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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for NatWest Group plc (NWG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Watch · Gem Score +32 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 44 · Value 24 · Sentiment -1 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $27.58 vs $18.74 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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NatWest Group plc
NWG NYSENatWest Group plc Sponsored ADR represents American Depositary Receipts for shares of the NatWest Group plc, a major British banking and financial services organization. The primary function of these ADRs is to provide U.S. investors with easier access to invest in NatWest Group's shares without dealing with the complexities of international trading laws. The NatWest Group offers a wide array of financial products and services, encompassing retail and commercial banking across the UK and Ireland, corporate lending, and investment banking operations. A significant player in the financial sector, NatWest Group serves millions of customers, impacting industries from small and medium-sized enterprises to large multinational corporations. By offering these ADRs, NatWest Group taps into increased liquidity from U.S. markets and broadens its investor base. The NatWest Group ADRs on U.S. exchanges make it simpler for investors to participate in the performance of one of the UK’s leading banking conglomerates, without direct exposure to foreign exchanges or currency fluctuations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.84
Total Equity: $58.14B
Shares: 4,325,667,656
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $130.22B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $130.22B
Revenue: $41.27B
Revenue: $41.27B
Revenue: $41.27B
Total Equity: $58.14B
Tax Rate: 24.3%
Equity: $58.14B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $130.22B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $58.14B
Shares: 4,325,667,656
Shares: 4,325,667,656
CapEx: -$907.38M
Shares: 4,325,667,656
Stock Price: $18.62
Net Income: $7.48B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:54pm (46d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $17.4B | $22.6B | $34.6B | $40.0B | $41.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $10.6B | $10.5B | $10.9B | $11.1B | $11.3B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $4.0B | $4.6B | $6.0B | $6.2B | $7.5B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $0.75 | $0.92 | $1.31 | $1.46 | $1.86 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.74 | $0.92 | $1.30 | $1.45 | $1.84 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:54pm (46d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $260.2B | $216.2B | $162.1B | $143.1B | $130.2B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.1T | $982.5B | $945.1B | $966.0B | $975.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.0T | $932.7B | $894.4B | $912.3B | $916.8B |
| Total Equity | $57.0B | $49.8B | $50.7B | $53.7B | $58.1B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:54pm (46d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $73.3B | -$59.5B | -$23.8B | $2.4B | $9.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.2B | -$871.9M | -$1.1B | -$633.1M | -$907.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $72.0B | -$60.4B | -$24.9B | $1.8B | $8.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | -$189.7M | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.4B | -$4.4B | -$2.3B | -$2.5B | -$3.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $70.3B | -$44.0B | -$54.1B | -$19.1B | -$12.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:54pm (46d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +29.6% | +53.1% | +15.5% | +3.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +13.2% | +31.6% | +2.8% | +21.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:54pm (46d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-14 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-20 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-08 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-01 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-17 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-25 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-26 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-15 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-21 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-23 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2008-05-29 | $13.75 | — | — | — |
| 2008-03-05 | $9.65 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 15:43The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: NatWest has compounded revenue from $17.4B (2021) to $41.1B (2025) — a 24% CAGR that the momentum module flatteringly softens to 9.2% by picking odd endpoints. Net income went $4.01B → $7.45B, with 2025 NI up 21% YoY on just 3.1% revenue growth. That's classic late-cycle NIM harvesting: the incremental pound of revenue is dropping to the bottom line at a very high rate because funding costs have lagged asset repricing. ROE is 12.9%, P/B 1.40 (not 0.66x as the narrative layer bizarrely claims — that number is flatly wrong given a $74.9B cap on $57.9B equity), P/E 10.2, yield 5%. This is a bank earning its cost of equity plus a small spread, priced at a modest premium to book. Not a screaming bargain, not expensive.
