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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Bunge Global SA (BG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -52 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -37 · Value -62 · Sentiment -46 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $46.55 vs $118.72 at analysis
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Bunge Global SA
BG NYSEBunge Global SA is an agribusiness and food company that connects agricultural producers with food, feed, and fuel markets worldwide. The company is organized around oilseed processing and refining, grain merchandising and milling, and related agricultural supply chain activities. Its operations include sourcing, storing, transporting, processing, and marketing key crops and oilseeds, along with producing vegetable oils, meal products, and other ingredients used by food manufacturers, animal feed producers, and industrial customers. Bunge Global SA also participates in specialty oils and fats, biofuel-related products, and agricultural inputs that support the broader farm-to-consumer value chain. Headquartered in Chesterfield, Missouri, with incorporation in Switzerland, Bunge Global SA plays an important role in global commodity flows and food ingredient supply networks.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.91
Total Equity: $17.42B
Shares: 166,466,940
Total Debt: $14.21B
Cash: $1.14B
EBITDA: $1.97B
Total Debt: $14.21B
Cash: $1.14B
Revenue: $70.33B
Revenue: $70.33B
Revenue: $70.33B
Total Equity: $17.42B
Tax Rate: 25.4%
Equity: $17.42B
Total Debt: $14.21B
Cash: $1.14B
Current Liabilities: $15.13B
Long-Term Debt: $8.99B
Total Debt: $14.21B
Total Equity: $17.42B
Shares: 166,466,940
Shares: 166,466,940
CapEx: -$1.72B
Shares: 166,466,940
Stock Price: $118.72
Net Income: $816.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:45am (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $59.2B | $67.2B | $59.5B | $53.1B | $70.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $55.8B | $63.6B | $54.7B | $49.7B | $66.9B |
| Gross Profit | $3.4B | $3.7B | $4.8B | $3.4B | $3.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| Operating Income | $2.1B | $2.3B | $3.1B | $1.6B | $1.3B |
| Net Income | $2.1B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $1.1B | $816.0M |
| EBITDA | $2.5B | $2.7B | $3.5B | $2.1B | $2.0B |
| EPS | $10.71 | $10.83 | $15.07 | $5.86 | $4.95 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $9.91 | $10.51 | $14.87 | $5.79 | $4.91 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:30am (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $902.0M | $1.1B | $2.6B | $3.3B | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | — | $16.8B | $16.4B | $16.0B | $24.4B |
| Total Assets | $23.8B | $24.6B | $25.4B | $24.9B | $44.5B |
| Current Liabilities | — | $9.6B | $7.7B | $7.4B | $15.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | $3.3B | $4.1B | $4.8B | $9.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $16.0B | $14.6B | $13.6B | $14.0B | $27.1B |
| Total Equity | $7.8B | $10.0B | $11.8B | $10.9B | $17.4B |
| Retained Earnings | — | $10.2B | $12.1B | $12.8B | $13.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:45am (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$2.9B | -$5.5B | $3.3B | $1.9B | $844.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$399.0M | -$555.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.4B | -$1.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$3.3B | -$6.1B | $2.2B | $524.0M | -$879.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$4.2B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $997.0M | -$729.0M | -$198.0M | $1.3B | $1.2B |
| Dividends Paid | -$289.0M | -$349.0M | -$383.0M | -$378.0M | -$459.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$100.0M | -$200.0M | -$600.0M | -$1.1B | -$551.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $524.0M | $247.0M | $1.5B | $705.0M | -$2.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:45am (33d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.7% | -11.4% | -10.8% | +32.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.5% | +31.6% | -30.0% | +0.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +8.8% | +35.7% | -48.7% | -20.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -22.5% | +39.3% | -49.3% | -28.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +6.7% | +31.9% | -42.0% | -4.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 3:03am (36d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-18 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-22 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-17 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-19 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-19 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-18 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-18 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-19 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-17 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-15 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-17 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-15 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-17 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-18 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-18 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-15 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-17 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-05 01:51The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly trajectory is the story here, and it's uglier than the synthesis lets on. Revenue jumped from $12.77B in Q2 2025 to $22.16B in Q3 2025 and $23.76B in Q4 — that's the Viterra acquisition closing, not organic growth. But net income went the wrong way: from $354M pre-deal to $166M, $95M, and $68M in the most recent quarter. Margins compressed from 2.8% to 0.3% as revenue nearly doubled. That's not "integration noise" — that's a $70B revenue business generating $68M in quarterly net income, an annualized run-rate around $270-400M against a $22.8B market cap. Trailing PE of 24x is on stale 2024 earnings; forward earnings on the current trajectory put this closer to 55-80x, not 24x. The "mature earner" classification is wrong — this is a cyclical mid-integration, and the pre-flight note calling it commodity-driven is directionally correct but understates how bad the crush spread environment has become.
