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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ubiquiti Inc. (UI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-28): Designation Low · Gem Score -32 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value -87 · Sentiment 39 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $354.70 vs $556.52 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Ubiquiti Inc.
UI NYSEUbiquiti Inc. is a technology company that designs and sells networking and communication equipment along with integrated software platforms. Headquartered in New York City and founded in 2003, the company focuses on high-performance wireless and wired networking solutions used by enterprises, internet service providers, and consumers. Ubiquiti’s product portfolio spans enterprise Wi-Fi access points, switches, routers, security gateways, and point-to-point wireless links, often managed through its centralized UniFi software interface for network configuration, monitoring, and control. The company also serves the residential and small business markets with user-friendly hardware and cloud-enabled management tools. Ubiquiti distributes its products primarily through web stores, distributors, value-added resellers, and a large online user community of IT professionals and service providers, which supports adoption and deployment of its platforms worldwide. Its role in the market centers on providing scalable, professional-grade networking technologies that bridge enterprise capabilities with relatively accessible deployment for a broad range of customers.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.76
Total Equity: $668.26M
Shares: 60,534,000
Total Debt: $249.56M
Cash: $149.73M
EBITDA: $858.18M
Total Debt: $249.56M
Cash: $149.73M
Revenue: $2.57B
Revenue: $2.57B
Revenue: $2.57B
Total Equity: $668.26M
Tax Rate: 11.6%
Equity: $668.26M
Total Debt: $249.56M
Cash: $149.73M
Current Liabilities: $710.86M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $249.56M
Total Equity: $668.26M
Shares: 60,534,000
Shares: 60,534,000
CapEx: -$12.59M
Shares: 60,534,000
Stock Price: $556.52
Net Income: $711.92M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:40pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $985.8M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B |
| Gross Profit | $912.3M | $669.8M | $760.7M | $739.8M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $169.7M | $207.5M | $216.2M | $240.8M | $281.2M |
| Operating Income | $742.6M | $462.3M | $544.6M | $499.0M | $836.3M |
| Net Income | $616.6M | $378.7M | $407.6M | $350.0M | $711.9M |
| EBITDA | $754.7M | $476.0M | $560.9M | $518.2M | $858.2M |
| EPS | $9.79 | $6.14 | $6.75 | $5.79 | $11.77 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $9.78 | $6.13 | $6.74 | $5.79 | $11.76 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:20pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $249.4M | $136.2M | $114.8M | $126.3M | $149.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $694.2M | $621.6M | $1.2B | $916.0M | $1.2B |
| Total Assets | $891.0M | $844.7M | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $276.4M | $311.0M | $351.8M | $284.8M | $710.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $467.0M | $762.6M | $1.0B | $669.9M | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $888.3M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $798.2M |
| Total Equity | $2.7M | -$382.9M | -$115.7M | $95.1M | $668.3M |
| Retained Earnings | $2.6M | -$383.1M | -$120.5M | $84.4M | $651.1M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:40pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $612.0M | $370.3M | -$145.4M | $541.5M | $640.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$18.3M | -$13.5M | -$20.9M | -$12.0M | -$12.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $593.7M | $356.8M | -$166.4M | $529.5M | $627.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$100.8M | -$148.1M | -$145.0M | -$145.1M | -$145.2M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$219.8M | -$618.1M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $106.8M | -$113.2M | -$21.4M | $11.5M | $23.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:40pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -10.9% | +14.7% | -0.6% | +33.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -26.6% | +13.6% | -2.8% | +51.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -37.7% | +17.8% | -8.4% | +67.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -38.6% | +7.7% | -14.1% | +103.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -36.9% | +17.8% | -7.6% | +65.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:21pm (25d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-18 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-17 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-19 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-18 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-18 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-17 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-16 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-01 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-12 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-02 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-11 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-12 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-03 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: revenue has ripped from $507M (Jun-24) to $788M (Mar-26) — that's 55% growth over seven quarters, with net margin expanding from 20.5% to ~29%. TTM revenue is roughly $3.1B versus the FY25 print of $2.57B, so annualized growth is closer to 20%+ and trailing net income is running near $940M. That reprices the P/E from the stated 47x on FY25 numbers to roughly 36x on TTM and ~30x forward if the current run-rate holds. That's still premium, but it's not the cartoon multiple the synthesis is anchored on. FCF conversion at $627M on $712M net income is fine (~88%), and capex of $12.6M on $2.57B revenue is genuinely asset-light — the "poor cash flow quality" flag looks stale or mechanical, not substantive.
