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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for AngloGold Ashanti plc (AU) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Watch · Gem Score +5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 47 · Value -23 · Sentiment 32 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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AngloGold Ashanti plc
AU NYSEAngloGold Ashanti plc is a global gold mining company focused on the exploration, development, and operation of gold assets across multiple regions. The company manages a diverse, high-quality portfolio of producing mines, development projects, and exploration prospects in countries including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania. Its primary output is gold, with additional production of silver and sulfuric acid as by-products in certain operations, enhancing overall resource utilization and revenue streams. AngloGold Ashanti plc participates in the full gold value chain, from geological exploration and mine planning to extraction, processing, and sale of refined metal to global markets. The company’s operations span Africa, the Americas, and Australia, providing geographic diversification and exposure to key gold-producing districts worldwide. Founded in 1998 and headquartered in Staines-upon-Thames, United Kingdom, AngloGold Ashanti plc plays a significant role in the precious metals sector, serving as an important supplier of gold to financial institutions, industrial users, and jewelry manufacturers around the world.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
AngloGold Ashanti plc is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 3 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-03-26, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.18
Total Equity: $9.92B
Shares: 509,093,536
Total Debt: $2.04B
Cash: $2.91B
EBITDA: $2.93B
Total Debt: $2.04B
Cash: $2.91B
Revenue: $9.89B
Revenue: $9.89B
Revenue: $9.89B
Total Equity: $9.92B
Tax Rate: 25.8%
Equity: $9.92B
Total Debt: $2.04B
Cash: $2.91B
Current Liabilities: $1.62B
Long-Term Debt: $2.03B
Total Debt: $2.04B
Total Equity: $9.92B
Shares: 509,093,536
Shares: 509,093,536
CapEx: -$1.45B
Shares: 509,093,536
Stock Price: $96.30
Net Income: $2.64B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:13am (56d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.0B | $4.5B | $4.6B | $5.8B | $9.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.7B | $5.0B |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $2.1B | $4.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.2B |
| Operating Income | -$1.0B | -$1.4B | -$1.7B | -$598.0M | $1.6B |
| Net Income | $614.0M | $233.0M | -$235.0M | $1.0B | $2.6B |
| EBITDA | -$523.0M | -$802.0M | -$995.0M | $154.0M | $2.9B |
| EPS | $1.46 | $0.55 | $-0.56 | $2.33 | $5.19 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.46 | $0.55 | $-0.56 | $2.33 | $5.18 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:13am (56d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.2B | $1.1B | $964.0M | $1.4B | $2.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $3.1B | $4.6B |
| Total Assets | $8.0B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $13.2B | $15.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $827.0M | $884.0M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.4B | $4.6B | $5.2B |
| Total Equity | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.7B | $8.5B | $9.9B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:13am (56d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.3B | $1.8B | $971.0M | $2.0B | $4.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$1.0B | -$1.0B | -$1.1B | -$1.4B |
| Free Cash Flow | $240.0M | $776.0M | -$71.0M | $878.0M | $3.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | $0 | $0 | $68.0M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.0M | $82.0M | $256.0M | -$254.0M | $40.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$240.0M | -$203.0M | -$107.0M | -$244.0M | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$128.0M | $20.0M | -$13.0M | $479.0M | $1.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:13am (56d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.7% | +1.8% | +26.4% | +70.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -3.5% | -9.0% | +101.3% | +135.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -43.6% | -14.9% | +63.8% | +374.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -62.1% | -200.9% | +527.2% | +162.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -53.3% | -24.1% | +115.5% | +1,800.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:14am (56d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-29 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $1.73 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-28 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-22 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-24 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-25 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-26 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-11 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-12 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-21 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-22 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-22 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-29 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2013-03-13 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:38The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a straightforward cyclical story that the models are partially misreading. AU generated $9.89B revenue in 2025 vs $5.79B in 2024 (+71% YoY) and $4.03B in 2021 — but this is almost entirely gold price leverage, not volume/execution transformation. Operating income swung from -$598M (2024) and -$1.65B (2023) to +$1.64B in 2025; net margin jumped to 26.7% from ~17% prior. That's textbook operating leverage on a commodity price spike, not a durable re-rating event. Gold ran from ~$2,000/oz in early 2024 to $3,000+ in 2025 — AU's earnings explosion is the derivative, not the cause. FCF of $3.34B on $48.7B market cap is a ~6.9% yield, and net debt is negligible ($2.04B debt vs $2.91B cash). Balance sheet is genuinely clean; that part isn't cyclical noise.
