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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for McKesson Corporation (MCK) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +32 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 55 · Value 16 · Sentiment 5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $849.10 vs $875.51 at analysis
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price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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McKesson Corporation
MCK NYSEMcKesson Corporation is a healthcare services company that supports the flow of medicines, supplies, and related solutions across the healthcare system. The company operates through North American Pharmaceutical, Oncology and Multispecialty, Prescription Technology Solutions, and Medical-Surgical Solutions, serving pharmacies, health systems, physician practices, post-acute care providers, and other care settings. Its pharmaceutical distribution business supplies branded, generic, specialty, biosimilar, and over-the-counter products, while its medical-surgical operations provide clinical supplies, logistics, and equipment support. McKesson also offers technology-enabled services that help healthcare organizations manage prescriptions, practice operations, and patient care workflows. Through its broad distribution network and service platforms, McKesson plays a central role in connecting manufacturers, providers, and pharmacies across the U.S. and internationally.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 38.38
Total Equity: -$1.78B
Shares: 124,100,000
Total Debt: $6.53B
Cash: $3.98B
EBITDA: $6.50B
Total Debt: $6.53B
Cash: $3.98B
Revenue: $403.43B
Revenue: $403.43B
Revenue: $403.43B
Total Equity: -$1.78B
Tax Rate: 17.8%
Equity: -$1.78B
Total Debt: $6.53B
Cash: $3.98B
Current Liabilities: $67.02B
Long-Term Debt: $6.53B
Total Debt: $6.53B
Total Equity: -$1.78B
Shares: 124,100,000
Shares: 124,100,000
CapEx: -$436.00M
Shares: 124,100,000
Stock Price: $869.00
Net Income: $4.76B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 10:15am (51d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $264.0B | $276.7B | $309.0B | $359.1B | $403.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $250.8B | $264.4B | $296.1B | $345.7B | $388.9B |
| Gross Profit | $13.1B | $12.4B | $12.8B | $13.3B | $14.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $11.1B | $8.0B | $8.9B | $8.9B | $8.3B |
| Operating Income | $2.0B | $4.4B | $3.9B | $4.4B | $6.2B |
| Net Income | $1.1B | $3.6B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $4.8B |
| EBITDA | $2.4B | $4.7B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $6.5B |
| EPS | $7.32 | $25.23 | $22.54 | $25.86 | $38.55 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.23 | $25.03 | $22.39 | $25.72 | $38.38 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 9:49am (51d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.5B | $4.7B | $4.6B | $5.7B | $4.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $46.2B | $44.3B | $48.0B | $55.4B | $57.2B |
| Total Assets | $63.3B | $62.3B | $67.4B | $75.1B | $82.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $48.5B | $48.0B | $52.4B | $61.6B | $67.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $5.9B | $5.6B | $5.6B | $5.7B | $6.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $65.1B | $63.8B | $69.0B | $76.8B | $84.1B |
| Total Equity | -$1.8B | -$1.5B | -$1.6B | -$1.7B | -$1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $9.0B | $12.3B | $15.0B | $17.9B | $22.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 10:15am (51d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.4B | $5.2B | $4.3B | $6.1B | $6.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$388.0M | -$390.0M | -$431.0M | -$537.0M | -$436.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.0B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $5.5B | $5.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$6.0M | -$867.0M | -$272.0M | -$24.0M | -$3.4B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.2B | -$277.0M | $703.0M | -$21.0M | $783.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.5B | -$3.6B | -$3.0B | -$3.1B | -$4.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.5B | $744.0M | -$94.0M | $1.4B | -$1.9B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 10:15am (51d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.8% | +11.7% | +16.2% | +12.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -5.9% | +3.8% | +3.9% | +9.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +115.0% | -10.8% | +13.1% | +40.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +219.6% | -15.7% | +9.8% | +44.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +98.0% | -10.0% | +12.1% | +38.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 9:51am (51d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-28 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-06 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays -2%; a −1σ run costs 48%. Ratio -0.1:1 (μ 11.6%, σ 6.1% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 29.3 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($875.51) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +11% | 17.3% | $9,155.49 | +946% |
| Base — stabilizes | +8% | 15.0% | $7,024.47 | +702% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 12.8% | $5,253.29 | +500% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 1.2% | $592.57 | -32% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +18% | 1.2% | $855.21 | -2% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +5% | 0.9% | $457.87 | -48% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:18The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: MCK is a $400B+ revenue distributor running 3.6% gross and 1.5% operating margins, growing top line 14% CAGR and earnings 26% CAGR into FY26. That earnings growth on a wafer-thin margin business is real but mechanically fragile — a 20bp gross margin swing is roughly $800M pretax on $400B of revenue, which is bigger than a full quarter of net income. The FY26 print (rev $403B, NI $4.76B, OCF $6.16B, FCF $5.72B) is genuinely strong, and the June 2026 quarter at $105B rev with $614M NI shows the margin oscillation that defines this model — Q1 is seasonally the softest, so I wouldn't read the 0.6% margin as deterioration. FCF conversion (~120% of NI) is the tell that this is a real cash machine, not accounting earnings. Negative $1.78B equity is a buyback artifact, not distress — with $6.16B OCF against $6.53B debt, leverage is trivial.
