Business Description
Nebius Group N.V. is a technology company dedicated to developing comprehensive infrastructure to serve the global artificial intelligence industry. Its operations encompass several key areas. Central to its mission is Nebius, an AI-focused cloud platform engineered to handle demanding AI workloads. This division constructs end-to-end AI infrastructure, featuring extensive GPU computing clusters, robust cloud platforms, and essential tools and services for developers. The group also includes Toloka AI, which functions as a data solutions provider, assisting with various phases of generative AI development. TripleTen operates as an educational technology venture, focused on equipping individuals with new skills for careers in the tech sector. Furthermore, Avride specializes in pioneering autonomous driving technologies for self-driving vehicles and delivery robots. Founded in 1989, the company was previously known as Yandex N.V. until its rebranding to Nebius Group N.V. in August 2024. Its headquarters are located in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, with additional research and development facilities spread across Europe, North America, and Israel.
Business History
Generated: Jun 14, 2026 4:50pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 9:05am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.11
Total Equity: $4.61B
Shares: 253,048,000
Total Debt: $4.13B
Cash: $3.68B
EBITDA: $494.80M
Total Debt: $4.13B
Cash: $3.68B
Revenue: $529.80M
Revenue: $529.80M
Revenue: $529.80M
Total Equity: $4.61B
Tax Rate: 12.1%
Equity: $4.61B
Total Debt: $4.13B
Cash: $3.68B
Current Liabilities: $1.53B
Long-Term Debt: $4.10B
Total Debt: $4.13B
Total Equity: $4.61B
Shares: 253,048,000
Shares: 253,048,000
CapEx: -$4.07B
Shares: 253,048,000
Stock Price: $240.30
Net Income: $101.70M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Nebius is a post-Yandex-divestiture entity that has pivoted into AI cloud/infrastructure, and the top-line trajectory is real and violent: revenue went from $20.9M (2023) to $117.5M (2024) to $529.8M (2025), with gross margin inflecting from negative to 68.6%. That GM% is genuinely cloud-software-grade and suggests pricing power on GPU capacity. However, operating margin is still -112.5% and the company burned $3.68B of free cash flow in 2025 building out infrastructure — equal to 100% of its liquid cash. Net income of $101.7M is almost certainly flattered by investment gains/mark-to-market on its stakes (Toloka, ClickHouse, Avride), not core operations — the OCF/NI of 1.43x and -7.6% accruals look clean only because the loss is buried in capex.
The capital structure tells the story: net cash is already negative (-$449.6M) despite $3.68B of liquidity, and at the current burn rate runway is roughly 4 quarters before another capital raise. Diluted share count has actually fallen from 362M to 253M (-8.6% CAGR), but that reflects the post-Yandex restructuring, not ongoing capital discipline — SBC at 15.7% of revenue is high, and buybacks only offset 20% of it. Insider tape is uniformly one-directional: 22 sells, zero buys, $131M sold including a $101.6M Korolenko exercise-and-sell. Beneish M at 1.35 is a flag worth noting given how lumpy and reclassified the recent income statements are.
As a business: the gross-margin breakthrough and revenue scaling are legitimately impressive, and Altman Z of 4.83 says the balance sheet isn't broken yet. But this is an unproven, cash-incinerating capex story dependent on continuous external financing, with insiders monetizing aggressively into the ramp. Quality verdict: mixed — promising operating economics, fragile financial structure.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Decomposition of 2025 net income: how much is operating vs. mark-to-market gains on Toloka/ClickHouse/Avride stakes
- Customer concentration in AI infrastructure revenue — is the $530M dominated by 1-2 hyperscaler-adjacent contracts?
- Capex commitments and signed GPU/data-center contracts for 2026 vs. financing already secured
- Terms of any convertible notes or preferred instruments outstanding — true cost of net debt position
- Real GM% ex-depreciation on the GPU fleet — accounting choice on useful life materially affects the 68.6%
- Whether the Korolenko 10b5-1 plan and other insider sales are programmatic or discretionary
- Operating cash flow excluding working capital and non-operating gain reversals — is core OCF still negative?
