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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Low · Gem Score -34 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 20 · Value -70 · Sentiment -52 (timing only, not weighted)
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United Microelectronics Corp.
UMC NYSEUnited Microelectronics Corp. Sponsored ADR represents ownership interests in United Microelectronics Corporation, a leading global semiconductor foundry based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. The company specializes in manufacturing integrated circuit wafers on a contract basis for fabless chip designers and integrated device manufacturers worldwide, rather than selling its own branded chips. United Microelectronics Corporation focuses on logic and specialty process technologies, including mixed-signal, embedded high-voltage, embedded non-volatile memory, RFSOI, and BCD platforms. Its production supports a broad range of applications across communications, consumer electronics, computing, automotive, industrial, and Internet of Things devices. The company operates multiple 200mm and 300mm fabrication plants concentrated in Asia, primarily in Taiwan, Singapore, mainland China, and Japan, with customer-facing offices across major global technology markets. Founded in 1980 and headquartered in Hsinchu, Taiwan, United Microelectronics Corporation today plays a significant role in the outsourced semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem by providing scalable capacity and process expertise to leading electronics and semiconductor companies.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
United Microelectronics Corp. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 8 annual reports, the latest filed 2025-04-24, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.62
Total Equity: $11.43B
Shares: 2,473,093,800
Total Debt: $266.18M
Cash: $3.28B
EBITDA: $3.11B
Total Debt: $266.18M
Cash: $3.28B
Revenue: $7.26B
Revenue: $7.26B
Revenue: $7.26B
Total Equity: $11.43B
Tax Rate: 14.7%
Equity: $11.43B
Total Debt: $266.18M
Cash: $3.28B
Current Liabilities: $2.42B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $266.18M
Total Equity: $11.43B
Shares: 2,473,093,800
Shares: 2,473,093,800
CapEx: -$2.77B
Shares: 2,473,093,800
Stock Price: $19.15
Net Income: $1.52B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 2:17pm (37d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.5B | $6.7B | $8.7B | $7.0B | $7.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.3B | $4.4B | $4.8B | $4.5B | $4.9B |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $2.3B | $3.9B | $2.4B | $2.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $533.2M | $636.3M | $670.9M | $620.3M | $751.2M |
| Operating Income | $685.2M | $1.6B | $3.3B | $1.8B | $1.6B |
| Net Income | $714.3M | $1.6B | $2.8B | $1.9B | $1.5B |
| EBITDA | $2.2B | $3.1B | $4.6B | $3.1B | $3.1B |
| EPS | $0.30 | $0.67 | $1.16 | $0.77 | $0.63 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.29 | $0.65 | $1.12 | $0.75 | $0.62 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:11am (37d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.9B | $4.1B | $5.4B | $4.1B | $3.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $5.1B | $7.3B | $7.9B | $6.8B | $5.9B |
| Total Assets | $11.5B | $14.1B | $16.4B | $17.1B | $17.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.5B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $2.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $4.5B | $5.8B | $6.3B | $6.3B | $6.1B |
| Total Equity | $7.0B | $8.3B | $10.1B | $10.7B | $11.4B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:11am (37d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.1B | $2.8B | $4.6B | $2.7B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$823.6M | -$1.5B | -$2.5B | -$2.9B | -$2.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.2B | $1.3B | $2.1B | -$171.1M | $166.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$305.3M | -$621.2M | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$45.2M | $1.2B | $1.3B | -$1.3B | -$861.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 2:17pm (37d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.5% | +30.8% | -20.2% | +4.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +84.8% | +74.6% | -38.2% | -2.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +135.7% | +101.8% | -44.5% | -10.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +124.2% | +74.6% | -33.3% | -18.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +39.6% | +50.5% | -33.8% | +1.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:18am (40d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-08 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-24 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-02 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-26 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-21 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-21 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2020-07-14 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2019-07-15 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2018-07-09 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2017-07-11 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2016-07-12 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2015-07-14 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2014-07-07 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2013-07-08 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2012-07-09 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2011-07-22 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2010-07-08 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2008-08-08 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2007-07-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2006-08-02 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:37The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The headline P/E of 155x and P/S of 32x are almost certainly artifacts — UMC's ADR represents 5 common shares, and FMP is comparing a $48B market cap against per-common-share earnings or is otherwise mangling the share count. On 2024 NI of $1.52B, a $48B cap is ~32x earnings; on 2023's $1.86B it's ~26x; on 2022's $2.80B peak it's ~17x. EV/EBITDA TTM of 14x (per the anomaly flag) is the honest number. So the synthesis "fair value $5.16, stock is 271% overvalued" is built on a broken denominator and should be discarded wholesale. This matters because every downstream layer — market forces "value trap," narrative "271% premium is pure geopolitical hype," pre-flight "P/E of 155x on depressed earnings" — inherited the same corrupted anchor. That's a cascade failure, not five independent confirmations.