Where I part ways with the synthesis: the "undervalued by 26.8%" composite ($1,108 signal-adjusted vs $869) is almost certainly overfitting the recent earnings acceleration. Distribution wholesalers have traded at 10-18x P/E historically for a reason — the business converts massive revenue into thin, contestable spread income. MCK at 22.8x trailing is already at the top of its historical band, and applying growth-stock multiples to a 1.2% net margin business is how you generate spurious upside. The 26% earnings CAGR is partly cyclical (GLP-1 volume surge, specialty pharma mix shift that's now well-known) and partly buyback-driven EPS math. Strip GLP-1 tailwind and you're likely back to 6-8% organic revenue growth and mid-single-digit EPS growth ex-buyback. The pre-flight note flagging "volume growth, not margin expansion" is the correct frame; the synthesis appears to ignore it.
The contrarian case that no model quite articulates: MCK's stock has roughly doubled in two years while operating margin moved from 1.4% to 1.5%. That's a re-rating, not a fundamental transformation. Insider activity confirms this — 8 sales vs 2 awards in the last 10 transactions, with sales dwarfing awards in share count (~25k sold vs ~8.4k awarded). "Neutral insider activity" undersells this; when insiders are net sellers at all-time highs in a mature distributor, that's a soft signal to trim, not add. The macro headwinds flag matters too: if drug pricing reform (IRA Medicare negotiation expansion, most-favored-nation pricing revival) compresses branded drug economics, distributor buy-side spreads get squeezed with no offsetting lever. The narrative layer's "21% discount to DCF" claim is doing a lot of work — DCFs on 1.5% operating margin businesses are wildly sensitive to terminal margin assumptions, and I'd want to see the sensitivity table before trusting any point estimate.
GPT Reading
McKesson is a superb business in a structurally unattractive-looking format: more than $400B of annual revenue, but only 1.2% net margin and 1.5% operating margin. The key question is whether that should trade like a dull distributor or a high-quality compounder. The raw data push me toward the latter operationally but not fully at this price. Revenue has climbed from $263.97B in FY2022 to $403.43B in FY2026, a 53% jump in four years, while operating income expanded from $2.04B to $6.21B and net income from $1.11B to $4.76B. That is not just inflation or pass-through volume; operating leverage and mix clearly improved. Free cash flow of $5.72B on only $436M of capex shows the model’s real strength: this is an asset-light toll collector on drug distribution with unusually strong cash conversion for a company whose accounting margins look razor-thin.
What stands out, though, is that the quarterly pattern is less pristine than the annual trend implies. The latest quarter, June 2026, posted revenue of $105.38B, up from $97.83B a year earlier, yet net income was only $614M versus $784M, with margin falling to 0.6% from 0.8%. That follows a very strong March 2026 quarter at $1.68B of net income on $96.30B of revenue, so profitability is not steadily improving; it is lumpy and sensitive to mix, timing, and likely charges. Across the last eight quarters, net margin has ranged from 0.3% to 1.7%, which is a reminder that this is still a spread business where tiny changes matter enormously. At $101.3B market cap and about 21-23x trailing earnings, the market is valuing McKesson not as a commodity distributor, but as a high-confidence allocator of capital with durable earnings expansion. I can understand that, but I do not think the current quote leaves enough room for a business with this much margin fragility and a current ratio below 0.86.
