components and spare parts. These machines are crucial for diverse applications such as construction, infrastructure development, and recycling initiatives, as well as quarrying, mining, and general material handling. They also play a vital role in maintenance for lifting equipment or materials, landscaping, and the biomass production sectors. To support its clientele, Terex Corporation provides financing options facilitating the rental, leasing, and purchase of its equipment. Established in 1986, Terex Corporation maintains its headquarters in Norwalk, Connecticut.
Business History
Generated: Jun 11, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:00am (1d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.36
Total Equity: $2.10B
Shares: 66,300,000
Total Debt: $2.70B
Cash: $772.00M
EBITDA: $633.00M
Total Debt: $2.70B
Cash: $772.00M
Revenue: $5.42B
Revenue: $5.42B
Revenue: $5.42B
Total Equity: $2.10B
Tax Rate: 24.3%
Equity: $2.10B
Total Debt: $2.70B
Cash: $772.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.19B
Long-Term Debt: $2.66B
Total Debt: $2.70B
Total Equity: $2.10B
Shares: 66,300,000
Shares: 66,300,000
CapEx: -$118.00M
Shares: 66,300,000
Stock Price: $59.51
Net Income: $221.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:06am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.9B | $4.4B | $5.2B | $5.1B | $5.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.1B | $3.5B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.4B |
| Gross Profit | $757.4M | $871.0M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $429.4M | $451.0M | $540.0M | $542.0M | $576.0M |
| Operating Income | $328.0M | $420.0M | $637.0M | $526.0M | $475.0M |
| Net Income | $220.9M | $300.0M | $518.0M | $335.0M | $221.0M |
| EBITDA | $365.5M | $463.0M | $699.0M | $579.0M | $633.0M |
| EPS | $3.12 | $4.38 | $7.66 | $5.00 | $3.36 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:02am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $266.9M | $304.1M | $371.0M | $388.0M | $772.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.7B |
| Total Assets | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $5.7B | $6.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $909.9M | $998.6M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $665.0M | $769.4M | $611.0M | $2.6B | $2.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $3.9B | $4.0B |
| Total Equity | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $936.9M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:06am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $293.4M | $261.2M | $459.3M | $326.0M | $440.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$59.7M | -$109.6M | -$127.2M | -$137.0M | -$118.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $233.7M | $151.6M | $332.1M | $189.0M | $322.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$42.7M | -$50.1M | -$23.8M | -$2.0B | $112.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.0M | -$101.3M | -$62.8M | -$49.0M | -$56.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$403.2M | $37.2M | $66.6M | $17.0M | $384.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:00am (1d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$5.4B $5.4B – $5.4B
|
$7.9B $7.7B – $8.1B
|
$8.5B $8.2B – $9.0B
|
$9.0B $9.0B – $9.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$772.8M $771.4M – $774.3M
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.3B
|
$1.3B $1.3B – $1.3B
|
| Net Income |
$326.6M $324.3M – $328.9M
|
$329.7M $314.3M – $342.2M
|
$400.3M $351.8M – $448.8M
|
$427.4M $346.3M – $508.5M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:06am (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.7% | +16.6% | -0.5% | +5.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +15.0% | +35.1% | -9.3% | -1.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +28.0% | +51.7% | -17.4% | -9.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +35.8% | +72.7% | -35.3% | -34.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +26.7% | +51.0% | -17.2% | +9.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:05am (1d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | CARROLL PATRICK S | A-Award | 56.00 | $63.26 | $3,543 |
| 2026-06-04 | JOHNSTON STEPHEN | S-Sale | 379.00 | $63.19 | $23,949 |
| 2026-06-04 | KONG-PICARELLO JENNIFER | A-Award | 31.00 | $63.26 | $1,961 |
