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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. (CHRW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc.
CHRW NASDAQC.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. is a global third-party logistics and supply chain services company that connects shippers with transportation providers across truckload, less-than-truckload, intermodal, ocean, air, and customs brokerage services. The company also offers freight brokerage, transportation management, produce sourcing, and related logistics solutions designed to help customers move goods efficiently across complex supply networks. Its business is organized around North American Surface Transportation and Global Forwarding, with additional services in its All Other and Corporate segment. C.H. Robinson serves a wide range of industries, including retail, automotive, healthcare, food and beverage, and energy, supporting manufacturers, distributors, and other commercial customers with scalable freight and logistics coordination. Headquartered in Eden Prairie, Minnesota, C.H. Robinson plays a significant role in global transportation markets through its broad carrier network and technology-enabled logistics platform.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 5.25
Total Equity: $1.63B
Shares: 120,703,333
Total Debt: $1.69B
Cash: $154.59M
EBITDA: $933.35M
Total Debt: $1.69B
Cash: $154.59M
Revenue: $17.00B
Revenue: $17.00B
Revenue: $17.00B
Total Equity: $1.63B
Tax Rate: 18.4%
Equity: $1.63B
Total Debt: $1.69B
Cash: $154.59M
Current Liabilities: $2.25B
Long-Term Debt: $1.69B
Total Debt: $1.69B
Total Equity: $1.63B
Shares: 120,703,333
Shares: 120,703,333
CapEx: -$16.60M
Shares: 120,703,333
Stock Price: $147.64
Net Income: $633.33M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:10pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $23.1B | $24.7B | $17.6B | $17.7B | $16.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $1.1B | $1.3B | $514.6M | $669.1M | $795.0M |
| Net Income | $844.2M | $940.5M | $325.1M | $465.7M | $587.1M |
| EBITDA | $1.2B | $1.4B | $613.6M | $766.3M | $897.8M |
| EPS | $6.37 | $7.48 | $2.74 | $3.89 | $4.88 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $6.31 | $7.40 | $2.72 | $3.86 | $4.83 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:10pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $257.4M | $217.5M | $145.5M | $145.8M | $160.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $4.8B | $3.6B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $2.8B |
| Total Assets | $7.0B | $6.0B | $5.2B | $5.3B | $5.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.3B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $1.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.4B | $920.0M | $1.4B | $921.9M | $1.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.0B | $4.6B | $3.8B | $3.6B | $3.2B |
| Total Equity | $2.0B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.9B | $5.6B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $6.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:10pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $95.0M | $1.7B | $731.9M | $509.1M | $914.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$34.2M | -$61.9M | -$30.0M | -$22.7M | -$19.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $60.8M | $1.6B | $702.0M | $486.4M | $894.9M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$14.8M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$11.9M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $298.0M | $200.0M | $0 | $0 | -$262.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$277.3M | -$285.3M | -$291.6M | -$294.8M | -$301.4M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$581.8M | -$1.5B | -$63.9M | $0 | -$354.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | $13.6M | -$39.9M | -$72.0M | $10.5M | $4.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:10pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.9% | -28.7% | +0.7% | -8.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +17.1% | -59.4% | +30.0% | +18.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +11.4% | -65.4% | +43.2% | +26.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +15.9% | -54.9% | +24.9% | +17.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:10pm (16d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-04 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-05 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-06 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-06 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-01 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-02 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-01 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-01 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-02 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-03 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-14 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly data tells a more nuanced story than the models capture. Revenue through the trailing twelve months is $16.99B, essentially flat against the prior-year TTM of $17.01B, confirming the "recent_revenue_yoy: -0.1%" figure. But the sequential trajectory within that window is the critical detail the models underweight: Q2 2026 revenue of $4.93B is up 19% year-over-year from $4.14B and up 23% sequentially from Q1's $4.01B. That is not a flat-revenue company. That is a company whose most recent print is the strongest quarter in the entire eight-quarter series shown, and it breaks the 2023-2025 revenue decline pattern ($24.7B → $17.6B → $17.7B → $16.2B) for the first time. Net income in that same quarter hit $186.8M at a 3.8% margin, the best absolute dollar figure in the series. TTM net income of roughly $633M on $16.99B revenue yields a 3.73% net margin — thin, yes, but stable across every single quarter shown, ranging from 3.3% to 3.9%. The "margin inflection" the bulls keep promising hasn't arrived, but the "margin collapse" the bears fear also hasn't happened. What you have is a structurally 3.5-4% margin business, not a 3% margin business on the verge of deterioration.
Against that, the valuation at $147.64 is genuinely stretched for what the company is today. Twenty-eight times trailing earnings, 20.7x EV/EBITDA, 10.9x book — these are multiples that make sense for a 15-20% growth company, not for a freight broker whose revenue is flat and whose net margin has been in a 3.3-3.9% band for eight consecutive quarters. The 21.5% ROIC and 5.5% FCF margin ($894.9M FCF on $16.23B revenue, with only $19.6M of capex) are the genuine quality signals that justify a premium over a pure trucking or brokerage peer, and the asset-light model with $1.09B of debt against $1.85B of equity is manageable but not trivially so. The "Net Insider Buying" secondary signal is, on inspection, meaningless: every one of the ten listed transactions is an "A-Award" vesting or an "F-InKind" trust transfer, with redacted names. No one is buying CHRW in the open market with their own money. That is not conviction; that is a compensation mechanism. The models that weighted this as a positive signal are reading a form 4 filing as a thesis.