The balance sheet is also more awkward than the equity story suggests. Net debt is manageable at roughly $2.6B after subtracting $3.98B cash from $6.53B debt, so solvency is not the issue. The issue is that total equity is negative $1.78B, which is usually the byproduct of aggressive buybacks and settlement accounting rather than economic distress, but it still reduces balance-sheet flexibility and makes the business look more robust on return metrics than it really is. EV/EBITDA around 17x is not cheap for a wholesaler, even a very good one. The low P/S of 0.27x is a red herring because gross margin is only 3.6%; revenue scale here is not equivalent to value creation. On trailing numbers, the stock is priced for continued double-digit EPS/FCF compounding, and that feels rich when recent quarterly profitability has already shown slippage.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: McKesson has earned a premium because it keeps proving the skeptics wrong. Annual revenue growth from $308.95B to $403.43B in just two years is exceptional for a “mature” company, and operating income rose from $3.91B to $6.21B over that span, far faster than sales. Free cash flow of $5.72B against a $101B market cap is not optically cheap, but for a defensive healthcare infrastructure asset with limited capex needs and strong buyback capacity, it is not unreasonable either. If the March 2026 earnings power is more representative than the June quarter, then normalized net income may be running comfortably above the $4.76B annual base, making the P/E less demanding than it appears. A smart bull would also say negative equity is cosmetic here, not fundamental, and that the market is paying for oligopoly position, specialty mix improvement, and exceptional capital returns rather than for accounting book value.
What would change my mind is evidence that the June-quarter margin dip was noise rather than signal. If the next two quarters sustain revenue above $105B while restoring net margin to at least 1.1%-1.3%, that would imply annualized earnings power well above $5B and make the current valuation more defensible, even attractive. Conversely, if revenue keeps growing near 10% but net income stalls around $0.6B-$1.1B per quarter outside seasonal spikes, then the stock is too expensive for a low-margin distributor. I would also want to see free cash flow remain above $5.5B and no deterioration in working-capital discipline; with a current ratio under 1, this model works beautifully until it doesn’t.
Grok Reading
McKesson’s numbers describe a distribution oligopoly that has quietly become a compounding machine on volume and mix rather than price. Revenue climbed from $264B in fiscal 2022 to $403B in fiscal 2026, a 14.3% CAGR, while net income more than quadrupled from $1.11B to $4.76B and free cash flow reached $5.72B on only $436M of capex. Operating income expanded from $2.04B to $6.21B over the same span, lifting operating margin from roughly 0.8% to 1.54%—evidence that specialty pharma, oncology, and technology attachments are doing real work inside a 3.6% gross-margin business. At $869 and a $101B enterprise, the stock trades at 22.8x trailing earnings and a 5.6% FCF yield; those are not distressed multiples, but they are supported by mid-20s earnings and FCF CAGRs and by a balance sheet that, despite negative book equity of $1.78B, carries only $6.5B of debt against nearly $4B of cash and generates more than enough cash to fund buybacks and a token 0.4% dividend.
What stands out against the clean multi-year trajectory is the most recent quarter and the structural balance-sheet optics. June 2026 delivered $105.4B of revenue but only $614M of net income—a 0.6% margin that is less than half the prior quarter’s 1.7% and well below the trailing annual 1.2%. That volatility, combined with a current ratio of 0.85 and negative equity (the residue of aggressive repurchases plus opioid-related charges), is the quantitative counterweight to the “steady compounder” label. Insider activity over the last several months has been almost entirely sales, and the secondary signals flag decelerating quarterly revenue and macro headwinds. The valuation engine’s $939–$1,108 fair-value band therefore embeds an assumption that margin expansion and mid-teens growth persist; the raw quarterly print and the sub-1.0 current ratio say that assumption is not yet risk-free.
