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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Arch Capital Group Ltd (ACGL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +26 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 70 · Value -10 · Sentiment -8 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $269.98 vs $99.57 at analysis
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Arch Capital Group Ltd
ACGL NASDAQArch Capital Group Ltd is a global specialty insurance and reinsurance company headquartered in Pembroke, Bermuda. The firm focuses on providing a broad range of risk solutions across three core underwriting segments: insurance, reinsurance, and mortgage. In its insurance segment, Arch Capital Group Ltd offers property and casualty coverage and tailored specialty risk solutions for commercial, institutional, and other professional clients across multiple industries. The reinsurance segment supports insurers worldwide with programs spanning property catastrophe, general property, casualty, marine, aviation, credit and surety, agriculture, accident, life and health, and political risk. Through its mortgage segment, the company delivers mortgage insurance and related risk management and financing products via platforms in the United States, Europe, Bermuda and Hong Kong. Operating across North America, Europe, Asia and Australia, Arch Capital Group Ltd plays a significant role in diversified insurance markets by concentrating on complex and specialty lines that require sophisticated underwriting and data-driven risk evaluation. Founded in 1995, it continues to serve a global client base from its Bermuda headquarters.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.60
Total Equity: $24.21B
Shares: 379,224,138
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $993.00M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $993.00M
Revenue: $19.29B
Revenue: $19.29B
Revenue: $19.29B
Total Equity: $24.21B
Tax Rate: 15.3%
Equity: $24.21B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $993.00M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $24.21B
Shares: 379,224,138
Shares: 379,224,138
CapEx: -$44.00M
Shares: 379,224,138
Stock Price: $101.14
Net Income: $4.40B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:34pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8.9B | $9.7B | $13.3B | $16.9B | $19.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $2.2B | $1.5B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.4B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $5.34 | $3.90 | $11.94 | $11.47 | $11.83 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.23 | $3.80 | $11.62 | $11.19 | $11.60 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 8:31pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $859.0M | $855.1M | $917.0M | $979.0M | $993.0M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $45.1B | $48.0B | $58.9B | $70.9B | $79.2B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $31.5B | $35.1B | $40.6B | $50.1B | $55.0B |
| Total Equity | $13.5B | $12.9B | $18.4B | $20.8B | $24.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $14.5B | $15.9B | $20.3B | $22.7B | $27.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:34pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.4B | $3.8B | $5.7B | $6.7B | $6.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$41.0M | -$51.7M | -$52.0M | -$51.0M | -$44.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.4B | $3.8B | $5.7B | $6.6B | $6.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | $0 | $0 | $852.0M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.2B | -$585.8M | $0 | -$24.0M | -$1.9B |
| Net Change in Cash | $24.0M | -$41.4M | $225.0M | $262.0M | $307.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:34pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.2% | +37.7% | +27.4% | +14.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -31.6% | +201.0% | -2.9% | +2.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 8:31pm (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-11-18 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:27| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($99.57) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +6% | 29.0% | $211.48 | +112% |
| Base — stabilizes | +4% | 25.2% | $174.42 | +75% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 21.4% | $141.21 | +42% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -10% | 25.2% | $106.08 | +7% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-17Arch is paid to absorb liability with rated balance-sheet capital — a function cheap software cannot perform — while AI attacks the cost side: claims triage, loss-adjustment expense, submission intake, actuarial and cat-model work, and the mortgage segment's credit analytics.
Arch's persistent sub-peer combined ratio rests on superior risk selection and cycle discipline; if inexpensive modeling lets weaker carriers, MGAs and ILS capital price specialty and cat risk nearly as well, that selection spread compresses precisely when the market softens.
Whether Arch's combined-ratio advantage over the specialty peer group holds through the next soft phase. Watch the gap in accident-year loss ratio and expense ratio versus peers, plus reserve-development direction, rather than headline premium growth.