The balance sheet deteriorated materially to fund Viterra: $14.2B debt against $1.14B cash and $17.4B equity, with operating cash flow of only $844M and free cash flow of *negative* $879M in 2025. ROIC of 3.1% is well below any reasonable cost of capital (~7-8%), meaning Bunge is currently destroying value on the incremental capital deployed. The 2.4% dividend at a 56% payout ratio on depressed earnings — and negative FCF — is not comfortably covered; a cut is plausible if 2026 crush margins don't recover. The synthesis's "composite fair value $220" is nonsense — it's almost certainly anchoring on normalized 2023 earnings ($2.24B NI, 3.8% margins) that predate both the deal dilution and current crush spread collapse. Signal-adjusted $161 is still too generous. On normalized post-Viterra earnings of maybe $1.2-1.5B (if crush recovers to mid-cycle) and 12-14x mature-cyclical multiple, fair value sits closer to $85-105.
Where I'd push back on my own bearishness: the insider buying in July/August 2026 (6,500 shares open-market) is genuinely interesting — small dollar amounts but P-Purchases on a cyclical bottom are the signal that matters, especially when the stock has been re-rating lower. The PB of 1.13 is near tangible book support; historically Bunge doesn't stay below 1x book for long absent structural impairment. If you believe (a) Viterra synergies materialize at the promised $250M+ run-rate, (b) South American crush spreads normalize to $40-50/ton from current $25-30, and (c) the biofuels demand pull returns, then 2027 earnings power of $6-7 EPS at a 15x multiple gets you to $90-105 — still below current $118.72. The contrarian bull case requires *both* mean reversion in commodity spreads *and* successful integration; that's two independent bets, not one.
The narrative model's "steady-compounder / anchored / minimal intensity" read is directionally right but too benign — this isn't a compounder, it's a cyclical trading at peak multiple on trough earnings, which is exactly the wrong setup. The market forces module failing to render is a real gap; I'd want to know sell-side FY26 EPS consensus (my guess: $6-7, with wide dispersion) before sizing anything. I dissent from the synthesis "$160.95 fair value" — that's model artifact, not analysis. I agree with the "fully_priced" verdict directionally but for opposite reasons: the synthesis thinks it's ~35% undervalued to a broken composite; I think it's roughly fairly-to-modestly overvalued at $118 given the earnings hole. The insider buying keeps me from calling it a short. Wait for either (1) a Q2-Q3 2026 print showing net margin back above 1.5% consistently, or (2) a pullback to the $85-95 range where PB approaches 0.85x and the dividend yield gets to 3.3%+. Buying $70B of revenue at 0.28x sales sounds cheap until you realize the revenue converts to 40 bps of net margin.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is that Bunge’s valuation looks optically cheap on sales and book, but expensive on actual earning power, and for a commodity processor the latter matters far more. At $118.72, the stock is on 24.2x 2025 earnings, 16.6x EV/EBITDA, and only 1.13x book; that mix tells you the market is not paying for assets, it is paying for a rebound. The problem is the earnings line has been moving the wrong way for three years: net income fell from $2.24B in 2023 to $1.14B in 2024 and then to $816M in 2025, while ROE collapsed to 4.7% and ROIC to 3.1%, both weak against any reasonable cost of capital. Revenue surged to $70.33B in 2025 from $53.11B in 2024, but gross profit barely changed, from $3.39B to $3.41B, and operating income actually fell from $1.59B to $1.27B. That is the clearest tell in the whole dataset: the business handled much more volume or price pass-through, but captured no incremental economics.
