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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company (HPE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -27 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -31 · Value -25 · Sentiment 47 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
HPE NYSEHewlett Packard Enterprise Company is a global information technology and enterprise solutions provider focused on business and public sector customers. The company designs and delivers integrated IT infrastructure spanning servers, data storage, networking, and hybrid cloud platforms that help organizations manage, protect, and process data across on-premises environments, the cloud, and the edge. Its portfolio includes high-performance computing and AI systems, intelligent edge solutions, containerization and virtualization technologies, and security, risk and compliance services, supported by advisory, professional, and managed services. Hewlett Packard Enterprise also offers financial and asset management services that enable customers to consume IT on flexible, service-like models. Serving industries such as financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, retail, telecommunications, and government, the company plays a central role in modern enterprise IT architectures worldwide, helping large and mid-sized organizations operate mission-critical workloads and data-intensive applications. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company is headquartered in Spring, Texas, United States.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.04
Total Equity: $24.75B
Shares: 1,324,000,000
Total Debt: $26.36B
Cash: $5.77B
EBITDA: $2.30B
Total Debt: $26.36B
Cash: $5.77B
Revenue: $34.30B
Revenue: $34.30B
Revenue: $34.30B
Total Equity: $24.75B
Tax Rate: 120.0%
Equity: $24.75B
Total Debt: $26.36B
Cash: $5.77B
Current Liabilities: $24.64B
Long-Term Debt: $21.75B
Total Debt: $26.36B
Total Equity: $24.75B
Shares: 1,324,000,000
Shares: 1,324,000,000
CapEx: -$2.29B
Shares: 1,324,000,000
Stock Price: $54.69
Net Income: $57.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:36pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $27.8B | $28.5B | $29.1B | $30.1B | $34.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $1.1B | $782.0M | $2.1B | $2.2B | -$437.0M |
| Net Income | $3.4B | $868.0M | $2.0B | $2.6B | $57.0M |
| EBITDA | $3.7B | $3.3B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $2.3B |
| EPS | $2.62 | $0.67 | $1.56 | $1.95 | $-0.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.58 | $0.66 | $1.54 | $1.93 | $-0.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:30pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $14.8B | $5.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $18.9B | $20.5B | $18.9B | $33.5B | $25.0B |
| Total Assets | $57.7B | $57.1B | $57.2B | $71.3B | $75.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $20.7B | $23.2B | $21.9B | $26.0B | $24.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $12.5B | $11.9B | $11.7B | $17.7B | $21.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $37.7B | $37.2B | $35.9B | $46.4B | $51.2B |
| Total Equity | $20.0B | $19.9B | $21.2B | $24.9B | $24.8B |
| Retained Earnings | -$5.6B | -$5.4B | -$3.9B | -$2.1B | -$2.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:36pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.9B | $4.6B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.5B | -$3.1B | -$2.8B | -$2.4B | -$2.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $627.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$505.0M | $0 | -$761.0M | -$147.0M | -$12.3B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.4B | -$696.0M | -$4.9B | -$5.5B | -$6.8B |
| Dividends Paid | -$625.0M | -$621.0M | -$619.0M | -$676.0M | -$684.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$213.0M | -$512.0M | -$421.0M | -$150.0M | -$202.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$289.0M | $431.0M | -$182.0M | $10.5B | -$9.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:36pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +2.6% | +2.2% | +3.4% | +13.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -30.9% | +167.1% | +4.8% | -120.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -74.7% | +133.3% | +27.4% | -97.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -12.5% | +44.2% | +1.0% | -51.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:30pm (57d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-16 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-24 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-19 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-18 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-18 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-21 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-20 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-19 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-18 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-12 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-13 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-13 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-09 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-10 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-09 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-10 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a more constructive story than the synthesis verdict admits. Quarterly revenue has stepped from $7.71B (Jul-24) to $10.68B (Apr-26) — that's a 39% expansion in seven quarters, driven substantively by the Juniper close. Net margins have re-normalized from the -13.8% Q2'25 disaster (Juniper-related charges) to 4.9% and 5.8% in the two most recent quarters. Annualizing recent quarter run-rate gets you ~$40B revenue and ~$2.2-2.5B net income — which against a $72B market cap is roughly 29-33x forward earnings, expensive but not absurd for a company just absorbing a $14B acquisition. The FY25 GAAP figures (op income -$437M, NI $57M) are transaction-distorted and materially useless as a base rate.