The synthesis model's $170-217 "fair value" is where I sharply dissent. Composite DCFs on cyclical commodity producers at peak margins are near-useless — they extrapolate a 26.7% net margin that historically ran negative three years running (2021-2023 all had operating losses). Normalize to a mid-cycle 12-15% operating margin on say $7B revenue and you get $850-1,050M operating income, maybe $600-750M net — implying a normalized P/E of 65-80x at current price. The rule-based "mature_earner" tag is misleading; this is a cyclical, not a compounder, and applying earner-style multiples is the exact error the synthesis engine appears to have made. The narrative layer got it right: "cyclical-late-stage" with fragile durability is the correct frame. The 43% "discount" is not a discount — it's the market correctly refusing to capitalize peak earnings at trend multiples.
That said, the pure-bear case has holes too. Central bank gold buying (1,000+ tonnes/year for three consecutive years), de-dollarization flows, and structural under-investment in gold exploration over the last decade are real supply-demand shifts, not pure sentiment. If gold holds $2,800-3,200 through 2026, AU's earnings power isn't reverting to 2022-2023 levels — it's settling somewhere in between. ROIC of 13.4% and ROE of 26.6% are genuine, and a 3% dividend yield plus $3.34B FCF gives real optionality for buybacks or special dividends. P/E 18.6x isn't demanding IF you believe the earnings level is 60-70% sustainable. The insider data is worthless — those are routine RSU awards, not a signal. "Weak FCF quality" flag seems wrong given $4.78B OCF converting to $3.34B FCF (70% conversion is fine for a miner with $1.45B capex).
A careful contrarian would push back on both sides: against the $170 fair value (peak-cycle extrapolation), and against a pure short thesis (gold's structural bid is stronger than 2013-2019). My read: AU at $96 is roughly fairly valued to modestly rich if you assume gold mean-reverts to $2,400-2,600, and undervalued only if you underwrite $3,000+ gold as the new floor — which is a macro bet, not a stock call. The stock is a levered call option on gold prices with a competent, geographically-risky operator underneath. Fair value on a normalized-earnings basis is $75-95; on sustained-gold basis, $110-130. The synthesis composite's $170 requires both peak margins AND a growth multiple, and I don't see the justification. Jurisdiction risk (DRC, Ghana, Tanzania) is real and the narrative model correctly flags it as embedded in the discount, not a fixable overhang. I dissent from "undervalued" — this is fairly valued at best, with asymmetric downside if gold cracks below $2,500. If you want gold exposure, AU is fine; if you want an undervalued equity, the numbers don't support it once you strip out the commodity tailwind.
GPT Reading
The numbers say AngloGold just had an extraordinary year, but the market is not stupidly missing it; it is discounting how much of 2025 is simply gold price leverage and how much is durable business improvement. Revenue jumped from $5.79B to $9.89B in 2025, up 71%, while gross profit more than doubled from $2.07B to $4.87B and operating income swung from a $598M loss to a $1.64B profit. That is a dramatic earnings reset, and the cash came through too: $4.78B of operating cash flow and $3.34B of free cash flow against just $2.04B of debt, with $2.91B of cash on hand. Net cash and a current ratio of 2.87x matter in a miner. So this is not a balance-sheet-stressed gold levered bet; it is a cash-rich producer in a favorable tape. But at a $48.7B market cap, investors are already paying nearly 5.0x sales, 16.4x EV/EBITDA, 18.6x earnings, and 4.9x book for a commodity business. Those are not distressed miner multiples; they are rich.
What stands out most is how violent the improvement is relative to the prior base. From 2021 through 2024, revenue moved only from $4.03B to $5.79B, but operating income was negative in every one of those four years, including losses of $1.00B, $1.44B, $1.65B, and $598M. Then suddenly 2025 prints a 16.6% operating margin and 26.7% net margin. Either 2025 marks a structural transformation in portfolio quality and cost position, or it is a high-water mark created by a much stronger gold price environment plus potentially cleaner one-time items below the operating line in the prior years. I lean to the latter. The inconsistency between years of negative operating income and positive net income in several periods tells you reported earnings have had a lot of non-operating noise. That makes a simple 18.6x P/E look more comforting than it really is. For a miner, I care more about mid-cycle cash generation than a single banner year, and paying almost 15x free cash flow on peak-ish conditions is not obviously cheap.
The bullish valuation synthesis calling the shares deeply undervalued looks too mechanical to me. A fair value north of $170 implies the market is massively undercapitalizing a business that just earned $2.64B and generated $3.34B of free cash flow, yet the same dataset shows ROIC of only 13.4% and a history of poor operating profitability. If I annualize 2025 as though it were stable, then yes, $96 looks tempting. But commodity producers should not be valued off one exceptional print when their prior four-year record includes chronic operating losses. The 3.0% dividend yield and net cash give downside support, but they do not justify a growth-stock sales multiple. The most important contradiction here is that “mature earner” is directionally right on business type but misleading on earnings quality: this is not a stable compounder, it is a cyclical asset-heavy operator whose valuation should embed a heavy haircut to current margins.