NBIS trades at $232.36 for a ~$55.8B equity value against a business currently burning $3.68B of free cash flow with $3.68B of cash — i.e., roughly four quarters of runway before more capital is required. The e2e synthesis itself flags 'High Conviction Required,' which I read as: no method confidently anchors a fair value here because the company is pre-economics. A neutral-cloud AI-infra winner thesis can support a large number, but the market is already paying for that outcome; the deserved value on skeptical, quality-adjusted numbers is materially below spot.
What's priced in at ~$56B: continued hypergrowth, gross margins holding/expanding from 68.6%, the loss-making side bets (Toloka, TripleTen, Avride) eventually not mattering, and a successful capital raise (dilution) on favorable terms to fund the GPU build-out without breaking the equity story. That is a stacked set of assumptions. Earnings quality on the reported profit is suspect (likely non-operating), insiders are selling, and the business model still needs to prove it can earn returns on capital above the cost of the GPUs it keeps buying. None of that screams 'cheap' — it screams 'fairly-to-richly valued on a great narrative.'
Quality is mixed (-42); a genuinely great business raises deserved value, but this one hasn't earned the right to a premium-to-narrative multiple yet. I want a real discount to the story before underwriting it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward capex guidance and contracted backlog/RPO — needed to size the next raise
- Cash burn trajectory and any disclosed financing plans (equity, convert, debt against GPUs)
- Segment-level economics: GPU-cloud standalone margins vs consolidated, to strip out Toloka/TripleTen/Avride drag
- Customer concentration disclosures — is revenue from a few large AI labs or genuinely diversified?
- Quality of the reported profit: how much is operating vs gains on the Yandex-related stakes/divestitures
NBIS is riding a strong platform-monopoly narrative as the non-hyperscaler AI infrastructure play, and the tape is letting that story breathe. The market regime is neutral (VIX 17, S&P near highs), so high-beta (1.43) story stocks aren't being punished, and that matters here because NBIS has no earnings shield - it lives or dies on narrative oxygen. The bull thesis (GPU scarcity, neutral alternative to AWS/Azure/GCP, sovereign AI demand) is the active, intense story being priced, and recent momentum (price at $279 vs 12m back triple-digits lower) confirms flows are chasing it. The key divergence is screaming bullish-sentiment: price $279.72 vs analyst consensus target $196 - the tape is roughly 43% ABOVE where 8 sell-side analysts (7 Buy / 1 Hold) think it should trade. That gap means the narrative is leading analysts, not the other way around, and the one revision this month nudged targets up to $255 - analysts are chasing, not leading. That is classic late-cycle narrative tailwind. Risks to the read: narrative durability is only 'moderate' and cult coefficient only 'medium,' so this is not a Tesla/Palantir-grade faith trade - a single crack in the AI capex story or a hyperscaler price-cut headline could snap the premium fast. Net: tailwind now, but fragile.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether AI-infra narrative cracks via hyperscaler capex cut or GPU price war headline
- Pace and direction of analyst target revisions - do they close the gap to price or stall
- VIX move above 22 or risk-off rotation that would hit beta-1.43 names hardest
- Any sovereign/enterprise AI contract wins or losses that validate or undercut the non-hyperscaler thesis
- Insider selling or secondary offering that could break momentum
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 4:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.8B | $13.5M | $20.9M | $117.5M | $529.8M |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.3B | $28.4M | $31.9M | $73.4M | $166.2M |
| Gross Profit | $2.4B | -$14.9M | -$11.0M | $44.1M | $363.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $2.6B | $143.1M | $316.5M | $484.8M | $959.8M |
| Operating Income | -$177.4M | -$158.0M | -$327.5M | -$440.7M | -$596.2M |
| Net Income | -$196.0M | $745.6M | $241.3M | -$641.4M | $101.7M |
| EBITDA | $240.8M | -$103.4M | -$310.1M | -$316.7M | $494.8M |
| EPS | $-0.54 | $2.03 | $0.65 | $-2.28 | $0.11 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 4:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.1B | $1.1B | $116.1M | $2.4B | $3.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.7B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $2.5B | $4.7B |
| Total Assets | $6.9B | $8.3B | $8.8B | $3.5B | $12.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.5B | $2.5B | $3.9B | $264.0M | $1.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.2B | $401.1M | $558.6M | $0 | $4.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.7B | $5.5B | $294.9M | $7.8B |