A-rated Bermuda-and-onshore capital base, decades of specialty and mortgage loss experience, broker and delegated-authority relationships, and regulatory licenses — none of which an AI-native entrant can bootstrap.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Arch on three channels: expense (real, incremental — intake, claims, actuarial, service functions, but commissions dominate the acquisition cost and don't fall), underwriting selection (double-edged — Arch's own tooling improves, yet the industry's average pricing accuracy rises faster, eroding the informational rent that specialty underwriters earn), and exposure mix (new AI/cyber liability and model-error covers add premium; better loss prevention slowly shrinks some casualty and property frequency base). The scarce asset — capital willing to own tail liability, plus the license and rating to do it — becomes relatively MORE valuable as analysis commoditizes, which is why the net read is favorable but not dramatic; AI moves Arch's costs and its competitors' competence at the same time, and capital supply, not intelligence, still sets the cycle.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside AI liability, model-failure and cyber exposures are a new specialty premium pool where scarce underwriting appetite, not code, sets price — Arch's specialty franchise can monetize risks created by the same technology pressuring its analytics edge.
Downside Model monoculture: if most carriers, brokers and ILS investors converge on similar AI-augmented cat and casualty models, correlated mispricing of tails gets embedded industry-wide, and Arch's reserve adequacy becomes a function of a shared error rather than its own judgment.
Outcome range spread 34
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:30The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a clearer story than the models' cacophony. Quarterly revenue peaked at $5.21B in Q2 2025 and has declined sequentially for three straight quarters to $4.67B in Q2 2026 — an 10.4% top-line contraction from peak. Net income margins compressed from 26.4% (Q3 2025) to 22.6% (Q2 2026). YoY revenue growth of 14% is real but the *trajectory* is unambiguously decelerating, and the Q1 2025 margin collapse to 12.3% (LA wildfires, per industry context) is a live reminder that a single cat event vaporizes two quarters of earnings. The five-year revenue CAGR of 20.5% is a hard-market artifact from 2022-2024 rate increases plus the MCE acquisition — not a run-rate. Book value equity of $24.2B against $33.7B market cap gives 1.39x P/B on my math (models say 1.55x — reconcile), and $4.4B TTM earnings on a $33.7B cap is genuinely cheap at ~7.6x if you believe the earnings.
That "if" is the whole game, and the synthesis model's $270 fair value is not serious analysis — it's a DCF crank applied to a cyclical insurer at cycle peak. No competent P&C analyst values Arch at 2.7x current price; the sell-side consensus range is roughly $105-$125, and even the KBW/Goldman bulls cap out around 1.6-1.8x forward book. A $270 target implies ~11x book, which is Progressive-in-2020 territory for a specialty reinsurer with material cat exposure. The Market Forces model's "reserve adequacy" concern and the Thesis Evaluation's -9 score are directionally correct even if slightly overwrought — softening reinsurance pricing (Jan 2026 renewals came in down mid-single-digits per broker reports), rising loss cost inflation, and the sequential margin compression visible right here in the quarterly print all point to normalization, not re-rating higher.
The contrarian case *against* the bears: Arch's underwriting franchise (MI, specialty, reinsurance three-legged stool) is genuinely differentiated, the MCE integration is accretive, ROE of 18% with zero financial leverage is real, and $6.13B FCF against $33.7B cap is a 18% FCF yield that even with normalization to $4B stays double-digit. Insider gifting of 1M+ shares in June 2026 is not a sell signal — likely estate/charitable planning by Watson or a founding shareholder — but the small open-market sales are noise, not conviction buying despite the "Net Insider Buying" tag which appears to be misreading the awards. Book value compounding at ~15% annually with the stock at 1.4x book means you earn a mid-teens IRR just from BVPS growth *if* combined ratios stay sub-90. That's the actual bull case, not a $270 DCF.
I dissent from the synthesis's "undervalued +172%" verdict as numerically unhinged, but I agree with its *direction*. Fair value on my read is $115-$130 — roughly 1.55-1.75x forward book on $75/share BVPS, or 9-10x normalized $12/share EPS. That's 15-30% upside from $99, not 172%. The Thesis Evaluation's -9 score understates the balance sheet quality; the Market Forces headwind flag correctly identifies the reserve/cycle risk but the stock already reflects most of it at 7.6x earnings. This is a modestly undervalued, high-quality cyclical at a late-cycle inflection — a starter position, not a table-pound, and absolutely not the generational bargain the DCF hallucinates. The right catalyst to watch: Q3 2026 combined ratio and reserve development commentary; if adverse development stays under $150M and CR holds sub-88, the re-rating to $120 is on. If Q3 shows $300M+ adverse development, this goes to $85 first.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that Arch is being priced like a cyclical insurer near peak earnings, yet the actual numbers say “plateau,” not “falling apart.” Revenue has scaled from $9.66B in 2022 to $19.30B in 2025, almost a clean doubling in three years, while net income has held above $4.3B for each of the last three years: $4.44B in 2023, $4.31B in 2024, $4.40B in 2025. That is important because the market often discounts insurers when written premium growth is masking deteriorating underwriting, but here the earnings base has not collapsed as the top line expanded. On the latest annual figures, you are paying 8.5x earnings and 1.55x book for an 18.2% ROE business with effectively no reported debt and $24.21B of equity. For a diversified specialty insurer/reinsurer, that is not a distressed multiple and not an expensive one either; it looks like a quality company being given only partial credit for sustaining current returns.