Rebuilding from the raw numbers: revenue went $5.52B (2020) → $6.66B → $8.71B (2022 peak) → $6.95B → $7.26B (2024), so we're one year off trough with 4.4% YoY growth resuming. Net margin compressed from 32% at peak to 21% — still healthy for a foundry, not remotely distressed. Balance sheet is fortress-grade: $3.28B cash vs $266M debt, D/E 0.023, current ratio 2.45. ROE 13.3%, ROIC 16.4% on a mature capital-intensive business is respectable. The one genuinely concerning line is FCF: $167M against $2.93B operating cash flow because capex ran $2.77B — that's ~38% of revenue reinvested, consistent with 22nm/28nm capacity buildout and the new Singapore fab. This is elective growth capex, not maintenance drowning the business; whether it earns its cost of capital is the real debate, not whether UMC is a "value trap."
The bear narrative has a legitimate kernel: UMC is stuck at mature nodes, TSMC and Samsung own leading edge, SMIC is subsidized competition at the trailing edge, and specialty foundry pricing is under pressure. The 2022 margin peak was a pandemic-driven anomaly unlikely to recur. But calling this "catastrophic market share loss during recovery" overstates it — revenue is up YoY, and mature-node demand from automotive/IoT is structurally sticky. At ~$19, you're paying roughly 26x depressed earnings, ~10x normalized (splitting 2022 peak and 2024 trough), with a 2.15% dividend yield and net cash. That's a fair-to-slightly-full price for a #3 foundry with cyclical optionality, not a 73% overvaluation.
Where I'd push back on myself: the capex intensity means reported earnings overstate distributable cash — a normalized FCF yield here is probably 2-3%, not the 6% headline earnings yield suggests. If mature-node ASPs compress another 10-15% as SMIC ramps, 2024 margins are the new ceiling, not the floor, and $19 becomes 12-14x steady-state FCF — full, not cheap. The narrative layer is correct that geopolitical premium is fragile; a Taiwan de-escalation or a China capacity flood would compress the multiple fast. I dissent from the synthesis verdict of $5.16 fair value (mechanically wrong) and from "strong headwinds value trap" (overstated). I partially agree the stock isn't a bargain. My read: fair value $17-22, so current price is roughly where it belongs, with the dividend paying you to wait through the cycle. Not a table-pound buy, not a short, and definitely not a $5 stock.
GPT Reading
The first thing that jumps out is that the headline valuation ratios are almost certainly contaminated by ADR/share-count or data mapping issues, because they do not reconcile with the reported income statement and market cap. At a $48.0B market cap against $1.52B of 2024 net income, the stock is trading around 32x earnings, not 155x; against $7.26B of revenue it is about 6.6x sales, not 32.6x; and with $3.28B of cash and only $266M of debt, enterprise value is closer to $45.0B, or roughly 6.2x revenue. That does not make UMC cheap, but it does make the mechanistic “worth $5” conclusion untrustworthy. On the actual financials, this is a net-cash foundry with 2024 operating margin of 22.2% and net margin of 21.0%, which is far better than a structurally broken commodity business. The real debate is not “is this a disaster?” but “how much should one pay for a second-tier foundry whose peak earnings were in 2022?”
The operating story is plainly cyclical, and not especially attractive at today’s price. Revenue peaked at $8.71B in 2022, fell to $6.95B in 2023, and recovered only modestly to $7.26B in 2024, still 17% below peak. Earnings have deteriorated faster: net income dropped from $2.80B in 2022 to $1.86B in 2023 and $1.52B in 2024, a 46% decline from peak despite revenue down “only” 17%. That tells you pricing and utilization are not just softer; operating leverage is working against them. Gross margin compressed from 45.1% in 2022 to 35.0% in 2023 and 32.6% in 2024, while operating margin fell from 37.4% to 26.0% to 22.2%. For a capital-intensive foundry, that trend matters more than simplistic “recent revenue up 4.4%” comfort. If the business were inflecting sharply, I would expect margin stabilization alongside that top-line recovery; instead, 2024 showed revenue up modestly and profit still down 18%.
Cash generation also argues against paying up. Operating cash flow of $2.93B looks solid in isolation, but capex of $2.77B left only $166.6M of free cash flow. That is a massive drop-through issue for equity holders: the accounting earnings are real enough, but this business eats capital to stay relevant. A company at $48B equity value producing $167M of annual free cash flow is not remotely inexpensive, even allowing for cyclical trough conditions. The balance sheet is a genuine strength — net cash above $3.0B and debt/equity of just 0.02 give UMC resilience and support the dividend — but a strong balance sheet is not the same as a compelling valuation. If I normalize earnings somewhere between 2024’s $1.52B and 2022’s $2.80B, maybe $2.0B-$2.2B, the stock is still around 22x-24x mid-cycle earnings for a company with flat-to-down three-year revenue and visible margin compression. That feels full, not distressed.