The quarterly progression reinforces that this is not just a noisy annual print. Over the last four reported quarters, revenue ran $12.77B, $22.16B, $23.76B, and $21.86B, yet net income was only $354M, $166M, $95M, and $68M. Margins have compressed from 2.8% in mid-2025 to 0.3% most recently. Even allowing for seasonality and commodity timing, a business earning under 1% net margins in three straight quarters should not command a mid-20s earnings multiple unless the rebound is highly visible. The cash flow statement makes that visibility worse, not better: operating cash flow was only $844M in 2025, below net income, and free cash flow was negative $879M after $1.72B of capex. For a company with $14.21B of debt and just $1.14B of cash, I do not want to underwrite a heroic normalization case. A current ratio of 1.61 says there is no immediate liquidity crisis, but that is not the same as attractive equity economics.
The biggest issue I have with the more constructive models is that they appear to over-weight low price-to-sales and low price-to-book, metrics that regularly flatter low-margin merchandisers. Bunge at 0.28x sales is not automatically cheap when the net margin is 1.16% for 2025 and only 0.3%-0.7% in the latest quarters. If the business can only convert tens of billions of revenue into sub-$1B earnings and negative free cash flow, sales-based valuation is close to irrelevant. Likewise, book value support is weaker than it looks when returns on that equity base are this poor. The rule-based “mature earner” label also feels too generous right now; mature earners usually show steadier cash conversion and less violent profit compression. To me, this looks like a cyclical processor in a down part of the margin cycle, but one where the stock price still assumes the cycle will fix itself soon enough to justify 24x trough-ish earnings. That may happen, but that is a trade, not a value case.
The strongest pushback is obvious and respectable. First, 2025 revenue jumped 32% and the recent quarters nearly doubled in size versus the comparable 2025 first-half base, suggesting changed scope and potentially a post-acquisition earnings base that annual figures have not fully digested yet. Second, agribusiness earnings are notoriously cyclical; buying on depressed margins has often worked if crush spreads and trade flows normalize. Third, insider purchases in late July and early August 2026 are a real positive signal, especially because they are open-market buys rather than just awards. And fourth, at 1.13x book with a 2.4% dividend yield, you are not paying an absurd asset multiple for a globally strategic franchise. I weigh all that less heavily because the operating evidence still says economics are deteriorating, not stabilizing: gross profit was flat despite a massive revenue jump, operating margin fell to 1.8% in 2025, and recent quarterly profits kept stepping down sequentially. If the bullish case is “earnings are temporarily depressed,” I need to see that in cash generation or in a clear margin trough; neither is in hand.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If Bunge can put up two consecutive quarters with net margin back above 1.5%, operating cash flow running ahead of net income, and annualized earnings power back into at least the $1.5B-$1.8B range, then today’s price would start to look reasonable and perhaps cheap. Evidence that capex is normalizing and free cash flow is turning positive would matter just as much as EPS. Conversely, if the next few quarters stay in the $50M-$150M net income range on $20B+ of revenue, the market should stop treating this as a temporarily bruised compounder and re-rate it like a structurally low-return processor. On current data, I think fair value is below the market, not above it.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe an agribusiness that just got much larger and much less profitable at the same time. Full-year 2025 revenue jumped to $70.33B from $53.11B the prior year—clearly the Viterra step-change—yet net income fell to $816M from $1.14B, and from $2.24B only two years earlier. The quarterly tape is harsher still: after the revenue base reset into the low-$20Bs per quarter, net margin collapsed from 2.8% in Q2 2025 to 0.7%, 0.4%, and then 0.3% by Q1 2026, with absolute NI sliding $354M → $166M → $95M → $68M. You are watching scale arrive without earnings power. Operating margin for the year is 1.8%, ROE 4.7%, ROIC 3.1%—all below any reasonable cost of capital—while the stock trades at 24.2x trailing earnings and 16.6x EV/EBITDA. That multiple is what the market pays for durable compounders, not for a 1.2% net-margin grain and oilseed processor whose free cash flow just printed –$879M on $844M of operating cash against $1.72B of capex.