The prior models are internally contradictory in ways worth flagging. The Valuation Synthesis says fair value $27.58 (+50% upside) yet labels it "fair_value" — that's incoherent; a 50% gap is not fair value by any normal definition. Market Forces calls it "structurally challenged" and says avoid. The Narrative layer cites a "0.66x book" that doesn't exist in the data (P/B is 1.40 per the canonical metrics). Thesis Evaluation scores it -12 (mildly bearish). So we have one model screaming 50% undervalued, two models saying avoid/mildly bearish, and a narrative model working off a wrong price-to-book. The synthesis "verdict" of fair value looks like an averaging artifact, not a considered judgment. I'd trust the bearish models' *direction* more than the DCF's magnitude here, because UK bank DCFs are notoriously sensitive to terminal NIM assumptions that almost certainly won't hold through a BoE cutting cycle.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: 2025 earnings are near-peak-cycle for UK banks. The 21% earnings YoY on 3% revenue growth is not a growth story — it's operating leverage on rate tailwinds that mechanically reverse when Bank Rate falls from 4.75% toward a 3-3.5% terminal. If NIM compresses 30-40bps over 2026-2027, and if you assume mid-single-digit loan growth and no credit shock, normalized earnings are probably closer to $5.5-6.0B, not $7.45B. On $5.75B normalized NI, at a 10x multiple that's a $57.5B market cap vs $74.9B today — meaning the current price already embeds some cycle mean reversion optimism, not pessimism. The 5% dividend and buybacks provide downside cushion, but they don't create value if earnings power is 20-25% below the print. The bull case requires believing either (a) rates stay higher for longer than the curve implies, or (b) NatWest's deposit franchise is stickier than peers'. Neither is established by the data provided.
I dissent from the synthesis' $28 fair value and side closer to Market Forces + Thesis Evaluation. A UK bank at 1.4x book earning 12.9% ROE deserves to trade near current levels, not 50% higher. Fair value is probably $18-22 depending on where you land on NIM normalization — essentially where it trades. The 5% yield is the return; there's no re-rating catalyst absent a surprise rate path or a capital return acceleration. The data gaps that matter: no quarterly trajectory shown (critical for a rate-sensitive bank where the deceleration inflection is everything), no NIM disclosure, no CET1 ratio, no loan loss provisions, no debt figure. For a bank, missing the liability structure is like analyzing a REIT without the debt maturity schedule. I'd want Q3/Q4 2025 quarterly data before sizing anything. On the numbers presented, this is a hold-for-yield, not a value opportunity — and the DCF's +50% signal is almost certainly a model error compounded by mis-tagged EV/revenue and a hallucinated P/B in the narrative layer.
GPT Reading
The data says NatWest is earning its valuation rather than merely looking statistically cheap. Net income has risen from $4.01B in 2021 to $7.45B in 2025, an 86% increase in four years, while revenue went from $17.38B to $41.11B. Even allowing for the distortions that bank revenue lines can carry through rates and accounting classifications, that is a very large earnings step-up for a supposedly no-growth franchise. On the latest numbers, the bank is generating 12.9% ROE on $57.93B of equity, trades at 10.2x earnings and 1.4x book, and throws off $8.71B of free cash flow with a 5.0% dividend yield and a 43% payout ratio. That combination usually belongs either to a structurally impaired bank or one the market expects to mean-revert. I think the market is still leaning too hard on mean reversion. If NatWest can hold anything close to a low-teens ROE through a softer rate backdrop, $18.76 is not expensive.
What stands out most is the internal consistency between profitability and capital return. This is not a story where headline earnings are high but capital is weak or distributions are stretched. Net margin is 18.1%, operating cash flow is $9.61B, and the dividend is covered more than twice by earnings. Cash of $129.73B also underscores the balance-sheet strength, even if “cash” for a bank is not directly comparable to an industrial company’s dry powder. The key valuation anchor for banks is book and ROE: at 12.9% ROE, a 1.4x P/B multiple is not crazy, but neither is it full if returns prove durable. A rough Gordon-style framing gets you there: a bank earning 12%-13% on equity with a 40%-45% payout and modest growth can justify comfortably above book. The market cap of $74.94B against $7.45B of earnings implies an earnings yield near 10%, which is generous for a large, systemically important domestic bank unless profits are near peak.
