Business Description
Oscar Health, Inc. operates as a health insurance provider across the United States. Its offerings include various health plans such as those for individuals and families, small businesses, and Medicare Advantage options. The company also features "+Oscar," a proprietary technology platform designed to facilitate engagement between healthcare providers, payers, and their members or patients. Additionally, Oscar Health provides reinsurance solutions. Originally established as Mulberry Health Inc., the firm officially changed its name to Oscar Health, Inc. in January 2021. It was founded in 2012 and maintains its main office in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: May 1, 2026 4:29pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:23pm (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -1.69
Total Equity: $977.65M
Shares: 262,388,000
Total Debt: $430.10M
Cash: $2.77B
EBITDA: -$391.05M
Total Debt: $430.10M
Cash: $2.77B
Revenue: $11.70B
Shares: 262,388,000
Revenue: $11.70B
Revenue: $11.70B
Revenue: $11.70B
Total Equity: $977.65M
Tax Rate: -1.3%
Equity: $977.65M
Total Debt: $430.10M
Cash: $2.77B
Current Liabilities: $4.86B
Long-Term Debt: $430.10M
Total Debt: $430.10M
Total Equity: $977.65M
Shares: 262,388,000
Shares: 262,388,000
CapEx: -$36.37M
Shares: 262,388,000
Stock Price: $27.22
Net Income: -$443.15M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.9B | $4.1B | $5.9B | $9.2B | $11.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $0 | $0 | $4.6B | $7.3B | $10.0B |
| Gross Profit | $1.9B | $4.1B | $1.2B | $1.8B | $1.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.5B | $4.7B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| Operating Income | -$570.6M | -$610.1M | -$235.6M | $57.3M | -$396.4M |
| Net Income | -$572.6M | -$606.3M | -$270.7M | $25.4M | -$443.2M |
| EBITDA | -$551.3M | -$572.2M | -$212.0M | $89.3M | -$391.1M |
| EPS | $-3.19 | $-2.85 | $-1.22 | $0.11 | $-1.69 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:26pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.8B | $4.1B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $4.6B |
| Total Assets | $3.3B | $4.5B | $3.6B | $4.8B | $6.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.6B | $3.3B | -$175.3M | $3.2B | $4.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $298.0M | $298.8M | $299.6M | $430.1M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.9B | $3.6B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $5.3B |
| Total Equity | $1.4B | $890.4M | $804.0M | $1.0B | $977.6M |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.0B | -$2.6B | -$2.9B | -$2.9B | -$3.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$181.7M | $380.3M | -$272.2M | $978.2M | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$25.9M | -$29.0M | -$25.6M | -$27.9M | -$36.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$207.6M | $351.3M | -$297.7M | $950.3M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $7.2M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $282.5M | $454.9M | $311.5M | -$340.9M | $1.3B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:25pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$19.9B $19.6B – $20.2B
|
$22.2B $22.1B – $22.3B
|
$25.3B $23.2B – $26.2B
|
$28.2B $25.9B – $29.2B
|
| EBITDA |
-$1.9B -$2.0B – -$1.9B
|
-$2.2B -$2.2B – -$2.1B
|
-$2.5B -$2.5B – -$2.3B
|
-$2.7B -$2.8B – -$2.5B
|
| Net Income |
$546.4M $12.7M – $636.8M
|
$554.1M $498.0M – $610.3M
|
$582.5M $519.7M – $608.9M
|
$739.9M $660.1M – $773.5M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:23pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +114.8% | +42.1% | +56.5% | +27.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +114.8% | -70.4% | +51.1% | -8.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -6.9% | +61.4% | +124.3% | -792.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -5.9% | +55.3% | +109.4% | -1,842.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -3.8% | +62.9% | +142.1% | -537.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 4:23pm (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | Lang Laura W | A-Award | 8,475.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Plouffe David | A-Award | 8,475.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Sankaran Sid | A-Award | 8,475.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Gassen William | A-Award | 8,475.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | WITTMAN VANESSA AMES | A-Award | 8,475.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-02 | Baltrus Victoria | S-Sale | 1,091.00 | $21.74 | $23,718 |
