Business Description
Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc. functions as a leading multi-channel business, acting as both a specialized retailer and a commercial distributor of hard surface flooring and its related accessories. The company provides a wide array of flooring options, such as tile, wood, laminate, vinyl, and natural stone, along with decorative and installation components. It serves a broad customer base, including professional installers, commercial clients, and do-it-yourself customers. As of May 5, 2022, the company boasted a significant physical presence with 166 large-format retail warehouses and five design studios spread across 34 states. Its products are also available online via its website, FloorandDecor.com. Founded in 2000, the company was initially known as FDO Holdings, Inc. before rebranding as Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc. in April 2017. Its headquarters are located in Atlanta, Georgia.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 8:32pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:28pm (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.93
Total Equity: $2.41B
Shares: 108,427,000
Total Debt: $1.99B
Cash: $249.30M
EBITDA: $510.97M
Total Debt: $1.99B
Cash: $249.30M
Revenue: $4.68B
Revenue: $4.68B
Revenue: $4.68B
Total Equity: $2.41B
Tax Rate: 21.8%
Equity: $2.41B
Total Debt: $1.99B
Cash: $249.30M
Current Liabilities: $1.15B
Long-Term Debt: $1.83B
Total Debt: $1.99B
Total Equity: $2.41B
Shares: 108,427,000
Shares: 108,427,000
CapEx: -$317.76M
Shares: 108,427,000
Stock Price: $49.74
Net Income: $208.65M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:35pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.4B | $4.3B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $4.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.8B |
| Gross Profit | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.6B |
| Operating Income | $339.0M | $396.8M | $321.4M | $256.2M | $278.7M |
| Net Income | $283.2M | $298.2M | $246.0M | $205.9M | $208.6M |
| EBITDA | $457.2M | $551.8M | $523.3M | $488.6M | $511.0M |
| EPS | $2.71 | $2.82 | $2.31 | $1.92 | $1.93 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:29pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $139.4M | $9.8M | $34.4M | $187.7M | $249.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Total Assets | $3.7B | $4.4B | $4.7B | $5.1B | $5.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $195.8M | $405.6M | $194.9M | $194.5M | $1.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.1B |
| Total Equity | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $872.2M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:35pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $301.3M | $112.5M | $803.6M | $603.2M | $381.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$407.7M | -$456.6M | -$547.6M | -$446.8M | -$317.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$106.3M | -$344.2M | $256.0M | $156.3M | $64.1M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$63.6M | -$3.8M | -$17.4M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$168.3M | -$129.7M | $24.6M | $153.3M | $61.6M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:28pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$4.7B $4.7B – $4.7B
|
$4.8B $4.8B – $4.9B
|
$5.1B $4.9B – $5.3B
|
$5.6B $5.6B – $5.6B
|
| EBITDA |
$562.2M $561.0M – $563.4M
|
$579.3M $574.5M – $584.1M
|
$614.4M $591.7M – $634.6M
|
$670.4M $668.6M – $672.2M
|
| Net Income |
$205.7M $200.3M – $211.1M
|
$205.8M $202.2M – $216.2M
|
$234.6M $220.5M – $254.0M
|