I also think some of the machine output is tripping over bad banking data plumbing. The negative EV/revenue is meaningless here, and the “debt to equity 0” figure is obviously unusable for a deposit-funded bank. More importantly, the narrative snippets conflict with the actual metrics supplied: one line talks about 0.66x book value, but the canonical P/B is 1.40x. That is not a small discrepancy; it changes the entire debate from “deep discount recovery” to “quality cyclical bank already re-rated.” Once you correct for that, the stock no longer screens as a classic bargain on book, but it still looks modestly undervalued on earnings and income. I don’t buy the implication that the market is pricing in some heroic future. At 10x earnings with a 5% yield, this is closer to a skepticism multiple than a celebration multiple.
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: 2023-2025 likely benefited from unusually favorable rate conditions, and banks like NatWest can look optically cheap at the top of the NIM cycle. Revenue growth has already slowed to 3.1% year over year, suggesting the easy rate-driven expansion phase is over, while the 21.2% earnings growth may prove to be the last strong comparison before margins compress. If UK rates fall, deposit competition intensifies, and credit costs normalize upward at the same time, then a 12.9% ROE can slide back toward 9%-10%, and 1.4x book quickly stops looking attractive. On that math, fair value is closer to the current price than to any blue-sky upside target. I take that risk seriously, but I weigh it less heavily because even a drop to roughly $6B of earnings would still leave the stock around 12.5x trough-ish earnings with a covered dividend, which is not punitive for a well-capitalized incumbent.
What would change my mind is not another valuation model; it is evidence that earnings quality is rolling over faster than the headline suggests. If annual net income falls back below $6.0B, ROE slips under 11%, and revenue starts declining rather than flattening, then the present multiple is probably fair at best. Likewise, if the dividend payout rises above 60% just to maintain shareholder returns, that would tell you the capital return story is masking weaker core profitability. Absent that, I think the stock deserves to trade closer to 11.5x-12x earnings, which on current earnings power points to the low-$20s rather than the high teens.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers on NatWest tell a clear rate-cycle story rather than a structural renaissance. Revenue climbed from $17.38B in 2021 to $41.11B in 2025, a 9.2% CAGR that is almost entirely the product of higher net interest income as UK rates rose; the latest year slowed to just 3.1% growth, confirming the tailwind is maturing. Net income followed a steeper path—$4.01B to $7.45B, 11.7% CAGR—with the most recent print jumping 21% year-on-year to produce an 18.1% net margin and 12.9% ROE on $57.93B of equity. Operating cash flow of $9.61B and free cash flow of $8.71B after only $904M of capex underwrite a 5.0% dividend at a sustainable 43% payout. At $18.76 the stock trades at 10.2x earnings and 1.4x book; that is not the deep discount some narratives claim, but it is still inexpensive for a bank generating mid-teens returns and returning capital, especially with $130B of cash on the balance sheet and negligible reported leverage. The market is correctly stripping out the non-recurring rate gift, yet it is still anchoring too heavily on permanent NIM compression and UK stagnation.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Nearly half the earnings base is rate-sensitive; if the Bank of England cuts aggressively, the 40% earnings hit flagged in the bear case is not theoretical, and the 3.1% latest revenue growth already shows the plateau. UK loan growth remains anemic, ROA is a thin 0.77%, and digital deposit flight plus legacy compliance overhangs keep the franchise from earning a true quality premium. The valuation synthesis composite near $28 looks heroic once those risks are stressed, and the slight negative thesis score (-12) plus “macro headwinds” and “poor cash-flow quality” flags are consistent with a stock that can easily re-rate down toward 8–9x if credit costs rise. I weigh this less heavily because the current 10x multiple and 5% yield already embed a full rate-cut scenario, capital return is locked in after the cost-out program, and 13% ROE on 1.4x book still leaves a positive spread over a reasonable UK cost of equity even after moderate margin squeeze.