The Valuation Synthesis fair value of $7.83 is, frankly, garbage output — it's mechanically anchoring on trailing GAAP earnings that reflect one-time Juniper charges. A $7 fair value implies HPE is worth less than its ~$5.77B cash balance net of nothing, which is obviously wrong for a business generating $2.9B operating cash flow and running at a $40B revenue rate. The Pre-Flight note flagging EV/EBITDA of 40x as "looking through" 2025 is closer to correct, but even that overstates the multiple — normalized EBITDA on the Juniper-inclusive base is likely $5-6B, putting EV/EBITDA closer to 17-18x, not 40x. So the synthesis and DCF layer are both wrong in the same direction: they treated a merger-year GAAP number as run-rate. The Market Forces and Narrative layers, which frame this as an execution-risk story rather than a valuation disaster, are more defensible.
The real bear case isn't the DCF — it's the balance sheet and competitive positioning. Debt of $26.36B against $5.77B cash and $24.75B equity is genuinely levered for a hardware business; interest expense at current rates eats meaningfully into that recovering NI line. FCF of $627M on $2.92B operating cash flow means capex is consuming 78% of OCF, which is not the profile of a capital-light platform company — it's the profile of a capital-intensive infrastructure vendor pretending to be one. GreenLake's ARR is real but small relative to the $34B revenue base. And in AI infrastructure — the actual growth vector — HPE is competing with Dell (which is winning the tier-2 hyperscaler backlog) and Supermicro, not leading. A contrarian would note that Dell trades at ~7-8x EV/EBITDA while executing better on AI servers; if HPE re-rates toward Dell's multiple on normalized numbers, downside is to ~$38-42. The insider activity — heavy option exercises and a 565k share gift on July 3 — is not a buying signal; it's monetization behavior consistent with an insider group that thinks the stock is fully valued here.
I dissent from the synthesis verdict ($7 fair value) as methodologically broken but I partially agree with its directional conclusion: HPE is not undervalued at $54.69. Fair value on normalized post-Juniper earnings, applying a 12-14x multiple appropriate for a levered infrastructure hybrid growing high-single-digits organically, lands at roughly $42-50. The stock is modestly overvalued but not catastrophically so, and the recent margin recovery (1.8% → 4.9% → 5.8%) is a genuine positive that could support current levels if it continues into Q3/Q4 2026. The thesis pivots entirely on whether the Apr-26 quarter's 5.8% margin holds — if Juniper synergies drive that to 7-8% by mid-2027, current price is justified; if margins slip back to 3-4% amid AI-server pricing pressure, $42 is the floor. Not a short (Juniper integration momentum is real, revenue trajectory is strong), not a buy (leverage, competitive position, valuation all say wait). The Market Forces "potential value trap" characterization is the most honest framing among the prior models.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is how disconnected the current equity value looks from the earnings base we actually have. On the latest annual numbers, HPE did $34.3B of revenue and just $57M of net income, with operating income of negative $437M. Even if I treat 2025 as a distorted year, the balance sheet and cash flow do not support a relaxed view: $26.4B of debt against $5.8B of cash leaves roughly $20.6B of net debt, while free cash flow was only $627M. That is a rich setup for a $72.4B market cap. The stock is effectively being valued on a forward normalization story, not on delivered economics. At the current price, investors are paying about 2.1x sales for a company whose annual net margin just collapsed to 0.2% and whose ROIC is functionally zero.
The bull argument would say the annual figures are stale and the quarterly run-rate already shows the rebound. There is truth there: the last four quarters are far better than the ugly annual print. Revenue has stepped up from $7.63B in April 2025 to $10.68B in April 2026, and net income has recovered from a $1.05B loss to $624M. On a trailing four-quarter basis, revenue is about $38.8B and net income about $1.56B, implying roughly a 4.0% net margin. That is real improvement. But even on that more generous lens, the stock is still expensive: $72.4B market cap on $1.56B of trailing quarterly-based earnings is about 46x earnings, before giving any penalty for leverage. For a company with debt/equity above 1x, current ratio barely over 1x, and structurally mixed hardware exposure, that multiple assumes the margin recovery is not only real but still early.