The synthesis verdict of $233 fair value versus $557 implies a 58% haircut, and I think that's built on FY25 or trailing figures that materially understate the current earnings power. If I run a simple check — $940M TTM NI, apply a defensible 25x for a founder-led, debt-light, 30%+ margin hardware franchise growing 30%+ YoY — I get ~$23.5B market cap, or ~$388/share. At 30x (cult premium warranted for durability), it's $470. At 35x, $550 — roughly where it trades. So the market is pricing sustainability of the current acceleration, not fantasy TAM. The narrative model's $323 "pure narrative premium" evaporates significantly once you use current-quarter run-rate rather than trailing annual. The synthesis and narrative layers are both anchored to a growth rate (15% CAGR) that the last four quarters have obliterated (33.5% YoY).
That said, the contrarian case is real and specific. The Jun-25 quarter's 35.1% net margin is an outlier — the surrounding quarters run 27-29%, suggesting one-time tax or inventory benefits. The revenue surge coincides with the enterprise WiFi/UniFi cycle and likely channel restocking post-2023 inventory glut; hardware companies famously mistake restock cycles for structural demand (see Arista in 2023, Cisco repeatedly). Insider activity is thin but directionally negative — two sales versus one small award, and Pera himself is opaque. Book value at $668M on a $33.7B cap means any impairment or working-capital shock hits equity hard; debt/equity of 0.37 is fine but current ratio 1.65 with only $150M cash against $250M debt is tighter than you'd want for a company printing this much FCF (implying cash is going somewhere — buybacks or dividends, which the 20% payout hints at but doesn't fully explain). The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag is fair: Mar-26 rev of $788M is down from Dec-25's $815M, so sequential growth has stalled.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. $233 is wrong — that's a mature no-growth DCF applied to a business currently growing 30%+. But $557 requires the current trajectory to hold, and hardware cycles don't hold. My read: fair value in the $400-475 range assuming growth normalizes to 15% and margins settle at 27%, meaning the stock is 15-25% overvalued, not 60%. The cult premium is real but bounded — you're paying ~10x sales for a hardware business that has cycled between $1.7B and $2.6B annual revenue over five years (2022 to 2025), which is not the monotonic ascent the last four quarters suggest. The market-forces "neutral" call is closest to correct. I'd wait for the next print — if Jun-26 revenue holds above $780M and margins stay near 29%, the bull case firms up; if it prints sub-$720M with margin compression, the $400 anchor becomes the ceiling and the stock has 25%+ downside. Not a short (founder-led, cult, low float dynamics punish shorts), not a buy here, and the models are collectively too bearish on fair value while correctly bearish on risk/reward at $557.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the business has clearly re-accelerated, and not just optically. Revenue went from $1.93B in FY2024 to $2.57B in FY2025, up 33%, while net income more than doubled from $350.0M to $711.9M. The quarterly run-rate since then has stayed elevated: the last four quarters sum to about $3.10B of revenue and $922M of net income, implying a trailing net margin near 29.8%. That is exceptional for a hardware-oriented networking vendor. Gross margin also recovered sharply to 43.4% in FY2025 from 38.3% in FY2024, and operating margin reached 32.5%. This is not a low-quality rebound in the sense of “sales up, profits still missing”; profits are leading. The balance sheet is also not the problem some premium hardware stories usually have: only $249.6M of debt against $149.7M of cash, with a current ratio of 1.65 and capex of just $12.6M on $640.0M of operating cash flow. This is an asset-light machine.
The issue is not whether Ubiquiti is a good business. It plainly is. The issue is whether a good business deserves a valuation that already assumes the next leg of excellence. At $33.7B of market cap, the stock trades at 13.1x sales, 47.3x trailing earnings, and 39.4x EV/EBITDA. Even if I annualize the latest four quarters rather than rely on FY2025, you are still paying roughly 36x trailing net income and around 10.9x trailing sales. For a company whose annual revenue was basically flat to down from 2021 through 2024 before rebounding, that is too aggressive. The recent quarterly pattern is also not a straight acceleration story: revenue rose from $550.3M to $599.9M to $664.2M to $759.2M, but then moved $733.8M, $814.9M, and $788.2M. That is a high plateau, not a business obviously compounding at 25%-plus from here. Net margin has remained elite, but even there the 35.1% June 2025 quarter looks unusually strong versus the subsequent 28%-30% range. If normalized earnings power is closer to $900M-$1.0B than some much larger future number, today’s price already capitalizes that at a premium multiple usually reserved for software or much longer-duration growth.
The contradiction I would push back on is the idea that this is simply a low-quality, narrative-only valuation. The cash flow quality warning looks overstated given the actual cash generation: FY2025 free cash flow was $627.4M against $711.9M of net income, and the gap is not alarming for a company with working-capital swings and minimal capex. This is not a case where earnings are unsupported by cash. Likewise, ROE above 100% and P/B above 50x are mostly artifacts of a thin equity base, not proof of absurd economics or imminent collapse. Ubiquiti deserves a premium to legacy networking peers because 43% gross margins, 32.5% operating margins, and sub-$15M capex on multi-billion revenue are structurally superior economics. If the market were valuing it at, say, 25x earnings on a $900M earnings base, I would not fight that. My problem is that the current price demands either another sustained step-up in revenue to well above $3.5B, or evidence that nearly 30% net margins can hold through scale and competition for years.
