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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Waste Management, Inc. (WM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -15 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 54 · Value -71 · Sentiment 31 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $112.25 vs $227.68 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Waste Management, Inc.
WM NYSEWaste Management, Inc. is a North American environmental services company that provides comprehensive waste and recycling solutions to residential, commercial, industrial, and municipal customers. Headquartered in Houston, Texas, the company focuses on solid waste collection, transfer, landfill disposal, and recycling, operating a large integrated network of routes, transfer stations, landfills, and material recovery facilities across the United States and Canada. Waste Management, Inc. manages a broad range of waste streams, including municipal solid waste, recyclables, organic materials, and certain hazardous and medical wastes, and offers specialized services such as document destruction and dumpster rental for businesses. The company also develops and operates landfill-gas-to-energy and renewable natural gas projects, capturing naturally occurring landfill gas to generate electricity and low-carbon fuels. By combining recurring collection services with asset-heavy local infrastructure, Waste Management, Inc. plays a central role in the region’s waste handling, resource recovery, and environmental compliance framework.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.70
Total Equity: $9.99B
Shares: 404,200,000
Total Debt: $711.00M
Cash: $201.00M
EBITDA: $7.17B
Total Debt: $711.00M
Cash: $201.00M
Revenue: $25.20B
Revenue: $25.20B
Revenue: $25.20B
Total Equity: $9.99B
Tax Rate: 20.9%
Equity: $9.99B
Total Debt: $711.00M
Cash: $201.00M
Current Liabilities: $5.52B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $711.00M
Total Equity: $9.99B
Shares: 404,200,000
Shares: 404,200,000
CapEx: -$3.23B
Shares: 404,200,000
Stock Price: $227.68
Net Income: $2.71B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 11:09pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $17.9B | $19.7B | $20.4B | $22.1B | $25.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $11.1B | $12.3B | $12.6B | $13.4B | $15.0B |
| Gross Profit | $6.8B | $7.4B | $7.8B | $8.7B | $10.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $5.9B |
| Operating Income | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.3B |
| Net Income | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.7B |
| EBITDA | $5.0B | $5.4B | $5.6B | $6.3B | $7.2B |
| EPS | $4.32 | $5.42 | $5.69 | $6.84 | $6.72 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.29 | $5.39 | $5.66 | $6.81 | $6.70 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:40am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $118.0M | $351.0M | $458.0M | $414.0M | $201.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.1B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.8B | $4.9B |
| Total Assets | $29.1B | $31.4B | $32.8B | $44.6B | $45.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.2B | $6.3B | $5.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $22.0B | $24.5B | $25.9B | $36.3B | $35.8B |
| Total Equity | $7.1B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $8.3B | $10.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.0B | $13.2B | $14.3B | $15.9B | $17.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 11:09pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.3B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $5.4B | $6.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.9B | -$2.6B | -$2.9B | -$3.2B | -$3.2B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.4B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$75.0M | -$377.0M | -$170.0M | -$7.5B | -$395.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$8.4B | -$7.3B | -$20.4B | -$17.9B | -$21.7B |
| Dividends Paid | -$970.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.4B | -$1.5B | -$1.3B | -$262.0M | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$454.0M | $251.0M | $107.0M | -$65.0M | -$190.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 11:09pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +9.9% | +3.7% | +8.0% | +14.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +8.6% | +5.6% | +11.0% | +17.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +13.5% | +6.2% | +13.7% | +6.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +23.2% | +2.9% | +19.2% | -1.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +8.8% | +4.5% | +12.1% | +13.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:40am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | $0.95 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.95 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-12 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-06 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-01 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-01 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-02 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-16 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-02 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-02 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:18Even the bull case prices 40% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 56%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($227.68) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 13.0% | $136.21 | -40% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 11.3% | $107.63 | -53% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 9.6% | $83.39 | -63% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +3% | 11.8% | $100.82 | -56% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: WM is compounding revenue at ~11% (helped by the Stericycle deal closing late 2024 — that's why 2025 revenue jumps to $25.2B from $22.1B, not organic growth), but net income actually declined YoY from $2.75B to $2.71B. Trailing four quarters of NI is roughly $2.85B, so on a $91B market cap that's ~32x earnings for a business whose organic volume growth is low-single-digit. Operating margin at 17.1% is fine but not expanding — 2024 was 18.4%, so integration is eating margin exactly as the narrative claims will reverse. FCF of $2.82B against $91B cap = 3.1% FCF yield, and capex of $3.23B against $6.04B operating cash flow means half of OCF is being reinvested just to maintain/grow the asset base. This is not a capital-light compounder.