The strongest case against my caution is straightforward: if 2025 is not a peak but a new base, the stock is still too cheap. A company doing $9.89B of revenue with 49.2% gross margins, 26.6% ROE, and $3.34B of free cash flow while sitting on net cash should not necessarily trade like a troubled miner. If gold stays elevated above the level embedded in 2025 results and AngloGold has genuinely fixed its operational issues, then the current 18.6x earnings could compress quickly on forward numbers, and 4.9x book may be less extreme than it looks because book value understates the earning power of reserves in a stronger gold regime. A smart bull would also say the market is over-penalizing jurisdictional risk and anchoring on the ugly 2021-2024 operating line even though cash generation has now overwhelmed that history.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 cash economics persist through the next year without relying on another step-up in gold prices. Specifically, I would want to see revenue holding above roughly $9B, operating margin staying in the mid-teens or better, and free cash flow remaining above $2.5B after capex. If AngloGold can do that while maintaining net cash and returning capital, then the stock deserves more than my current skepticism and I would revisit a fair value comfortably above $100. Conversely, if revenue slips back toward the $6B-$7B range or operating income reverts toward breakeven, the market will look prescient and the current multiple will prove too high. At $96.3, I see a good company, but not a cheap stock for a business with this much dependence on commodity conditions and such a mixed underlying operating history.
Grok Reading
The 2025 print is the entire story, and it is less clean than the headline multiples imply. Revenue nearly doubled year-on-year to $9.89B from $5.79B, gross margin expanded to 49% from the mid-30s, and free cash flow printed $3.34B against a $48.7B enterprise that still carries only $2.0B of debt and $2.9B of cash. That is real operating leverage to the gold price. What is not clean is the bridge from $1.64B of operating income to $2.64B of net income: roughly a billion dollars of non-operating contribution is doing heavy lifting inside the 18.6x P/E and the 27% ROE. Strip that noise and you are looking at a business whose core earnings power, even in a banner gold year, supports a mid-20s to low-40s multiple depending on tax assumptions—hardly a gift. The multi-year history reinforces the point: operating income was negative every year from 2021 through 2024. 2025 is an outlier, not a new run-rate until proven otherwise over a full cycle.
Cash generation is the bull case that survives scrutiny. Operating cash flow of $4.78B and FCF of $3.34B on only $1.45B of capex produce a roughly 7% FCF yield with a net-cash balance sheet and a 3% dividend. ROIC of 13.4% and a current ratio near 2.9 show a company that finally converted the gold spike into shareholder-level returns rather than just higher reported metal. The valuation synthesis’s $170–$218 fair-value range, however, treats that conversion as permanent and then compounds growth on top of it. That is the wrong archetype. This is a late-cycle commodity earner whose revenue CAGR of 47% and 71% recent y/y growth are price-driven, not volume- or franchise-driven. At 4.9x book and 16.4x EV/EBITDA, the market is already paying a clear premium to historical gold-miner averages; the residual discount to an aggressive DCF is mostly jurisdictional and cyclical risk premia, not a mispricing free lunch.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: if gold holds above the levels that produced $9.9B of revenue, AngloGold’s diversified production base and sub-0.21 debt-to-equity leave it geared to keep throwing off multi-billion FCF, and a 7% yield plus 3% dividend at $96 is attractive absolute capital return in a world still buying the de-dollarization and central-bank bid. Skeptics who short this on “peak earnings” have been wrong for longer than feels comfortable, and the stock already sits well off its 52-week highs, so some mean-reversion is in the price. I weigh that less because the same data set flags weak cash-flow quality, macro headwinds, and below-sector benchmarks, and because the NI–operating income gap plus thin sustaining-capex disclosure leave open the possibility that 2025 FCF is flattered by working-capital and investment timing that will reverse. A smart opponent cites the balance sheet and the cash; I cite the cycle position and the quality of the earnings bridge.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance if the next two reported halves show operating income remaining above ~$1.5B annualized with net income converging toward it (i.e., the non-operating tail disappearing without earnings collapse), or if gold prices and all-in sustaining costs keep unit margins wide enough to push FCF above $3B again while reserve replacement stays credible. I would flip decisively overvalued on any quarter where revenue falls back toward the $6B zone with margins compressing and FCF yield dropping under 4% at this market cap.