The deeper issue is quality of the recovery. The quarterly pattern says revenue is accelerating, but margins remain thin and erratic. HPE posted net margins of 1.8%, 4.9%, and 5.8% in the last three quarters after the big loss quarter; that is stabilization, not evidence of a transformed business model. A business valued like this should be showing either durable double-digit margins or much faster organic growth. Instead, the long view is revenue growth from $27.8B in 2021 to $34.3B in 2025, respectable but not extraordinary, while earnings have gone the wrong way: $3.43B of net income in 2021, $2.03B in 2023, $2.58B in 2024, then basically breakeven in 2025. That is not a clean compounding story; it is a cyclical, lumpy infrastructure vendor with inconsistent profitability. I also do not trust the “mature earner” framing much here, because mature earners usually throw off dependable free cash flow and support valuation with steady margins. HPE’s 2025 free cash flow of $627M on $34.3B of sales is less than 2% of revenue.
The strongest case against my skepticism is that the market may be correctly looking through a one-year trough and pricing the next two years, not the last one. If the latest quarter’s $624M of net income on $10.68B of revenue is closer to a normalized earnings power, then annualized earnings would be around $2.5B, and the market cap would be closer to 29x that number. That is still not cheap, but it is no longer absurd if investors believe AI infrastructure demand, higher attach software/services, and operating leverage can push margins materially higher. The sequential revenue jump from $9.30B to $10.68B is strong, and if that reflects broad demand rather than one-off deal timing, the business may be exiting a bad patch faster than the annual statements imply. I weigh that less heavily because one strong quarter does not erase a year in which operating income went negative, and because leverage means HPE has less room for execution errors than a cleaner balance sheet peer.
What would change my mind is simple: I would need to see that the revenue rebound converts into durable cash earnings, not just temporary accounting recovery. Specifically, if the next few quarters hold revenue above $10B while net margin stays at or above 6%, and if annual free cash flow moves from $627M to comfortably above $2B without debt swelling further, then the current price would look much more defensible. Conversely, if revenue stays strong but net income falls back toward the $175M-$305M range seen in late 2025, that would confirm HPE is being valued on hope rather than economics. At $54.69, the market is already capitalizing a successful normalization. I do not think the proof is there yet.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a company that grew the top line while nearly extinguishing the bottom line. Fiscal 2025 delivered $34.3B of revenue—up roughly 14% from $30.1B—yet operating income flipped from +$2.19B to –$437M and net income collapsed from $2.58B to $57M. That is not a rounding error; it is a full profit cycle wipeout coinciding with elevated integration spend, mix shift, and the balance-sheet load of the Juniper deal. Net debt sits near $20.6B against only $5.8B of cash, free cash flow compressed to $627M on $2.92B of operating cash flow after $2.29B of capex, and returns on equity and capital are effectively zero. The market is nonetheless paying $54.69, or about $72B of equity value and roughly $92B of enterprise value—2.1× sales and a reported 40× EV/EBITDA—while trailing earnings are meaningless and the annual operating margin is negative. Recent quarters do show sequential stabilization: the two most recent prints ($9.30B and $10.68B revenue, 4.9% and 5.8% net margins) look cleaner than the –13.8% catastrophe of April 2025. That recovery is real, but it is still only mid-single-digit profitability on a capital-intensive hardware-plus-services base, and it has not yet repaired the annual cash-generation or leverage picture.
What stands out is the gap between the improving quarterly run-rate and the valuation that already assumes the turnaround is largely complete. Annualize the latest quarter’s $624M net income and you get roughly $2.5B—respectable, and close to the 2023–2024 earnings level—yet even that optimistic annualization supports a mid-teens multiple only if you believe margins hold and debt is digested without further dilution of returns. At 15–18× that run-rate the equity is worth something closer to $35–45B, or roughly $27–34 per share, before applying any conglomerate or execution discount. The $54 handle therefore embeds either sustained mid-to-high single-digit net margins on continued double-digit revenue growth, material Juniper cost and cross-sell synergies that have not yet appeared in the annuals, or an implicit breakup/sum-of-parts bid that the cash-flow statement does not yet underwrite. Revenue CAGR of 8.5% is decent for mature infrastructure; earnings and FCF CAGRs of –83% and –37% are not. The classification as a “mature earner” sits uncomfortably beside near-zero ROIC and a current ratio of 1.0.
