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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Otis Worldwide Corporation (OTIS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -29 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 39 · Value -74 · Sentiment -2 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $60.97 vs $71.74 at analysis
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Otis Worldwide Corporation
OTIS NYSEOtis Worldwide Corporation is a global elevator and escalator company that designs, manufactures, installs, services, and modernizes vertical transportation systems. Otis Worldwide Corporation supplies passenger and freight elevators, escalators, and moving walkways for residential towers, commercial buildings, infrastructure projects, and public transit environments. Its business is centered on two main segments: New Equipment, which handles design and installation, and Service, which provides maintenance, repair, and modernization for installed equipment. The company also supports a large global base of buildings and transit systems with connected service offerings that help keep equipment operating safely and efficiently. Headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut, Otis Worldwide Corporation plays a central role in urban mobility and building infrastructure across markets worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.50
Total Equity: -$5.27B
Shares: 394,900,000
Total Debt: $8.84B
Cash: $1.10B
EBITDA: $2.25B
Total Debt: $8.84B
Cash: $1.10B
Revenue: $14.43B
Revenue: $14.43B
Revenue: $14.43B
Total Equity: -$5.27B
Tax Rate: 24.8%
Equity: -$5.27B
Total Debt: $8.84B
Cash: $1.10B
Current Liabilities: $7.66B
Long-Term Debt: $7.79B
Total Debt: $8.84B
Total Equity: -$5.27B
Shares: 394,900,000
Shares: 394,900,000
CapEx: -$152.00M
Shares: 394,900,000
Stock Price: $71.74
Net Income: $1.38B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:10am (38d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.3B | $13.7B | $14.2B | $14.3B | $14.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $12.2B | $11.7B | $12.0B | $12.0B | $12.2B |
| Operating Income | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.1B |
| Net Income | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.4B |
| EBITDA | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.2B |
| EPS | $2.91 | $2.98 | $3.42 | $4.10 | $3.52 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.89 | $2.96 | $3.39 | $4.07 | $3.50 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:00am (38d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.2B | $1.3B | $2.3B | — | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $6.1B | $6.4B | $7.7B | — | $6.5B |
| Total Assets | $9.8B | $10.1B | $11.3B | — | $10.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.8B | $6.5B | $7.7B | — | $7.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.7B | $6.9B | $8.3B | — | $7.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $14.5B | $14.8B | $16.0B | — | $15.9B |
| Total Equity | -$4.7B | -$4.7B | -$4.7B | — | -$5.3B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.9B | -$2.0B | -$978.0M | $188.0M | -$440.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:23am (38d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$156.0M | -$115.0M | -$138.0M | -$126.0M | -$152.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$80.0M | -$46.0M | -$36.0M | -$87.0M | -$109.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.0B | -$500.0M | $213.0M | $1.5B | -$800.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$393.0M | -$465.0M | -$539.0M | -$606.0M | -$647.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$725.0M | -$850.0M | -$800.0M | -$1.0B | -$809.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.7B | -$2.3B | $85.0M | $1.0B | -$1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:10am (38d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -4.3% | +3.8% | +0.4% | +1.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -3.6% | +7.5% | -8.1% | +6.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +0.6% | +12.2% | +17.0% | -15.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -3.3% | +7.5% | -8.0% | +5.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:00am (38d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-14 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-15 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-14 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-15 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-17 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-16 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-17 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-18 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-19 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-17 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-07 02:03A +1σ run of quarters pays -28%; a −1σ run costs 54%. Ratio -0.5:1 (μ 3.5%, σ 3.9% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($71.74) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +7% | 17.3% | $74.79 | +4% |
| Base — stabilizes | +4% | 15.0% | $61.08 | -15% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 12.8% | $48.92 | -32% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +3% | 10.9% | $44.06 | -39% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +7% | 11.2% | $51.45 | -28% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -0% | 9.0% | $32.79 | -54% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 05:33The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue has quietly re-accelerated — Q2 2026 at $3.86B is a real number, up 7.2% YoY from $3.60B, and Q1 2026 at $3.57B was up 6.6% YoY from $3.35B. That's meaningfully better than the 0.8% five-year revenue CAGR and the 1.2% "recent YoY" the momentum module cites, which appears to be averaging across a stale base. Net income Q2 2026 of $428M vs $393M prior year is +8.9%. The "earnings_yoy -15.9%" figure is being distorted by the Q3 2024 comp of $540M at a 15.2% margin — clearly a one-time item (divestiture gain or tax benefit), not a run-rate. Strip that outlier and OTIS is doing ~10-11% net margins consistently, with 2026 tracking toward ~$14.9B revenue and ~$1.55B+ NI. That's not deterioration; that's a mid-single-digit grower stabilizing after 2025's soft Q1.