Balance-sheet and cash conversion reinforce the caution. Net debt is roughly $13B against $17.4B of equity; the dividend is still being paid at a 56% payout and 2.4% yield even as FCF is deeply negative. Revenue CAGR of 8.7% is almost entirely acquisition optics; earnings CAGR is –40%. The valuation synthesis composite that floats a $161 signal-adjusted fair value (and an unadjusted $220) is not supported by the same briefing’s own red flags—poor cash-flow quality, elevated leverage, and unreliable revenue—and should be discounted heavily until the income statement stops deteriorating. At $118.72 you are not buying a trough multiple on normalized earnings; you are paying a premium multiple on earnings that are still falling, with returns on capital that do not clear the bar. Cheap sales and book multiples (0.28x PS, 1.13x PB) are the residual of a capital-intensive, low-margin model, not evidence of mispricing.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and worth respecting. If the $70B revenue base is durable and crush/logistics margins mean-revert even halfway toward the 2021–2023 era—when net income ran $1.6–2.2B—forward earnings power of $1.5B-plus would put the stock at roughly 11–15x, squarely inside the historical 10–12x agribusiness band, and $118 would look like a discount to mid-cycle value. Insider open-market purchases (6,500 shares across two tickets) and a still-intact investment-grade-style current ratio of 1.6 offer modest corroboration that management sees a floor. The narrative layer correctly notes there is no cult premium; price is tracking a skeptical fundamentals view, so any genuine synergy capture or crush-spread recovery would not have to fight a frothy story. I weigh this less heavily because the last four reported quarters show no stabilization, only further margin bleed, and negative FCF plus a half-billion-plus dividend commitment while integrating a large acquisition is a capital-allocation risk, not a free option on the cycle.
I would flip toward a clear undervalued stance if the next two quarters deliver sequential net-margin expansion back above ~1.5% with operating cash flow covering capex, or if management guides to tangible Viterra cost synergies that lift ROIC toward high single digits. Conversely, another quarter of sub-0.5% margins or further FCF burn while debt stays elevated would push me to outright overvalued and a lower price anchor nearer book.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Bunge is a scale commodity processor with revenue swinging from $53.1B (2024) to $70.3B (2025) as the Viterra combination lands, but the business economics remain thin and worsening: gross margin compressed from 8.1% in 2023 to 4.8% in 2025, operating margin from 5.2% to 1.8%, and net income fell from $2.24B to $816M. FCF flipped from +$2.19B (2023) to -$879M (2025), and OCF/NI at -0.13x signals reported earnings are not converting to cash this year. Accruals at 8.5% of assets and a Beneish M of -1.54 warrant scrutiny, though much of that noise likely reflects working-capital swings and purchase-accounting from the Viterra deal rather than manipulation per se. Balance sheet is the real constraint: net debt of roughly $12.2B, short-term debt of $5.22B against $2.0B liquid cash, and Altman Z of 2.84 (grey zone). Runway math (9.1 quarters at current burn) overstates fragility for a commodity house with inventory-backed credit lines, but refinancing exposure is real. Offsets: diluted share count is down at a -5.6% CAGR (209.6M in 2021 to 166.5M in 2025), so per-share value is being concentrated, and a director (Mahoney) made two open-market P-purchases totaling ~$689K in mid-2026 - a small but directionally positive signal amid otherwise routine A-awards.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Viterra purchase-accounting impact on 2025 accruals, inventory step-up, and reported margins
- Terms and maturity schedule of the $5.22B short-term debt and committed revolver capacity
