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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Fiserv, Inc. (FISV) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-22): Designation Watch · Gem Score +24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 43 · Value 12 · Sentiment -61 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $72.17 vs $52.51 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Fiserv, Inc.
FISV NASDAQNo business description available.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.34
Total Equity: $25.81B
Shares: 549,000,000
Total Debt: $1.24B
Cash: $798.00M
EBITDA: $8.79B
Total Debt: $1.24B
Cash: $798.00M
Revenue: $21.19B
Revenue: $21.19B
Revenue: $21.19B
Total Equity: $25.81B
Tax Rate: 19.0%
Equity: $25.81B
Total Debt: $1.24B
Cash: $798.00M
Current Liabilities: $23.89B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $1.24B
Total Equity: $25.81B
Shares: 549,000,000
Shares: 549,000,000
CapEx: -$1.76B
Shares: 549,000,000
Stock Price: $52.68
Net Income: $3.48B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 12:22pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $16.2B | $17.7B | $19.1B | $20.5B | $21.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $2.3B | $3.7B | $5.0B | $5.9B | $5.8B |
| Net Income | $1.3B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.5B |
| EBITDA | $5.3B | $6.7B | $7.9B | $8.8B | $8.8B |
| EPS | $2.01 | $3.94 | $5.02 | $5.41 | $6.36 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.99 | $3.91 | $4.98 | $5.38 | $6.34 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 12:07pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $835.0M | $902.0M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $798.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $18.9B | $27.5B | $34.8B | $23.5B | $24.7B |
| Total Assets | $76.2B | $83.9B | $90.9B | $77.2B | $80.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $18.3B | $26.5B | $33.6B | $22.2B | $23.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $44.3B | $52.2B | $60.2B | $49.5B | $54.3B |
| Total Equity | $32.0B | $31.7B | $30.7B | $27.7B | $25.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $14.8B | $17.4B | $20.4B | $23.6B | $27.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 6:02pm (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.0B | $4.6B | $5.2B | $6.6B | $6.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.2B | -$1.5B | -$1.4B | -$1.6B | -$1.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.8B | $5.1B | $4.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$848.0M | -$988.0M | -$13.0M | $0 | -$820.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.4B | -$1.7B | $2.6B | $1.4B | $2.5B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $636.0M | -$13.0M | -$229.0M | $30.0M | -$191.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 12:22pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +9.3% | +7.6% | +7.1% | +3.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +63.5% | +34.1% | +17.3% | -1.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +89.7% | +21.3% | +2.1% | +11.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +26.3% | +17.9% | +10.4% | +0.2% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:42A +1σ run of quarters pays +8%; a −1σ run costs 59%. Ratio 0.1:1 (μ 1.5%, σ 6.8% , 4 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.3 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($52.51) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -2% | 31.2% | $43.15 | -18% |
| Base — stabilizes | -4% | 27.1% | $36.06 | -31% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -5% | 23.1% | $29.68 | -43% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -4% | 16.9% | $24.31 | -54% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +8% | 29.4% | $56.45 | +8% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -5% | 15.3% | $21.61 | -59% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 15:45The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a jarring story that the models are underweighting. Look at the sequential trajectory: 2025 full-year NI of $3.48B on $21.19B revenue (16.4% margin), but the two most recent quarters (Q1'26 and Q2'26) show NI collapsing to $571M and $627M on $5.03B and $5.29B revenue — an 11.4% and 11.8% net margin versus the 18.6% posted in Q2'25. That's roughly a 700bp margin compression in twelve months on essentially flat-to-declining revenue (Q2'26 $5.29B vs Q2'25 $5.52B — that's negative 4.2% YoY, not the +3.6% "recent revenue YoY" the momentum module cites). Annualizing the last two quarters gets you closer to $2.4B NI, not $3.48B. That's why TTM EV/EBITDA is 6.5x versus annual 3.2x — the anomaly flag is screaming that the trailing snapshot is stale, and the forward picture is materially worse.
The synthesis verdict of "fully_priced" with a $68.62 fair value versus $52.51 spot is anchored to 2025 earnings that are demonstrably rolling over. If I re-anchor P/E on run-rate NI of ~$2.4B, the multiple isn't 8x — it's closer to 12x, which is fair-to-full for a decelerating payments incumbent with $29B of debt against $798M cash. The debt-to-equity metric of 0.048 is nonsensical given $29B debt vs $25.8B equity (should be ~1.12x); somebody's denominator is wrong, and it matters because interest coverage on $29B at current rates is the actual bear case the pre-flight flagged. Operating CF of $6.06B and FCF of $4.30B remain the strongest counter — cash generation hasn't broken the way GAAP earnings have, suggesting some of the margin compression is non-cash (amortization of Clover/First Data intangibles, restructuring). That's the crux: is the earnings collapse accounting noise or real operating deterioration?
