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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Willis Lease Finance Corporation (WLFC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-31): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -24 · Value -16 · Sentiment -13 (timing only, not weighted)
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Willis Lease Finance Corporation
WLFC NASDAQWillis Lease Finance Corporation is a leading provider of aircraft engine leasing and aviation services, primarily serving commercial airlines, aircraft engine manufacturers, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations across more than 120 countries. The company specializes in leasing both large and regional spare commercial aircraft engines, auxiliary power units, and related aircraft equipment. Its business model integrates engine and aircraft trading, engine lease pools, and asset management services, supported by subsidiaries focused on maintenance, repair, parts management, and end-of-life solutions for aviation materials. Willis Lease Finance Corporation operates a substantial and diverse portfolio, with over $2.8 billion in book value, predominantly focused on modern narrowbody jet engines. This portfolio is complemented by vertically integrated services including engine maintenance, aircraft disassembly, aftermarket parts sales, and consulting, enabling clients to minimize downtime and optimize fleet operations. The firm's comprehensive service offerings, industry expertise, and global reach have established it as an independent pioneer in aircraft engine leasing, contributing to enhanced liquidity and flexibility in the aviation finance sector. Its consistent profitability and leadership in innovative leasing strategies make it a significant player in the business services and industrials segment, impacting airline fleet efficiency and maintenance economics worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.40
Total Equity: $725.54M
Shares: 21,060,000
Total Debt: $2.70B
Cash: $16.44M
EBITDA: $215.85M
Total Debt: $2.70B
Cash: $16.44M
Revenue: $730.24M
Revenue: $730.24M
Revenue: $730.24M
Total Equity: $725.54M
Tax Rate: 29.2%
Equity: $725.54M
Total Debt: $2.70B
Cash: $16.44M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $2.70B
Total Debt: $2.70B
Total Equity: $725.54M
Shares: 21,060,000
Shares: 21,060,000
CapEx: -$31.08M
Shares: 21,060,000
Stock Price: $56.93
Net Income: $113.76M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 2:39pm (15d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $274.2M | $311.9M | $418.6M | $569.2M | $730.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $8.3M | $9.9M | $64.2M | $144.4M | $104.3M |
| Net Income | $3.4M | $5.4M | $43.8M | $108.6M | $113.8M |
| EBITDA | $98.8M | $98.1M | $155.1M | $236.9M | $215.8M |
| EPS | $0.18 | $0.30 | $2.31 | $5.54 | $5.61 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.18 | $0.29 | $2.25 | $5.32 | $5.40 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:51am (15d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $14.3M | $12.1M | $7.1M | $9.1M | $16.4M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $3.9B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.7B | $3.2B |
| Total Equity | $425.7M | $454.6M | $488.9M | $612.5M | $725.5M |
| Retained Earnings | $355.4M | $357.5M | $397.8M | $491.4M | $590.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 2:39pm (15d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $90.7M | $144.4M | $229.7M | $284.4M | $283.2M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.2M | -$6.6M | -$5.1M | -$15.6M | -$31.1M |
| Free Cash Flow | $88.5M | $137.8M | $224.6M | $268.8M | $252.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $96.7M | $55.2M | -$39.8M | $465.7M | $439.4M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | $0 | -$10.7M | -$8.7M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$10.1M | -$5.2M | $0 | -$11.6M | -$3.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | $16.7M | -$6.6M | $79.0M | -$35.5M | $414.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 2:39pm (15d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.8% | +34.2% | +36.0% | +28.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.2% | +551.7% | +124.8% | -27.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +62.3% | +704.9% | +148.1% | +4.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -0.7% | +58.1% | +52.7% | -8.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:51am (15d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-11 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-11 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-30 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:33The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a specific story: WLFC is riding a massive engine-leasing supercycle driven by the GTF/CFM shop-visit crunch that has grounded a chunk of the narrowbody fleet and forced airlines to lease spare engines at premium rates. Revenue went from $274M in 2021 to $730M TTM — a 2.7x in four years — with quarterly revenue now steady at ~$194M for three straight quarters. That plateau is the tell: sequential growth has stopped. The 2025 net income trajectory is also lumpy ($60.4M in Q2'25 driven by gain-on-sale, then $12.2M in Q4'25) — this is not clean operating earnings, it's a book of leases plus opportunistic asset sales in a hot market. FCF of $252M on $283M OCF looks great until you note capex of only $31M against a $2.7B debt-funded engine book depreciating fast; maintenance capex on aircraft engines is not $31M/yr, so reported FCF overstates distributable cash by a wide margin.