| 2026-06-02 | Baltrus Victoria | S-Sale | 432.00 | $22.45 | $9,698 |
| 2026-06-02 | Schlosser Mario | S-Sale | 24,452.00 | $21.74 | $531,586 |
| 2026-06-02 | Schlosser Mario | S-Sale | 9,668.00 | $22.45 | $217,047 |
| 2026-06-02 | McAnaney Adam | S-Sale | 7,065.00 | $21.74 | $153,593 |
| 2026-06-02 | McAnaney Adam | S-Sale | 2,794.00 | $22.45 | $62,725 |
| 2026-06-02 | Liang Janet | S-Sale | 8,940.00 | $21.74 | $194,356 |
| 2026-06-02 | Liang Janet | S-Sale | 3,535.00 | $22.45 | $79,361 |
| 2026-06-02 | Blackley Richard Scott | S-Sale | 22,706.00 | $21.74 | $493,628 |
| 2026-06-02 | Blackley Richard Scott | S-Sale | 8,977.00 | $22.45 | $201,534 |
| 2026-05-18 | Blackley Richard Scott | S-Sale | 110,000.00 | $25.03 | $2.8M |
| 2026-05-14 | Blackley Richard Scott | S-Sale | 91,259.00 | $23.10 | $2.1M |
| 2026-05-14 | Blackley Richard Scott | S-Sale | 8,741.00 | $23.79 | $207,948 |
| 2026-04-09 | Sankaran Sid | A-Award | 1,203.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-09 | Gassen William | A-Award | 1,418.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The Q1 2026 print is the entire ballgame here and the models are dramatically underweighting how strange it is. Revenue jumped from $2.81B in Q4'25 to $4.65B in Q1'26 — a 66% sequential leap — with net income swinging from -$352.6M to +$679M, a 14.6% margin in a business that has never sustained positive margins. For an ACA-exposed insurer this is not "operational leverage emerging" — it's the seasonal pattern of risk-adjustment true-ups and the front-loaded premium recognition that hits Q1 every year. Look at Q1'25: +$275M NI, then three consecutive losses totaling -$718M for the rest of the year. The TTM picture flatters a business whose full-year 2025 was -$443M on $11.7B of revenue, an operating margin of -3.4%. The synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" is leaning on a number that historically reverses.
The 41% revenue CAGR is real but it's almost entirely ACA enrollment growth juiced by enhanced premium tax credits — the same subsidies scheduled to sunset at end of 2025 absent Congressional extension. This is the contrarian case the models barely touch: Oscar's membership base, MLR, and revenue trajectory are all levered to a policy variable that is currently a live political fight. If enhanced APTCs lapse, marketplace enrollment estimates drop 30-40% and the adversely-selected residual pool gets sicker — exactly the dynamic that blew up Oscar's MLR in 2021-2022. The "tech-enabled disruptor" narrative the pre-flight model entertains is doing real work here; +Oscar platform revenue is a rounding error and gross margin is 14.4%, which is normal-to-thin for a health plan, not a software business. P/S of 0.32 (not 0.6 as the synthesis claims — check the math, $7.06B / $11.7B = 0.60, so the synthesis is right and the ratios tile's 0.32 is using a different share base or TTM revenue near $22B annualizing Q1).
Insider activity is more bearish than "neutral" — five sales on June 2 totaling ~42,700 shares immediately followed by awards on June 4 looks like routine RSU vest-and-sell, but the absence of any open-market buying after a stock that's been volatile in the $13-30 range tells you insiders don't see it as cheap at $27. Balance sheet is fine — $2.77B cash, $1.06B FCF in 2025 despite GAAP losses (the FCF/NI divergence is float dynamics typical of insurers and shouldn't be read as "quality"). Current ratio of 0.95 is normal for an insurer but leaves no buffer if claims spike. The market-forces module failing to run and the EV/EBITDA of 139x being flagged unreliable means the synthesis is leaning on revenue-DCF and scenario work that almost certainly extrapolates the Q1'26 margin — a heroic assumption.
