Business Description
AST SpaceMobile, Inc. establishes and operates a satellite-based cellular broadband network designed to connect directly with standard mobile phones. Through its SpaceMobile service, it delivers mobile internet access to individuals in remote or unserved locations that lack traditional terrestrial mobile coverage, whether on land, across oceans, or during air travel. The company is situated in Midland, Texas.
Business History
Generated: May 13, 2026 10:41amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:07am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -1.34
Total Equity: $1.84B
Shares: 255,982,592
Total Debt: $2.22B
Cash: $2.34B
EBITDA: -$369.93M
Total Debt: $2.22B
Cash: $2.34B
Revenue: $70.92M
Shares: 255,982,592
Revenue: $70.92M
Revenue: $70.92M
Revenue: $70.92M
Total Equity: $1.84B
Tax Rate: -0.9%
Equity: $1.84B
Total Debt: $2.22B
Cash: $2.34B
Current Liabilities: $150.34M
Long-Term Debt: $2.21B
Total Debt: $2.22B
Total Equity: $1.84B
Shares: 255,982,592
Shares: 255,982,592
CapEx: -$1.06B
Shares: 255,982,592
Stock Price: $71.45
Net Income: -$341.94M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 1:46pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.4M | $13.8M | $0 | $4.4M | $70.9M |
| Cost of Revenue | $7.6M | $6.7M | $0 | $0 | $33.0M |
| Gross Profit | $4.8M | $7.1M | $0 | $4.4M | $37.9M |
| Operating Expenses | $88.7M | $152.9M | $222.4M | $247.2M | $325.6M |
| Operating Income | -$83.8M | -$145.8M | -$222.4M | -$242.8M | -$287.7M |
| Net Income | -$30.6M | -$31.6M | -$87.6M | -$300.1M | -$341.9M |
| EBITDA | -$83.8M | -$97.6M | -$162.0M | -$443.0M | -$369.9M |
| EPS | $-0.37 | $-0.58 | $-1.07 | $-1.94 | $-1.34 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 1:46pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $321.8M | $238.6M | $85.6M | $565.0M | $2.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $335.8M | $268.3M | $106.9M | $600.2M | $2.5B |
| Total Assets | $443.9M | $438.4M | $360.9M | $954.6M | $5.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $21.4M | $27.8M | $46.2M | $75.9M | $150.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | $5.0M | $4.8M | $59.3M | $155.6M | $2.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $92.0M | $78.5M | $147.3M | $285.4M | $2.6B |
| Total Equity | $100.3M | $133.5M | $99.0M | $479.1M | $1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | -$70.5M | -$102.1M | -$189.7M | -$489.7M | -$831.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 1:46pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$80.1M | -$156.5M | -$148.9M | -$126.1M | -$71.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$54.8M | -$57.3M | -$118.8M | -$174.1M | -$1.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$134.9M | -$213.7M | -$267.7M | -$300.3M | -$1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $25.9M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $281.8M | -$85.3M | -$151.2M | $479.4M | $2.2B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:07am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$751.8M $656.6M – $826.8M
|
$1.9B $1.9B – $1.9B
|
$3.2B $2.5B – $3.8B
|
$4.1B $3.3B – $4.9B
|
| EBITDA |
-$451.1M -$496.1M – -$394.0M
|
-$1.1B -$1.1B – -$1.1B
|
-$1.9B -$2.3B – -$1.5B
|
-$2.5B -$2.9B – -$2.0B
|
| Net Income |
$175.3M -$549.7M – $588.1M
|
$278.2M $159.1M – $397.4M
|
$822.8M $610.4M – $1.0B
|
$1.0B $759.4M – $1.3B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 1:46pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.4% | -100.0% | — | +1,505.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +46.9% | -100.0% | — | +757.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -73.9% | -52.6% | -9.2% | -18.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -3.6% | -176.7% | -242.7% | -13.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -16.4% | -66.1% | -173.4% | +16.5% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-22 | Avellan Abel Antonio | J-Other | 2,500,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | Cisneros Adriana | A-Award | 2,124.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | Torres Julio A. | A-Award | 2,124.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | RUBIN RONALD L | A-Award | 2,124.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | Wibergh Johan | A-Award | 2,124.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | SARNOFF RICHARD | A-Award | 2,124.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Johnson Andrew Martin | S-Sale | 45,809.00 | $93.81 | $4.3M |