| 2026-05-13 | JOHNSTON STEPHEN | F-InKind | 1,799.00 | $62.82 | $113,013 |
| 2026-05-07 | KONG-PICARELLO JENNIFER | A-Award | 20.00 | $63.36 | $1,267 |
| 2026-05-07 | CARROLL PATRICK S | A-Award | 37.00 | $63.36 | $2,344 |
| 2026-05-04 | Gross Joshua | S-Sale | 5,874.00 | $61.53 | $361,427 |
| 2026-04-07 | KONG-PICARELLO JENNIFER | A-Award | 21.00 | $58.88 | $1,236 |
| 2026-04-07 | CARROLL PATRICK S | A-Award | 39.00 | $58.88 | $2,296 |
| 2026-04-07 | Jindal Namita | A-Award | 187.00 | $59.00 | $11,033 |
| 2026-04-01 | Dreasher John Lee | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-01 | Jindal Namita | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-20 | CARROLL PATRICK S | F-InKind | 32.00 | $58.73 | $1,879 |
| 2026-03-20 | GEORGE AMY | F-InKind | 14.00 | $58.73 | $822 |
| 2026-03-20 | Gross Joshua | F-InKind | 9.00 | $58.73 | $529 |
| 2026-03-20 | Hegarty Kieran | F-InKind | 33.00 | $58.73 | $1,938 |
| 2026-03-20 | JOHNSTON STEPHEN | F-InKind | 8.00 | $58.73 | $470 |
| 2026-03-20 | KONG-PICARELLO JENNIFER | F-InKind | 6.00 | $58.73 | $352 |
| 2026-03-20 | MEESTER SIMON | F-InKind | 49.00 | $58.73 | $2,878 |
| 2026-03-20 | POSNER SCOTT | F-InKind | 26.00 | $58.73 | $1,527 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 11, 2026 3:00am (1d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-08 | $0.17 | 2026-05-22 | 2026-06-08 | 2026-06-22 |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.17 | 2026-02-06 | 2026-03-06 | 2026-03-19 |
| 2025-11-10 | $0.17 | 2025-10-16 | 2025-11-10 | 2025-12-19 |
| 2025-08-11 | $0.17 | 2025-07-17 | 2025-08-11 | 2025-09-19 |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.17 | 2025-05-14 | 2025-06-06 | 2025-06-20 |
| 2025-03-07 | $0.17 | 2025-02-06 | 2025-03-07 | 2025-03-19 |
| 2024-11-08 | $0.17 | 2024-10-14 | 2024-11-08 | 2024-12-19 |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.17 | 2024-07-30 | 2024-08-09 | 2024-09-19 |
| 2024-06-06 | $0.17 | 2024-05-23 | 2024-06-06 | 2024-06-20 |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.17 | 2024-02-08 | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-19 |
| 2023-11-08 | $0.17 | 2023-10-12 | 2023-11-09 | 2023-12-19 |
| 2023-08-11 | $0.17 | 2023-07-11 | 2023-08-14 | 2023-09-19 |
| 2023-06-05 | $0.15 | 2023-05-18 | 2023-06-06 | 2023-06-20 |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.15 | 2023-02-09 | 2023-03-09 | 2023-03-20 |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.13 | 2022-10-13 | 2022-11-10 | 2022-12-19 |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.13 | 2022-07-13 | 2022-08-12 | 2022-09-19 |
| 2022-06-03 | $0.13 | 2022-05-19 | 2022-06-06 | 2022-06-21 |
| 2022-03-08 | $0.13 | 2022-02-10 | 2022-03-09 | 2022-03-21 |
| 2021-11-08 | $0.12 | 2021-10-21 | 2021-11-09 | 2021-12-17 |
| 2021-08-11 | $0.12 | 2021-07-16 | 2021-08-12 | 2021-09-20 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw trajectory first: quarterly net income has collapsed from $140.7M in Q2 2024 to a $93M LOSS in Q1 2026, on revenue that actually grew to $1.73B (the ESG/Environmental Solutions acquisition is doing the lifting on the top line). Margins went from 10.2% → -5.4% in seven quarters. That's not "cyclical softening," that's a company eating acquisition integration costs on top of a genuine AWP downturn. Full-year 2025 NI of $221M is down 34% from 2023's $518M despite revenue being $270M higher — operating margin compressed from 12.4% to 8.8%. FCF of $322M on a $4.36B market cap is a 7.4% yield, which sounds attractive until you note FCF was running materially higher pre-cycle and the Q1 2026 loss likely means TTM FCF is deteriorating fast.
The prior models are talking past each other and it's not subtle. Pre-flight calls it a cyclical-industrial-duo pricing in trough earnings. Valuation Synthesis says it's "disconnected from fundamentals" in a BULLISH direction (cheap). Market Forces calls it a distressed over-leveraged name to AVOID. Market Narrative pegs DCF anchor at $37.50 with a 59% narrative premium — i.e., overvalued. These cannot all be right. The Synthesis model is anchored on a stale 17.7x P/E that doesn't match the file's own 36.5x TTM figure — that's a real error, because Q1 2026's loss has crushed TTM earnings and the multiple is no longer "cheap." At 36x trailing earnings on a cyclical with collapsing margins and negative recent earnings CAGR (-34.7%), the "discount" thesis evaporates.