Where I partially agree with the models: Market Forces is right to call this "crisis valuation or early displacement," and the Narrative layer correctly identifies that fundamentals — not story — are doing the work on the discount. The insider buy (10,000 shares on 8/7/26, post-collapse) is a real signal but a single 10K-share purchase at a ~$28B market cap is a rounding error, not a table-pound. The contrarian argument the models miss: Clover (Fiserv's merchant acquiring crown jewel) is losing share to Toast, Square, and Stripe in SMB, and PCE growth is slowing — this isn't a cyclical earnings dip, it's the front end of a competitive re-rating. Payments incumbents (GPN, WU, even V/MA to a lesser extent) are all seeing multiple compression; FISV at 8x isn't uniquely cheap, it's converging with the peer group's new normal. The "sector leader" tag is backward-looking.
I dissent modestly from the $68.62 fair value. On run-rate earnings and a 11-13x multiple (appropriate for a low-single-digit grower with leverage risk), fair value is $45-55, which brackets the current $52.49. The stock is fairly valued, not undervalued by 30%. The path to $68 requires margin recovery back toward 16%+, which needs either the Q1-Q2'26 print to be one-time noise (possible — check for restructuring charges, integration costs) or a genuine operating turnaround. Neither is proven yet. I'd want to see one more quarter of margin data before committing capital; the risk/reward at $52 isn't asymmetric enough given the balance sheet, and a break to $45 on a bad Q3 print is very much on the table. If margins snap back to 15%+ in Q3, then the synthesis is right and this is a $65+ stock. Until then, the market's skepticism is warranted, not excessive.
GPT Reading
At $52.5, the first thing that jumps out is how cheap Fiserv looks on backward-looking multiples relative to what the income statement still shows: $21.19B of 2025 revenue, $5.82B of operating income, $3.48B of net income, and $4.30B of free cash flow against a $28.0B equity value. That is roughly 8.0x earnings and about 6.5x FCF for a business that has grown revenue from $16.23B in 2021 to $21.19B in 2025, with net income rising from $1.33B to $3.48B over the same span. On those annual numbers alone, this screens as plainly undervalued. But the quarterly data says the market is not irrationally missing a healthy compounder; it is discounting a business whose profitability has deteriorated sharply in real time. Net margin was 18.6% in 2025-06 and 16.6% in 2025-03, then fell to 11.4% in 2026-03 and 11.8% in 2026-06. Revenue also slipped from $5.52B in 2025-06 to $5.29B in 2026-06, so this is not just accounting noise around a stable top line. If I annualize the last two quarters, earnings power looks closer to $2.4B–$2.5B than the reported $3.48B, which makes the “true” multiple more like 11x-12x than 8x.
That gap between annual cheapness and current-quarter deterioration is the whole story. The anomaly flags reinforce it: annual EV/EBITDA at 3.2x versus TTM 6.5x is too large to ignore, and annual ROIC of 17.9% versus TTM 8.7% says returns have compressed materially. I also do not trust the debt metrics as presented; $29.0B of debt and only $798M of cash means leverage is economically meaningful regardless of a seemingly tiny reported debt-to-equity ratio. The balance sheet is not distressed today because the business still throws off over $6B of operating cash flow, but it absolutely narrows the margin for error if lower margins prove structural rather than temporary. For a payments/infrastructure company, I can accept low-teens net margins if growth is accelerating; here, recent revenue growth is only 3.6% while margins are moving the wrong way. That combination deserves a discount.
Still, I think the stock is more undervalued than fully priced because the market appears to be capitalizing the bad quarters as if they represent a durable reset in earnings power. Even if normalized net income is no longer $3.5B, a business of this scale with $20B+ of revenue, high recurring revenue characteristics, 27% operating margin on the last annual print, and $4.3B of FCF should not trade near 1.36x sales unless one believes a much harsher impairment is coming. If earnings settle around $2.8B-$3.0B rather than recovering to $3.5B, the stock is still at roughly 9x-10x earnings. That is a low bar for a company that has compounded revenue at mid-single digits and maintained strong cash conversion. The insider purchase of 10,000 shares in August is not dispositive, but it is notable because management had every reason to know whether the 2026 margin compression was a one-off or the start of something uglier.