The balance sheet is the real story and the synthesis model's $198 fair value is where I get off the bus. $2.70B debt against $725M equity and $16M cash is 3.7x D/E in a rising-rate regime where the leasing spread is everything. ROIC of 2.2% versus a debt cost that's almost certainly 6%+ means the incremental invested dollar is destroying value — the ROE of 15.7% is pure financial leverage on a thin operating spread. EV/EBITDA of 14.2x is not cheap for a leveraged lessor; the "P/E of 3.7" is a mirage because it capitalizes peak-cycle earnings including gains. A DCF that spits out $198 is almost certainly extrapolating 2025-26 lease economics into perpetuity — exactly the "melting ice cube" risk the pre-flight thesis flagged. When Pratt gets the GTF fleet back through the shops in 2026-27, spare engine demand normalizes and lease rates compress; that's the base case, not the tail.
I largely agree with Market Forces' skeptical read and disagree with the synthesis composite. The narrative model's "fundamentals dominate, story is thin" framing is correct — this isn't a cult stock, it's a cyclical where the market is pricing cycle-peak earnings correctly at ~4x. The insider activity reinforces this: seven separate sales on July 1, 2026, right after Q2 print, with only routine equity awards as offset — that's not a bullish signal from people who know the lease book. Where I'd push back on the bears: WLFC does have real embedded value in its engine portfolio, the aviation aftermarket is structurally tight through at least mid-2027, and the dividend (2.3% yield, 7.7% payout) is trivially covered. This is not a solvency crisis at current utilization; it's a valuation question about what happens after 2027.
Contrarian steelman: if GTF issues persist longer than consensus (Pratt has repeatedly guided worse), lease rates stay elevated through 2028, and WLFC uses this window to term out debt at fixed rates, then earnings power of ~$110M/yr is durable and $56 is genuinely cheap — you'd get to maybe $80-90 on a 7-8x multiple. But that requires believing (a) the crisis extends 2+ years beyond consensus, (b) management doesn't overpay for engines at cycle peak (they're actively buying), and (c) refinancing goes smoothly. Three conditional bets stacked. The synthesis's $198 requires all three plus multiple expansion to a growth-company multiple that a levered lessor will never get. I read fair value at $60-70 — essentially where it trades — with asymmetric downside if 2027 lease rates soften. Not a short (cycle could extend), not a buy (no margin of safety on peak earnings), and the insider tape says wait.
GPT Reading
WLFC screens optically absurdly cheap, but the cheapness is not a mirage in the usual sense; it is the market putting a very hard discount on leverage, cyclicality, and the possibility that 2025 was a peak earnings year helped by unusually favorable engine market conditions. Even after granting that, I think the stock is too low. Revenue has expanded from $274.2M in 2021 to $730.2M in 2025, and the quarterly run-rate has held near $194M for the last three quarters, which matters more than the annual CAGR headline because it shows the business did not immediately fall apart after the step-up. Net income similarly moved from $3.4M in 2021 to $113.8M in 2025, and the last four quarters sum to about $91.8M despite the obvious normalization from the exceptional $60.4M quarter in 2Q25. At a $1.20B market cap and $56.93 share price, you are paying roughly 13x trailing four-quarter earnings on that more conservative quarterly view, but only 3.7x on reported 2025 earnings. That gap is actually the story: the market is saying reported annual earnings overstate steady-state power. I agree they overstate it, but not by enough to justify 0.55x book and 0.55x sales.