The best case against my overvaluation call is straightforward: the company may be in the early innings of a genuine earnings regime change, and backward-looking annual multiples understate it. Using the last four quarters’ $922M of net income, the P/E is already materially lower than 47x, and if the next year lands at $1.0B-$1.1B of net income, the forward multiple compresses into the low 30s without any stock decline. For a business growing quarterly revenue 33.5% year over year and earnings 103.4% year over year, with a founder-led model, direct distribution advantages, and almost absurd capital efficiency, a low-30s forward P/E is not insane. The bull would also note that Ubiquiti has recovered from a weak FY2023-FY2024 period without levering up, diluting, or sacrificing margins, which argues the model is more durable than skeptics admit. I weigh that argument less heavily because the company is being judged after a rebound year, not before it. Paying peak-style multiples when the revenue base has only recently escaped a multi-year stall leaves little margin of safety if growth settles back to high-single digits.
What would change my mind is specific evidence that this is not just a rebound to a new plateau but the start of another durable growth curve. If quarterly revenue can break decisively above $850M and hold there for several quarters while net margin stays at or above 28%, I would be more willing to underwrite $3.4B-$3.6B revenue and $1.0B+ earnings power. I would also want to see FY2026 free cash flow keep pace with earnings—something like $850M+ of FCF would validate the profitability quality. On the other side, if revenue slips back toward the low-$700Ms or margins fade toward the low-20s, the stock should not be anywhere near 10x sales. My base case is simpler: this is an elite business priced like an even better one.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a genuinely excellent operating business that the market has priced as if it were already a software franchise. Ubiquiti just closed a fiscal year at $2.57B revenue and $712M net income, up from $1.93B and $350M the year prior, with free cash flow of $627M on only $13M of capex. Trailing quarterly run-rate sits near $3.1B annualized, net margins have climbed from the low-20s into the high-20s (latest quarter 29.7%), and ROIC prints at 96% because the balance sheet is almost pure working-capital light. That combination of mid-teens-plus growth, hardware-plus-software-like margins, and near-100% FCF conversion is rare in communication equipment and explains why the stock trades at 47× earnings and 13× sales. The story the data tell is not of a broken company; it is of a high-quality compounder that has already been awarded a software multiple for a still-cyclical, channel-disintermediated hardware model.
What stands out on closer inspection is the tension between the last four quarters of absolute strength and the valuation’s implicit permanence. Revenue YoY decelerated from roughly 50% in the June 2025 quarter to about 19% in the March 2026 quarter ($788M vs $664M). Sequential revenue has been choppy—$759M, $734M, $815M, $788M—rather than a clean upward slope. The valuation models’ ~$234 fair-value anchor is directionally correct once you refuse to capitalize the current 28–30% net margin and 30%+ earnings growth as a forever state; even granting a 25× multiple on next-twelve-months earnings power around $850–900M still leaves you well below $400. The 50× price-to-book and 39× EV/EBITDA are simply the arithmetic consequence of an asset-light equity base of $668M supporting a $34B enterprise—not a red flag by themselves, but confirmation that almost the entire market cap is terminal-growth and narrative premium.
The strongest counter-argument is that the quality of the earnings stream and the durability of the cost advantage are being systematically under-weighted by any DCF that assumes mean-reversion to peer hardware multiples. Gross margin has held above 43%, operating margin is 32.5%, and the company converts nearly every dollar of net income into free cash with trivial reinvestment needs. If the UniFi ecosystem continues to take share in the SMB and prosumer layers at 20% revenue growth while holding 28%+ net margins, a 35× earnings multiple is defensible and the stock is closer to fairly valued than 58% overvalued. Recent earnings CAGR of 32% and a 103% YoY earnings jump show operating leverage is still live; the cult-favorite community and founder-led distribution model have already delivered a decade of outperformance versus Cisco-like incumbents, so dismissing the premium as pure narrative ignores realized economic rents. That case is real—I simply weigh the deceleration in the latest quarter, the 0.66× accrual-quality flag, and the absence of any disclosure that would let an outsider underwrite multi-year 25% growth as more decisive than the historical margin miracle.
