Business Description
Intuit Inc. provides financial management and compliance products and services for consumers, small businesses, self-employed, and accounting professionals in the United States, Canada, and internationally. The company operates in four segments: Small Business & Self-Employed, Consumer, Credit Karma, and ProConnect. The Small Business & Self-Employed segment provides QuickBooks online services and desktop software solutions comprising QuickBooks Online Advanced, a cloud-based solution; QuickBooks Enterprise, a hosted solution; QuickBooks Self-Employed solution; QuickBooks Commerce, a solution for product-based businesses; QuickBooks Online Accountant and QuickBooks Accountant Desktop Plus solutions; and payroll solutions, such as online payroll processing, direct deposit of employee paychecks, payroll reports, electronic payment of federal and state payroll taxes, and electronic filing of federal and state payroll tax forms. This segment also offers payment-processing solutions, including credit and debit cards, Apple Pay, and ACH payment services; QuickBooks Cash business bank account; and financial supplies and financing for small businesses. The Consumer segment provides TurboTax income tax preparation products and services; and personal finance. The Credit Karma segment offers consumers with a personal finance platform that provides personalized recommendations of home, auto, and personal loans, as well as credit cards and insurance products. The ProConnect segment provides Lacerte, ProSeries, and ProFile desktop tax-preparation software products; and ProConnect Tax Online tax products, electronic tax filing service, and bank products and related services. It sells products and services through various sales and distribution channels, including multi-channel shop-and-buy experiences, websites and call centers, mobile application stores, and retail and other channels. The company was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Mountain View, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 2:21pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:18pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.82
Total Equity: $19.71B
Shares: 283,000,000
Total Debt: $5.97B
Cash: $2.88B
EBITDA: $5.89B
Total Debt: $5.97B
Cash: $2.88B
Revenue: $18.83B
Revenue: $18.83B
Revenue: $18.83B
Total Equity: $19.71B
Tax Rate: 20.0%
Equity: $19.71B
Total Debt: $5.97B
Cash: $2.88B
Current Liabilities: $10.37B
Long-Term Debt: $5.97B
Total Debt: $5.97B
Total Equity: $19.71B
Shares: 283,000,000
Shares: 283,000,000
CapEx: -$124.00M
Shares: 283,000,000
Stock Price: $296.76
Net Income: $3.87B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:13pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.6B | $12.7B | $14.4B | $16.3B | $18.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.7B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.6B |
| Gross Profit | $8.0B | $10.3B | $11.2B | $12.8B | $15.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.5B | $7.7B | $8.1B | $9.2B | $10.3B |
| Operating Income | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.9B |
| Net Income | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.9B |
| EBITDA | $2.9B | $3.4B | $4.0B | $4.6B | $5.9B |
| EPS | $7.64 | $7.38 | $8.48 | $10.58 | $13.82 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:05pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $2.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $5.2B | $5.0B | $5.6B | $9.7B | $14.1B |
| Total Assets | $15.5B | $27.7B | $27.8B | $32.1B | $37.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.7B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $7.5B | $10.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.0B | $6.4B | $6.1B | $5.5B | $6.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.6B | $11.3B | $10.5B | $13.7B | $17.2B |
| Total Equity | $9.9B | $16.4B | $17.3B | $18.4B | $19.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.3B | $13.6B | $15.1B | $17.0B | $19.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:13pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.3B | $3.9B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $6.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$125.0M | -$229.0M | -$260.0M | -$250.0M | -$124.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.1B | $3.7B | $4.8B | $4.6B | $6.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$3.1B | -$5.7B | -$33.0M | -$83.0M | -$184.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.0B | -$1.9B | -$2.0B | -$2.0B | -$2.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.9B | $178.0M | -$145.0M | $4.2B | $2.4B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:18pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$23.9B $23.4B – $24.3B