The balance sheet is where the market’s fear lives, and it is not irrational. $2.70B of debt against just $16.4M of cash is extremely tight in absolute liquidity terms, and debt/equity of 3.72x leaves little room for an aviation shock or refinancing misstep. But this is also a leasing business where book capital is the raw material of earnings, so the right question is whether cash generation covers the burden. On the 2025 figures, operating cash flow of $283.2M and free cash flow of $252.2M are very strong relative to the equity value; that is a FCF yield above 20% on market cap. Even if that free cash flow is flattered by leasing economics and timing, there is still a large cushion between current valuation and a plausible mid-cycle cash yield. The contradiction in the model outputs is that EV-based multiples look much less cheap than equity multiples: EV/revenue at 4.2x and EV/EBITDA at 14.2x say creditors own most of the enterprise. That is true, but for equity holders the relevant question is whether the asset base and cash flows can delever over time. At 15.7% ROE and only 2.2% ROIC, this is clearly a levered spread business rather than a high-quality compounder; still, spread businesses do not need glamorous ROIC to work if asset values are sound and utilization stays high.
What stands out in the raw earnings is that profitability is lumpy but not collapsing. Quarterly net margins moved from 16.5% in 3Q24 to 13.8%, 10.7%, then a spike to 30.9%, then settled into 13.3%, 6.3%, 12.9%, and 15.5%. That pattern looks less like deterioration and more like a business with asset sale gains, lease-rate swings, and financing noise. The annual oddity is more telling: 2025 revenue rose 28% over 2024, yet operating income fell from $144.4M to $104.3M while net income still increased to $113.8M from $108.6M. That implies below-the-line benefits or one-offs helped reported earnings, so I would not capitalize the 2025 EPS blindly. But even if normalized earnings are only $70M-$80M, the stock is still trading around 15x or below for a niche aviation lessor that has materially improved from the 2021-2022 trough. For a company with book equity of $725.5M, the market is effectively saying either the assets are overstated, the cash flows are transient, or equity will remain structurally hostage to lenders. Some discount is deserved; a 45% discount to book is too punitive unless the cycle is about to turn sharply down.
The best bear case is stronger than the valuation bulls admit. First, this may be close to peak conditions in the engine leasing market, and if current shortages ease, lease rates and utilization could compress while interest expense remains stubborn. Second, the tiny cash balance means WLFC has almost no conventional margin for error despite the headline free cash flow. Third, the low 2.9% ROA and 2.2% ROIC are a warning that without leverage the economics are mediocre; equity holders only win if leverage behaves. Fourth, insider activity is not encouraging: seven sales on 2026-07-01, even if small in share count, are not what you want to see in a deeply discounted name supposedly misunderstood by the market. Finally, the quarterly earnings already show normalization: net income in the last three quarters was $12.2M, $25.1M, and $30.2M versus the blowout $60.4M quarter a year ago, and recent earnings growth of just 4.7% YoY despite 28.3% revenue growth suggests margin pressure is real. If the market is valuing the company on normalized earnings power closer to $60M and a perpetual refinancing overhang, then the low P/B is less a bargain than a control premium lenders are extracting from common shareholders.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters show revenue slipping below roughly $180M with net margins back to mid-single digits, I would conclude 2025-2026 was a temporary windfall and that book deserves a heavy haircut. Likewise, any sign of stressed refinancing, materially higher funding costs, or a jump in debt without corresponding cash generation would invalidate the equity case quickly. On the other hand, if WLFC can sustain quarterly net income in the $25M-$30M range, keep annual operating cash flow above $250M, and start showing debt reduction or improved liquidity from that $16.4M cash base, the stock should not remain at 0.55x book. In that scenario, a move into the low-to-mid $70s would still leave it inexpensive.