I dissent from the "Reasonable Premium" verdict. At $27.22 the stock prices in sustained mid-single-digit operating margins on a continued 20%+ growth ramp, which requires both APTC extension and structural MLR improvement Oscar has never demonstrated across a full year. Strip the Q1 seasonality and you have a company that lost $443M on $11.7B last year trading at 16x trailing FCF of $1.06B that is itself float-inflated. Fair value on a normalized 1-2% net margin (generous for a subscale ACA-focused plan) and 15% growth fade is closer to $16-20. The setup to own this is post-APTC-resolution clarity plus two consecutive non-Q1 quarters of positive NI — neither exists yet. The bull case isn't crazy, it's just being underwritten on one quarter of seasonal accounting.
GPT Critique
Examining Oscar Health's recent financial data, a few key trends emerge. The company shows substantial revenue growth, with a 41.3% CAGR over recent years, driven largely by ACA enrollment and enhanced premium tax credits. However, the net income volatility is striking, with significant losses in most quarters except for notable Q1 profitability, such as the $679M net income in Q1 2026 on $4.65B revenue. This suggests a pattern of front-loaded premium recognition and risk-adjustment true-ups, rather than sustainable operational leverage. The cash flow remains positive despite GAAP losses, indicating typical insurance float dynamics rather than true profitability. With a market cap of $7.06B and a P/S ratio of 0.6, the valuation leans heavily on expected future efficiencies and policy extensions.
Opus's analysis underlines the seasonal nature of Oscar's profits, particularly in Q1, which I agree is a critical point. The 66% sequential revenue jump from Q4 2025 to Q1 2026, coupled with a swing from negative to positive margins, is unlikely to be sustainable without policy support like the APTC. Their assessment that the market is pricing in structural improvements not yet demonstrated across a full year is valid. The insider sales and lack of open-market buying at $27 suggest insiders might not view the stock as undervalued, aligning with Opus's skepticism on current pricing.
Where I diverge is in the valuation perspective. Opus suggests a fair value of $16-20, hinging on normalized margins and growth assumptions. While I concur that the current price of $27.22 may be optimistic given the dependency on policy variables and cyclicality, I see potential for a slightly higher valuation range, around $18-22, considering the cash flow strength and possibility of renewed policy support. This acknowledges some of the operational progress and growth trajectory, albeit cautiously.
A careful skeptic might argue that both perspectives underestimate Oscar's tech-enabled potential and brand positioning within the healthcare market. They might point to the company's innovative platform and recent profitable quarters as indicators of a longer-term shift in healthcare economics. However, the inherent cyclicality and policy dependencies in the health insurance sector pose substantial risks that cannot be ignored.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Reconciling a -4 quality grade with a -71 value score, the two lenses agree on direction: this is a real, scaled, cash-generative business that I do not want to own at this price. The fortress balance sheet and the FCF inflection are genuine, but a health insurer is its MLR, and 2025's 570bp gross-margin collapse plus a $443M GAAP loss is exactly the moment the multiple should compress — instead the stock is asking me to underwrite the rebound. Layer on ~10%/yr dilution silently raising my per-share hurdle and there's just no asymmetry at $27. I'm passing, not shorting — the cash pile and ACA scale make this no zero.
My playbook: zero position today. I get interested with a starter (roughly 1% of book) at $21 or below, which is where the value lens flags attractiveness and where I'd be paying for the cash and franchise rather than the turnaround. I scale to a 2.5-3% position only if I get a 1-2 quarter MLR print in 2026 showing 2025 was the anomaly (gross margin re-expanding back toward 18-20%) AND the stock is still sub-$24. Catalysts that flip me aggressive: a clean Q1/Q2 2026 MLR, evidence reinsurance/risk-adjustment normalized, and any pause in dilution. Catalysts that keep me sidelined or send me lower: another MLR miss, ACA subsidy policy noise into the 2026 election cycle, or continued 10% share creep without margin recovery. This is a watchlist name with a clear price and a clear data trigger — not a buy here.
