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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Diageo plc (DEO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-25): Designation Watch · Gem Score +23 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 13 · Value 31 · Sentiment -41 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $122.33 vs $94.62 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Diageo plc
DEO NYSEDiageo plc Sponsored ADR represents shares in Diageo plc, a British multinational alcoholic beverage company headquartered in London, United Kingdom. The company produces and distributes a diverse portfolio of premium spirits, beers, and ready-to-drink products, including iconic brands such as Johnnie Walker, Crown Royal, Buchanan’s and J&B whiskies; Smirnoff, Cîroc, and Ketel One vodkas; Captain Morgan rum; Baileys liqueur; Don Julio and Casamigos tequilas; Tanqueray gin; and Guinness stout. Diageo plc operates across key geographical segments: North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa, with sales in nearly 180 countries from over 130 sites worldwide. It maintains a strong position in high-growth categories like premiumisation, convenience through ready-to-drink options, and moderation with non-alcoholic variants. The company focuses on building world-class brands through innovation, supply chain efficiency, and consumer insights, serving a global footprint that spans spirits leadership and expanding beer segments.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Diageo plc is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 8 annual reports, the latest filed 2025-08-14, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.77
Total Equity: N/A
Shares: 557,000,000
Total Debt: $4.00B
Cash: $0.00
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $4.00B
Cash: $0.00
Revenue: $38.15B
Revenue: $38.15B
Revenue: $38.15B
Total Equity: N/A
Tax Rate: N/A
Equity: N/A
Total Debt: $4.00B
Cash: $0.00
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $4.00B
Total Equity: N/A
Shares: 557,000,000
Shares: 557,000,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 557,000,000
Stock Price: $94.62
Net Income: $3.21B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 2:00am (44d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | — | $40.6B | $38.6B | $38.1B | $38.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $6.9B | $27.7B | $24.6B | — | — |
| Gross Profit | $10.5B | $12.9B | $13.9B | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $5.4B | $6.9B | $7.6B | — | — |
| Operating Income | $5.1B | $6.0B | $6.3B | — | — |
| Net Income | — | $5.8B | $6.1B | $5.3B | $3.2B |
| EBITDA | $5.7B | $7.1B | $7.8B | — | — |
| EPS | $6.21 | $10.08 | $10.72 | $9.45 | $5.78 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $6.19 | $10.05 | $10.68 | $9.43 | $5.77 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 2:00am (44d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.8B | $3.1B | $2.0B | — | — |
| Total Current Assets | $15.6B | $17.6B | $16.9B | — | — |
| Total Assets | $43.6B | $49.8B | $48.6B | — | — |
| Current Liabilities | $9.7B | $11.5B | $10.4B | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $17.6B | $19.8B | $20.2B | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $32.1B | $36.8B | $35.9B | — | — |
| Total Equity | $11.5B | $13.0B | $12.7B | — | — |
| Retained Earnings | $4.3B | $4.8B | $5.3B | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 2:00am (44d ago)| Metric | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.4B | $3.2B | $5.0B | $5.4B | $4.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$915.5M | -$955.1M | -$854.1M | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.5B | $2.2B | $4.1B | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$76.4M | -$177.4M | -$665.8M | -$369.8M | -$466.6M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.4B | -$2.4B | -$2.3B | -$2.4B | -$2.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $73.7M | $3.5B | -$315.2M | -$907.3M | -$792.7M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 2:00am (44d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | — | -5.0% | -1.3% | +0.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +23.2% | +7.8% | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.2% | +5.1% | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | — | +3.9% | -12.9% | -39.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +25.3% | +8.8% | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 9:46am (46d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-17 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-17 | $2.52 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $2.52 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-24 | $2.51 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-02 | $1.53 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-25 | $2.28 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-24 | $1.53 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-26 | $2.43 | — | — | — |
| 2021-02-25 | $1.53 | — | — | — |
| 2020-08-13 | $2.19 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-27 | $1.36 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-08 | $2.09 | — | — | — |
| 2019-02-28 | $1.36 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-09 | $2.09 | — | — | — |
| 2018-02-22 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-09 | $2.02 | — | — | — |
| 2017-02-22 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-10 | $1.85 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-08-25 02:14Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 05:03The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a harsher story than the synthesis wants to admit. Revenue has actually contracted from $40.59B in FY22 to $38.15B in FY25 — that's -2% per year on the top line, not a "temporary trough." More damaging: net income collapsed from $6.06B (FY23) to $5.28B (FY24) to $3.21B (FY25) — a 47% decline in two years on flat revenue, which means this is a margin story, not a demand pause. Net margin at 8.4% is roughly half of Diageo's historical mid-to-high teens. That's what drives the 65x P/E — you're paying a trough-earnings multiple that only looks reasonable if you believe FY25 EPS is the bottom and mean-reversion is imminent.