The strongest pushback is that I may be over-penalizing a cyclical trough at exactly the wrong moment. UMC earned $1.60B in 2021, $2.80B in 2022, and even after the downturn still made $1.52B in 2024; this is not a business falling into losses. Return on equity of 13.3% and ROIC of 16.4% remain respectable, and the company’s specialty-node mix can produce more durable economics than bleeding-edge foundry capacity. The 2024 revenue rebound to $7.26B could be the first year of a broader utilization recovery, and if margins even partially retrace toward 2023 levels, earnings could move up much faster than revenue. On that view, 2024 free cash flow is the wrong anchor because capex is elevated ahead of demand, and the market is rationally looking through a temporarily weak cash conversion year. A bull could also say that a net-cash, strategically important foundry should not trade on trough FCF any more than a steel mill should.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2024 was indeed the earnings floor rather than part of a structural de-rating. Specifically, I would want to see revenue run-rate clearly above the 2024 level and gross margin recover back toward 35%-37% rather than continuing to leak downward; that combination would suggest utilization and pricing are improving together. I would also want capex to moderate enough that operating cash flow again converts into meaningfully positive free cash flow — not $167M on a $48B market cap, but something comfortably north of $1B. If UMC can show a path back toward $2.2B-$2.5B of net income with disciplined capex, then the current price becomes easier to defend. Absent that, I think the stock is being valued more like a quality compounder than a cyclical foundry still earning below peak on weak cash conversion.
Grok Reading
UMC’s raw P&L tells a clear late-cycle foundry story, not a growth compounder. Revenue recovered modestly from $6.95B in 2023 to $7.26B in 2024 (+4.4%), but that still sits 17% below the 2022 peak of $8.71B. More telling is the margin path: gross profit fell from $3.93B (45% margin) in 2022 to $2.43B (35%) in 2023 and $2.36B (32.6%) in 2024 even as sales ticked up, and operating income compressed from $3.26B to $1.61B. Net income of $1.52B is down 18% year-over-year and nearly half the 2022 high. Against a $48B market cap that implies roughly 6.6x sales and ~32x 2024 earnings—multiples that would require either a sharp utilization rebound or structural pricing power UMC has not demonstrated. The balance sheet is pristine ($3.28B cash, only $266M debt, debt-to-equity 0.02), but free cash flow collapsed to $167M after $2.77B of capex on $2.93B of operating cash flow. That is not a mature cash machine returning capital; it is a capital-intensive foundry spending heavily to defend share while returns compress. The published P/E of 155x and P/B of 20x are metric artifacts (likely ADR/currency distortion); the economic multiples derived from the dollar statements are still rich for a business posting negative mid-single-digit revenue CAGR and deeply negative earnings and FCF CAGRs over the recent window.
The quantitative models’ sub-$6 fair value is too punitive and underweights the net cash fortress and the fact that 2024 earnings, while depressed, are not near zero. A smart opponent would correctly note that ROE of 13% and ROIC of 16% remain respectable for a trailing-edge/specialty foundry, that the slight 2024 revenue inflection could mark the start of a utilization recovery, and that a return even halfway toward 2022 peak earnings ($2.8B) would drop the earnings multiple into the mid-teens—historically normal for UMC in an upcycle. They would also argue the geopolitical “TSMC alternative” bid and specialty process exposure (auto, IoT, mature nodes) justify a scarcity premium versus pure commodity logic, and that the clean balance sheet gives UMC staying power through the trough that weaker peers lack. I weigh those points but do not let them carry the verdict: margin structure has deteriorated for two straight years through a partial volume recovery, FCF conversion is broken under the current capex regime, and paying ~32x for earnings that are still shrinking year-over-year embeds a recovery that the operating numbers have not yet confirmed. Narrative premium is real; it is also fragile and already fully in the price at $19.15 versus any cash-flow-anchored read near the mid-single digits to low double digits on a per-share basis.