$272.1M $209.0M – $373.9M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:35pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +24.2% | +3.5% | +0.9% | +5.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.5% | +7.6% | +3.8% | 0.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +17.0% | -19.0% | -20.3% | +8.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +5.3% | -17.5% | -16.3% | +1.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.7% | -5.2% | -6.6% | +4.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:33pm (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-18 | LANGLEY BRYAN | M-Exempt | 1,159.00 | $9.99 | $11,578 |
| 2026-05-18 | LANGLEY BRYAN | M-Exempt | 1,159.00 | $9.99 | $11,578 |
| 2026-05-05 | PAULSEN BRADLEY | F-InKind | 2,461.00 | $48.30 | $118,866 |
| 2026-05-04 | LANGLEY BRYAN | P-Purchase | 2,500.00 | $48.69 | $121,725 |
| 2026-05-04 | SAYMAN ERSAN | M-Exempt | 28,320.00 | $9.99 | $282,917 |
| 2026-05-04 | SAYMAN ERSAN | S-Sale | 15,200.00 | $48.28 | $733,856 |
| 2026-05-04 | SAYMAN ERSAN | M-Exempt | 28,320.00 | $9.99 | $282,917 |
| 2026-05-04 | PAULSEN BRADLEY | P-Purchase | 5,000.00 | $50.25 | $251,250 |
| 2026-02-26 | Adamson John J | F-InKind | 154.00 | $70.14 | $10,802 |
| 2026-02-27 | Adamson John J | F-InKind | 254.00 | $69.09 | $17,549 |
| 2026-02-26 | DENNY STEVEN ALAN | F-InKind | 276.00 | $70.14 | $19,359 |
| 2026-02-27 | DENNY STEVEN ALAN | F-InKind | 218.00 | $69.09 | $15,062 |
| 2026-02-27 | DENNY STEVEN ALAN | F-InKind | 539.00 | $69.09 | $37,240 |
| 2026-02-26 | TAYLOR THOMAS V | F-InKind | 3,016.00 | $70.14 | $211,542 |
| 2026-02-27 | TAYLOR THOMAS V | F-InKind | 2,870.00 | $69.09 | $198,288 |
| 2026-02-27 | TAYLOR THOMAS V | F-InKind | 10,262.00 | $69.09 | $709,002 |
| 2026-02-26 | Christopherson David Victor | F-InKind | 704.00 | $70.14 | $49,379 |
| 2026-02-27 | Christopherson David Victor | F-InKind | 575.00 | $69.09 | $39,727 |
| 2026-02-27 | Christopherson David Victor | F-InKind | 1,219.00 | $69.09 | $84,221 |
| 2026-02-26 | LANGLEY BRYAN | F-InKind | 319.00 | $70.14 | $22,375 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting from the raw tape: revenue went from $4.26B (2022) to $4.68B (2025) — that's 3% CAGR over three years, and net income collapsed from $298M to $209M over the same window. Operating margin compressed from 9.3% in 2022 to 6.0% in 2025. The quarterly trajectory is worse than the annual smooths: Q1'26 revenue $1.15B was down from Q3'25's $1.18B and Q2'25's $1.21B, and Q1'26 net margin of 3.4% is roughly half of mid-2024's ~5%. So the trend isn't "decelerating mature compounder" — it's actively eroding into 2026 with no inflection visible. FCF of $64M on $382M operating cash flow tells you capex ($318M) is still consuming nearly all internal cash to build stores whose unit economics are demonstrably worse than the 2021-2022 vintage.
On valuation: 26.9x TTM P/E and 14.1x EV/EBITDA for a business with -7.9% earnings CAGR, decelerating revenue, and a sub-5% ROIC is rich, full stop. EV/sales of 2.18x is what you pay for a compounder, not a cyclical specialty retailer mid-cycle-bottom whose ROIC (4.6%) sits below any reasonable WACC. If I normalize earnings to a recovered-cycle ~$260M NI (between 2023 and 2024 actuals) and put a 18-20x multiple on it (generous for a 5% grower), I get $4.7-5.2B market cap, i.e. $43-48/share. Current $49.74 is at the top of that band. The synthesis verdict of "disconnected from fundamentals" is directionally right but the framing is sloppy — it's not that the market demands 48.9% FCF growth; it's that the market is paying a normalized-earnings multiple for a business not yet earning normalized earnings, while ignoring that the next-100-stores cohort may permanently dilute ROIC.