The synthesis verdict of $119.58 fair value (+26.4% upside) is doing heavy lifting on assumptions I'd interrogate. If the DCF is anchored to normalized FCF using pre-2024 margins, it's essentially saying "assume the last two years didn't happen." That's defensible for a durable-brand thesis (Johnnie Walker, Don Julio, Guinness aren't going anywhere) but it ignores that the LATAM inventory destocking, GLP-1 headwinds on alcohol consumption, and Gen Z drinking less are all showing up simultaneously. The pre-flight thesis acknowledges option (2) — structural multiple compression already priced in — but the synthesis picks option (1) without justifying why. On $38.15B revenue at a recovered ~14% net margin, you'd get ~$5.3B NI, ~$9.50 EPS, and at 18-20x that's $170-190 — which is why bulls salivate. On persistent 8-9% margins, you get $3.2-3.4B NI, ~$5.80 EPS, and 16x = $93. The current price IS the bear case fair value.
A contrarian would push harder on three points the models glide past. First, the balance sheet disclosure is thin — $4.0B total debt looks light for Diageo, which historically carries ~$20B+ in net debt; either the data is stale/incomplete or something material changed, and neither the synthesis nor market-forces (which failed entirely) caught this. Second, the market-narrative layer calls this "durable, anchored, low cult" — I agree, but that cuts against the upside case: steady-compounders that stop compounding get re-rated to utility multiples (12-15x), not re-rated back up. Third, the 3.5% dividend yield is being framed as support, but if margins don't recover, the payout ratio on FY25 earnings is already stretched — a dividend trim would break the last narrative pillar holding the stock.
I partially dissent from the fair_value/undervalued lean. The synthesis math isn't wrong conditional on margin normalization, but it treats normalization as a base case when the two-year trajectory says it's a bull case. At $94.62, you're not getting a bargain — you're getting a fair price for trough earnings with a free option on mean reversion, offset by real downside if FY26 margins stay compressed or deteriorate further. The stock is a hold for existing dividend holders and a "wait for the Q1/Q2 FY26 print" for new capital. I'd want to see either (a) sequential margin stabilization confirming FY25 was the trough, or (b) a price closer to $80 where the trough-earnings multiple compresses to 14x and you're paid to wait. The 26% "upside" in the synthesis is really a coin-flip on margin recovery timing, not a discount to intrinsic value.
GPT Reading
At $94.62, Diageo is not screening like a classic cheap defensive; it is screening like a stock whose earnings base has become unreliable while the market still pays up for brand quality. The raw numbers are the issue. Revenue has gone nowhere for three years: $40.59B in 2022, $38.57B in 2023, $38.06B in 2024, and $38.15B in 2025. That is effectively flat to down over the period, a -0.5% revenue CAGR, and it is happening after a period when premium spirits were supposed to be a structural grower. Worse, the profit line has cracked much more than sales. Net income fell from $6.06B in 2023 to $5.28B in 2024 and then to $3.21B in 2025, a 47% drop in two years. Net margin is now just 8.4%, far below the roughly 15%-16% level implied by 2022-2024 results. When a mature consumer staples company shows flat sales and a near-halving of earnings, I do not give it the benefit of the doubt just because the brands are excellent.
The valuation metrics provided also look internally inconsistent in a way that makes me distrust the bullish synthesis more than embrace it. A P/E of 65.6x on a beverage incumbent is not remotely a normal trough multiple unless earnings are temporarily depressed by clearly identifiable one-offs. But the briefing gives no evidence of a clean one-time charge large enough to explain why net income went from $5.28B to $3.21B on basically unchanged revenue. The DCF-style fair value output of about $120 appears to be extrapolating a normalized earnings power that the recent data simply does not confirm. If the current market cap is $52.6B and 2025 net income is $3.21B, investors are paying about 16x market-cap-to-net-income before even reconciling the reported P/E discrepancy; either way, this is not an obvious bargain for a business with zero top-line momentum and sharply negative earnings momentum. On sales, 5.5x is also rich for a no-growth global staples name unless margins are pristine and durable, which currently they are not.