The balance sheet metric shown — $711M total debt — is almost certainly wrong or a line-item mislabel. WM carried ~$16-17B of long-term debt after the Stericycle acquisition; a $711M debt figure for a $91B enterprise with $3.2B annual capex is not credible. EV/EBITDA of 12.8x implicitly uses a real debt figure, so the ratios are probably right but the balance sheet line is stale/wrong. That matters because the "fortress balance sheet" read some models might infer from D/E of 0.07 is fiction — real net debt/EBITDA is closer to 3x. ROE of 27% and ROIC of 32% are also flattered by the thin equity base and likely by using pre-acquisition invested capital.
On the model stack: the synthesis verdict of $134-138 fair value vs $228 spot (-40%) is directionally right but I think slightly harsh. A DCF that pegs WM at $138 is probably using a discount rate that doesn't fully credit the regulatory moat, contract escalators tied to CPI, and the near-impossibility of new landfill permitting (which is the actual moat, not ESG storytelling). Fair value for a genuine toll-road-like business deserves 22-25x earnings, not 17-18x — that puts fair value closer to $165-180, still a meaningful discount to $228 but not a 40% overvaluation. The market-forces "tailwinds" call feels wrong given decelerating quarterly revenue (6.44 → 6.43 → 6.31 → 6.23 → 6.68, and the 6.68 is likely seasonal Q2 strength) and YoY earnings actually down 1.4%. The narrative model correctly identifies that ~$90 of the $228 price is story premium, and I agree the story is "durable but optimistic."
Contrarian case for paying up: WM's landfill assets are effectively irreplaceable — NIMBY and permitting mean the replacement cost of the network is multiples of book. RNG (renewable natural gas) projects genuinely have attractive unit economics with IRA tax credits, and the Stericycle medical waste business, if integrated cleanly, adds a higher-margin, less-cyclical revenue stream. If organic growth re-accelerates to 5-6% and margins recover 200bps as integration completes, 2027 EPS could be $9-10, making today's price 23-25x forward — expensive but not absurd for the quality. The bear risk the models underweight: labor is 30%+ of opex, and if wage inflation stays sticky while pricing power is capped by municipal contract terms, margin compression could persist longer than "integration noise" implies. Also, decelerating quarterly revenue net of the Stericycle contribution suggests underlying organic growth may already be at 3-4%, not the 5-6% the bull case requires.
I partially agree with the synthesis: WM is overvalued, but $134 is too low. Fair value is $170-185, implying ~20-25% downside, not 40%. This is a hold-if-you-own-it, don't-chase-here name. The setup that would change my mind: two consecutive quarters of accelerating organic revenue (ex-Stericycle) above 5%, or margin recovery to 19%+ operating margin proving integration synergies are real. Absent those catalysts, paying 32x for a business growing organic earnings low-single-digits with rising capex intensity is a bet on multiple persistence, not compounding. The prior models' quantitative verdict is right in direction; the market-forces "tailwinds" label contradicts the actual decelerating trajectory and should be discounted.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is that the business is still excellent while the stock already assumes excellence for a long time. Revenue has climbed from $17.93B in 2021 to $25.20B in 2025, an 8-9% annualized top-line compounding rate for what is supposed to be a dull essential-service operator, and the quarterly run rate has stepped up again to $6.68B in 2026-06 from $5.85-5.90B territory not long ago. Operating income also rose, but much less dramatically in 2025: $4.31B on $25.20B of revenue versus $4.06B on $22.06B in 2024. That means 14.2% revenue growth translated into only about 6.2% operating income growth and slightly lower net income, $2.71B versus $2.75B. The core story in the numbers is price and acquisition-fueled growth with only partial profit conversion, not some hidden acceleration in earnings power. The most recent two quarters are better, with net margins stable at 11.6-11.7%, but even there earnings growth is not keeping pace with sales growth.
The valuation asks investors to pay up as if margin expansion and durable growth are both still ahead. At $227.68, the stock trades around 34x earnings, 3.65x sales, 12.8x EV/EBITDA, and over 9x book. For a business with a 2025 net margin of 10.7%, operating margin of 17.1%, dividend yield of 1.55%, and free cash flow of $2.82B, that is a rich multiple stack. On market cap alone, the FCF yield is roughly 3.1%; on earnings, the yield is under 3%. Those are not absurd for a monopoly-like compounder with very long duration cash flows, but they are expensive for a capital-intensive company that still spent $3.23B in capex last year and whose net income actually slipped in 2025 despite strong revenue growth. I think the market is capitalizing the quality of WM’s franchise correctly but overcapitalizing the incremental growth story, especially the idea that sustainability and recycling adjacencies meaningfully change the earnings algorithm.