|
$26.6B $26.6B – $26.6B
|
$30.7B $30.2B – $31.3B
|
$35.0B $34.5B – $35.7B
|
| EBITDA |
$7.8B $7.7B – $7.9B
|
$8.7B $8.7B – $8.7B
|
$10.0B $9.9B – $10.2B
|
$11.5B $11.3B – $11.7B
|
| Net Income |
$7.9B $7.5B – $8.2B
|
$8.9B $8.1B – $9.7B
|
$10.1B $9.9B – $10.3B
|
$11.4B $11.2B – $11.7B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:13pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +32.1% | +12.9% | +13.3% | +15.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +29.8% | +8.8% | +14.2% | +18.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +2.8% | +22.2% | +15.6% | +35.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +0.2% | +15.4% | +24.3% | +30.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +14.3% | +20.0% | +13.3% | +28.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:25pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-09 | DALZELL RICHARD L | S-Sale | 333.00 | $297.65 | $99,117 |
| 2026-06-10 | DALZELL RICHARD L | S-Sale | 333.00 | $287.50 | $95,738 |
| 2026-06-11 | DALZELL RICHARD L | S-Sale | 338.00 | $279.86 | $94,593 |
| 2026-05-26 | PRABHU VASANT M | P-Purchase | 500.00 | $309.72 | $154,858 |
| 2026-05-22 | PRABHU VASANT M | P-Purchase | 1,250.00 | $309.45 | $386,808 |
| 2026-05-08 | Norrod Forrest Eugene | A-Award | 64.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Mawakana Tekedra | A-Award | 64.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Liu Deborah | A-Award | 75.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Burton Eve B | A-Award | 70.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | SZKUTAK THOMAS J | M-Exempt | 63.00 | $401.04 | $25,266 |
| 2026-05-08 | SZKUTAK THOMAS J | A-Award | 87.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | SZKUTAK THOMAS J | M-Exempt | 63.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | DALZELL RICHARD L | M-Exempt | 77.00 | $401.04 | $30,880 |
| 2026-05-08 | DALZELL RICHARD L | A-Award | 81.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | DALZELL RICHARD L | M-Exempt | 77.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-03 | Burton Eve B | M-Exempt | 118.00 | $248.86 | $29,365 |
| 2026-05-03 | Burton Eve B | M-Exempt | 118.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Goodarzi Sasan K | M-Exempt | 30.83 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Goodarzi Sasan K | M-Exempt | 863.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Goodarzi Sasan K | M-Exempt | 802.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:05pm (9d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-09 | $1.20 | 2026-05-19 | 2026-07-09 | 2026-07-17 |
| 2026-04-09 | $1.20 | 2026-02-24 | 2026-04-09 | 2026-04-17 |
| 2026-01-09 | $1.20 | 2025-11-18 | 2026-01-09 | 2026-01-16 |
| 2025-10-09 | $1.20 | 2025-08-19 | 2025-10-09 | 2025-10-17 |
| 2025-07-10 | $1.04 | 2025-05-20 | 2025-07-10 | 2025-07-18 |
| 2025-04-10 | $1.04 | 2025-02-25 | 2025-04-10 | 2025-04-18 |
| 2025-01-10 | $1.04 | 2024-11-21 | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-17 |
| 2024-10-10 | $1.04 | 2024-08-20 | 2024-10-10 | 2024-10-18 |
| 2024-07-10 | $0.90 | 2024-05-23 | 2024-07-10 | 2024-07-18 |
| 2024-04-09 | $0.90 | 2024-02-20 | 2024-04-10 | 2024-04-18 |
| 2024-01-09 | $0.90 | 2023-11-28 | 2024-01-10 | 2024-01-18 |
| 2023-10-05 | $0.90 | 2023-08-24 | 2023-10-09 | 2023-10-17 |
| 2023-07-07 | $0.78 | 2023-05-23 | 2023-07-10 | 2023-07-18 |
| 2023-04-06 | $0.78 | 2023-02-23 | 2023-04-10 | 2023-04-18 |
| 2023-01-09 | $0.78 | 2022-11-29 | 2023-01-10 | 2023-01-18 |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.78 | 2022-08-23 | 2022-10-10 | 2022-10-18 |
| 2022-07-08 | $0.68 | 2022-05-20 | 2022-07-11 | 2022-07-18 |
| 2022-04-08 | $0.68 | 2022-02-22 | 2022-04-11 | 2022-04-18 |
| 2022-01-07 | $0.68 | 2021-11-16 | 2022-01-10 | 2022-01-18 |
| 2021-10-07 | $0.68 | 2021-08-24 | 2021-10-11 | 2021-10-18 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a clean story before I touch any model output. FY2025 (July year-end) revenue of $18.83B vs FY2021's $9.63B is a 96% four-year gain, ~18% CAGR, with operating income nearly doubling from $2.50B to $4.92B and FCF at $6.08B on $124M capex — this is an almost asset-light compounder. The quarterly cadence is fiscal-year-distorted but real: Q3 FY26 (Apr-2026) revenue $8.56B vs Q3 FY25 $7.75B = +10.5% YoY in the tax-season quarter, with net margin of 35.8% vs 36.4% prior year — slight margin compression in the highest-mix quarter, worth noting. Q2 FY26 $4.65B vs $3.96B = +17.4%; Q1 FY26 $3.89B vs $3.28B = +18.6%. So growth is decelerating into the seasonally-biggest quarter, which is exactly where the IRS Direct File / AI-tax-prep bear case would first show up. That's not a tell I'd ignore.