Where I'd push back on the prior models: the "Market Headwinds / value-destructive expansion" framing from Market Forces is too harsh. Operating cash flow of $382M is healthy, gross margin actually expanded to 41.2% (vs. 40.6% in 2022), and the cash balance ($249M) plus the absence of disclosed debt stress means this isn't a balance-sheet story — it's a returns-on-incremental-capital story. The Narrative layer's "durable category killer" thesis isn't wrong either; FND genuinely has a structural edge in hard-surface assortment depth that Home Depot and Lowe's can't replicate per-SKU. The honest read is somewhere between: a quality franchise over-earning on multiple, under-earning on margin, with management still pressing the accelerator on store growth into a housing trough. The insider activity (two small P-Purchases on May 4, ~7,500 shares combined, against an M-Exempt/S-Sale of similar size) is essentially noise — calling it "net insider buying" is generous.
Contrarian case I'd take seriously: existing-home sales are at multi-decade lows (~4M annualized). When/if mortgage rates break below 6% and turnover normalizes to 5M+, FND's comps could swing from -LSD to +MSD almost overnight, and the operating leverage on 250+ stores with depressed throughput is real — a return to 2022's 9.3% op margin on $5.5B revenue is $510M op income, or roughly $380M NI, putting current price at 14x recovered earnings. That's the bull case the steady-compounder narrative is implicitly underwriting. The problem: you're paying 26x today for the option, and the timing is unknowable — every quarter of waiting compounds the dilution from sub-cost-of-capital store openings. I'd want to buy that option closer to $38-42, not $50. The synthesis is right that fundamentals don't support the price; it's wrong to imply there's no there-there. This is a "right company, wrong price, wrong moment in the cycle" setup. I dissent mildly from "Disconnected from Fundamentals" only in tone — agree with substance, disagree with implied severity.
GPT Critique
In examining Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc., I notice a company that has experienced revenue growth from $4.26 billion in 2022 to $4.68 billion in 2025, a subdued 3% CAGR. However, net income has seen a sharp decline from $298 million to $209 million over the same period, indicating significant margin pressure. The quarterly data reveals further concerns, with the latest 2026 Q1 revenue of $1.15 billion showing a decrease from 2025 Q2's $1.21 billion, and net margins dropping to 3.4% from mid-2024's ~5%. This pattern suggests that Floor & Decor is currently struggling to maintain profitability amid pressures from its aggressive expansion strategy and macroeconomic headwinds.
Opus makes a compelling case that the current valuation metrics, such as a P/E of 26.9x and EV/EBITDA of 14.1x, are overly optimistic for a company facing a -7.9% earnings CAGR and a ROIC of just 4.6%. I concur with his assessment that these valuations are more suitable for a growing compounder rather than a business stuck in a cyclical downturn with underwhelming returns. Where I diverge slightly is in Opus's assertion that the market's expectations of a "48.9% FCF growth" are exaggerated. While the market may indeed overestimate immediate growth potential, the notion that expansion into new markets can dilute ROIC further is critical, as these new stores may not mirror the success of prior expansions.
I align with Opus on the critique of the "Market Headwinds / value-destructive expansion" narrative. While the operating cash flow of $382 million and a solid cash position of $249 million depict a stable financial footing, the significant capex of $318 million indicates a continuous reliance on cash to fuel expansion. This doesn't directly equate to value destruction, but it does signal a strategic risk if these investments fail to yield expected returns. Additionally, while the narrative of Floor & Decor as a "durable category killer" holds some weight due to its specialization and assortment depth, the competitive landscape with big-box retailers remains a formidable challenge.
A skeptic might argue that the current downturn in the housing market, paired with rising interest rates, has unduly punished Floor & Decor's valuation. They might propose that a recovery in housing demand could rapidly improve sales and margins, thus validating the company's aggressive expansion strategy. However, this remains speculative, as the timing of any market recovery is uncertain, and the ongoing capital expenditures could become burdensome if market conditions don't improve promptly.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses are telling a coherent story and I'm going to respect both. The -10 quality score says this is a real business: clean accruals, 1.89x OCF/NI, no dilution, insiders buying small lots in the open market — I don't need to question whether the earnings are honest or the model works. But the -67 value score is right that at $49.74 I'm underwriting three things at once — a housing turn, a 400bp margin recovery, and continued warehouse unit growth — with $1.74B of net debt and FCF down 75% in two years as my starting point. That's not margin of safety, that's a stack of hopes priced in.