I would flip to a clear sell if 2026 net interest income falls more than 15% year-on-year or if the dividend is cut; sustained ROE above 15% with flat-to-up loan growth would push me to a high-conviction buy above the mid-$20s.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that jumps out at me is the revenue deceleration curve: 53% growth in 2023, 15.5% in 2024, and a mere 3.1% in 2025. That is the entire rate cycle playing out in three annual prints, and it tells me the 9.2% five-year revenue CAGR is a mirage of a single macro event, not a structural trend. The 21.2% earnings growth in the most recent period looks impressive next to that 3.1% revenue line, but the net margin jumped from 15.4% to 18.1% in a single year, which for a bank almost always means either a provision release, a one-off gain, or a cost line that won't repeat. The "Poor Cash Flow Quality" flag from the secondary signals is the tell: the $9.61B operating cash flow and $8.71B FCF are not being earned the way a clean, recurring earnings stream would produce them. I am not going to underwrite 21% earnings growth as a run-rate.
What I do find genuinely compelling is the cost structure. The cost-out is described as complete, and the 43.4% payout ratio against a 5.03% dividend yield means NatWest is returning roughly $3.2B in dividends on $7.45B of net income while retaining the rest. At 12.86% ROE and 1.40x tangible book, the stock is not trading at the 0.66x book the bull narrative in the briefing claims — that figure is flatly contradicted by the canonical P/B of 1.40 and the $57.93B equity base against a $74.94B market cap. The bull case is built on a book-value discount that does not exist in the data. What does exist is a reasonable multiple on a bank that has structurally lowered its cost base, which is a different and more defensible argument. The 10.2x P/E is not screaming cheap, but for a bank with a completed cost transformation and a 5% yield, it is not expensive either.
The strongest case against my read is the rate-cut scenario, and I take it seriously. The top bear thesis — "rate cuts shred the NIM and 40% of earnings" at a 72/100 weight — is not hyperbolic. NatWest's revenue is overwhelmingly net interest income, and the 2023-to-2025 revenue expansion from $34.5B to $41.1B is almost entirely the Bank of England's tightening cycle. If the BoE cuts 150-200 basis points over the next two years, the top line compresses meaningfully, and the 3.1% revenue growth I see in 2025 becomes negative. The "Macro Headwinds" flag and the UK economic stagnation bear case at 58/100 weight compound this: loan growth stalls, credit costs creep up, and the 18.1% net margin I flagged as suspiciously high normalizes back toward the 15-16% range. In that world, earnings land closer to $5.5-6B, the P/E expands to 12-13x, and the yield drops to 3.5-4%. That is not a broken stock, but it is not the 50%-upside story the valuation synthesis implies.
I also want to flag a direct internal contradiction in the prior model outputs that I refuse to accept. The valuation synthesis states a composite fair value of $28.21, a 50.6% premium to the $18.74 price, and then immediately says "Market prices in more growth than projected — vulnerable to disappointment." Those two sentences cannot both be true. If the market is pricing in more growth than the model projects, the fair value should sit below the market price, not 50% above it. I believe the DCF is being too generous on terminal growth or too low on the discount rate, and the "signal adjustment" is papering over a methodology mismatch. I am discounting that $28.21 figure heavily.
What would change my mind in either direction: a quarterly print showing net interest margin compression of more than 20 basis points quarter-over-quarter while loan growth stays flat or negative would confirm the rate-cut bear case and push me toward overvalued. Conversely, if the next two quarters show the 18%+ net margin holding while revenue growth stabilizes above 2%, that would validate the cost-out thesis and the earnings floor, and I would move to a stronger undervalued call. The BoE's next two rate decisions and NatWest's Q1 2026 NIM print are the specific data points I am watching.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
NatWest is a mature, deposit-funded UK bank running at scale: revenue has climbed from 17.4B in 2021 to 41.1B in 2025, net income from 4.0B to 7.5B, and 2025 FCF of 8.7B roughly matches net income. Diluted share count has fallen from 6.00B to 4.33B (a -7.8% CAGR) reflecting an aggressive buyback programme post-UK Treasury exit, which meaningfully concentrates per-share value. Cash of 129.7B versus a 74.9B market cap is a bank-balance-sheet artifact (customer deposits, central bank reserves) rather than true 'net cash,' and the Altman Z of 0.09 and OCF/NI of 0.57x are the same artifact - Z-score and accruals models are not meaningful for banks, whose assets are loans and whose liabilities are deposits. Earnings trajectory is genuinely improving: NIM has benefited from the higher-rate cycle, and net income growth of ~86% over four years while share count fell 28% is a strong per-share compounding story. That said, this is still a cyclical UK-lender exposed to UK mortgage credit, rate normalisation, and litigation/regulatory tail risk (motor finance commissions issue in the UK sector). It is a solidly run, well-capitalised systemic bank - not a fortress compounder, but clearly on the healthier side of its peer set.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio, leverage ratio, and liquidity coverage ratio versus regulatory minima