There is also a subtle contradiction in the data quality that makes me less willing to stretch. The balance sheet shows only $711M of debt against $9.99B of equity, implying negligible leverage for a company of this size; that is almost certainly understating economic indebtedness or at least not capturing the full financing picture you would usually expect in this industry. So the superficially pristine debt-to-equity ratio of 0.07 and eye-catching ROIC of 32.4% should be handled cautiously rather than celebrated at face value. Even granting the franchise its due, the cleanest hard numbers here are the cash generation and margins, and they say “high-quality mature compounder,” not “deserving of any price.” If I annualize the first half of 2026, you get roughly $25.8-26.0B of revenue and about $3.0B of net income. That still leaves the stock near 30x forward earnings for a company growing earnings in the high single digits at best.
The best case against my view is straightforward: WM has repeatedly shown that this is one of the few industrial service businesses that can push price, absorb inflation over time, and convert route density into resilient returns. Gross margin improved to 40.4% in 2025 from 39.4% in 2024, operating cash flow hit $6.04B, and free cash flow of $2.82B provides room for dividends, buybacks, and acquisitions. Quarterly revenue has been marching up almost monotonically, from $5.61B in 2024-09 to $6.68B in 2026-06, while net income has recovered from the 2025-09 dip to $742M, $723M, and $785M in the last three quarters. A bull would argue that 2025 was a temporary digestion year: acquired assets and sustainability investments depressed margins before synergies arrived, and the current premium multiple is justified because few businesses combine essential demand, inflation pass-through, regulatory barriers, and long reinvestment runway. I weigh that differently because even if that is true, the current price leaves little room for anything less than smooth execution. A great business can still be a bad stock when bought at 34x earnings and about 3% FCF yield.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of 12-14% revenue growth by itself; I would need to see that growth convert. Specifically, I’d want evidence that annualized net income can move above $3.2B and free cash flow above $3.5B without a corresponding jump in leverage, implying real operating leverage rather than just acquired revenue. If the next few quarters sustain revenue above $6.6B while net margin pushes into a durable 12.5-13.0% range, the current multiple would become easier to defend. Conversely, if revenue keeps growing double digits while net income remains around flat to mid-single-digit growth, the stock should de-rate materially. My base case is that WM remains a superb operator and an overpriced equity.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a high-quality franchise whose growth is real but whose earnings power is not compounding as cleanly as the top line suggests. Revenue climbed from $22.06B in 2024 to $25.20B in 2025 (+14.2%), and the trailing quarterly run-rate sits near $6.4–6.7B, consistent with the 11.1% revenue CAGR. Yet net income slipped from $2.75B to $2.71B over the same annual span, and recent earnings YoY is −1.4%. Quarterly net margins have whipsawed between 9.4% and 13.5%, settling lately around 11.6–11.7%—respectable, but not expanding. Operating cash flow of $6.04B and free cash flow of $2.82B after $3.23B of capex confirm the business still throws off substantial cash, and ROIC at 32.4% with ROE at 27.1% is elite for an industrial. The balance sheet is fortress-like: only $711M of debt against $9.99B of equity (D/E 0.07). The story the numbers tell is therefore straightforward—WM is a cash-generative, capital-intensive consolidator that is buying growth and holding pricing power, but it is not yet converting the revenue step-up into proportional earnings leverage.
That disconnect matters at 34× trailing earnings, 3.65× sales, and 9.2× book. EV/EBITDA of 12.8× looks less extreme until you remember the heavy ongoing capex load and the fact that FCF yield on the $91B equity value is only about 3.1%. A mature earner growing mid-to-high single digits organically (with the rest from M&A) does not historically clear a 34× multiple without sustained margin expansion or a structural re-rating of the entire sector. The 2025 gross margin of 40.4% and operating margin of 17.1% are solid, yet they have not broken out to levels that would justify paying nearly 40% above a DCF anchored near $138. The market is clearly embedding the ESG/RNG/pricing-power narrative on top of the cash flows; the fundamentals themselves only support a high-teens to low-20s earnings multiple for this growth profile.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is the quality of the franchise and the cash-flow trajectory. FCF CAGR of 24.3% is exceptional, route density and landfill ownership create genuine barriers, and the near-zero net leverage means WM can keep consolidating without balance-sheet stress. EV/EBITDA at 12.8× is not egregious for a sector leader with 32% ROIC, and the moderate narrative intensity plus durable regulatory tailwinds argue the premium can persist longer than a pure DCF implies. A smart opponent would also note that 2025 net income was essentially flat while revenue surged, so any mean-reversion in margins or successful integration of recent deals could quickly re-accelerate earnings and make today’s multiple look less stretched in hindsight. I weigh those points seriously but still subordinate them: quality justifies a premium, not a 65% gap to intrinsic value when earnings growth is lagging and the payout ratio is already near 50%.