The quarterly trend is softer, but still better than the stock multiple implies. Revenue peaked at $5.21B in 2025-06 and has stepped down to $5.11B, $4.93B, $4.52B, then $4.67B in 2026-06; net income similarly came off the late-2025 highs of $1.24B-$1.35B to about $1.05B-$1.06B in the first half of 2026. That is a moderation, not a break. Margins ran 23%-26% through most of 2025 and are now 22.6%-23.2%, still very strong for insurance. If I annualize the last two quarters, earnings power is roughly $4.2B, only modestly below 2025’s $4.40B. At today’s $33.66B market cap, that still leaves the stock around 8x run-rate earnings. The huge model fair value near $270 looks absurd because it probably capitalizes recent cash flow like an industrial business rather than an insurer, but rejecting that output does not make the equity expensive. It just means the right upside case is a rerating from 8.5x to maybe 10-11x earnings or from 1.55x to 1.8x book, not a tripling.
Cash generation and capitalization make the equity harder to dislike. Operating cash flow of $6.17B and free cash flow of $6.13B on just $44M of capex underscore the capital-light nature of the model, even if “FCF” is a slippery concept in insurance because working capital and float move around. Still, zero debt-to-equity in the supplied metrics matters: Arch is not levering itself to manufacture ROE. A company producing 18% ROE off a largely equity-funded balance sheet deserves respect. At about 1.39x 2025 revenue using the stated market cap versus $19.30B sales, or about 1.95x on the provided P/S metric depending on average share count treatment, the market is not paying a growth multiple for a business that has compounded revenue above 20% annually since 2022. My read is that investors are heavily haircutting the durability of underwriting margins and reserve adequacy; that skepticism is reasonable, but the present valuation already embeds a lot of normalization.
The best case against this view is straightforward: earnings have gone nowhere for three years while revenue surged, which can mean peak pricing has already rolled over and incremental premiums are lower quality. Net income was $4.44B in 2023, then $4.31B, then $4.40B, so despite 45% revenue growth from 2023 to 2025, there was essentially no earnings growth. On a quarterly basis, the drift from $1.35B in 2025-09 to about $1.05B in 2026-03 and 2026-06 suggests normalization is underway, and in insurance that can accelerate fast if catastrophe losses, reserve strengthening, or competitive pricing bite at once. The market-headwinds critique also has teeth: insurers often look cheapest exactly when the cycle is best. If “true” normalized earnings are not $4.2B-$4.4B but closer to $3.0B-$3.3B, then today’s stock is not cheap at all; it is roughly fair at 10x-11x through-cycle earnings and 1.55x book. I weigh that risk differently because there is no evidence in the data of a dramatic earnings air pocket yet, and the balance sheet gives Arch room to absorb volatility without equity impairment becoming the central story.
What would change my mind is not another model claiming 170% upside; it is proof that earnings quality is cracking. If the next two quarters show revenue still around $4.5B-$4.7B but net income falls below $800M and margin drops into the mid-teens, I would assume the cycle is turning harder than expected and that 2025 was the earnings peak. A material decline in book value, a meaningful reserve hit, or sustained ROE below 13%-14% would also flip me toward fair-value-at-best. On the other hand, if Arch can keep quarterly net income around $1.0B+ with book value compounding and no signs of balance-sheet stress, the current $99 price should look too low; in that scenario I would be comfortable underwriting value in the $115-$125 range without needing heroic assumptions.