Grok Reading
The numbers paint a capital-intensive lessor that has scaled aggressively and is now throwing off real cash while the equity market prices it like a distressed credit. Revenue compounded from $274M in 2021 to $730M in 2025; net income went from $3.4M to $113.8M. Trailing quarters have stabilized near $194M of revenue with net margins oscillating between 6% and 16% (the 30.9% print in mid-2025 looks like a one-time residual or gain). Free cash flow of $252M against only $31M of capex and a $1.2B market cap is the standout: the firm is converting earnings into cash at a rate the P/E of 3.7 and P/B of 0.55 simply refuse to acknowledge. Book equity sits at $726M, so the stock trades at roughly 55 cents on the dollar of reported equity while carrying a 15.7% ROE. That combination—rapid top-line expansion, positive and growing FCF, sub-1x book—usually only appears when the market has decided the assets or the earnings power are fictitious.
The balance-sheet arithmetic is what keeps the multiple compressed. $2.70B of debt against $16M of cash and a debt-to-equity ratio of 3.72 means every residual-value or utilization miss hits equity hard. ROIC of 2.2% and ROA of 2.9% confirm that the attractive ROE is almost entirely a leverage artifact; the unlevered economics of the engine portfolio are mediocre. EV/EBITDA of 14.2 is far less “cheap” than the equity multiples once the debt load is grossed up, and the recent string of insider sales (multiple small disposals on the same July date) does nothing to reassure. Revenue growth is also decelerating: the last four quarters are essentially flat at ~$194M after the earlier ramp, consistent with the secondary signal that the GTF-driven spare-engine boom is maturing.
The strongest counter-argument is that the market is correctly discounting an earnings cliff once the temporary engine-shop and spare-engine shortage normalizes, leaving WLFC with an over-levered balance sheet, thin cash, and assets whose book values will be written down in the next downturn. A smart skeptic points to the drop in operating income from $144M in 2024 to $104M in 2025 even as revenue rose 28%, the fragile 2% ROIC, the refinancing wall implied by $2.7B of debt, and the fact that composite models flashing ~$198 fair value still carry an explicit “high debt risk / interest coverage” flag. Those points have merit; I simply weigh the $252M of unlevered free-cash-flow generation and the still-elevated utilization environment more heavily than the narrative of imminent impairment. The cash is real today; the impairment is a scenario, not yet a run-rate.
What flips the view is straightforward: two consecutive quarters of revenue below $170M or net margins compressing sustainably under 8%, any material increase in non-performing leases or residual-value write-downs, or a refinancing that forces equity issuance or a sharp rise in cash interest. Conversely, a clean extension of the debt stack at manageable spreads plus another $200M-plus FCF year would force a re-rating toward book value and collapse the discount.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Willis Lease has executed a striking operational ramp: revenue grew from $274M (2021) to $730M (2025), a 2.7x expansion, with operating margin swinging from 3% to a 25.4% peak in 2024 before compressing back to 14.3% in 2025. Net income scaled from $3.4M to $113.8M, and FCF has been consistently strong ($88M to $252M), well in excess of net income (OCF/NI 12.8x reflects the depreciation-heavy leasing model). This is a genuinely improved earner riding the post-COVID aircraft engine leasing cycle. However, the business model is structurally capital-intensive and debt-funded: net debt of roughly $2.68B against only $16.4M liquid cash and a $1.2B market cap means the balance sheet IS the business. Altman Z of 0.71 flags distress on the model, though the model penalizes leasing firms unfairly. Dilution is a real drag: shares grew from 19.0M to 21.1M (2.6% CAGR), SBC runs 6.1% of revenue, and buybacks recover only 26% of it. Insider activity is one-sided selling by Austin Chandler Willis with zero open-market buys, which deserves attention even if small in dollar terms. Earnings quality looks clean (accruals -5.1% of assets, FCF > NI), and the 2025 op margin drop from 25.4% to 14.3% while revenue still grew 28% suggests either mix shift, gain-on-sale normalization, or rising financing/depreciation costs - worth verifying. Overall a cyclically strong operator in a good part of its cycle, but leverage and dilution keep this from being a quality fortress.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Cause of 2025 operating margin drop from 25.4% to 14.3% - gain-on-sale normalization, mix shift, or interest/depreciation step-up