The contrarian case — and I think it's the correct one here — is that the market is NOT pricing trough earnings; it's pricing a hoped-for recovery that may not arrive on schedule. AWP demand correlates with non-residential construction and rental fleet refresh cycles; United Rentals and Ashtead have both signaled cautious 2026 capex. The ESG acquisition added revenue but also debt (the balance sheet tile shows "—" for total debt, which is itself a red flag — the file is incomplete on the most important line item for a leveraged cyclical mid-downturn). EV/EBITDA of 11.3x is not cheap for an industrial at this point in the cycle; Caterpillar trades ~14x but with vastly better margins and scale, and Oshkosh trades ~9x with a stronger defense backlog. The insider activity is genuinely neutral-to-negative — multiple sales, only small awards, no conviction buys near $59. If management thought this was trough, you'd expect open-market purchases.
I dissent from the Valuation Synthesis "undervalued cyclical recovery" framing and side with Market Forces and the Narrative layer's $37.50 DCF anchor — though I'd put fair value at $42-48, slightly above pure DCF, because Genie is a real franchise with aftermarket pull-through and ESG diversification has long-term merit. The 1.28% dividend yield offers minimal support. The path to $59 being right requires: (1) Q2-Q3 2026 margins inflecting back to 6%+, (2) the Q1 loss being primarily one-time integration charges rather than demand destruction, and (3) no further rate-driven non-resi softening. That's three conditions, each maybe 50/50, compounding to roughly coin-flip odds — and you're paying full price for that coin flip. Revenue growth of 5.7% YoY is entirely acquisition-driven; organic is likely negative. The "Strong Cash Flow Quality" tag is backward-looking and will deteriorate as working capital normalizes post-acquisition. Wait for either (a) a Q2 2026 print showing margin stabilization above 5%, or (b) the stock at $45 where you're paid for the cyclical risk. Owning here is paying mid-cycle multiples for late-cycle earnings during an integration with incomplete balance sheet disclosure.
GPT Critique
In analyzing Terex Corporation, the financial trajectory over recent quarters is quite telling. The company has seen its quarterly revenue grow significantly, from $1.23 billion in Q1 2025 to $1.73 billion in Q1 2026. However, this revenue growth has not translated into profit, with a sharp net income decline from $140.7 million in Q2 2024 to a $93 million loss in Q1 2026. The overall margins have plummeted, from a high of 10.2% in Q2 2024 to a negative 5.4% in the most recent quarter, indicating severe operational challenges, likely exacerbated by acquisition integration costs and a downturn in the Aerial Work Platforms (AWP) segment. The annual income figures further highlight this trend, with 2025 showing a net income of $221 million, down from $518 million in 2023, despite higher revenues, suggesting significant margin compression.
Opus argues that Terex is overvalued given the recent financial performance, pegging a fair value between $42 and $48. I agree with Opus on the overvaluation at the current price of $59.51. The 36.5x P/E ratio, in the context of declining earnings and a negative recent earnings CAGR of -34%, does not support a valuation that implies a recovery in the near term. The Q1 2026 net loss undermines any thesis that trough earnings are already priced in, aligning with Opus's skepticism about the market's optimistic pricing of a swift recovery. Furthermore, the insider transactions, predominantly sales, provide no confidence in the stock's current valuation.
However, I diverge from Opus in assessing the company's strategic positioning. While Opus suggests waiting for margin inflection or a price drop to a $45 handle, I believe that the investment thesis rests more heavily on assessing the integration and impact of the ESG acquisition. Terex's attempt to diversify through this acquisition could offer long-term strategic benefits that may not be immediately apparent in the current financials. The cash flow from operations and free cash flow remain relatively strong, with a 7.4% yield, which could buffer against short-term operational headwinds.