| 2026-06-06 | Wibergh Johan | F-InKind | 208.00 | $93.60 | $19,469 |
| 2026-06-05 | Yao Huiwen | S-Sale | 40,000.00 | $96.37 | $3.9M |
| 2026-05-30 | Avellan Abel Antonio | F-InKind | 32,754.00 | $113.41 | $3.7M |
| 2026-05-30 | Bernal Maya | F-InKind | 2,621.00 | $113.41 | $297,248 |
| 2026-05-30 | Wisniewski Scott | F-InKind | 16,377.00 | $113.41 | $1.9M |
| 2026-05-30 | Johnson Andrew Martin | F-InKind | 16,377.00 | $113.41 | $1.9M |
| 2026-05-30 | Gupta Shanti B. | F-InKind | 21,275.00 | $113.41 | $2.4M |
| 2025-05-27 | Wisniewski Scott | S-Sale | 25,904.00 | $126.64 | $3.3M |
| 2026-05-22 | Yao Huiwen | A-Award | 30,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Johnson Andrew Martin | S-Sale | 5,000.00 | $90.25 | $451,250 |
| 2026-05-18 | Gupta Shanti B. | A-Award | 66,667.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-18 | Gupta Shanti B. | F-InKind | 11,350.00 | $86.83 | $985,521 |
| 2026-05-19 | Yao Huiwen | X-InTheMoney | 40,000.00 | $0.06 | $2,564 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: ASTS pulled in $70.9M in 2025 revenue (up from $4.4M in 2024), but the quarterly trajectory is wildly lumpy — $54.3M in Q4'25, then crashing to $14.7M in Q1'26 with a $191M net loss, the worst quarterly bottom-line print in the dataset. That's not a SaaS-like ramp; it's milestone/government contract revenue lumpiness (likely USSF or gateway equipment recognition), which makes the 1,505% YoY headline meaningless as a run-rate. Capex of $1.06B against $2.34B cash means the company has roughly 2 years of runway at current burn before another raise — and FCF of -$1.14B in 2025 will accelerate as they build out the Block 2 BlueBird constellation (they need ~45-60 satellites for continuous coverage vs. the 5 currently in orbit). Gross margin of 53% on $71M of mixed revenue tells you nothing about unit economics at scale.
On the prior models: the synthesis verdict of "Priced for Perfection" at 429x P/S is directionally correct but lazy — P/S is the wrong frame for a constellation business where revenue won't meaningfully ramp until 2027+. The more honest critique is EV/invested-capital and dilution math: ASTS has issued stock aggressively and the April 2026 insider sales of 3.04M shares (~$227M at current prices) plus the synthesis's cited $451M total are a genuine red flag — not because insiders ever time tops, but because the cap table is going to keep expanding. The "pre_profit_growth" classification with confidence 1 is essentially the model admitting it doesn't know what to do; this is a pre-revenue infrastructure call option, not a growth company. Market Forces calling "Strong Headwinds" while Pre-Flight calls it a legitimate call option on a $1T market — those aren't actually contradictory, they're the bear and bull case stated separately, and neither resolves the question.
The contrarian bull case the models underweight: ASTS has demonstrated technical viability (voice/video calls direct to unmodified smartphones), has signed AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone, and Rakuten as partners, holds defense contracts that de-risk near-term cash needs, and operates in a market where Starlink Direct-to-Cell is the only credible competitor — and SpaceX's offering currently requires T-Mobile partnership and is bandwidth-limited compared to ASTS's larger phased-array design. If you believe in the technology, $30B is not obviously crazy for a duopolist in global D2D connectivity; Iridium trades at $3B with vastly inferior tech and addressable market. The contrarian bear case the models also underweight: the launch cadence is the entire thesis, and ASTS is dependent on SpaceX (a direct competitor) and Blue Origin for launches, with Block 2 satellites delayed multiple times already. One launch failure or 12-month delay and the dilution required to bridge could be 30-50% of the current cap table.
