Plasma Companies — Profiles & Track Records
Plasma Gasification Companies — The Full Picture
Every company that has attempted commercial plasma gasification, with honest outcomes. Understanding the failures is as important as knowing the technology works.
The Pattern of Failure
Almost every plasma gasification company follows the same arc: 1. Raise tens or hundreds of millions of dollars 2. Build a demo plant that technically works at small scale 3. Attempt to scale up 4-10x for commercial viability 4. Scale-up reveals engineering problems (refractory failures, sticky particulates, heat balance mismatches) 5. Concurrent economic shifts (falling natural gas prices, increased recycling) undermine the business case 6. Company enters creditor protection / bankruptcy / dissolution 7. Founder sometimes buys back IP for pennies and tries again under a new name
The honest assessment: Plasma gasification works as physics and chemistry. It has not worked as a business at municipal waste scale. The commercially viable applications treat waste streams so dangerous or valuable that the high operating cost is justified (nuclear waste, asbestos, precious metals, military applications).
However — The Claw's use case is different from MSW processing. See "Why Ocean Plastic Is Different" at the bottom.
FAILURES
AlterNRG / Westinghouse Plasma Corporation — CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
What they did: Canadian company acquired Westinghouse Plasma Corporation in 2007. Owned the Westinghouse plasma torch technology. Attempted to commercialize at massive scale.
The Air Products / Tees Valley disaster (UK):
- Air Products partnered with AlterNRG to build two 49 MW plasma gasification power plants in Tees Valley, England
- Plan: convert 700,000 tonnes of waste annually, power ~100,000 homes
- Construction began 2013 with the "world's largest gasifiers" ever built
- The technology had never been scaled beyond ~250 TPD. They tried to jump to 1,000 TPD.
- First unit completed but could never be made to run properly
- CEO admitted: "For the past year, we start the plant up, learn something, and the plant goes down because something goes wrong."
- April 4, 2016: Air Products left the waste-to-energy business entirely
- Write-down: $900 million to $1 billion
- This was the single largest financial failure in plasma gasification history
- March 2015: Harvest International New Energy (Chinese company) acquired ~94% of AlterNRG for C$147 million
- Now owned by Sunshine Kaidi, headquartered in Wuhan, China
- 2025 revenue: ~$5.6 million (minimal activity)
- July 2021: announced sale/investor solicitation process
Plasco Energy Group (Ottawa, Canada) — FAILURE
What they did: Built an 85 TPD plasma gasification demonstration plant on Trail Road in Ottawa. Technology ran garbage through high-powered plasma torches, producing syngas + vitrified slag.
Investment: $300-400 million in private funding over nearly a decade.
What went wrong:
- Missed multiple deadlines to provide City of Ottawa with plans for functioning plant
- March 2015: City of Ottawa severed ties through out-of-court settlement
- Natural gas prices fell, making their electricity uncompetitive
- Technology worked at demo scale but never achieved commercial viability
- 2015: Filed for creditor protection (CCAA), owing $100+ million
- Founder Rod Bryden bought the company's remains (IP only, not the facility) for $1 Canadian dollar
- Hired back core staff, rebranded to Plasco Conversion Technologies, then to Omni Conversion Technologies Inc. (December 2020)
- Developed "Omni200 Gasification and Plasma Refining System"
- December 2024: Omni announced ANOTHER sale/investment solicitation process — the phoenix may have crashed again
Hitachi Metals — Utashinai Eco-Valley (Japan) — CLOSED
What they built: 150 TPD (165 short tons/day) plasma gasification plant on Hokkaido island, Japan. Used Westinghouse plasma torches (via AlterNRG).
Timeline:
- Constructed 2002, operational 2003
- By 2007: processing ~300 TPD of MSW and automobile shredder residue
- Generated up to 7.9 MWh electricity, 4.3 MWh exported to grid (54% export ratio)
- Dioxin emissions: ~100x lower than incineration
- Wrong size for reactor bottom
- Carryover of sticky particulate
- Wrong choice of refractory material
- Official: Lost waste supply contracts, didn't meet design heat/material balance
- Industry narrative: Japan's aggressive recycling programs reduced available waste below operating threshold — literally ran out of garbage
Europlasma / CHO Power (France) — TROUBLED, PIVOTED
What they built: CHO Morcenx — a 12 MW plasma gasification plant processing 150 metric TPD of industrial and wood waste in Morcenx, Landes, France. "Most powerful plant of its type worldwide." Opened 2012.