I place more weight on the cash-conversion engine and the oligopoly volume franchise than on the historical 10–18x wholesaler P/E band cited in the pre-flight note. A business that turns $400B of revenue into $5.7B of unlevered free cash with negligible reinvestment deserves a premium to pure commodity distribution, and the 26% earnings CAGR is not an accounting artifact. Still, at 23x and 17x EV/EBITDA the market has already paid for a large fraction of the specialty-mix and GLP-1 volume story. The 27% upside in the signal-adjusted composite looks optimistic once the latest quarter’s margin compression and the litigation tail are treated as recurring rather than one-off noise.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward: earnings power is still rising, FCF quality is graded strong, and a 5.6% free-cash-flow yield with double-digit growth is cheap relative to the broader healthcare complex if operating margins can stabilize near 1.5–1.8%. A bull would also note that negative equity is largely cosmetic—an artifact of buybacks in a low-tangible-asset model—and that the opioid overhang is increasingly quantifiable. I discount that optimism because the June quarter already showed how quickly a 1.7% margin can halve, revenue growth is flagged as decelerating, and 23x leaves little room for multiple compression if GLP-1 volumes or specialty attach rates disappoint.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance if the next two quarters restore net margins above 1.2% on continued double-digit revenue growth and if fiscal 2027 guidance implies FCF above $6.5B; I would flip decisively overvalued if margins stay sub-1% or if another material opioid or channel charge appears that impairs the buyback capacity that has underpinned the equity story.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that should make any analyst pause is the June 2026 quarter: revenue of $105.38B, up 7.7% from $97.83B a year earlier, yet net income of $614M, down 22% from $784M. That is a 0.6% net margin, the lowest in the eight-quarter series, and it directly contradicts the "earnings CAGR of 26%" headline that the momentum module is touting. That CAGR is a base-effect artifact — FY2022 net income was $1.11B, almost certainly depressed by opioid settlement charges or one-time items, and the "growth" from that trough to $4.76B in FY2026 is a recovery, not a compounding trajectory. Strip out the FY2022 anomaly and the real earnings CAGR from FY2023 ($3.56B) to FY2026 ($4.76B) is roughly 10%, and the most recent quarter shows that even that modest growth has stalled. The valuation synthesis calling McKesson "undervalued" at a composite of $938.92 is, in my view, too generous. At $869, the stock trades at 22.76x trailing earnings on a business whose net margin is 1.18% and whose most recent quarter printed 0.6%. For a pharmaceutical distributor — a business whose entire value proposition is moving molecules from manufacturer to pharmacy for a thin spread — that multiple is at the very top of the historical 10-18x range the pre-flight module itself cites. The P/S of 0.27x looks deceptively cheap until you remember that 98.8% of every revenue dollar is cost of goods sold.
What I find genuinely impressive, and what keeps this from being a straightforward value-trap call, is the cash flow architecture. Operating cash flow of $6.16B against capex of just $436M — a 0.1% capex-to-revenue ratio — produces $5.72B in free cash flow, which exceeds net income by roughly 20%. That is the signature of a business with enormous working-capital leverage and almost no capital intensity. The oligopoly structure of the top-three pharma distributors (McKesson, Cardinal, AmerisourceBergen) means this is not a business where a new entrant can easily replicate the logistics network. The GLP-1 and specialty oncology mix shift is a real structural tailwind that should, over time, lift the blended margin above the 1.2% commodity-distribution baseline. The FCF yield at $101B market cap is 5.7%, which is respectable for a mature infrastructure play. I am not dismissing the business model.
What I cannot ignore is the balance sheet. Total equity is negative $1.78B. That is not a rounding error or a one-time write-down; it is the arithmetic consequence of years of aggressive buybacks against a 1% margin business. Combined with $6.53B in total debt against $3.98B in cash, the net debt position of roughly $2.55B sits on top of a capital structure with zero equity cushion. The current ratio of 0.85 confirms that short-term obligations exceed short-term assets. In a stress scenario — a payer consolidation event, an Amazon entry into specialty distribution, or an opioid litigation judgment that exceeds reserves — there is no equity buffer to absorb the shock. The "mature_earner" archetype at 0.75 confidence undersells the fragility here. This is a levered, low-margin middleman with negative book equity, not a utility-like compounder. The insider transaction log, while small in absolute share counts (301 to 8,463 shares), is uniformly sales with zero purchases over the past three months, which is a mild but consistent signal that those closest to the P&L are not adding at $869.
The strongest case against my skepticism is the cash flow quality and the structural position. A smart bull would point out that the 0.6% margin in June 2026 is a single quarter, possibly distorted by a one-time charge or seasonal timing, and that the trailing four-quarter margin of 1.18% is actually an improvement from 0.92% in FY2025. They would note that the $5.72B FCF is growing at a 21.4% CAGR, that the technology and specialty segments are growing faster than the commodity distribution base, and that the negative equity is a *feature* of a buyback program that is shrinking the share count and boosting EPS mechanically. They would argue that 22.76x P/E on a business with 5.7% FCF yield, 14.3% revenue CAGR, and a duopoly/oligopoly moat is not expensive in absolute terms, especially if the opioid overhang is resolved. I weigh this differently because the margin compression in the latest quarter is not a one-off — it is the second consecutive quarter where the margin has been at or below 0.8% (June 2025 was 0.8%, June 2026 is 0.6%), and the revenue growth rate has decelerated from 11.4% (Dec 2025 vs Dec 2024) to 7.7% (June 2026 vs June 2025). The "decelerating" revenue confidence flag in the secondary signals is the correct read, and the 26% earnings CAGR is doing a lot of narrative lifting that the raw quarterly data does not support.