My play: this goes on the watchlist with a hard discipline. No starter here at $49.74 — I'm not paying up for a recovery I can't yet see in the print. I begin nibbling around $40 (roughly 0.5% position), scale to a real starter (1.5-2%) in the high $30s where the value lens says it actually gets interesting, and would build toward a full 3-4% position only if I get a panic flush into the low $30s OR I see two consecutive quarters of comp inflection and gross margin stabilization. What flips me aggressive earlier: gross margin clawing back above 42% with op margin showing sequential expansion, or a meaningful insider buy cluster (not the $373K token buys — real size). What keeps me on the sidelines: another leg down in comps, GM staying sub-41%, or any incremental leverage. Good business, wrong price — and I have the luxury of waiting for the price to come to me.
Floor & Decor is a mature specialty retailer that has grown revenue from $3.43B (2021) to $4.68B (2025), a ~8% CAGR, while expanding store count. Earnings quality is genuinely good: OCF/NI of 1.89x, negative accruals (-3.8% of assets), Beneish M of -2.75, and a clean dilution profile (diluted share CAGR 0.2%, SBC just 0.6% of revenue). There is no evidence of accounting manipulation or per-share value erosion through issuance — that is rare and a real positive.
The concern is the operating trajectory. Operating margin has fallen every year from 9.9% (2021) → 9.3% → 7.3% → 5.7% → 5.9%, and net income peaked in 2022 at $298M against $208M in 2025 despite ~10% more revenue. FCF is positive but decelerating ($256M → $156M → $64M), consistent with heavy store-build capex outrunning incremental earnings. Net debt of $1.74B against only $249M liquid cash and $64M of trailing FCF means the balance sheet is a constraint — Altman Z of 2.63 sits in the grey zone, not the safe zone.
Insider behavior is mildly encouraging: Langley and Paulsen made open-market P-purchases in May 2026 (~$373K combined), while Sayman's sale was an option-exercise-and-sell, not a conviction exit. Overall this looks like a well-run, honestly-reported business going through a cyclical and margin-compression phase, not a quality breakdown — but not a fortress either.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Split of $1.74B net debt between operating lease liabilities vs true funded debt — changes balance sheet read materially
- Same-store / comp sales trend vs new-store contribution to disentangle cyclical pressure from unit-economic decay
- New-store productivity (sales per square foot in vintages opened 2022-2024) — is the unit model still working?
- Capex breakdown: maintenance vs growth — to estimate steady-state FCF if expansion paused
- Whether the 2025 gross margin decline reflects tariff/import cost pressure or competitive promotion
- Customer mix Pro vs DIY — Pro is the stickier, higher-quality revenue stream
The e2e synthesis flags FND as 'Disconnected from Fundamentals,' which on a $5.4B market cap with collapsed FCF is code for: the multiple is being supported by narrative, not current cash flows. A 75% FCF drawdown and operating margins cut roughly in half over four years means trailing-based deserved value is materially below the price. Even being generous and capitalizing a normalized mid-cycle margin recovery, the stock at $49.74 looks closer to fair-to-rich than cheap.
The Solid quality grade (clean accruals, stable share count, real earnings) does raise deserved value versus a typical cyclical retailer — but it doesn't close the gap on its own. You're paying for (a) a housing/remodel cycle turn, (b) margin recovery back toward prior peak, and (c) continued warehouse unit growth compounding. That's a stack of three things that need to go right. With net debt on the balance sheet and capex still heavy, the margin of safety at today's price is thin. I'd call this Rich, not Overvalued — the business is good enough that it's not a short, but I'm not paying $49.74 for it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward comp guidance and any inflection in same-store sales trajectory
- Operating margin trajectory and SG&A leverage as new stores mature
- Capex guidance and resulting FCF run-rate — is the 75% FCF drop bottoming?
- Net debt level and interest coverage given balance sheet leverage
- New unit productivity vs. legacy stores — is the box still earning its keep?