The best argument against my read is that the market has already sniffed out structural decay that the annual statements hide. A smart bear would point to the sequential and year-over-year margin compression in 2026, the quarterly revenue decline from $5.52B to $5.29B, the TTM deterioration embedded in the EV/EBITDA and ROIC anomalies, and the thin liquidity cushion relative to $29B of debt. They would say this is exactly how legacy payment processors look before they de-rate for years: reported earnings appear cheap, but every quarter reveals lower growth, lower returns, and less strategic relevance. They would also note that 2024 operating income was $5.88B and 2025 operating income was slightly lower at $5.82B despite revenue growth, a quiet sign that margin pressure predated the ugly 2026 quarterly prints. I weigh those concerns seriously; they are why I am not calling for a dramatic rerating to a market multiple.
What changes my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters show revenue still stuck around $5.0B-$5.3B and net margins remain near 11%-12%, then the annual 2025 earnings base is obsolete and fair value is probably only around the current price, maybe lower if debt costs bite. Conversely, if revenue reaccelerates back toward 5%-7% year-over-year and net margins recover into the 15%-17% range, then the current quote will look too low by a wide margin because the market is valuing Fiserv as a melting-ice-cube utility rather than a still-growing payments platform. For now, I think the stock deserves a discount to its own history, but not this much of one.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a mature payments infrastructure compounder that has quietly broken its multi-year earnings trajectory. Annual revenue climbed from $16.23B in 2021 to $21.19B in 2025 with net income more than doubling to $3.48B and free cash flow reaching a solid $4.30B, yet the 2026 run-rate is already telling a different story. First-half 2026 revenue of roughly $10.32B sits ~3% below the $10.65B posted in H1 2025, while net income collapsed from $1.88B to about $1.20B—a 36% drop that compressed net margins from the mid-to-high teens into the 11–12% range. Operating margin on the full-year 2025 base was still a healthy 27.5%, but the quarterly sequence (18.6% NI margin in Q2 2025 versus 11.4–11.8% in the two most recent quarters) shows the earnings power the market is capitalizing at 8.3× trailing PE is already fading. The ROIC anomaly is not noise: annual 17.9% versus TTM 8.7% confirms returns are being cut in half in real time, and EV/EBITDA’s jump from 3.2× annual to 6.5× TTM is the market’s way of saying the same thing.
Balance-sheet geometry amplifies the problem. $29.0B of total debt against only $798M of cash and $25.8B of equity leaves a net-debt-heavy structure whose reported debt-to-equity of 0.05 is simply inconsistent with the absolute figures; true leverage is closer to 1.1× equity and nearly 1× EV. That leverage was tolerable when FCF was $4.3B and earnings were rising; it is less so when interest coverage is flagged as “dangerously low” and refinancing risk is live. The $28B market cap therefore buys a still-cash-generative franchise, but one whose enterprise value of ~$56B is now supported by a shrinking earnings base and a sector facing macro headwinds plus competitive pressure from embedded-finance and fintech challengers.
The strongest counter-argument is valuation and cash-flow quality. At $52.49 the stock trades at 1.4× sales, 1.1× book, and a mid-single-digit EV/EBITDA on trailing figures, while the composite models land fair value near $68–70—implying ~30% upside. Free-cash-flow conversion remains excellent, revenue confidence is still tagged high on a multi-year basis, an insider open-market purchase of 10,000 shares appeared in August 2026, and the secular need for bank core processing and merchant acquiring has not disappeared overnight. A patient buyer can argue that 5–7% FCF CAGR and a 7–8% FCF yield on EV already discount a lot of bad news, and that any stabilization of margins back toward mid-teens would re-rate the multiple quickly. I weigh this less heavily because the deterioration is not a one-quarter blip: both the revenue decline and the 600-plus-basis-point margin compression are sequential and year-over-year, the ROIC and EV/EBITDA TTM gaps are large and high-confidence, and high absolute debt turns every point of margin loss into a refinancing and coverage problem. Cheap multiples on peak or fading earnings are how value traps are built.