Oscar has scaled revenue from $1.92B (2021) to $11.70B (2025) — roughly a 6x in four years, a genuinely impressive top-line trajectory in ACA-exchange health insurance. The balance sheet is a fortress for an insurer: ~$3.99B liquid cash, $3.56B net cash, and operating cash flow that has turned decisively positive ($950M FCF in 2024, $1.06B in 2025). OCF/NI of 7.3x and accruals of -15.5% of assets indicate reported earnings are conservative relative to cash — typical of an insurer with growing float, but still clean.
The quality concerns sit on the income statement and cap table. Gross margin compressed from 20.8% (2023) to 20.1% (2024) to 14.4% (2025) — a meaningful deterioration suggesting medical loss ratio is rising. Operating margin swung from +0.6% in 2024 back to -3.4% in 2025, and net income flipped from +$25M to -$443M. So the 'path to profitability' narrative just took a step backward. Meanwhile diluted shares grew from 179M (2021) to 262M (2025) — a 10% CAGR — meaning per-share economics lag the business by a wide margin. SBC at only 0.8% of revenue suggests most of the dilution came from earlier capital raises/IPO mechanics rather than ongoing comp, but the damage to per-share value is done.
Altman Z of 1.66 flags 'distress,' but that model is calibrated for industrial firms and is largely meaningless for a regulated insurer sitting on $4B cash with positive FCF — I'd discount it heavily. Insider tape shows coordinated June 2026 sales across multiple NEOs (Schlosser, Blackley, Liang, McAnaney) right after director equity awards — looks like scheduled/programmatic selling, not a panic signal, but no insider conviction buying either.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) trend by year — is the 2025 GM compression a one-year reset or structural?
- Membership growth vs. revenue/member — is revenue growth volume or pricing?
- Risk-adjustment receivable/payable balances and any one-time accruals in 2025
- ACA enhanced subsidy exposure (set to expire end-2025) — what % of members rely on enhanced subsidies?
- Source of share count growth — secondary offerings vs. converts vs. SBC vesting
- Statutory capital at insurance subsidiaries vs. holdco cash (the $4B may not all be dividendable)
- Whether June 2026 insider sales were under 10b5-1 plans
The e2e synthesis lands at 'Reasonable Premium' and the company-quality lens grades the business Mixed (-4) — a fast-growing ACA insurer that just slipped from 20.1% to 14.4% gross margin and printed a $443M loss in 2025. You don't pay a premium for an insurer whose MLR just deteriorated; you pay a discount. At $7.06B market cap on a thin-margin, cash-generative-but-GAAP-loss business with 10%/yr dilution, the market is already underwriting the bull turnaround narrative.
Deserved value for a commoditized health plan that earns, at best, low-single-digit underwriting margins should be a modest multiple of normalized earnings — and normalized earnings here are unproven. Even crediting the fortress cash and real operating cash flow, paying ~$7B for a business that lost $443M last year requires believing 2025's MLR spike was a one-off and that ACA pricing/reinsurance dynamics cooperate. That's the bull case priced in, not a margin of safety. Per-share progress is further taxed by ~10% annual dilution, which silently raises the deserved-price hurdle every year.
I don't see cheapness here. I see a fair-to-rich price on a business the market wants to call a tech compounder before the unit economics have proven repeatable.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2026 MLR guidance and whether the 2025 gross-margin drop was pricing-cycle or structural
- Reinsurance recoverables and any one-time items inside the $443M loss
- Medicare Advantage segment economics and contribution to consolidated MLR
- Stock-based comp run-rate and any buyback authorization to offset 10% dilution
- ACA risk-adjustment true-ups that could swing reported margins materially