The Valuation Synthesis verdict of "overvalued" with a composite fair value of $87.21 (signal-adjusted $79.71) is directionally right but the magnitude is wrong, and I think the error is in the DCF anchor. A $80 fair value implies roughly 12-13x trailing FCF, which is below where CHRW has traded for the past decade and below the 15-18x FCF range that is standard for asset-light logistics with sub-$20M capex. A more defensible range: 15x TTM FCF of ~$900M gives $13.5B or roughly $112 per share; 20x gives $18B or roughly $150. The current $147.64 sits at the very top of that range, meaning the market is paying for the Q2 acceleration to be the start of a sustained recovery rather than a tariff-driven one-quarter spike. The Narrative layer's claim that "60-70% of the share price is the margin-transformation story" overstates the case — the asset-light FCF profile and 21.5% ROIC are real cash-flow attributes, not narrative. But the "Navisphere AI matching" premium layered on top of that is, as the bear story correctly notes, a story that has been "next year" since 2016. The Pre-Flight's observation that the stock de-rated from $210 to $147 on freight-cycle disappointment is the right framing: this is a cyclical stock that the market is still pricing as if the cycle has turned.
The contrarian case for the stock is the Q2 print itself. If the $4.93B quarter reflects tariff-driven reshoring, inventory restocking, and a genuine freight-volume recovery rather than a one-time pricing spike, then the revenue base is not $16.2B and declining — it is $17B and inflecting upward, and the 28x multiple compresses to 22-24x on forward earnings within two quarters. The models' "sector in contraction" flag and "macro headwinds" signal are based on the 2023-2025 data and may be stale relative to the Q2 2026 print. But the contrarian case for the stock is equally fragile: one quarter of acceleration in a business whose revenue is down 34% from its 2022 peak, with no visible margin expansion, is not a trend. The data is thin on the forward side — we have no guidance, no volume breakdown, no tariff-impact quantification — and the insider data is effectively empty. I commit to "fairly valued to slightly overvalued," which means I partially agree with the synthesis direction but reject its $80 anchor.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
C.H. Robinson is an asset-light freight brokerage whose revenue collapsed 35 percent from the 2022 freight-bubble peak of $26.38B to a stabilized $17.0B in 2025-2026. Operating margin bottomed at 3.0 percent in 2024 and has recovered to 4.9 percent by 2026, with net income climbing from a $332M trough to $633M. Free cash flow, after a volatile 2023 spike of $1.83B (likely working-capital release as receivables normalized) and a 2024 dip to $362M, has settled around $670M per year. The business is self-funding and does not need external capital, but it carries $1.53B of net debt that acts as a constraint rather than a cushion. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 1.46x, negative accruals of -3.8 percent of assets, and an Altman Z of 7.6 all point to cash-backed, unmanipulated results. Share count has shrunk from 132M to 120.7M over four years, with buybacks exceeding stock-based compensation by a factor of 593 percent, so per-share value is being concentrated. The structural limitation is the business model itself: a 3-to-5 percent operating margin on pass-through freight revenue, high cyclicality tied to macro freight volumes, and a moat that rests on scale and digital platform rather than pricing power or switching costs.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer concentration: top-10 shipper share of revenue from the 10-K to assess single-client risk in a $17B revenue base
- Convertible or term-loan covenants tied to the $1.53B net debt, including interest coverage and any maturity wall in the next 24 months
- Segment or mode-level revenue split (ocean, air, truck, rail) to confirm whether the $17B plateau is broad-based or concentrated in one mode
- Working-capital cycle: days sales outstanding and days payable outstanding trend to confirm the 2023 FCF spike was indeed receivable normalization and not a one-time item
- SBC grant structure: whether the 0.5 percent SBC/rev is performance-vested or time-vested, and any change in grant size relative to the 2022-2023 peak
At $147.64, CHRW trades well above what its cash flows support. The e2e composite fair value is $87.21 and the signal-adjusted figure is $79.71, implying the price carries a 69-85% premium over deserved value. The DCF output of $82.68 reinforces this: a business generating roughly 3-5% operating margin on $17B of largely pass-through freight revenue simply does not produce the free cash flow needed to justify a $17.25B market cap on a discounted basis. The one method that lands near the price is the anchored PE at $146.97, which is essentially the current share price to the dollar. That means the market's multiple is 'fair' by peer comparison, but the cash-flow math says the multiple is too high for the earnings power. The bull case requires operating margins to roughly double from ~3% to 6-7% via Navisphere AI scaling, a transformation that has been narrated since 2016 without the inflection arriving. The bear case correctly notes the $10B working-capital hole and the commodity-like economics. Earnings quality is high (score 3), so no haircut is warranted, but that only confirms the numbers are real - it does not make them large enough to support the price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest 10-Q segment detail: is Navisphere/AI-driven revenue actually growing faster than legacy brokerage, and at what incremental margin?
- Management guidance on operating-margin trajectory for FY2026-2027 - any concrete target above 4% would change the DCF terminal assumptions
- Working-capital trend: is the $10B receivables/payables gap stabilizing or expanding with volume?
- Share buyback pace and remaining authorization - is the share count shrinking fast enough to offset multiple compression?
- Freight-rate outlook (Drewry, BCI) for H2 2026 - a second recessionary dip would compress the already-thin margin further
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 2, 2026, CHRW was $188.86. We expect it to be $166.37 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $110.00. This is an early model (v0.3.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.