The strongest contrary case is that the market is correctly looking through a one-time trough. Revenue has re-accelerated into the $9–10B+ quarterly zone, net margins have reclaimed the 5% area, and the AI server and networking cycle plus GreenLake’s recurring layer could restore operating leverage faster than a static DCF assumes. Juniper brings a higher-quality networking franchise that, if integrated cleanly, lifts the blended margin profile and gives HPE a more credible AI-fabric story against Arista and Cisco. On that view, $2.5–3.0B of normalized net income is achievable within a couple of years; apply a 20× multiple in an AI-capex up-cycle and you can defend a mid-$40s to low-$50s price, making today’s level merely full rather than egregious. Insider activity is noisy but not panic-driven, the dividend is covered at a low payout, and the stock has already been re-rated as a transformation vehicle rather than a melting hardware ice cube. I weigh this less heavily because the annual 2025 results and the still-elevated net leverage show the transformation’s cash cost in arrears, FCF conversion remains weak, and a 40× EV/EBITDA screen is what you pay for proven software compounders, not for a still-cyclical infrastructure mix whose earnings power has just been demonstrated to be fragile.
I would reverse to a neutral or constructive stance if the next two reported quarters sustain net margins above 6–7% with free-cash-flow conversion back above 50% of net income, if net debt begins a clear absolute decline, and if management prints concrete Juniper synergy dollars and GreenLake ARR growth that together support a credible path to $3B+ of annual net income without another leverage spike.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
HPE is a classic mature earner: revenue grew from $27.8B in 2021 to $34.3B in 2025 (a jump driven at least partly by the Juniper acquisition), with operating margin oscillating between 2.7% and 7.3% before collapsing to -1.3% in 2025. Net income fell from $2.58B in 2024 to just $57M in 2025, and FCF halved from $1.97B to $627M. Share count has been remarkably stable (-0.1% CAGR), SBC is a modest 1.9% of revenue, and buybacks offset 66% of SBC — dilution is not a problem, but per-share value is not being aggressively compounded either.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Extent to which 2025 operating loss reflects Juniper deal charges, integration costs, or underlying margin erosion
- Terms and maturity ladder of the $20B+ debt stack post-Juniper financing
- Segment-level margins - is core Compute deteriorating or is weakness concentrated in one-time items
- Whether the Juniper-enlarged entity has a coherent networking strategy vs Cisco/Arista
- Customer concentration and AI-server GPU supply exposure
- Working capital drivers behind the -4.2% accruals figure and OCF/NI of 12.4x
The e2e composite fair value of $7.83 (signal-adjusted $7.18) is essentially an EPV-floor artifact anchored on the depressed 2025 P&L, where operating margin went negative on Juniper deal indigestion and restructuring. Taking that number literally would imply an 87% overvaluation on a $72B enterprise IT franchise generating real cash - that is not credible and I discount it heavily. Normalized, HPE historically earns mid-single-digit billions of operating income; on a more sober mid-cycle earnings power of roughly $2.00-$2.20 EPS, $54 is around 25x trough-ish earnings or a mid-teens multiple on normalized numbers, i.e. broadly in line with mature enterprise infrastructure peers. Against $20B net debt and $627M TTM FCF, the balance sheet argues for a discount, not a premium. The bull case (AI server tailwind, Juniper synergies, recurring GreenLake mix) is largely reflected in a stock that has re-rated to a full market cap of $72B. The bear case (commoditization, hyperscaler bypass, deal integration risk) is a real offset but not obviously mispriced in either direction. Net: price roughly matches deserved value; no margin of safety, no clear overpricing either. This is a 'wait for a better pitch' situation, not an actionable long or short on valuation alone.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Juniper deal accretion timeline and synergy targets in latest guidance
- Normalized (ex-restructuring, ex-deal) operating margin bridge from 2025 to 2026
- Segment breakout of AI server revenue, backlog, and gross margin vs traditional compute
- Net debt paydown schedule and any dividend/buyback pause risk
- GreenLake ARR growth and mix shift toward recurring revenue
The dominant force on HPE right now is a fresh, high-profile narrative shift: Morgan Stanley moved to Overweight with a ~30% upside call and explicitly conceded 'we've been on the wrong side' of enterprise hardware, and simultaneously upgraded the whole IT hardware group to In-Line. That is exactly the kind of analyst-tone inflection that reshapes a fallen-angel setup - the story is pivoting from 'legacy box-maker' toward 'AI-infrastructure beneficiary,' and the tape is rewarding it (6% pop, cohort moves with Dell and SMCI). Memory price surge commentary adds a second, independent bullish thread on hardware pricing power.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether other sell-side desks follow Morgan Stanley's upgrade or fade it
- Next HPE earnings print - does AI-server margin recovery hold or look one-time
- Dell / SMCI earnings reactions as tone-setters for the AI-hardware cohort
- 10y yield direction - a break above 4.8% would pressure this re-rating
- Juniper integration commentary - any slip re-activates the legacy-hardware bear story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for HPE — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.