Where the data is thin: there's no debt figure shown, but ASTS has ~$460M in convertible notes outstanding that the file omits — material for a company burning $1B+ annually. The "Neutral Insider Activity" tag is wrong given $200M+ in recent sales at these prices; that should be flagged as bearish, not neutral. The current ratio of 16.3 is meaningless when your liabilities are mostly long-dated and your real constraint is constellation capex. Revenue confidence labeled "Moderate" with "decelerating" quarterly trend is misleading — Q4'25's $54M was almost certainly a one-time defense/equipment milestone, not a baseline. I largely agree with the synthesis "Priced for Perfection" verdict but think the framing is incomplete: this isn't an overvalued operating company, it's a call option whose strike price keeps rising as dilution compounds. At $74.76 you're paying for ~2028 commercial success at high probability. Fair value as a probability-weighted call option, using 35% success at $150-200/share and 65% failure/dilution at $15-25, gives roughly $62-80 — meaning the stock is close to fair as a binary bet, but with negatively skewed risk because the dilution path is near-certain and the success path requires flawless execution. I'd dissent slightly from "Priced for Perfection" — it's priced for *probable* success with brutal downside, which is different. Not a short (squeeze ris
GPT Critique
AST SpaceMobile's financials paint a picture of a company deep in its pre-profit phase, marked by significant volatility and substantial capital requirements. Revenue soared to $70.9M for 2025, a dramatic rise from $4.4M in 2024, but this surge is misleading when considering the inconsistency in quarterly figures, notably the plunge from $54.3M in Q4 2025 to $14.7M in Q1 2026. This pattern suggests revenue driven by milestone payments rather than steady growth, which is typical for infrastructure projects waiting on specific achievements rather than an ongoing revenue stream. The net losses remain alarmingly high, with a $191M net loss in Q1 2026 alone, indicating a business model heavily reliant on continued capital infusion. The gross margin of 53% on fluctuating revenue levels does not provide a clear indication of potential profitability at scale. Cash reserves of $2.34B might seem robust, but with negative free cash flow of $1.14B in 2025, the company faces a relentless cash burn that foreshadows additional capital raises.
Opus rightly identifies AST SpaceMobile as a speculative investment, primarily due to its high valuation relative to its revenue and the existing uncertainty around its business model. While Opus notes the "Priced for Perfection" verdict, I agree with their critique that focusing solely on the P/S ratio is inadequate for such a capital-intensive entity. The critical issue here is not just revenue growth but the ongoing dilution risk as ASTS raises further capital to fund its satellite constellation, a point Opus correctly highlights with the insider sales and stock issuance. I diverge slightly from Opus's conclusion that the market is pricing for "probable success." Given the negative cash flow and dependency on successful satellite launches, I view the current pricing as excessively optimistic, particularly when factoring in potential delays and competition from companies like SpaceX.
Opus's analysis of the competitive landscape is thorough, acknowledging ASTS's technical achievements and partnerships with major telecoms like AT&T and Verizon, which add credibility to its strategic vision. However, the dependency on competitors like SpaceX for satellite launches introduces significant execution risk. Opus's assertion that the insider sales should be flagged as bearish rather than neutral aligns with my interpretation—selling $200M+ at current valuations suggests insiders might be less confident in near-term share value appreciation, a view that contradicts the "Neutral Insider Activity" classification.
A skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating ASTS's technological edge and the potential first-mover advantage in the nascent direct-to-device satellite market. They could posit that the partnerships with major telecom providers are evidence of strategic positioning that could yield substantial market share, and that the market's optimism is justified given the transformative potential of ASTS's services. Additionally, the large cash reserves and lack of traditional debt might be viewed as strategic strengths that provide more flexibility than competitors encumbered with debt.