Grok Reading
Arch Capital at $99 is a high-quality specialty underwriter whose numbers still look like a hard-market winner even as the top line cools. Annual revenue scaled from $9.66B in 2022 to $19.30B in 2025 while net income stepped up from $1.48B to a stable $4.3–4.4B band; trailing profitability sits at a 22.8% net margin, 18.2% ROE, and $6.13B of free cash flow against a $33.7B equity value and essentially zero net debt on $24.2B of book. The market is only paying 8.5x earnings and 1.55x book for that package. What stands out in the recent tape is not collapse but deceleration: quarterly revenue rolled from $5.21B in mid-2025 to $4.52–4.67B in the two most recent prints, and year-ago earnings growth has flattened to roughly 2% even as margins re-expanded into the low-to-mid 20s after the soft 12.3% March 2025 quarter. The story the numbers tell is a mature earner that harvested the cycle, is still throwing off enormous cash, and is being priced as if normalized earnings will be meaningfully lower—not as if the franchise is broken.
The quantitative models that spit out ~$270 fair value and +172% upside are disconnected from how P&C franchises are actually valued. Capitalizing $4.4B of what may be late-cycle earnings at a mid-teens multiple ignores both the historical mean-reversion in specialty pricing and the catastrophe tail that never appears in a clean DCF. A more grounded read still leaves the stock cheap: 1.55x book with high-teens ROE and fortress leverage is a classic value entry for an insurer if underwriting discipline holds, and the $6B+ operating cash flow gives management real optionality on buybacks, reserve strength, and selective growth. Insider flow is noise (mostly awards plus a large gift), not a signal. I am therefore long the quality and the multiple, not the hockey-stick re-rating.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and already partially visible in the data. Revenue CAGR of 20.5% is backward-looking; the recent quarterly trend is decelerating, and the earnings CAGR over the same span is essentially flat at –0.5%, which is exactly what you expect when a hard market peaks and reserve releases roll off. Market-forces commentary flags growth-over-discipline risk and inadequate reserves as the core bear; the thesis engine itself scores slightly negative (–9) with the dominant bear weight on 2023–25 underwriting having been mispriced. If current earnings are 20–30% above mid-cycle, an 8.5x multiple on peak is not a bargain—it is fair-to-expensive once you normalize. Catastrophe volatility and competitive re-entry into specialty lines can compress combined ratios faster than the bull case allows, and the absence of debt is less comforting when the real leverage sits in the liability side of the balance sheet.
I would flip to a clear avoid if two consecutive quarters show combined-ratio deterioration into the mid-90s or higher with explicit reserve strengthening, or if 2026 full-year net income falls below ~$3.5B while book value growth stalls. I would become aggressively bullish if Arch delivers another year of >15% ROE with tangible book value per share compounding mid-teens and revenue stabilizing above $19B without sacrificing loss ratios—proof the cycle has more runway than the market’s 8.5x multiple implies.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue more than doubled from 8.92B in 2021 to 19.30B in 2025 while net income scaled from 2.16B to 4.40B and operating cash conversion stayed elite (OCF/NI 1.68x, FCF 6.13B in 2025). Accruals are negative (-3.1% of assets), consistent with clean earnings and conservative reserving typical of a hard-market specialty carrier. The Altman Z of 1.09 is a false alarm - the model misclassifies insurers because policyholder reserves inflate liabilities; for a P&C/reinsurer, cash flow, reserve development, and combined ratio are the right lenses, and those look healthy. Capital discipline is a genuine strength: diluted share count fell from 412.4M to 379.2M (-2.1% CAGR), SBC is only 0.8% of revenue, and buybacks run at ~6.8x SBC - per-share value is being concentrated. Liquid cash of 993M is modest versus a 33.7B cap but immaterial for a business whose 'cash' is really its float and investment portfolio. Insider tape is unremarkable: mostly routine May 2026 director awards plus a 1M-share gift by Pasquesi and small Posner sales; the reported net buying dollar figure is trivial. Nothing screams distress or aggressive accounting; the pattern is a mature, well-run specialty (re)insurer past the peak of the hard market.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Prior-year reserve development trend (favorable vs adverse) across Insurance, Reinsurance, and Mortgage segments
- Combined ratios by segment for 2024-2025 and cat-loss ratio versus peers
- Impact and integration status of the MidCorp/Entertainment acquisition from Allianz
- Investment portfolio credit quality and duration given the large float
- Any share repurchase authorization changes and pace in 2025-2026