I would flip to neutral or better if the next two quarters re-accelerate revenue growth above 25% YoY while net margins stay north of 28%, or if management provides visibility into enterprise/TAM expansion that supports a credible path to $4B+ revenue inside three years without margin sacrifice. A sustained multiple compression toward 30× concurrent with continued double-digit growth would also close the gap from the price side. Until one of those arrives, the gap between $557 and fundamental cash-flow value remains too wide.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Ubiquiti runs a genuinely high-return hardware business: FY2025 revenue jumped to $2.57B (+33% YoY) with gross margin recovering to 43.4% and operating margin to 32.5%, driving $711.9M net income and $627.4M FCF. Altman Z of 29.96 and Beneish M of -1.79 signal no mechanical earnings-quality issues, accruals at 5.8% of assets are unremarkable, and OCF/NI at 0.81x is acceptable for a growth-inventory year. Capital discipline is a clear standout: diluted share count has actually shrunk (60.5M vs 63.1M in 2021), SBC is a trivial 0.3% of revenue, and buybacks run 33x SBC - management is concentrating per-share value, not diluting it. The blemishes are real but contained. Net debt of -$99.8M with only $149.7M liquid cash against $249.6M short-term debt means the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a fortress, unusual for a business throwing off $627M FCF (implying deliberate capital return over hoarding). The 2022-2024 stretch showed margin compression (GM from 48.1% to 38.4%, OpM from 39.1% to 25.9%) and a $-166.4M FCF year in 2023 - evidence the model is not immune to inventory/supply-chain shocks. FY2025 recovered emphatically, but the prior three years show the earnings power is not perfectly steady. Insider tape is small-fry (a director selling ~$542K over a year) and not directionally informative.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Reconcile e2e 'Poor Cash Flow Quality' tag against FY2025 $627M FCF - which years/line items drive it?
- Terms and maturity of the $249.6M short-term debt and any covenants
- Customer/channel concentration disclosed in the 10-K (Ubiquiti historically has distributor concentration)
- Inventory levels and days-on-hand given the 2023 FCF shock was inventory-driven
- Whether FY2025 margin recovery is mix-driven (enterprise vs service provider) or pricing, and its durability
- Founder/CEO Robert Pera ownership and any Rule 10b5-1 activity beyond the small director sales
The composite fair value lands at $234.95 (signal-adjusted $233.14) against a $556.52 price - a -58% implied downside. The two cash-based methods are even harsher: DCF at $105.44 and EPV floor at $75.06 both say the underlying earnings stream, capitalized normally, is worth a fraction of the quote. The only method within shouting distance of price is the anchored P/E at $484.14, and even that sits ~13% below spot - meaning the stock is rich even on its most generous framing. Earnings quality is good, so there is no haircut to hide behind; the gap is real, not an accounting artifact. Company quality is Strong, which legitimately lifts the deserved multiple - but 'Strong' does not stretch to 5x EPV or 5x DCF. The market is pricing Ubiquiti as a secular compounder with no margin wobble risk, ignoring the 2022-2024 margin dip and thin liquidity cushion. To justify $556 you need sustained mid-teens+ growth at peak margins in perpetuity - a heroic setup for a networking hardware vendor facing Cisco/HPE/Netgear at scale. This is a cult-narrative price, not a value price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether current gross/operating margins have durably re-broken to prior peaks or are cyclically elevated
- Forward revenue growth cadence vs the mid-teens implied by the price
- Any guidance or transcript color on channel expansion, enterprise wins, or competitive pricing pressure
- Working capital and inventory trends given the lean balance sheet
The dominant force on UI right now is narrative, not fundamentals. This is a high-intensity, high-cult archetype where the market is paying roughly 2.4x DCF because of the Pera-founder mythology and a fiercely loyal IT-community brand. That story is intact and the tape is rewarding it: recent 33.5% return sharply outpaces the 15.2% long-term CAGR, meaning momentum sentiment is accelerating, not fading. For a name whose price is 139% narrative premium, active narrative is the single biggest sentiment vector, and it is currently pointing up. On the macro side the regime is mildly constructive (score +22, VIX 16, S&P near highs) but rates at 4.68% and a 26.9 market PE create a background headwind for any richly-valued, narrative-priced equity. UI's 1.31 beta means a risk-off jolt would hit it harder than the tape average, and cult-premium names are historically the first to de-rate when liquidity tightens - so the macro exposure is real, just not currently activating. Net: the narrative tailwind and price momentum outweigh the latent macro/valuation-sentiment risk, but the durability is only moderate and the setup is fragile to any crack in the story.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any security-vulnerability or supply-chain headline that could puncture the community-brand story
- Signs of Cisco/Arista pressure in the SMB/prosumer channel that would erode the disruptor narrative
- Sector rotation out of high-beta comm-equipment names or a VIX break above 20
- Analyst target revisions - currently unspecified; a downgrade cluster would signal narrative fatigue
- Insider selling or Pera-related headlines given how much premium rides on founder mythology
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%