What would change my mind in either direction. On the bull side: if the next two quarters (September and December 2026) show net margins back above 1.0% with revenue growth re-accelerating above 10%, that would confirm the specialty/GLP-1 mix shift is real and the June dip was noise. A definitive opioid litigation resolution — either a favorable ruling or a capped settlement that is fully reserved — would remove the single largest overhang and could justify the 22x multiple. On the bear side: if margins slip below 0.5% in the next quarter, or if the negative equity position worsens further (another $1B+ in buybacks against a 1% margin), I would downgrade to overvalued. A 10% revenue decline from payer consolidation or Amazon entry would be existential at this margin profile, and the negative equity means there is no cushion. I am watching the September 2026 print more closely than any other single data point.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
McKesson is a mature earner operating in a structurally thin-margin industry (gross margin 3.6-5%, operating margin 0.8-1.6%), yet the trajectory is genuinely constructive: revenue has compounded from $264B in 2022 to $403B in 2026 (about 11% CAGR), net income has more than quadrupled from $1.11B to $4.76B, and FCF has grown from $4.05B to $5.72B. Operating margin recovered to 1.5% in 2026 after a 2024 dip, showing operating leverage is real, not just a mix artifact. Earnings quality checks are clean: OCF/NI at 2x, accruals -3% of assets, Beneish M at -2.36, and Altman Z of 6.11 all point to reported numbers being backed by cash.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer concentration disclosure — top pharma customers (CVS, Walmart, etc.) as percent of revenue
- Remaining opioid litigation liabilities and settlement cash flow schedule
- Composition of gross-margin decline — mix shift vs pricing pressure
- Buyback authorization remaining and pace assumptions
- Segment-level performance (US Pharma vs Prescription Technology Solutions vs International)
- Working capital dynamics given the massive revenue scale and thin margins
The e2e composite pins fair value at $938.92 (signal-adjusted $1,107.98) against a $875.51 price - a ~7% gap on the composite, ~27% on the signal-adjusted number. The methods disagree loudly: DCF at $981.94 is credible for a mid-single-digit grower with heavy buybacks; the anchored P/E at $1,358.47 looks like a runaway multiple on a 1.5%-margin distributor and should be discounted heavily; the EPV floor at $433 reminds us that without growth this is a much cheaper business. Splitting the difference around the DCF/composite ($940-$980) feels like honest deserved value. Earnings quality is high (score 3, no haircut needed) and the buyback is genuinely shrinking the float, both of which support - not inflate - the deserved number. What's priced in: continued low-single-digit distribution growth, steady specialty/oncology mix-shift, and disciplined capital return. What's NOT fully priced: a re-rating on software/services, or a tail hit from opioid liabilities or Amazon-style disintermediation. Net: a modest discount to a defensible fair value, not a screaming bargain. Margin of safety exists but is thin - call it 7-10%, not 25%.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Specialty and oncology segment growth rates and margin contribution in latest 10-Q
- Remaining opioid settlement cash outflows and any new claims
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization
- Prescription Technology Solutions (software) revenue growth and margin trajectory
- Any guidance revisions to operating margin - the whole thesis rides on holding 1.5%+
MCK sits in the quiet lane of the market. With a beta of 0.31, the mildly risk-on regime (score +52, VIX 14.3) delivers almost no lift here - high-beta story stocks are catching the bid, not healthcare distributors. The macro headwind from 4.63% 10y and a 26.2 market PE is similarly muted for a low-multiple, cash-generative name whose earnings stream is largely rate-insensitive. Net tape pressure on THIS ticker is close to zero.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any fresh opioid settlement or state-AG headline that reignites the litigation overhang
- Specialty/oncology mix commentary on next print - the pillar holding the compounder narrative
- Sell-side target revisions or a sector rotation out of defensive healthcare into higher-beta names
- Amazon Pharmacy or vertical-integrator news that could sharpen the disruption bear case
The world is pushing more drug value through fewer, larger pipes: biologics and specialty launches, GLP-1 mass adoption, aging demographics, and care migrating from hospital to community and home. Each of those adds units and complexity, and complexity is what a distributor is paid for. The offsetting force — payers, retailers and manufacturers trying to shorten the chain — is real but slow, and the capital intensity plus cold-chain/compliance scale of national distribution has repelled every entrant so far. Macro backdrop (4.63% 10y, headwind label) matters little: healthcare volume is non-discretionary and MCK's model is fee-based rather than price-levered, though higher rates do raise the bar on debt-funded roll-up M&A. Net: the environment supports steady volume growth with margin coming from services and specialty, not from distribution spread.
When we made this prediction on Aug 18, 2026, MCK was $859.92. We expect it to be $955.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $820.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%