- Reinsurance recoverables aging and counterparty concentration
The e2e composite fair value of $270.74 implies 172% upside, but that number is almost entirely driven by a $326.56 DCF output that is nonsensical for a P&C (re)insurer whose earnings are cycle-dependent and whose value is best anchored to book value and normalized underwriting ROE. I discount the DCF heavily. The anchored-PE of $159.11 is more defensible but still assumes near-peak underwriting margins persist; a through-the-cycle multiple on flatlined net income argues for something closer to $115-135. Against the $99.57 price, that frames a modest, not dramatic, discount. The Company-Quality lens (score 70, 6.13B FCF, OCF/NI 1.68x, shrinking share count) supports a full deserved multiple, but a strong business does not by itself make the stock cheap. The bear case is directionally right that catastrophe tail-risk and cycle normalization cap the upside case, and the market's discount to the composite FV is largely rational skepticism about DCF-ing an insurer. Net: this looks modestly cheap on a quality-adjusted basis, with maybe 15-30% of genuine margin of safety, not 172%.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Combined ratio trend and catastrophe load in the latest 10-Q vs prior year
- Book value per share growth rate ex-buybacks
- Reserve development (favorable vs adverse) in recent quarters
- Management commentary on reinsurance pricing cycle turning
- Share count trajectory and buyback pace at current price
ACGL sits in a sentiment dead zone. The narrative intensity is minimal, the archetype is 'quiet-quality,' and cult coefficient is low — this stock has no active story for the market to inflate or puncture. That is unusual and important: most tape forces simply don't grip here. With a beta of 0.29, the mildly risk-on regime (score +52, VIX 14.3) barely registers as a tailwind, and the higher-rate backdrop is arguably a quiet positive for an insurance float business rather than the headwind it is for growth names. Net macro pressure on THIS name is close to neutral. The one real crosswind is momentum: a 20.5% long-term CAGR has cooled to 14% recently, and the 3-year trend is -10.6pp — the tape is quietly de-emphasizing the name even without a bearish narrative to drive it. Analyst tone appears unremarkable (no revision surge flagged), consistent with a name that trades on book value math rather than storytelling. Cat season and any Q3 loss events are the only obvious sentiment triggers on the horizon.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Atlantic hurricane season activity and any Q3 cat-loss pre-announcements across specialty reinsurers
- Any shift in analyst target revisions or downgrades tied to softening P&C pricing
- Whether relative momentum vs the insurance group turns down or stabilizes
- Signs of capital return acceleration (buyback pace) that could reignite quiet-quality bid
AI reaches Arch on three channels: expense (real, incremental — intake, claims, actuarial, service functions, but commissions dominate the acquisition cost and don't fall), underwriting selection (double-edged — Arch's own tooling improves, yet the industry's average pricing accuracy rises faster, eroding the informational rent that specialty underwriters earn), and exposure mix (new AI/cyber liability and model-error covers add premium; better loss prevention slowly shrinks some casualty and property frequency base). The scarce asset — capital willing to own tail liability, plus the license and rating to do it — becomes relatively MORE valuable as analysis commoditizes, which is why the net read is favorable but not dramatic; AI moves Arch's costs and its competitors' competence at the same time, and capital supply, not intelligence, still sets the cycle.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Rating agency capital adequacy views
- Bermuda/US regulatory capital changes
- Litigation/social-inflation severity trend
- Global insured exposure growth
- Captive and self-insurance retention trends
- New AI/cyber line submissions
- Peer combined-ratio dispersion narrowing
- Third-party AI underwriting tool adoption
Two macro forces cut opposite ways for Arch. High rates (10y 4.63%) are a durable earnings tailwind on the float and the main reason profit rose while premium fell. Simultaneously, that same capital abundance — traditional reinsurance equity plus ILS inflows — has ended the hard market, pushing property/cat pricing down and forcing disciplined underwriters to shed volume. Social inflation and litigation funding keep casualty severity elevated, which supports rate there but threatens back-year reserves. Elevated cat frequency raises both pricing floors and earnings variance. Net: a world where specialty insurers' earnings power is defended by yields and diversification while their top line compresses — flat, not broken.
When we made this prediction on Aug 18, 2026, ACGL was $97.81. We expect it to be $110.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $88.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.