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The 2021-2025 arc is a genuine transformation: revenue $4.03B to $9.89B, gross margin 29% to 49.2%, operating margin -24.9% to +16.6%, and FCF $240M to $3.34B. Net income turned from a -$235M loss in 2023 to $2.64B in 2025, with OCF/NI of 1.89x and accruals at -12.8% of assets - earnings appear cash-backed rather than accrual-inflated. Altman Z of 6.92 and Beneish M of -2.9 are consistent with a low-manipulation, low-distress profile. Liquid cash $2.91B and net cash $861M give a self-funding posture. The blemishes are real but bounded. Diluted shares grew from 420M to 509M, a 4.9% CAGR with a step-up in 2025 (~430.9M to 509.1M, likely acquisition-related), so per-share value creation lags headline growth. The e2e note flags 'Weak Cash Flow Quality' which sits oddly against OCF/NI 1.89x and $3.34B FCF - possibly reflecting commodity-price sensitivity rather than accrual games. Insider tape is neutral: one tiny $35.6K sale against routine awards, no meaningful open-market buying to signal conviction. As a gold miner, results are heavily levered to the gold price, so the 2025 breakout partly reflects a favorable price environment rather than durable structural moat.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Reason for the 2025 share count jump from ~431M to 509M (Centamin acquisition or equity raise?) and terms of any issued paper
- All-in sustaining cost (AISC) per ounce and reserve life to test durability of 2025 margins ex-gold-price tailwind
- Whether the 'Weak Cash Flow Quality' flag reflects working-capital swings, hedging, or a specific accounting item
- Capital return policy - dividends vs buybacks - to see if management offsets ongoing dilution
- Jurisdictional exposure (Ghana, Tanzania, DRC, Australia) and any royalty/tax regime changes affecting cash conversion
The e2e composite fair value of $217.78 and signal-adjusted $170.29 imply 77% upside, but I discount that heavily. The DCF at $330 is a runaway output extrapolating current gold-price-driven cash flows into perpetuity; the EPV floor at $2.53 is equally useless (it capitalizes a barely-there normalized earnings base). The anchored PE at $208 is the most defensible anchor but still assumes gold-price-inflated earnings persist. Haircutting for gold cyclicality, 4.9% annual dilution, and jurisdictional risk (DRC, West Africa), I peg deserved value roughly $115-135 per share. Against a $96.30 price that is a 15-30% gap - real, but not a fat pitch. The market is not missing the story: gold is near highs, AU has re-rated hard, and the bear case (cyclical gold prices, geopolitical/tax risk, ESG/labor) is the reason the discount to DCF exists rather than a mispricing. Earnings quality is high, which supports the deserved-value end, but the swing to 16.6% op margins is the gold price working, not a moat widening. This is Modestly Cheap on mid-cycle math, Fairly Valued if gold rolls over.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Realized gold price assumptions in sell-side models vs spot
- AISC trajectory and jurisdiction-level cost inflation
- Guidance on share count and any further equity issuance
- DRC/Ghana/Tanzania tax and royalty developments
- Reserve life and capex intensity to sustain production
The non-fundamental setup for AU is net positive right now. The tape is risk-on (regime +52, VIX at a one-year low near 14.3), and while AU's 0.7 beta means the equity beta contribution is muted, gold miners are being carried by a powerful commodity-driven narrative: central bank buying, de-dollarization, and geopolitical premium. Price action confirms it - 70.8% recent versus a 46.9% long-term CAGR shows the flow is actively chasing this name, not just tolerating it. That is a genuine tailwind that has nothing to do with whether AU the business is well-run or the stock is cheap. The counter-pressure is that the archetype is cyclical-late-stage with fragile durability and low cult coefficient - meaning the story has no loyal holder base to defend it if gold rolls or if African jurisdiction headlines (DRC, West Africa tax/regulatory) hit the wire. There is no fresh negative catalyst in the 72h news flow (the Kincora item is unrelated), and no analyst downgrade wave visible. Net: a moderate tailwind driven by tape and commodity narrative, capped by a story the market itself rates as fragile.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Gold price action - a break below recent range would collapse the momentum tailwind quickly
- Any DRC/West Africa political, tax or ESG headline - fragile narratives punish these immediately
- Rate/inflation prints that could re-arm the real-rates-negative-for-gold story
- Analyst target revisions on the gold miner cohort - a wave of upgrades would confirm the tailwind
Gold's current cycle is driven by central-bank accumulation, reserve diversification away from the dollar, and geopolitical hedging demand — a buyer set that is price-insensitive and slow-moving, which makes the price level more durable than a typical speculative commodity spike. That supports the near rungs. But the same logic caps the growth rate: once the price plateaus at a high level, miners revert to volume-plus-inflation growth, and host governments move to capture the surplus through royalties and taxes. AU's differentiator versus peers is that a meaningful slice of its growth is volumetric (Sukari in the base, Obuasi ramp, Nevada development), so it does not need gold to keep rising to hold earnings power — it needs gold not to fall. The gap between the mechanical +73.5% projection and the price-implied +25.3% is less a discovery of upside than a sign that both figures extrapolate a base-effect year; the honest structural rate for a diversified gold producer at cycle-high realized prices is low-to-mid single digits plus whatever the pipeline delivers.