I would flip to neutral or constructive on a sustained print of net margins above 12.5% with earnings growth re-accelerating above 12% for two consecutive quarters, or on a pullback that brings the stock toward $170–180 while FCF holds above $2.8B. Failure of the next two quarters to show sequential NI recovery, or any guidance that capex stays elevated without corresponding FCF expansion, would reinforce the overvalued stance.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
WM is a mature earner in an oligopolistic, essential-service industry, and the numbers behave the way a high-quality operator should. Revenue grew from $17.93B (2021) to $25.20B (2025), gross margin expanded from 38.0% to 40.4%, and operating margin sits at 17-18%. FCF of $2.82B in 2025 is the highest of the five-year window, and OCF/NI of 2.13x plus accruals of -7.3% of assets point to reported earnings that are, if anything, conservative relative to cash. Beneish M at -2.8 shows no manipulation signature. Capital discipline is real: diluted shares fell from 422.9M to 404.2M (-1.1% CAGR), SBC is trivial at 0.7% of revenue, and buybacks run 7.7x SBC - management is a net returner of capital, not a diluter. The 2025 operating margin dip to 17.1% from 18.4% (despite gross margin expansion) suggests opex or integration drag worth watching, likely tied to the Stericycle acquisition given the revenue jump. The soft spot is the balance sheet: net debt of ~$510M against only $201M liquid cash, and $711M short-term debt exceeding cash on hand. Altman Z of 2.89 sits in the grey zone. For a fee-based, recession-resilient business with $2.8B FCF, this leverage is manageable but is a constraint, not a cushion - a genuine fortress it is not.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Stericycle acquisition integration costs and their impact on 2025 opex - is the margin dip transient?
- Long-term debt maturity schedule and refinancing risk beyond the $711M short-term portion
- Organic vs. acquired revenue growth breakdown in 2024-2025
- Capex composition (maintenance vs. growth, including renewable natural gas and recycling investments)
- Pricing vs. volume contribution to revenue growth in collection/disposal segments
The e2e composite fair value of $134.08 (signal-adjusted $137.64) sits roughly 40% below the $227.68 price, with the DCF at $152.96 and an EPV floor of $96.32. Even giving full credit to the Strong quality grade and clean earnings (no haircut warranted), the deserved value on any reasonable weighting sits in the $140s to maybe $170 - well short of today's tape. The market is paying a premium for the compounder narrative: pricing power, route density, ESG/recycling optionality, and buyback-driven per-share compounding. Those are real, but they are already in the multiple. To justify $227 you need mid-single-digit revenue growth to translate into high-single-digit or better FCF per share growth for a long time, with no margin give-back from labor or capex on renewables projects. That is not heroic, but it is the base case being priced - there is no margin of safety if anything slips. I would not call this dangerously overvalued the way a speculative name would be; WM has a floor because the cash flows are real. But 'rich' is the honest word. A patient buyer should wait.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward FCF guidance and sustaining vs growth capex split (especially renewables/recycling projects)
- Organic pricing vs volume trends in the next few quarters - is pricing still outrunning cost inflation
- Buyback pace and net debt trajectory - per-share compounding is a core pillar of the bull case
- Any margin give-back from labor costs that would compress the deserved multiple
The tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 14.9 and the S&P at highs, but WM's 0.44 beta means the market's mood barely moves this name in either direction. What matters more here is the narrative: WM is cast as a boring-utility-with-ESG-upside compounder, moderate intensity but durable, and that framing has been steadily supportive - the kind of story that keeps long-only defensive money anchored in the name regardless of the daily tape. Momentum is strong-positive with an 11% CAGR trajectory, which itself feeds a self-reinforcing 'own the quality compounder' bid. The offsetting pressure is subtle but real: the bear frame that the stock trades at a ~65% premium to intrinsic is a known overhang that limits how hard sentiment can push it higher, and the macro backdrop of 4.69% 10y yields plus a 26x market PE is a slow drag on any bond-proxy-like defensive with a stretched multiple. Net, the non-fundamental push is modestly upward - narrative durability and low-vol appeal outweigh the quiet valuation-premium unease.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any crack in the ESG/organics growth story that would puncture the compounder narrative
- Analyst target revisions - a wave of downgrades citing valuation would flip the read
- Rotation out of low-vol defensives into cyclicals if the risk-on tape intensifies
- Labor cost headlines that could reshape the margin narrative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, WM was $227.68. We expect it to be $214.00 by Feb 2027. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.