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted interest rate on the $2.68B net debt
- Customer/lessee concentration in the engine leasing portfolio
- Whether the FCF figure includes proceeds from asset sales vs pure operating cash
- Terms and dilution schedule of any convertibles or preferred within the debt stack
- Whether Austin Chandler Willis sales are 10b5-1 plan-driven or discretionary
The e2e composite FV of $198.56 is not credible for this business - it is dominated by a $322 DCF that extrapolates a peak-cycle FCF surge in a capital-intensive lessor, and an anchored PE of $107 that assumes multiple expansion on cyclical earnings. The EPV floor of $41.93 is the more honest anchor: it says on steady-state earnings power, the equity is worth roughly 26% less than today's $56.93 price. Blending a skeptical view - EPV floor near $42, a mid-cycle earnings-power number closer to $70-90 on normalized ROE against $2.8B book (the tangible book anchor the bulls lean on) - suggests deserved value modestly above the current price, not multiples of it. Quality is Mixed: $2.7B net debt, 2.6% annual dilution, and a 2025 margin reversal all argue against paying a premium multiple. Earnings quality is clean, so no additional haircut, but the leverage and cyclicality mean the market's discount to DCF is rational, not a mistake. Net: mildly cheap on asset value and current earnings run-rate, but the enormous headline upside is a valuation-method artifact.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2025 gross/operating margin trajectory - is the reversal a blip or peak signal
- lease rate and utilization trends in the next two quarters
- debt maturity schedule and refi rates given the $2.7B net debt stack
- share issuance pace - does dilution continue at 2.6% annually
- segment mix between core leasing and lower-quality service revenue
The macro backdrop is modestly supportive: a risk-on tape with VIX at 14.3 and the S&P near highs is a light tailwind for cyclicals tied to aviation recovery. But WLFC has a beta of 0.75 and effectively no active narrative to ride the tape - the fallen-angel archetype is running at minimal intensity with fragile durability and low cult coefficient, so risk-on flows are not seeking this name out. Higher rates (10y 4.63%) are a genuine headwind for a capital-intensive leasing balance sheet, and that pressure is stock-specific here in a way it is not for asset-light peers. Analyst tone and news flow are quiet, which for a small-cap aviation lessor means the tape essentially ignores it rather than pushes it. The story-vs-fundamentals gap (deep discount to DCF) is a sentiment signal in itself: the market is skeptical the recovery assumptions hold, and there is no catalyst or narrative arc currently forcing a re-rate. Net: no dominant force in either direction - a mild macro lift roughly offset by rate pressure and narrative apathy.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any sell-side initiation or upgrade that could revive a story arc
- Signs of a rate-cut path that would relieve pressure on lessor funding costs
- Aviation lease-rate data or engine utilization prints that could re-ignite the recovery narrative
- Whether the fallen-angel archetype hardens into distressed if credit spreads widen
The world is short usable engine thrust, not short aircraft. OEM ramp problems on new-generation engines plus elongated MRO turnaround times force airlines to keep prior-generation narrowbodies airborne and to rent spare engines rather than own them — exactly Willis's inventory. Against that, the money cost of owning engines has risen (10y 4.63%, flat-ish curve, macro headwinds) and the broader leasing category is stagnant with compressing margins, so the tailwind is asset-specific rather than sectoral. Net: a genuine idiosyncratic scarcity trade inside an unexciting category, with the financing side of the ledger tightening.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for WLFC — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.