What stands out positively is that the business has not become financially stretched. Reported debt of $4.00B against a $52.6B market cap is modest, and a 3.5% dividend yield gives some carry while waiting. Operating cash flow of $4.13B in 2023 suggests the franchise does still convert a lot of revenue into cash, and the gross profit line improved from $12.93B in 2022 to $13.94B in 2023, showing there is still real brand power in the system. If 2025 earnings were depressed by non-cash or unusual items, then today’s headline P/E is overstating the true multiple, and the market may indeed be valuing Diageo on normalized cash earnings rather than trough EPS. That is the best argument for the stock: a world-class spirits portfolio, modest leverage, and a temporary earnings air pocket can absolutely justify buying a boring compounder when sentiment is sour.
But I weigh that argument less heavily because the burden of proof is now on recovery, not on quality. A smart bull will say this is a mature earner temporarily hurt by macro headwinds, inventory corrections, and consumer downtrading, and that paying around $95 for irreplaceable brands with a dividend is reasonable if earnings rebound even halfway toward the $5.5B-$6.0B range. I agree those are the right bull facts. I just think the market is already granting substantial normalization. For a business with recent earnings down 39% year over year and essentially no sales growth, “cheap because premium brands” is not enough. If normalized earning power is really closer to the 2023-2024 range, the stock is fair; if 2025 is nearer the new run-rate, it is expensive. Given only the data here, I lean toward the latter interpretation because there is no hard evidence yet of a revenue reacceleration or margin snapback.
What would change my mind is straightforward: I would need to see either revenue growth return meaningfully above inflation, say 3%-5% organic/top-line growth on the next annual print, or net income recover decisively back above $4.5B with operating cash flow holding at or above the $4B level. If Diageo can show 2025 was an aberration and restore margins toward the mid-teens on a stable $38B-$40B revenue base, then $95 will look attractive and the DCF-style upside case becomes more credible. If instead revenue stays pinned around $38B and earnings remain near $3B-$3.5B, the stock should trade on a lower staples multiple and belongs closer to the low $80s than to triple digits.
Grok Reading
Diageo’s numbers describe a mature spirits franchise whose top line has stalled and whose earnings power has cracked. Revenue sat at $38.15B in FY2025 after $38.06B in 2024 and $38.57B in 2023, a -0.5% CAGR that follows a $40.59B peak in 2022; recent revenue growth is a negligible +0.3%. Net income, by contrast, has collapsed: $6.06B in 2023, $5.28B in 2024, then $3.21B in 2025, a -39.2% year-over-year drop and a -27.2% earnings CAGR. Net margin is now 8.4%, roughly half the mid-teens levels implied by the earlier years. Operating cash flow of $4.13B (FY2023) still covers the franchise, and a 3.51% dividend yield supplies a cash return floor, but the income statement is no longer that of a steady compounder—it is a trough story. The reported 65.6x P/E is an artifact of that trough; the more relevant signal is that the market is capitalizing roughly $53B of equity against a business that has just lost nearly half its reported profit in two years while selling almost nothing more.
What stands out against the prior models is the gap between a “below no-growth floor / +26% undervalued to ~$120” synthesis and the actual trajectory. A no-growth floor assumes durable mid-cycle earnings; here earnings are not mid-cycle, they are falling hard, and free-cash-flow CAGR is essentially zero. EV/revenue at 1.48 sits awkwardly beside a 5.5x P/S, balance-sheet fields are mostly blank (only $4.0B of debt is shown), and the cash-flow cut is stale—so the composite fair-value arithmetic is resting on thinner ice than the +26% headline implies. Sector signals (below benchmarks, macro headwinds) and the momentum tape line up with a market that has already marked down growth assumptions rather than with a pure mispricing. The narrative layer correctly flags low cult intensity and an anchored, durable dividend-plus-premiumization story; that story is intact as brand equity, but it is not currently converting into volume or margin expansion.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward mean-reversion: if FY2025’s $3.21B net income is a one-off inventory, mix, and emerging-market air pocket, and profits snap back toward the $5.3–6.1B band of 2023–24, then today’s $94.62 price and mid-teens earnings multiple on normalized profits look cheap, the 3.5% yield is paid to wait, and the models’ ~$120 target becomes the base case rather than the bull case. Premium brands (Johnnie Walker, Don Julio, Crown Royal) and decades of dividend compounding give that recovery a real fundamental path; skeptics who treat $3.21B as the new run-rate may be over-extrapolating a cycle trough. I weigh that less heavily because revenue has already been flat for three years—there is no volume rebound visible yet—and because guidance and category trends in developed markets have already tempered the premiumization narrative. Until the P&L turns, “cheap on normalized” is a hypothesis, not a fact.