- Loan book composition and stage 3 / non-performing loan trends, especially UK mortgages and unsecured
- Provisions and any reserves for motor finance commissions or other conduct matters
- Buyback authorisation size, pace, and whether HM Treasury has fully exited
- Net interest margin trajectory and deposit beta as UK rates decline
- Dividend policy and payout ratio versus regulatory capital return constraints
Price is $18.74 against a composite fair value of $27.58 and signal-adjusted $28.21, implying ~47-51% upside on the model. I discount that headline: anchored-PE fair values on cyclical banks near a NIM peak routinely overshoot because they extrapolate today's rate-boosted earnings. Haircutting for the earnings-quality flag and cyclical NIM risk, deserved value lands closer to the low-to-mid $20s, call it ~$22-24, still meaningfully above spot. The 4.8% yield plus ongoing buybacks means you get paid to wait. At 0.66x tangible book for a bank earning a mid-teens ROTE, the market is pricing in NIM compression and credit normalisation that are real but not catastrophic. This is a fallen-angel setup where the discount to book is doing most of the work; you are not paying for growth, you are paying for a mature UK deposit franchise at a below-peer multiple. Margin of safety is real but modest - roughly 15-25% to a skeptical deserved value, not the 50% the model prints. Fairly-cheap, not deep value.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward NIM guidance and deposit beta trajectory in latest results
- Stage 3 loan formation and expected credit loss trend
- Buyback pace and remaining CET1 headroom above target
- Any updated conduct/litigation provisions
NWG sits in a mildly risk-on tape but with a low beta (0.82) and defensive UK retail bank profile, so the macro tailwind barely reaches it. The higher-for-longer rate backdrop (10y 4.7%) is actually a subtle positive for net interest income here, partially offsetting the market-PE and curve headwinds that press on higher-multiple names. This name does not trade on the S&P tape; it trades on UK rate expectations and BoE cycle chatter, and neither is currently screaming. The active narrative is a low-intensity fallen-angel story - moderate durability, low cult - meaning sentiment is neither being chased nor abandoned. Analyst tone is quietly constructive on repricing at 0.66x book with a 4.8% yield, but there is no story-momentum bid and no obvious crack in the tape. Recent moves (+5.4%, -3%) were flagged as no-news drifts inside sector rotation, which itself signals sentiment is passive rather than directional. Net: the non-fundamental pressure on NWG right now is close to neutral - a mild rate-narrative tailwind offset by a stale, uninspiring story and a market that simply is not focused on UK banks.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any BoE dovish pivot or rate-cut acceleration that would kill the NIM narrative
- UK bank sector flows and relative performance vs European peers
- Analyst target revisions post next results - direction of drift matters more than level
- Signs the fallen-angel story is either strengthening (rerating chatter) or dying (fresh fintech deposit-loss headlines)
The world that matters here is the rate path, not technology disruption. Higher-for-longer front-end rates and a positively sloped curve are the direct fuel for a deposit-funded UK bank, and the structural hedge means yesterday's rates keep paying for another 18-24 months regardless of what the BoE does next. Against that, the UK's nominal growth is thin, mortgage stock is fought over on price, and the deposit base is slowly being intermediated by digital challengers and money-market alternatives — a decade-long leak rather than a cliff. Fintech disruption of a full-service clearing bank with regulated deposit-taking and SME payments infrastructure is real but slow; the moat is the licence, the current-account switching inertia and the payments plumbing. Net: a favourable transitional environment producing better earnings than the underlying franchise growth rate justifies, with the transition benefit fading toward the back of the forecast window.
When we made this prediction on Aug 27, 2026, NWG was $18.43. We expect it to be $22.40 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $16.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.