Now the prior models. The synthesis's $62-66 fair value and "fully_priced -13%" verdict I think is defensibly conservative but leans on the depressed CAGR figures. At $71.74 and ~$1.55B forward NI, that's ~17.6x forward — not cheap, but not egregious for a business with 75%+ service revenue mix, 90%+ FCF conversion ($1.44B FCF on $1.38B NI), and 14.8% operating margins. The Market Forces module calling this a "value trap losing market share with financial engineering masking deterioration" is, frankly, overwrought. Negative equity of -$5.27B is a capital-return artifact from the 2020 UTX spin and years of buybacks against a cash-generative service annuity — it's the same structure as MCD, HD, SBUX, AZO. It is not evidence of distress when you're producing $1.6B in OCF against $8.84B of debt (net debt/EBITDA ~3x, manageable). The insider "selling" flag is also weak — the transaction log shows Awards and one option exercise with in-kind withholding, not open-market disposals. Market Forces and the synthesis are contradicting each other, and I side with the Narrative layer's "anchored steady-compounder" read.
The contrarian case that actually has teeth isn't financial engineering — it's China. Otis has meaningful new-equipment exposure to a Chinese property market that remains structurally impaired, and management commentary through 2025 flagged double-digit China new-equipment declines. The fact that consolidated revenue is still growing 6-7% means Americas/EMEA service and modernization are more than offsetting, but if China stabilizes lower and Western commercial construction rolls over in 2026-27, the growth algo compresses to 2-3% and 17x forward becomes 15x fair. The other real risk is that 11% Q2 margin is near a cyclical high for this business — historical op margin band is 14-16%, and labor inflation in service (the crown-jewel segment) is a slow grind. Modernization backlog is the swing factor: if it converts, you get operating leverage; if it stalls, margins fade.
My verdict: I partially dissent from the synthesis. $62 fair value understates the recent re-acceleration and the durability of the service annuity; the Market Forces "value trap" call is wrong on the facts. But I also don't think OTIS is undervalued at $71.74 — it's a high-quality compounder trading at a reasonable-to-slightly-full multiple for what it is. Fair value band $68-75, with the stock currently mid-band. Not a table-pound buy, not a sell, and definitely not the deterioration story one module is telling. If you own it for the 2.4% yield, ~$1.4B annual FCF against a $27B cap (~5.3% FCF yield), and mid-single-digit topline with buyback-driven EPS growth of 7-9%, you're getting a mid-teens IRR expectation with low drawdown risk. That's a hold-and-accumulate-on-dips profile, not a fresh entry at these levels. I'd want $65 or a China stabilization signal to add aggressively.
GPT Reading
Otis looks like exactly what the market thinks it is: a high-quality, slow-growing industrial annuity, but not an obvious bargain at $71.74. The revenue line has barely moved over five years — $14.30B in 2021, $13.69B in 2022, $14.21B in 2023, $14.26B in 2024, and $14.43B in 2025. That is roughly flat in real terms. Operating income has also been range-bound, from $2.03B to $2.19B over that span, landing at $2.13B in 2025. The business is clearly resilient rather than expanding. The most important positive is that resilience converts to cash: 2025 free cash flow was $1.44B on just $152M of capex, a very healthy cash model. On a $27.3B market cap, that is only about a 5.3% FCF yield though — solid, not cheap, especially for a business with sub-1% revenue CAGR and slightly negative earnings CAGR.
The quarterly picture reinforces that read. Revenue improved from $3.35B in 2025-03 to $3.86B in 2026-06, and net income recovered from an ugly $243M quarter to $428M, so this is not a deterioration story. But it is also not a breakout. The latest quarter’s 11.1% net margin is respectable, yet not structurally above the company’s own history, and the trailing sequence of 9.5%, 11.1%, 9.9%, 10.1% says earnings quality is stable rather than inflecting. What jumps out more is the contrast between annual 2024 net income of $1.65B and 2025 net income of $1.38B despite slightly higher revenue in 2025. That tells me the business has pricing power and service stickiness, but not enough growth or margin expansion to justify paying a premium multiple. A 20.5x P/E and 12.5x EV/EBITDA for a company with low-single-digit top-line progress and modest cash-flow shrinkage over time is full, not distressed.