| Total Equity | $3.5B | $4.2B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $4.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.8B | $2.3B | $3.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 4:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $124.6M | $697.0M | $829.8M | $245.6M | $384.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$598.4M | -$14.6M | -$83.4M | -$807.7M | -$4.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$473.7M | $682.4M | $746.4M | -$562.1M | -$3.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$110.4M | $0 | $0 | $1.5B | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$93.4M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$711.4M | $131.8M | -$1.0B | $1.4B | $1.3B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:07am (58m ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$11.6B $9.1B – $13.5B
|
$21.3B $16.4B – $28.9B
|
$37.0B $28.4B – $50.2B
|
$53.9B $41.3B – $73.1B
|
| EBITDA |
-$4.7B -$5.4B – -$3.7B
|
-$8.6B -$11.7B – -$6.6B
|
-$14.9B -$20.2B – -$11.4B
|
-$21.7B -$29.5B – -$16.7B
|
| Net Income |
-$337.9M -$5.7B – $5.5B
|
$300.8M $210.0M – $440.6M
|
$602.3M $420.4M – $882.1M
|
$2.7B $1.9B – $3.9B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 4:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -99.7% | +54.8% | +462.2% | +350.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -100.6% | +26.2% | +500.9% | +724.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +10.9% | -107.3% | -34.6% | -35.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +480.4% | -67.6% | -365.8% | +115.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -142.9% | -199.9% | -2.1% | +256.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:07am (58m ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 100.00 | $246.17 | $24,617 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 200.00 | $251.89 | $50,378 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 200.00 | $255.03 | $51,006 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 100.00 | $257.54 | $25,754 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 100.00 | $262.09 | $26,209 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 200.00 | $248.73 | $49,746 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 3,206.00 | $250.08 | $801,756 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 200.00 | $253.58 | $50,716 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 900.00 | $260.76 | $234,684 |
| 2026-06-15 | Boynton John Wilson IV | S-Sale | 606.00 | $259.45 | $157,227 |
| 2026-06-04 | Shtan Danila | S-Sale | 15,678.00 | $238.96 | $3.7M |
| 2026-06-02 | Boroditsky Marc | S-Sale | 10,776.00 | $276.20 | $3.0M |
| 2026-06-02 | Alonso Sanchez Maria del Dado | S-Sale | 1,509.00 | $276.20 | $416,786 |
| 2026-05-20 | Tal Boaz | S-Sale | 2,600.00 | $199.00 | $517,400 |
| 2026-05-20 | Tal Boaz | S-Sale | 2,000.00 | $200.00 | $400,000 |
| 2026-05-20 | Tal Boaz | S-Sale | 500.00 | $199.01 | $99,505 |
| 2026-05-15 | Boroditsky Marc | S-Sale | 4,500.00 | $217.55 | $978,975 |
| 2026-05-13 | Korolenko Andrey | M-Exempt | 500,000.00 | $100.00 | $50.0M |
| 2026-05-13 | Korolenko Andrey | M-Exempt | 500,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Korolenko Andrey | S-Sale | 500,000.00 | $203.24 | $101.6M |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw trajectory is genuinely extraordinary: quarterly revenue went from $12.1M (Q2'24) to $399M (Q1'26) — a 33x ramp in seven quarters, with the sequential step from $227.7M to $399M (+75% QoQ) being the most important datapoint in the file. That is not a decelerating quarterly trend as the secondary-signals line claims; that's an acceleration. Annual 2025 revenue of $530M with $364M gross profit (68.6% gross margin) is the real tell — this isn't a price-war GPU reseller margin profile, it looks more like a software-inflected infrastructure business or contains favorable bookkeeping around prepaid capacity. The $102M of 2025 net income is almost certainly non-operating (op loss was -$596M); the $621M Q1'26 net income on $399M revenue and the $584M Q2'25 net income are mark-to-market or divestiture gains (residual Yandex stakes, ClickHouse, Toloka etc.), not core earnings. Ignore PE entirely.
The capital structure is where I depart hardest from the bear framing. $3.68B cash, $384M operating cash flow, and -$4.07B capex in 2025 means this is a self-funded (so far) hyper-build, not a debt-funded one — debt line is blank, current ratio 3.08. But run the math forward: if 2026 capex matches 2025, cash runway is ~10-11 months from year-end before they tap equity or debt. The Q1'26 $399M revenue annualizes to $1.6B, and if the sequential growth even halves to 35% QoQ they exit 2026 near $3B run-rate — that's the bull math the market is paying for. At $55.8B market cap, that's ~18x forward run-rate sales, which is rich but not absurd for a 200%+ grower with 69% gross margins. The 105x trailing P/S the synthesis cites is the wrong denominator.