A careful skeptic of both perspectives might argue that while the financial indicators point to a current overvaluation, the historical cyclicality of the industrial sector and Terex's dominant position in the AWP market could provide a base for eventual recovery. They would caution against underestimating the potential positive impact of the acquisition once integration challenges are resolved and might highlight that the market's forward-looking nature often prices in expected recoveries before they appear in the financials.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses don't really disagree — they tell a coherent story. Quality at -6 says this is a competently run, FCF-positive cyclical with clean accounting and real buyback discipline, but no moat and a balance sheet that quietly got worse ($1.9B net debt, grey-zone Z). That's a 'fine if cheap' business, not a 'own through the cycle' compounder. Then valuation at -91 tells me I'm being asked to pay peak-cycle multiples on earnings that have already halved from the 2023 peak, with the bull case fully embedded. There is no version of this where I pay $59 for a -6 quality score with rolling margins. Pass.
My play: zero position today, TEX goes on the watchlist with a $42 trigger and a $36 'back up the truck' level. At $42 I start a 1% nibble — that's where the Genie franchise premium gets me to deserved value and I'm at least not paying for the bull case. At sub-$38 with any sign margins are stabilizing (one clean quarter of gross margin holding ~20%, or order book inflecting), I scale to a 3-4% position — clean earnings quality and the buyback give me confidence the downside math is real there. What flips me bullish earlier: a genuine margin re-expansion print, not management commentary. What keeps me away even at $45: further deterioration in operating margin toward 7% or any debt refinancing stress. This is a price-and-patience trade, not a thesis trade — and at $59.51 I'm not in the game.
Terex puts up the hallmarks of a respectable industrial: revenue grew from $3.89B (2021) to $5.42B (2025), FCF is consistently positive ($322M in 2025), OCF/NI of 1.21x and accruals of -0.6% of assets indicate clean earnings, Beneish M of -2.57 shows no manipulation flags, and diluted shares shrank from 70.9M to 66.3M (-1.7% CAGR) with buybacks running 199% of SBC. That is genuine per-share value protection in an industry where dilution is common.
The concerns are operational and structural. Operating margin peaked at 12.4% in 2023 and has since compressed to 8.8% in 2025 — below the 2022 level — while net income has nearly halved from $518M (2023) to $221M (2025) on roughly flat revenue. Gross margin slipped from 22.8% to 19.4% in two years. Meanwhile net debt sits at $1.93B against $772M of cash, and Altman Z of 2.57 lands in the grey zone — fine in good times, uncomfortable in a cyclical trough. The 2025 FCF rebound to $322M is encouraging but came alongside earnings deterioration, suggesting working capital release rather than improving fundamentals.
Insider tape is unhelpful: zero open-market buys, $2.3M of sales over twelve months, mostly small option/award-related dispositions. No conviction signal either way.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Source of the net debt step-up — confirm whether the ~$1.9B reflects the Environmental Solutions acquisition and what synergy/deleveraging path management has committed to
- Backlog and book-to-bill trends in AWP and Materials Processing segments to gauge whether margin compression is cyclical or competitive
- 2025 FCF composition — how much came from working capital release vs operating performance
- Customer/end-market concentration (rental channel exposure, construction vs infrastructure mix)
- Debt maturity ladder and covenant headroom given the grey-zone Altman Z
The e2e composite pegs deserved value at $37.51 — roughly 37% below the $59.51 print. That FV looks directionally credible because it lines up with the cyclical reality: 2023 was the margin peak, net income is back at 2021 levels, and the balance sheet absorbed $1.9B of net debt to get here. Earnings quality is clean (no haircut needed), and the Genie franchise plus aftermarket stream do deserve a premium versus pure-play cyclicals — call it a $42-45 deserved range once you give credit for the duopoly aerial position. Even on that more generous frame, the stock is ~30-40% above deserved.
What's priced in at $59.51 is essentially the bull case: infrastructure supercycle extends multiple more years, margins re-expand from here, and the debt load gets refinanced cheaply. That is a coherent story but it is a story — and it's the consensus story at the top of a cycle that has already started rolling over. There is no margin of safety; the market is paying full late-cycle price for a mid-cycle business with a worsening balance sheet. Quality is mixed, deserved value is below price, and the gap is the wrong way.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward order book / backlog trend in Aerials and Materials Processing — is backlog still shrinking?
- Updated FY guidance for revenue, margin, and FCF — specifically whether margin compression is stabilizing
- Net debt trajectory and refinancing maturity wall post the recent acquisition spend
- Aftermarket / parts revenue mix — the more durable slice, key to deserved value
- Channel inventory at rental customers (URI, HEES commentary) as a leading indicator