I also do not buy the more alarmist bear case embedded in some of the secondary commentary. Negative equity at -$5.27B looks scary on the surface, but for a mature capital-return-heavy industrial with durable cash generation, that is more a balance-sheet artifact than proof of economic weakness. Likewise, the insider tape here is basically awards and option exercises, not meaningful open-market dumping. The current ratio below 1.0 matters less for a business with recurring service cash inflows and $1.60B of operating cash flow. Net debt of roughly $7.7B against that level of cash generation is noticeable but manageable. So I would push back on any claim that Otis is a value trap or masking operational decay. The raw numbers say something more pedestrian: a dependable franchise that likely deserves a quality multiple, just not an ambitious one.
The best argument against my cautious view is that this kind of company often deserves to look expensive on backward metrics because the downside is unusually limited. The latest two quarters showed year-over-year improvement — Q2 revenue rose from $3.60B to $3.86B and net income from $393M to $428M, while Q1 improved from $3.35B/$243M to $3.57B/$340M. If that trajectory continues, the market may be right to pay up for a business with service-like durability, low capex needs, and a 2.4% dividend on top of buyback-like balance-sheet efficiency. A smart bull would also point out that even flat revenue can create acceptable shareholder returns when operating margins stay around 15% and cash conversion remains this strong. I weigh that argument less heavily because the last five years still show very little cumulative economic progress; I need more than two better quarters to underwrite sustained reacceleration.
What would change my mind is simple. I would turn constructive if Otis can show that 2026 is not just a modest rebound but a genuine earnings step-up: annualized revenue tracking above $14.8B, net income back toward or above the 2024 level of $1.65B, and free cash flow moving decisively above $1.5B without leverage rising further. That would support a case that today’s ~20x earnings multiple is paying for durable compounding rather than stagnation. On the other hand, if the recent revenue improvement fades and quarterly net margins slip back toward the 7%-9% zone seen in weaker periods, the stock should not hold a low-70s price; in that scenario I would anchor fair value closer to the low $60s.
Grok Reading
Otis prints the profile of a late-cycle industrial annuity: roughly $14.3–14.4B of revenue that has barely moved for five years (0.8% CAGR), operating income stuck near $2.0–2.2B, and free cash flow of $1.44B on only $152M of capex. The installed-base service engine is doing the real work—net margins have re-centered around 9.5–11% in recent quarters after the noisy 15.2% print in 3Q24—and the business converts earnings into cash at a high rate. That is the story the numbers actually tell: a durable, low-growth cash machine, not a growth compounder. At $71.74 the stock still commands ~20.5× earnings, ~12.5× EV/EBITDA and nearly 2× sales while trailing twelve-month earnings are down ~16% year-over-year and FCF is gently declining (−1.5% CAGR). The balance sheet is levered—$8.84B debt against $1.1B cash and a sub-1.0 current ratio—yet the negative $5.27B equity is the residue of post-spin buybacks and dividends, not operating distress. Insiders are not dumping; the last ten filings are almost entirely awards and option exercises, so the “insider selling” claim in the market-forces note is simply wrong.
The valuation synthesis that pins fair value in the low-to-mid $60s therefore looks directionally correct. A 2.4% dividend at a 47% payout is sustainable on $1.4B+ of FCF, but it does not justify paying a mid-teens premium to a DCF that already embeds the service moat. New-equipment revenue remains cyclically soft, China exposure is a known drag, and the recent revenue run-rate ($3.57–3.86B per quarter) shows only low-single-digit sequential bounce with decelerating confidence. Paying 20× for flat-to-down earnings and mid-single-digit free-cash-flow yield is the market’s bet that service modernization will offset equipment weakness forever; the arithmetic does not leave much margin for error.
The strongest counter-argument is that the service contract base is genuinely sticky, modernization cycles are multi-year, and the stock has already de-rated from prior highs, so the 20× multiple is simply the fair clearing price for a high-quality annuity rather than a premium. A bull can also point to the $1.44B FCF covering the dividend with room left for modest buybacks, operating margins that have held near 15%, and the fact that negative equity is an accounting artifact of capital return, not a solvency issue. Those points are real; I simply weigh them as already discounted. Once you accept near-zero organic growth and mild earnings pressure, the composite $62–66 range is the more coherent anchor than the current $72 print.