What went wrong:
- Facility described as "struggling" even after "successful tests"
- January 2019: Europlasma entered judicial receivership
- Rescued by Luxembourg-based Zigi Capital
- August 2019: Court approved restructuring eliminating 95% of €30 million debt (~€21 million wiped)
- CHO Power plant equipment dismantled and resold for ~€7 million
- Abandoned electricity production entirely
- Still publicly traded (Euronext Growth Paris: ALEUP), stock down 99.78% over past year
- Revenue €42.5M in 2024 (176% increase) — but from metalworking subsidiaries, NOT plasma
- Only surviving plasma business: Inertam — vitrifies asbestos waste (8,000 tonnes/year). The ONLY authorized asbestos vitrification site in France
- €5M invested to increase asbestos treatment capacity
Advanced Plasma Power (UK) — DORMANT
Technology: Patented Gasplasma process — fluidised bed gasification + plasma conversion. Clean hydrogen-rich syngas + vitrified "Plasmarok" product.
Claims: 150,000 tonnes/year, 11 MWh net electrical output, 98% landfill diversion.
What happened:
- Selected by Velocys for UK waste-to-jet-fuel project (sustainable aviation fuel)
- Joint venture with Group Machiels (Belgium) for landfill mining
- Advanced Plasma Power International Ltd dissolved December 3, 2019
- Advanced Plasma Power Limited still technically registered but no evidence of operations
- No commercial-scale Gasplasma plant was ever built
Pune, India (BARC) — FAILURE
- 72 TPD plasma-based hazardous waste treatment plant, commissioned 2008
- Separate process aimed to convert 42,000 tons/year of sorted waste into 12 tonnes hydrogen/day
- Required 525-700 MWh/day energy input — hydrogen costs pushed above $6/kg
- Feedstock inconsistency (heterogeneous MSW) made operations unreliable
- Pune's planners pulled the plug
OPERATIONAL / ACTIVE
InEnTec (Oregon, USA) — OPERATIONAL AND GROWING ★
The most important company for The Claw's thesis.
Background:
- Founded 1995, spinoff from MIT's Plasma Science and Fusion Center (PSFC)
- Technology origin: NASA's arc jet research (spacecraft heat shield testing)
- Incorporated NASA's segment-constricted arc heater design (patented 1965)
- Operating temperature: 1,800 to 27,000°F (1,000 to 15,000°C)
| Location | Client | Waste Type | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| Midland, Michigan | Dow Corning | Hazardous industrial waste | 20 TPD; 10-year contract (2007) |
| Japan | Kawasaki Heavy Industries | PCBs, asbestos | 10 nines destruction of PCBs (99.99999999%) |
| Kuan Yin, Taiwan | Global Plasma | Medical waste | Near Taipei |
| Columbia Ridge, Oregon | Columbia Ridge Landfill | MSW, plastics, biomass | 1,500 kg H₂/day; $8M expansion; commissioning 2025 |
| Richland, Washington | InEnTec | Various | First commercial facility (2008) |
- Location: Arlington, Oregon
- Capacity: 600-1,100 kg hydrogen/day initially, 1,500 kg/day at full capacity
- Feedstock: 25 TPD of MSW, biomass, e-waste, unrecycled plastics, PVC, textiles, auto shredder residue
- Investment: $8 million expansion
- Status: Mechanical completion October 2025, commissioning underway
- Energy efficiency: Uses ~half the energy of electrolysis for H₂; expected to improve to ~quarter
- Output: fuel cell-grade hydrogen (enough for 80,000 miles of vehicle travel/day)
- Converts nearly 100% of incoming organics into syngas
- Zero hazardous ash or char — only non-hazardous vitrified glass
- PCB destruction: 99.99999999% (10 nines)
- 1 ton MSW diverted prevents ≥1 ton CO₂ equivalent
shipboard-processing.md.PyroGenesis (Montreal, Canada) — OPERATIONAL ★
Key distinction: Supplies the US Navy and US Air Force. NASDAQ: PYR.