What flips me is concrete evidence of operating leverage returning: quarterly gross margin re-expanding through the mid-30s toward 38%+ with utilization, 2025 revenue reclaiming toward $8B+, and free cash flow climbing back above $1B as capex intensity normalizes. Absent that, multiple compression is the base case.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
UMC is a mature-earner foundry with genuine financial strength: $3.28B liquid cash, $3.02B net cash, Altman Z of 5.7, and no earnings-quality flags (Beneish M -2.69, OCF/NI 1.93x, accruals -8.8% of assets). Diluted share count has been essentially flat (0.2% CAGR) with SBC at just 0.3% of revenue, so per-share value is protected. This is a well-capitalized, disciplined issuer. The concern is the trajectory. The 2022 cycle peak (revenue $8.71B, GM 45.1%, OpM 37.4%, NI $2.80B, FCF $2.05B) has given way to a clear downcycle: 2024 revenue $7.26B (-17% vs peak), GM compressed to 32.6%, OpM to 22.2%, NI to $1.52B, and FCF collapsed to $166.6M after a negative $171M print in 2023. That FCF collapse against still-solid net income implies heavy capex - normal for a foundry reinvesting to stay relevant at trailing-edge nodes, but it explains the 'Poor Cash Flow Quality' tag. Business quality is real but bounded: UMC is a specialty/mature-node foundry that does not lead at the bleeding edge, so its moat is narrower than TSMC's, and its earnings visibly breathe with the semi cycle. Solid, not fortress.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Capex plans and depreciation schedule to gauge normalized FCF conversion
- Customer concentration and exposure to specialty nodes (28nm, 22nm) vs commodity mature nodes
- Utilization rates and pricing trends into 2025
- Dividend policy and any buyback authorization details (buyback/SBC shown as 0%)
- Any China/Taiwan geopolitical exposure and fab footprint disclosure
The valuation stack points one direction: DCF $2.29, EPV floor $6.86, anchored P/E $10.37, composite $5.45, signal-adjusted $5.16 - all materially below the $19.15 price. Even taking the most generous of the three methods (anchored P/E at $10.37), the stock trades at roughly 1.85x deserved value. The earnings-quality signal is clean (no haircut needed), and the business quality is Solid, which supports a premium to EPV - but not a near-4x premium to the composite. The market is paying for the geopolitical/reshoring narrative and a cyclical trough-to-peak recovery that the numbers do not yet justify. What has to be true to defend $19: sustained pricing power against TSMC, a durable specialty-foundry margin uplift, and a cycle upswing that pushes earnings back toward the 2022 peak and holds there. That is a stack of heroic assumptions for a capital-heavy commodity-adjacent foundry with mediocre through-cycle FCF conversion. I would not call this a short - the balance sheet is a fortress and the business is real - but the price-vs-value gap is uncomfortable, and there is no margin of safety here.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest quarterly utilization rates and blended ASP trend vs TSMC pricing
- Specialty node mix (28nm, 22nm) revenue share and margin contribution
- Capex guidance and free cash flow conversion through the current cycle
- Automotive/IoT segment growth vs consumer/comms decline
- Management commentary on 2024-2025 pricing environment and overcapacity
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs), which usually flatters a beta-1.7 semi like UMC. But the pressure that matters here is narrative, and UMC's story is the weakest kind: a cyclical-late-stage archetype with strong intensity and fragile durability, riding a geopolitical/reshoring/'TSMC alternative' hype trade rather than an AI-winner tag. The GF Securities note flagging a more selective AI rebound is exactly the wrong headline for a name that is not in the front row of that trade - selectivity means capital rotates to TSMC and leading-edge winners, not to a trailing-edge pure-play foundry. Momentum confirms the drag: -8.7% CAGR and -11pp of 3y relative underperformance, with only a modest recent bounce. The stock has ridden a narrative premium far above fundamental anchors, and fragile narratives on high-beta names de-rate fast when the tape wobbles. Rates at 4.63% and a 26.2 market PE add a background headwind to any premium-multiple, cyclical, non-US listed cyclical. Net: the risk-on tape is a small tailwind, but the narrative setup and analyst/news tone lean against this specific name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any sell-side note explicitly ranking foundries and where UMC lands in the 'selective AI' pecking order
- Taiwan Strait or export-control headlines that could reawaken the geopolitical premium
- Sector rotation signals - if flows leave semis for defensives, high-beta UMC gets hit disproportionately
- Next earnings tone on pricing/utilization; a soft print would crack the fragile narrative fast
The world is bifurcating semiconductors. Capital and pricing power are migrating to leading-edge AI silicon, while mature nodes are being commoditised by state-subsidised Chinese capacity — a supply glut that does not clear on a normal cycle because the builders are not profit-maximising. Offsetting that, tariff regimes and China+1 sourcing are creating a real premium for non-China mature-node supply, which is UMC's single best structural card and the logic behind the Intel 12nm tie-up. Macro is a headwind (10y 4.63), which delays the auto/industrial and consumer-IoT restocking UMC depends on. Net: UMC's units survive, its ASPs and margins are the casualty.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for UMC — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.