I would reverse course if H2 2026 revenue returns to positive mid-single-digit year-over-year growth with net margins re-expanding above 15%, or if management demonstrably deleverages below ~$20B net debt while FCF holds above $4B. Conversely, another two quarters of flat-to-down revenue and sub-12% net margins, or any material uptick in interest expense that erodes the $4.3B FCF, would confirm the market’s skepticism and push the stock lower still.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that should make every model in this stack stop and reconsider is the Q2 2026 revenue print: $5.29 billion against $5.52 billion a year earlier. That is a 4.2% year-over-year revenue *decline* at a payments processor that just posted 3.6% growth for full-year 2025. The "recent_revenue_yoy: 3.6%" in the momentum card is the full-year 2025 figure, not the current trajectory, and the quarterly trend card itself flags "declining." A company that processes trillions in payment volume and is *losing* top-line revenue is not a "steady compounder" with a "moderate narrative durability." It is a company whose core banking and merchant relationships are being eroded, and the margin compression tells you the cost base is not flexing down with the revenue. Net margin went from 18.6% in Q2 2025 to 11.8% in Q2 2026 — a 680-basis-point collapse in twelve months. That is not integration noise from the TI or Alldata deals; those were years ago. That is structural.
The TTM anomalies confirm what the quarterly data screams. ROIC has halved from 17.9% (fiscal 2025 annual) to 8.7% on a trailing basis. EV/EBITDA has doubled from 3.2x to 6.5x. The valuation synthesis anchors its $68.62 fair value on fiscal-2025 earnings of $3.48 billion, but the trailing twelve months of net income — roughly $2.80 billion when you sum the four most recent quarters ($792M + $811M + $571M + $627M) — puts the real P/E closer to 10x, not the 8.3x the canonical metrics card shows. The "fully_priced" verdict and the "mature_earner" archetype are both calibrated to a company that no longer exists in its current form. The rule-based model's confidence of 1 on that classification is doing a lot of quiet work in the composite, and I would not trust it.
The balance sheet is the one genuinely defensible pillar here. $6.06 billion in operating cash flow and $4.30 billion in free cash flow against $29 billion of total debt is serviceable — roughly 4.8x debt-to-OCF — and the $798 million cash cushion, while thin, is not an emergency. The debt-to-equity figure of 0.048 in the canonical metrics is plainly a data error (the actual ratio is closer to 1.1x), but the cash flow coverage is real. The 10,000-share insider purchase on August 7 at roughly $525,000 is small enough to be a single executive's conviction bet rather than a coordinated signal, but it is a data point that someone with full visibility into the Q3 pipeline does not think the stock is at the bottom. I weigh it modestly, not heavily.
The strongest case against my read is this: Fiserv is mission-critical infrastructure. Banks do not rip out their core processing and merchant acquiring platforms on a quarterly cycle. The revenue decline could reflect a one-time client migration, a timing shift in transaction volume, or a specific large-merchant loss that is already behind the company. The 5.4% five-year revenue CAGR and 6.5% earnings CAGR show a company that has compounded through multiple cycles. At 1.36x sales and 1.12x book, with a 27.5% operating margin on the annual basis, the multiple is at the bottom of its historical range for a company with this cash-flow profile. A smart opponent would argue I am anchoring on two bad quarters and ignoring the $4.3 billion FCF machine, and that the 8x P/E is a floor, not a ceiling, for a company that will re-accelerate once the integration overhang clears. I concede the multiple is genuinely low and the cash flow is genuinely strong. But I weight the *direction* of the data more than the *level*, and the direction is down.