Torch product line:
- APT-HP: 200 kW to 2 MW, plume exceeds 5,000°C
- APT: 50 kW to 500 kW
- RPT (Reverse Polarity): In use since 1991
- MINIGUN: Small-scale R&D
| Year | Power Rating | Event |
|---|---|---|
| 2019-2020 | 900 kW | Torch tests for RISE Energy (Sweden) |
| 2022 | 2.5 MW | Intermediate scale-up |
| Aug 2023 | 4.5 MW | Contract signed: $4.13M CAD |
| Jan 2026 | 4.5 MW | Delivered to US defense client |
| Oct 2024 | 20 MW | Ordered — "largest plasma torch ever produced commercially" |
- PAWDS (Plasma Arc Waste Destruction System) on Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers — 4 units delivered. See
shipboard-processing.md. - PRRS (Plasma Resource Recovery System) at Hurlburt Field, FL (US Air Force) — 3,100 metric tons/year, 420 kW output, first facility in North America to use plasma gasification for energy from unsorted waste (operational since June 2011)
Tetronics (UK) — OPERATIONAL (Niche)
Founded: ~1964, Swindon, UK. 55+ years. DC Plasma Arc Technology.
97+ installations across four continents — but niche/specialty, not MSW.
What actually works:
- Precious metals recovery — platinum group metals from spent catalysts and automotive converters
- Nuclear waste — plasma vitrification of plutonium-contaminated materials for Sellafield (UK government funded, with Costain)
- Asbestos/hazardous waste — Air Pollution Control Residue treatment
Japan Small-Scale Plants — OPERATIONAL
The Japanese facilities that WORK are the small ones (25-40 TPD):
| Plant | Capacity | Commissioned | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mihama-Mikata | 28 short TPD (25 metric) | 2002 | Reported still running at capacity |
| Yoshii | 24 TPD MSW | 1999 | Operational (Hitachi Ltd) |
| Shimonoseki | 41 TPD MSW ash | 2002 | Operational |
IN DEVELOPMENT
Sierra Energy (USA) — FastOx Gasifier
Not strictly plasma but related high-temperature gasification at ~2,200°C using oxygen + steam injection (modified blast furnace).
- Demo facility at Fort Hunter Liggett (US Army), testing since January 2020
- DoD invested $3M, California Energy Commission invested $5M
- Series A: $33 million (August 2019)
- Handles nearly any waste with minimal pre-processing, moisture content up to 50%
- Pivoted from full waste-to-fuel plants to supplying gasifier as core technology
- Potentially first commercial unit by 2025 (unconfirmed)
Reformed Energy (Houston, TX) — Pilot Stage
- Building pilot plant: 150 TPD of MSW, plastics, tires
- Targets: 1M+ gallons sustainable aviation fuel + 500K gallons green diesel annually
- Secured investment from Riot Platforms (Bitcoin mining company) in March 2024
- Q1 2024 target for initial operations (status unclear)
Firepoint Energy (Pennsylvania) — Early Stage Startup
- Plans to use plasma gasification to extract rare earth elements + lithium from waste coal
- Also produce synthetic jet fuel, electricity, and green hydrogen
- Signed LOI for 100-acre pilot site near 4-million-ton waste coal pile (October 2024)
- Self-reported $50M valuation. No operational plant yet.
Total Worldwide Operational Capacity
Approximately 200 TPD across ~5 commercial locations (mostly Japan).
For comparison, the GPGP contains ~80,000-100,000 tonnes. At 200 TPD, it would take ~1,100 years to process the entire patch. This is why scale matters and why The Claw needs to succeed.
Why Ocean Plastic Is Different From MSW
Every failed plasma gasification company was trying to compete against cheap landfill or cheap natural gas for processing municipal solid waste that cities need to dispose of.
The Claw's situation is fundamentally different:
1. No competing disposal option — you can't landfill ocean plastic from the middle of the Pacific. The only alternative is shipping it 10,000 miles to a landfill (which is what Ocean Cleanup does now). 2. Infinite feedstock — unlike Utashinai which ran out of garbage, the GPGP has 80,000+ tonnes and growing. Feedstock supply is guaranteed. 3. No cheaper alternative — there is no "cheap natural gas" competing option for processing waste 1,000 miles from shore. 4. The value proposition is environmental, not economic — you're not competing on electricity price. You're solving an environmental crisis. 5. Carbon credits + ESG funding — entirely different revenue model from selling electricity. 6. Military tech exists — PAWDS proves plasma waste processing works at sea on a moving warship. A stationary platform is easier.
The question isn't "can plasma gasification compete with landfill?" (it can't — that's proven). The question is "can plasma gasification work at sea for ocean plastic?" That's a different question with a much more favorable answer.