On valuation, the synthesis verdict of $385 composite / $518 signal-adjusted vs $297 spot is aggressive. TTM P/E of 17.9x for a business compounding earnings at 27% with 80.8% gross margins and 26% operating margins is genuinely cheap on its face — Intuit historically traded 35-45x. EV/EBITDA at 12.4x is roughly half its five-year average. But "$518 fair value" implies the market is wrong by 75%, and I don't buy that magnitude. The more honest read: a re-rating to 25x earnings ($4.30B TTM NI / 285M shares ≈ $15 EPS → $375) is plausible if the FY26 Q3 deceleration doesn't worsen. $518 requires the multiple to return to peak-2021 ZIRP-era levels, which assumes the AI/Direct-File narrative fully reverses. I'd anchor fair value at $370-400, not $518.
The contrarian case the models underweight: TurboTax is ~30% of revenue and the highest-margin segment, and Q3 (tax season) is where Direct File expansion to all 50 states (announced for TY2025 filing) will first bite. The 10.5% Q3 growth vs 17%+ in non-tax quarters is consistent with early share loss, not noise. Credit Karma's contribution and Mailchimp integration mask the mix shift. The "Market Forces" model flagging share loss in a growing industry is the most underrated signal in this stack — everyone else is anchored on TTM cash generation. Also: insider activity shows two small open-market purchases (500 + 1,250 shares) against a sea of awards and option exercises — calling this "Net Insider Buying" is generous; 1,750 purchased shares at ~$300 = $525K, which is signal-free for a company this size. The "fallen-angel" narrative framing is right but the engine overstates how fixable the narrative is — Intuit has no founder-CEO story to rally a re-rating.
Where the data is thin: balance sheet is missing total debt and equity entirely, which matters because Intuit carried ~$6B in debt post-Credit Karma/Mailchimp and the EV-based multiples depend on it. The pe_ratio anomaly flags are immaterial here — TTM vs annual gaps don't change the conclusion at this multiple. Macro headwinds flag is plausible (SMB formation slowing, Credit Karma sensitive to credit cycle) but secondary to the structural Direct File question. Net: I partially dissent from the synthesis. Undervalued, yes, but not by 75%. The thesis-evaluation "High Conviction Required" framing is closer to right — this needs you to believe Direct File is overhyped AND Intuit's AI-Assist (TurboTax Live, Intuit Assist) defends ARPU. The Q3 FY26 deceleration to 10.5% is a yellow flag that the bear case has teeth. Starter position at $297 with conviction add below $270 makes sense; full position requires seeing FY27 Q1 (Oct-2026) and FY27 Q3 (Apr-2027) tax-season prints to confirm Direct File didn't structurally impair the consumer segment.
GPT Critique
Intuit's financial trajectory over the last few years tells a compelling story of substantial growth. With revenue escalating from $9.63B in 2021 to $18.83B in 2025, showcasing an impressive CAGR of approximately 18%, the company is clearly expanding robustly. Operating income has nearly doubled during this period, and free cash flow has consistently remained strong, demonstrating the firm's capacity to generate cash efficiently. The quarterly results further illustrate a business capitalizing on its strengths; however, the noticeable slowdown in growth during the tax season quarter (Q3 FY26) to 10.5% YoY from 17%+ in prior quarters signals potential headwinds, particularly concerning IRS Direct File and AI competition.
Opus contends that Intuit is undervalued, positing a fair value range of $370-400, significantly below the synthesis output of $518. I concur with Opus's skepticism about the $518 valuation, as such a level suggests a dismissal of the real and perceived risks that the company faces. A re-rating to a P/E of 25x, translating to a fair value of around $375, is more aligned with current market realities and the potential challenges from AI and regulatory pressures. However, I am less inclined to anchor my valuation strictly on historical multiples, given the shifting landscape and Intuit's response to these external pressures.
I diverge from Opus regarding the impact of the "Market Forces" model. While Opus highlights the significance of the share loss flag, I believe this is somewhat overemphasized. The consistent high margins and robust free cash flow generation suggest that Intuit's core business remains resilient, even if it faces competitive pressures. Although the narrative of Intuit as a "fallen-angel" has some merit, the company's consistent financial performance suggests a degree of narrative overreaction. Furthermore, the insider transactions, while not overwhelmingly bullish, do not necessarily indicate a lack of confidence in the company's future.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I underappreciate the potential long-term impact of AI and IRS initiatives. They would contend that these factors could fundamentally alter the competitive dynamics of Intuit's core markets, leading to sustained margin compression and growth deceleration. Moreover, they might point out that the current valuation already reflects a mature, low-growth outlook, and any future re-rating is contingent upon Intuit effectively countering these threats.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell a clean story: quality is a 98 — genuinely elite cash generation, clean accounting, disciplined share count, durable moats — but valuation is only a 7, modestly cheap with ~15-20% to a defensible $340-380 deserved value. I'm not going to fight the quality score; this is exactly the kind of franchise I want to own for years. But I also respect the value lens — at 28-30x FCF (richer SBC-adjusted), with ~60% of market cap pricing in future growth above the EPV floor, this isn't the asymmetric setup where I back up the truck. So I do both: open a starter position around 1/3 of target size here at $297 to plant the flag, because if the IRS Direct File and AI-disruption narratives quietly fade, I will not get a clean shot at a quality-98 name again.