Where I agree with the skeptics: the insider activity is real and ugly — 500K-share M-Exempt-then-sale on May 13 is classic options-funded distribution, and the steady drip through June is not "diversification," it's conviction-revealing. The market-forces "no visible moat" critique is correct in substance — Nebius has no demonstrated switching cost, no proprietary silicon, and competes against Oracle/CoreWeave/Crusoe plus the hyperscalers themselves, all of whom have cheaper capital. The "non-US sovereign alternative" narrative is thin gruel; European AI labs that matter (Mistral, etc.) are not going to single-source from a Dutch-listed ex-Yandex entity for strategic workloads. And the synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" is analytically lazy — it's a way of refusing to commit. The market-narrative layer correctly identifies the cult coefficient as only medium and durability as moderate, which is the most honest read in the stack.
The contrarian case nobody in the prior models articulated: the gross margin is suspicious. 68.6% gross margin on GPU rental is 2-3x what CoreWeave or pure compute resellers report. Either (a) Nebius is capitalizing GPU depreciation aggressively into capex rather than COGS, which would mean true gross margin is materially lower once the $4B of capex flows through D&A, or (b) the revenue mix includes high-margin software/data layers (Toloka data labeling, ClickHouse-adjacent) that won't scale with the AI infra story. Either resolution hurts the bull case. Net: I dissent from the synthesis's "High Conviction Required" hedge and from the pre-flight's implicit endorsement of the $5-10B revenue trajectory at face value. The growth is real, the cash position buys ~12 months, but the valuation assumes both sustained 50%+ growth AND eventual hyperscaler-level margins on infrastructure, and one of those two has to break. Fair value on a 2026 exit run-rate of $2.5B at 12x sales (a fair multiple for a decelerating 100% grower with question marks on margin sustainability) is roughly $30B, or ~$125/share. Today's $232 embeds the picks-and-shovels-monopoly outcome with little discount for the dilution that's coming when capex outruns OCF in mid-2026.
GPT Critique
The raw data on Nebius Group N.V. presents a company undergoing a rapid transformation with a dramatic revenue growth trajectory. The numbers are indeed striking: a 33x increase in quarterly revenue from $12.1 million in Q2 2024 to $399 million in Q1 2026. This growth is paired with a notable quarterly leap from $227.7 million to $399 million, indicating an acceleration rather than deceleration, which contradicts the secondary-signals claim of a decelerating trend. However, the net income figures tell a complex story with substantial fluctuations, and the massive net income in some quarters likely reflects non-core earnings, such as mark-to-market or divestiture gains, rather than sustainable profitability from operations. The company's cash and operating cash flow are substantial, but the immense capital expenditure of $4.07 billion in 2025 raises questions about future funding needs.
I agree with Opus's assessment that the company's growth is remarkable, but I diverge on some key points. Opus suggests that the valuation at $232 per share is overvalued, pegging fair value at around $125. They argue that the insider selling activity indicates a lack of confidence, which aligns with my own skepticism. However, I believe Opus underestimates the potential for Nebius to leverage its current momentum and cash position. While I concur that insider selling is concerning, it could also be seen as executives taking advantage of high market valuations, rather than a direct signal of underlying business weakness.
Opus's narrative about the gross margin being artificially inflated is persuasive. A gross margin of 68.6% for a company in the GPU rental business seems unusually high, suggesting potential aggressive accounting practices or a mix of high-margin revenue sources that may not align with the core AI infrastructure narrative. This casts doubt on the sustainability of such margins if Nebius is to scale further in the AI infrastructure space, where competition from hyperscalers is fierce.
A careful skeptic might argue that both analyses overemphasize the potential risks without fully appreciating the strategic positioning Nebius has achieved. The growth trajectory, while dependent on continued capital investment, might attract strategic partnerships or acquisitions that could mitigate the need for equity or debt raises. Furthermore, the current geopolitical climate might enhance Nebius's appeal as a non-US infrastructure alternative, potentially opening markets that are not yet fully appreciated.