What would flip me: a Q3 2026 print (due late October) showing revenue back above $5.4 billion year-over-year and net margin recovering above 14% would tell me the Q2 dip was a timing artifact and the stock is undervalued at $52. Conversely, if Q3 revenue comes in below $5.2 billion and margin stays under 12%, the 8x P/E is not a floor — it is the market correctly pricing a company whose earnings power is structurally lower than the fiscal-2025 print suggests, and I would be bearish below $45. A second consecutive quarter of revenue decline would be the single most important data point, more than any margin or multiple.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Fiserv is a mature earner throwing off substantial cash: FCF grew from $2.87B in 2021 to $4.30B in 2025, with OCF/NI of 2.08x and accruals of -3.2% of assets confirming reported earnings are cash-backed. Operating margin expanded from 14.1% to 27.5% over five years while revenue compounded from $16.23B to $21.19B, and net income grew from $1.33B to $3.48B - a clear picture of operating leverage in a scaled processing/merchant-services franchise. Capital returns are aggressive: diluted share count fell from 671.6M to 549.0M (-4.9% CAGR), meaningfully concentrating per-share economics, with SBC a modest 1.7% of revenue. The balance sheet is the caveat. Net debt of ~$28.2B against $798M liquid cash means short-term debt ($1.24B) exceeds cash, and the Altman Z of 1.3 flags distress-zone leverage (though the Z-score is calibrated for asset-heavy manufacturers and less reliable for a fee-based processor with recurring cash flows). $4.3B annual FCF comfortably services this stack, but the company has no cushion - it depends on continued market access. Insider behavior is a mild positive: six open-market P-purchases in June-August 2026 totaling ~$1.87M across multiple executives and directors (Fritz, Todd, Rosman, Yarkoni, Mamilli), with zero sales. That is a coordinated insider vote of confidence, not routine granting.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted-average interest rate - refinancing risk sensitivity
- Segment mix (Merchant Acceptance vs Financial Solutions) and organic growth ex-acquisitions
- Customer concentration in merchant/Clover business
- Detail on 2025 operating margin softening - is it mix, investment, or pricing pressure
- Goodwill/intangibles balance and any impairment risk given legacy First Data deal
- Nature of the ~$28B debt (fixed vs floating, covenants)
The e2e composite lands at $70.13 with a signal-adjusted FV of $68.62, implying ~31% upside from $52.51. The DCF ($89) is the aggressive anchor and the EPV floor ($32) is the punitive one; splitting the difference and leaning toward the signal-adjusted number gives roughly $65-70 as a defensible deserved value for a scaled, cash-generative processor with expanding margins and a shrinking share count. That is a genuine discount, not a mirage, but it is not a fat-pitch either - about a quarter off deserved value on a Strong (not Fortress) business carrying $28B of net debt.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Organic revenue growth ex-M&A in Merchant and Financial segments
- Free cash flow conversion and buyback pace in the next 10-Q
- Net debt trajectory and refinancing terms on near-term maturities
- Any guidance revision on Merchant volume growth given fintech competition
- Integration costs and revenue synergies from prior acquisitions
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX ~15.5, S&P near highs), which under normal conditions would be a modest tailwind for a low-beta, defensive payments compounder like FISV. But that lift isn't landing here. The stock-specific narrative has cracked: a Q2 miss and full-year guidance cut on August 6, Jana Partners cutting its stake ~18%, and a bear thesis (fintech disruption, margin compression, messy post-Clover/legacy integrations) that is actively winning the tape versus the tired 'boring compounder' bull story. Narrative intensity is minimal and cult is low, so there's no fan base to defend the name on red days. Analyst tone has skewed toward cuts post-guide-down, reinforcing the drift. Recent price action confirms the pressure: sharp down days on fundamentals-linked headlines, and the one 7.6% pop was a single insider-buy signal, not a re-rating. Broad market breadth is also poor (nearly two-thirds of S&P names already in correction), meaning the 'risk-on' headline overstates the actual bid under mid-cap financial-infrastructure names. Net: sentiment pressure is a persistent, ordinary-to-moderate headwind on THIS name, not catastrophic but clearly one-way until the narrative gets a reset catalyst.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Sell-side revision trend over the next 2-4 weeks post guide-down - are estimates stabilizing or still cutting
- Whether Jana fully exits or holds the residual stake (13F cadence)
- Next earnings print - any evidence Argentina and implementation delays are one-offs would reset the narrative
- Sector rotation into defensive financials or continued flow into fintech disruptors
- Follow-on insider buying vs. selling
Payments volume growth is a function of nominal consumption and merchant formation, both of which are still positive; the pool Fiserv fishes in is not draining. What has changed is where new merchants enter the system — through vertical software and developer platforms rather than bank/ISO distribution — which is exactly where Fiserv's advantage is thinnest and where its recent revenue shortfall is concentrated. Meanwhile the interest-rate backdrop (10y 4.7%) removes the interest-linked and float-type income that flattered prior-year comparisons and raises the cost of the levered balance sheet. The durable half of the company — bank core processing, issuer processing, biller — is genuinely hard to displace and is largely insulated from this shift; the contested half is not. That split is the entire story: a defensible utility bolted to a business that is losing new-customer share in a growing market.
When we made this prediction on Aug 27, 2026, FISV was $52.74. We expect it to be $63.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $46.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips up 25%
cost_of_capital
flips down 25%