I would flip to a clear undervalued call on two consecutive quarters of positive organic sales growth above ~3% with operating margin rebuilding toward prior-cycle levels, or a full-year net income print back above ~$5B. I would flip bearish if revenue rolls over again and net income stays sub-$3B, or if the dividend is cut, confirming that cash generation no longer supports the mature-earner frame.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the net-income trajectory: $6.06B (FY2023) → $5.28B (FY2024) → $3.21B (FY2025), a 47% collapse over two fiscal years on essentially flat revenue ($38.6B → $38.1B). The briefing does not tell us whether the 2025 print embeds a one-time restructuring charge, an impairment, or a tax item, and without that distinction the entire valuation hinges on which earnings figure is the run-rate. The stated P/E of 65.6x is a base-year artifact of that depressed year and should be discarded; the P/S of 5.53x is arithmetically inconsistent with the $52.6B market cap and $38.15B revenue (the correct figure is ~1.38x) and is a data error, not a finding. The EV/Revenue of 1.48x, by contrast, checks out: ($52.6B + $4.0B debt) / $38.15B ≈ 1.48x, and the $4.0B debt line is plausible for a company of this scale. Cash and equity lines are blank, so I cannot refine the EV below the ~$56.6B ceiling, but for a business generating $4B+ in operating cash flow (the 2023 figure, which is the only one provided and is two years stale), a $2–4B cash balance is the reasonable assumption, putting true EV closer to $53–55B.
On a normalised earnings basis, the median of the last three fiscal years is $5.28B, and the 2023 operating margin of 16.4% ($6.32B op income on $38.57B revenue) is the cleanest pre-decline reference point. Using $5.0B as a conservative normalised net income (splitting the difference between the 2024 print and acknowledging that some margin pressure may be persistent), the P/E is roughly 10.5x and EV/earnings is roughly 11x. For a global premium-spirits franchise with a 3.5% dividend yield and a portfolio that includes Johnnie Walker, Don Julio, and Crown Royal, that sits at the very bottom of the 15–25x range the company has historically commanded. The prior models' composite fair value of $119.58 implies roughly 12.5–13x on that $5.0B base, which is a re-rating to the low end of historical norms rather than an aggressive multiple. I find that defensible, though I would not go higher without evidence that the 2025 earnings collapse is genuinely one-time.
The strongest case against the undervalued read is the revenue line itself. Three consecutive years of flat-to-declining top-line ($40.6B → $38.6B → $38.1B) with a 5-year revenue CAGR of −0.5% is not the profile of a company in the middle of a cyclical trough; it is the profile of a mature business that has lost its growth engine. The "Below Sector Benchmarks" tag and the bear narrative's emphasis on developed-market saturation and competitive pressure in emerging markets are consistent with that reading. If the 2025 earnings decline is structural margin compression rather than a one-time charge, the true run-rate is closer to $3.5–4.0B, the P/E is 13–15x, and the stock is fairly valued rather than cheap. The absence of quarterly data in the briefing means I cannot confirm whether the most recent quarters show stabilisation or continued deterioration, and the cash-flow section being two years old means I cannot verify that free cash flow is tracking the income statement. A smart opponent would also note that the 3.5% dividend yield, while respectable, is not the 5–6% that would make this a true income-floor play, and that the "steady-compounder" narrative has lost its compounding leg.