- Segment margin split (Agribusiness vs Refined & Specialty Oils vs Milling) to see where the compression is concentrated
- Working-capital drivers behind the -$879M FCF (RMI/readily marketable inventory changes vs true burn)
- Whether the -5.6% diluted-share CAGR reflects true buybacks or share issuance for Viterra netting against prior repurchases
- Any covenant thresholds tied to leverage ratios given Altman Z in grey zone
The e2e composite FV of $220 and signal-adjusted $161 are dominated by a runaway DCF ($381) that cannot be taken at face value for a 1.8% operating margin commodity processor with -$879M FCF in 2025. The EPV floor at $39 and anchored PE at $79 tell the more honest story: on trailing earnings power this business is worth well below the current $118.72. The truth sits between - normalized mid-cycle earnings for the combined Bunge/Viterra franchise plausibly support something in the $110-140 range, which brackets today's price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Viterra synergy realization pace and updated mid-cycle EBITDA guide
- FCF trajectory in next 2 quarters - is negative print a working capital timing issue or structural
- Ag Services segment margin normalization vs 2021-2022 peak
- Buyback pace and whether it continues through the FCF trough
- M-score drivers - receivables, gross margin, accruals
The broad tape is mildly risk-on with a low VIX, but that regime does almost nothing for a low-beta (0.65) ag processor with no story the market wants to own. BG's archetype is 'steady compounder' with minimal narrative intensity and low cult coefficient - meaning there is no bid from thematic money, no momentum crowd, and no cheerleaders to defend the name on down days. In this environment, sentiment pressure is dominated by sector-specific news rather than macro. The 72h news catalyst is squarely negative: U.S. cattle shortages and livestock volatility are squeezing food-production margins and triggering outlook cuts across the peer group, and BG was tagged in that selloff. That is a fresh, tangible headwind hitting a name that has no counter-narrative to absorb it. Combined with a bear story (structural margin compression, capital allocation skepticism, geopolitical supply-chain fragmentation) that the market is actively pricing in as a persistent discount, the narrative pressure is one-sided to the downside. Momentum reads mixed - 3y trend is negative but recent 12m action is strong - suggesting a recovering name that just got tapped by an industry scare rather than a broken chart. Net: a mild but real headwind, not a rout. Low beta and defensive sector mute the damage, but there is no visible tailwind force pushing this specific ticker up right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the cattle/livestock margin scare broadens into oilseed and grain processing commentary or stays contained
- Analyst target revisions in the next 2-4 weeks following peer outlook cuts
- Any capital-return announcement (buyback pace, dividend) that would give the compounder story a fresh talking point
- Sector rotation flows - if defensives catch a bid, BG's low beta becomes a mild positive
Agricultural processing is mid-cycle-to-trough on spreads even as volumes grow: global protein and vegetable-oil consumption keeps rising in emerging markets, but a wave of new crush capacity built for renewable-diesel demand arrived before the demand mandates were finalized, so processing margins are the bottleneck, not tonnage. Geopolitical fragmentation — tariffs, Chinese sourcing shifts, Black Sea risk, Argentine export policy — increases the value of owning assets in multiple origins, which is precisely what the Viterra combination bought. The net world read is favorable for scaled, multi-origin traders' volumes and unfavorable for their unit margins; consolidation (Bunge/Viterra) is itself a rational response to that squeeze.
When we made this prediction on Sep 5, 2026, BG was $118.72. We expect it to be $144.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $95.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.