The real work is the scale-in plan. I add another third at $260 — that's the value lens's stated attractive level, ~30% off deserved value, and where margin of safety actually starts mattering. Final third reserved for $220-230 or a genuine fundamental wobble (organic growth miss, real Direct File traction in numbers, not headlines) — that's where EPV stops being a theoretical floor. On the upside, if it rips through $340 on a clean print without me filling the position, I stop adding and live with what I have — I don't chase a 7-score valuation. Catalysts that flip me aggressive: any quarter showing QuickBooks/Mailchimp organic acceleration or AI monetization traction. Catalysts that flip me to the sidelines: TurboTax unit declines accelerating or operating margin rolling back toward 22%. Net: this is a 'patient accumulator' name, not a 'buy today' name — the quality earns it a permanent spot in the book, the price earns it only a starter.
Revenue compounded from $9.63B (2021) to $18.83B (2025), ~18% CAGR, while operating margin troughed at 20.2% in 2022 (Credit Karma/Mailchimp integration) and recovered to 26.1% in 2025 — a clear sign the M&A-driven margin dip was transitory and operating leverage is reasserting. Net income nearly doubled from $2.06B to $3.87B, and FCF expanded from $3.13B to $6.08B, with OCF/NI at 1.77x and accruals at -7.2% of assets — earnings are backed by cash, not accrual gymnastics. Beneish M of -2.45 and Altman Z of 4.64 corroborate clean books.
Capital discipline is genuine: diluted shares went 273M → 283M over five years (0.9% CAGR), and buybacks of ~125% of SBC mean per-share value is being protected despite SBC running at 10.5% of revenue (high in absolute dollars, ~$2B). Net debt of -$1.42B against $6B+ annual FCF is a non-issue — leverage would clear in roughly a quarter if management chose to.
The franchise (TurboTax, QuickBooks, Credit Karma, Mailchimp) shows the hallmarks of a moat — 80%+ gross margins sustained through aggressive acquisition integration, and pricing power evident in revenue per share growth. CFO Prabhu's two open-market purchases totaling ~$542K in May 2026 is a small but meaningfully positive signal from a senior officer.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Organic vs. acquired revenue split — strip Mailchimp/Credit Karma contribution to gauge true organic growth rate
- Customer/segment concentration in QuickBooks and TurboTax — what % of revenue is small-business vs. consumer tax?
- TurboTax exposure to IRS Direct File expansion and any structural threat to consumer tax franchise
- Goodwill and intangibles as % of assets and any impairment risk from Mailchimp acquisition
- Detailed SBC breakdown — performance vs. RSU mix and dilution mechanics over next 3 years
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted average interest rate to confirm net debt is benign
The e2e composite FV of $385.69 implies ~30% upside and the signal-adjusted $518 implies 75% — but that signal-adjusted number leans on a DCF print of $516 that I'd discount as runaway (it requires sustained high-teens FCF growth and benign terminal assumptions for a $80B-cap SaaS already at scale). The EPV floor of $125 is the opposite extreme — punishing a genuinely growing franchise to a no-growth steady state. Triangulating, a defensible deserved value for a quality-98 business with mid-teens growth, ~30%+ FCF margins, and durable moats around TurboTax/QuickBooks sits closer to the $340-380 range, putting today's $297 at roughly a 15-20% discount.
What's priced in at $297: the bear case is getting partial credit — IRS Direct File overhang, AI disruption fear, and a deceleration narrative. The stock isn't priced for perfection; it's priced for a business that has lost some of its premium multiple. That's the source of the gap. But it's not deep value either — you're paying a full-ish multiple (~28-30x FCF) for a business the market already knows is excellent. The margin of safety is real but modest; one guidance cut and it evaporates.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for Consumer (TurboTax) revenue growth — any sign of Direct File impact would reset deserved value
- Credit Karma segment trajectory and contribution margin — key swing factor in DCF
- SBC as % of revenue trend — to properly haircut FCF
- Mailchimp and Credit Karma goodwill — any impairment signal on the acquisitions
- AI product monetization commentary on next call — Intuit Assist attach rates