What would change my mind in either direction: a next-quarter print that isolates the 2025 charge as a discrete item (restructuring, brand impairment, one-time tax) and shows operating margin back in the 14–16% range would confirm the $5B+ run-rate and push fair value toward $115–125, strengthening the undervalued call. Conversely, if the next two quarters show operating margin below 12% with no identifiable one-time driver, the normalised earnings base drops to $3.5–4.0B, the P/E normalises to 13–15x, and the stock is fairly valued at $95 with the dividend as the only support. The specific number to watch is operating margin in the next reported quarter relative to the 16.4% FY2023 benchmark.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Diageo runs at roughly $38B revenue with steady $4B+ FCF generation ($4.13B in 2023, $5.37B in 2024, $4.13B in 2025) and is a net buyer of its own stock, with diluted shares down from 586M to 557M (-1.3% CAGR). Historical gross margins in the mid-30s and operating margins around 15-16% (2022-2023) reflect the branded-spirits moat one expects from a portfolio anchored by Johnnie Walker, Guinness, Tanqueray, and Don Julio. Earnings quality checks are clean: OCF/NI of 0.92x and accruals at 3.8% of assets show reported profits are broadly backed by cash.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Actual cash and equivalents on the 2025 balance sheet (module shows $0 which likely reflects data feed, not reality)
- Composition and maturity ladder of the $4B short-term debt and refinancing plans
- Why 2024 and 2025 GM% and OpM% are reported as 0 — data artifact vs. true margin structure; confirm from filed P&L
- Drivers of the 2025 net income drop to $3.21B (impairments, restructuring, LatAm inventory issues, tariff impacts)
- Organic volume vs. price/mix trends by region, especially US spirits and LatAm
- Any goodwill/intangible impairment charges tied to recent M&A (Casamigos, Aviation, Don Julio economics)
The composite fair value is $122.54 and the signal-adjusted FV is $119.58, with the EPV floor at $113.09 and DCF at $127.26. Against a $94.62 price that's roughly 21-26% upside, and importantly the EPV floor alone sits ~20% above spot — meaning even a no-growth capitalization of current earnings power justifies more than today's quote. That's a genuine margin of safety, not a rounding error, on a business the quality lens grades as Solid.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the FY guidance implies stabilization or further declines in organic operating profit
- Latin America and US spirits volume trajectory in the next print
- Any dividend policy signal given leverage and softening earnings
- Refinancing terms/cost on the $4B ST debt stack
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 15 and the S&P near highs, but DEO's 0.32 beta means it barely participates in that lift. What actually presses on this name is stock-specific: the spirits narrative has quietly broken. The archetype is 'steady-compounder' but intensity is minimal and momentum is neutral-to-negative (-0.5% CAGR, -7.3pp over 3 years), meaning the market has lost interest in defending the story. The just-out headline of a ~2,000-person workforce cut and a $1.2B reshaping effort in its biggest market reads as defensive, not offensive, and reinforces the bear framing of a mature cash cow fighting category saturation. The peer read-through is also bad (Boston Beer down 17% in six months on volume declines and cost pressure), tarring the entire drinks cohort. Analyst/CEO tone has some offsets: the August rally on Dave Lewis's $1B cost plan and Guinness refocus shows the market will reward a credible turnaround narrative, but that pop has faded and the follow-up news is layoffs rather than growth. Net: a persistent, ordinary headwind, not a decisive one - the low beta and defensive sector cushion the downside, but there is no active tailwind story pulling the stock up.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the $1.2B restructuring is received as strategic or panic in the next 2-3 weeks of analyst notes
- Any sign of stabilizing US spirits volumes in scanner data or peer prints
- Target-price revisions following the layoff news - direction and dispersion
- Emerging-market (Asia-Pacific) commentary in upcoming conference appearances
The world is shifting against volume in Western alcohol: generational moderation, GLP-1 adoption, cannabis substitution and post-COVID normalisation of premium spirits are all pressing the same core. Layered on top are trade frictions (US tariffs on Scotch/tequila), a 4.69% long rate that raises the cost of a leveraged consumer-staples balance sheet, and soft EM currencies. The offsets are real but smaller: India/Africa premiumisation, Guinness's demographic pull, and consolidation of shelf space toward the largest owner as smaller distillers retrench. Net: a flat-to-slightly-down top line for a scale winner, with earnings power dependent on cost-out rather than demand.
When we made this prediction on Aug 24, 2026, DEO was $96.29. We expect it to be $106.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $85.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 24, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips down 25%
cost_of_capital
flips up 25%
shares
flips up 25%