I would flip constructive on a clear re-acceleration of service organic growth above mid-single digits, a return of annual free cash flow sustainably above $1.6B, or a decisive de-rating into the low $60s that restores a mid-teens free-cash-flow yield. Conversely, another year of negative earnings growth or a material step-up in net leverage would confirm the value-trap reading.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Otis runs a steady, high-quality mature business: revenue has drifted from $14.3B (2021) to $14.4B (2025) with operating margins remarkably stable in a 14.1%-15.4% band, and net income ranging $1.25B-$1.65B. FCF has been dependably $1.44B-$1.59B every year, with OCF/NI of 1.18x and negative accruals (-3% of assets) confirming earnings are cash-backed. Altman Z of 2.86 (grey) reflects the leveraged post-spin capital structure rather than operating stress. Capital return discipline is a real strength: diluted shares have compounded down at -2.2% per year (431M to 395M), with buybacks running ~12x SBC and SBC only 0.6% of revenue, so per-share value is being concentrated, not leaked. The elevator model (installed base plus long-tail service revenue) is implicitly durable, though the raw shows 0% gross margin (data gap) so I can't verify unit vs service mix directly. The main quality drag is the balance sheet: $1.1B cash against roughly $8.85B gross debt leaves net debt of $7.75B, ~5.4x FCF - manageable given the annuity-like cash flows, but a genuine constraint rather than a cushion. Insider tape is neutral (7 small sales, no open-market buys), typical for a mature large-cap and not a signal either way. Growth is essentially flat in nominal terms over five years, which caps how high this grades.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Service vs new-equipment revenue mix and service margin trajectory (gross margin shows as 0% in the feed - data gap)
- Cause of 2025 net income decline to $1.38B despite stable operating margin (tax, interest, one-timers?)
- Debt maturity ladder and average coupon on the ~$8.85B gross debt
- China new-equipment exposure and whether service backlog is offsetting weakness there
- Any pension or off-balance-sheet obligations from the UTX spin-off
The composite FV of $65.91 and signal-adjusted FV of $62.45 both sit below the $71.74 price, implying roughly -8% to -13% downside to deserved value. The DCF at $59.85 (a -17% gap) is the most defensible anchor for a mature, low-growth industrial; the anchored-PE of $118.92 is a runaway output that assumes multiple expansion or heroic EPS growth in a mid-single-digit organic grower and should be heavily discounted. The EPV floor of $25.02 confirms there is essentially no asset-based downside cushion - you are paying entirely for the franchise and its service annuity.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- China new-equipment order trends and pricing (largest swing factor in DCF)
- service portfolio unit growth and modernization backlog conversion
- segment margin bridge for labor inflation pass-through
- capital allocation split between buybacks and debt paydown given net leverage
Otis sits in a place where sentiment forces are muted on both sides. The tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14.4, S&P near highs), which normally lifts equities, but with beta 0.88 and a steady-compounder profile, Otis captures little of that upside beat - risk-on flows chase story stocks, not elevator maintenance annuities. Offsetting that, higher rates (10y 4.67%) and a stretched market PE 25.9 are a background headwind for bond-proxy quality compounders like OTIS whose appeal is duration-like cash flows; that pressure is real but not decisive here given the low beta and defensive service mix.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any commercial real estate / new-equipment order data that could crack the steady-demand story
- 10y yield direction - a move back toward 4.2% would ease the bond-proxy headwind materially
- Sector rotation into defensives (would flip the mild headwind to a mild tailwind)
- Analyst target revisions or a downgrade citing China property exposure
Vertical transportation is one of the few industrial franchises where the world's direction is genuinely supportive on one side and hostile on the other. Urbanization, aging installed base and safety/accessibility codes make maintenance and modernization a compounding annuity — regulation effectively mandates spend regardless of the construction cycle. Against that, the single biggest new-install engine of the last two decades, Chinese residential construction, is structurally shrinking, and higher-for-longer rates (10y 4.67) plus a slowing industrial cycle delay Western non-residential starts. The net shape of the world for Otis is: profits more resilient than volumes, volumes structurally slower than the prior decade. Earnings power grows through mix, price and density rather than through end-market expansion, which caps the plausible ceiling at mid-single-digit compounding rather than a double-digit trajectory.
When we made this prediction on Aug 30, 2026, OTIS was $71.74. We expect it to be $66.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $58.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 30, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.