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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for ON Semiconductor Corporation (ON) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-21): Designation Low · Gem Score -46 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -7 · Value -72 · Sentiment -43 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $21.52 vs $74.80 at analysis
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ON Semiconductor Corporation
ON NASDAQON Semiconductor Corporation is a semiconductor company that develops intelligent power and sensing solutions for automotive, industrial, computing, and communications applications. The company designs and supplies a broad portfolio of products that includes power management devices, image sensors, analog and mixed-signal components, and silicon carbide technologies used in energy-efficient systems. ON Semiconductor Corporation supports customers building electric vehicles, factory automation, advanced driver-assistance systems, data centers, and renewable energy equipment. Its products help manage power conversion, enable sensing and imaging, and improve system efficiency across complex electronic platforms. Headquartered in Scottsdale, Arizona, ON Semiconductor Corporation plays an important role in the global semiconductor market by supplying components that support electrification, automation, and connected devices.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.29
Total Equity: $7.69B
Shares: 411,800,000
Total Debt: $3.00B
Cash: $2.15B
EBITDA: $770.20M
Total Debt: $3.00B
Cash: $2.15B
Revenue: $6.00B
Revenue: $6.00B
Revenue: $6.00B
Total Equity: $7.69B
Tax Rate: 5.9%
Equity: $7.69B
Total Debt: $3.00B
Cash: $2.15B
Current Liabilities: $1.29B
Long-Term Debt: $3.00B
Total Debt: $3.00B
Total Equity: $7.69B
Shares: 411,800,000
Shares: 411,800,000
CapEx: -$341.20M
Shares: 411,800,000
Stock Price: $74.80
Net Income: $121.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 3:23am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.7B | $8.3B | $8.3B | $7.1B | $6.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $3.9B | $4.0B |
| Gross Profit | $2.7B | $4.1B | $3.9B | $3.2B | $2.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.9B |
| Operating Income | $1.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $1.8B | $84.2M |
| Net Income | $1.0B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $1.6B | $121.0M |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $2.4B | $770.2M |
| EPS | $2.37 | $4.39 | $5.07 | $3.68 | $0.29 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.27 | $4.25 | $4.89 | $3.63 | $0.29 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 3:00am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.4B | $2.9B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.8B | $5.7B | $5.9B | $6.8B | $5.8B |
| Total Assets | $9.6B | $12.0B | $13.2B | $14.1B | $12.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.9B | $3.1B | $2.6B | $3.4B | $3.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.0B | $5.8B | $5.4B | $5.3B | $4.8B |
| Total Equity | $4.6B | $6.2B | $7.8B | $8.8B | $7.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.4B | $4.4B | $6.5B | $8.1B | $8.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 3:23am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$444.6M | -$1.0B | -$1.6B | -$694.0M | -$341.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.3B | $1.6B | $401.9M | $1.2B | $1.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | -$236.3M | -$20.5M | -$124.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$483.2M | -$30.0M | $121.6M | $0 | -$375.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$259.8M | -$564.2M | -$654.1M | -$1.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | $296.2M | $1.6B | -$448.0M | $208.4M | -$544.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 3:23am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +23.5% | -0.9% | -14.2% | -15.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +50.2% | -4.8% | -17.2% | -38.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +83.3% | +7.6% | -30.4% | -95.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +88.4% | +14.8% | -28.0% | -92.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +54.5% | +8.1% | -23.4% | -68.0% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:44A +1σ run of quarters pays -86%; a −1σ run costs 96%. Ratio -0.9:1 (μ -5.0%, σ 12.0% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.9 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($74.80) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -1% | 17.3% | $13.12 | -82% |
| Base — stabilizes | -1% | 15.0% | $11.40 | -85% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -2% | 12.8% | $9.74 | -87% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -11% | 5.6% | $3.98 | -95% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +7% | 10.3% | $10.74 | -86% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -17% | 5.5% | $3.29 | -96% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-28 03:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
ON Semi's raw numbers tell a cyclical-trough story, not the "broken business" story the Market Forces model is pushing. Revenue bottomed at $1.45B in Q1 2025 and has climbed sequentially every quarter since to $1.60B in Q2 2026 — that's four straight quarters of sequential growth, +10% off the trough. Net margin recovered from -33.6% in Q1 2025 to 14.1% in Q2 2026. The Q1 2025 -$486M loss and Q1 2026 -$33M loss look like restructuring/inventory charges, not operational collapse — surrounding quarters print 12-16% net margins on lower revenue than 2024. FCF of $1.42B on a $29B market cap is a ~4.9% FCF yield even in a trough year, and the balance sheet is fine: $2.15B cash against $3.0B debt, 4.5x current ratio. This is not a company in structural decline; it's a semi cyclical mid-recovery.
The synthesis verdict of $15.53 fair value is, frankly, absurd and I dissent from it strongly. That number implies ON is worth ~$6.7B — less than 5x trough FCF, less than book equity of $7.69B, and roughly the cash-plus-tangible-asset floor. Peak 2023 earnings were $2.18B; even applying a punitive 10x multiple to a normalized $1.2-1.5B earnings power (below peak, above trough) gets you to $12-15B, and a 15x multiple gets $18-22B, or ~$45-55/share. The DCF driving $15 must be extrapolating trough margins forward, which is exactly the mistake you make with a cyclical at the bottom of the cycle. The P/E of 258 is a garbage metric here — the anomaly flag correctly notes it — and building a valuation narrative off it (as Market Forces implicitly does) is the classic cyclical-value trap in reverse: shorting the trough.
That said, the bull case has real cracks and I don't think $74.80 is cheap either. Peak 2023 revenue of $8.25B is 37% above the current $6.0B run-rate, and there's no evidence yet that automotive/industrial demand snaps back to 2023 levels — Tesla insourcing SiC, Wolfspeed/Infineon competition, and China domestic power-semi buildout are all real structural pressures on the SiC premium narrative. Insider activity shows two 30,000-share sales in April 2026 at what would have been near-recent-highs, and awards/vests are the only buys — that's a mild negative tell. The narrative layer correctly identifies that ON has been bundled into the "AI + EV + renewables" megatheme basket, and if EV growth continues to disappoint (which 2025 numbers suggest it is), multiple compression is warranted. EV/EBITDA of 41 on trough EBITDA normalizes to maybe 15-18x on mid-cycle — not cheap for a cyclical.
My read: fair value is $55-65, not $15 and not $90. The rule-based "high_growth_profitable" classification is wrong (revenue CAGR is -14.8%, this is cyclical-recovery not growth), the pre-flight "traditional/cyclical" framing is correct, the synthesis is directionally right that it's not a screaming buy but wildly overshoots on magnitude, and Market Forces is telling a broken-thesis story that the sequential revenue and margin recovery directly refutes. Momentum's "accelerating quarterly trend" is the signal actually being ignored here. I'd call this modestly overvalued at $74.80 — you're paying peak-cycle multiples on early-recovery earnings, and the risk/reward asymmetry favors waiting for either a pullback to the mid-$50s or two more quarters confirming the margin recovery is sustainable. Not a short (the cash flow floor is real, the balance sheet is clean), not a buy here (paying up for a story that requires 2023 demand to return), and definitely not worth $15.
GPT Reading
The numbers say ON is in a sharp downcycle, but not a broken company, and that distinction matters because the market cap at $29.1B is still charging a premium that only makes sense if earnings power snaps back much harder than the recent data proves. Revenue has fallen from $8.33B in 2022 and $8.25B in 2023 to $7.08B in 2024 and then $6.00B in 2025, a two-year decline of roughly 28% from the peak. More troubling than the top line is the collapse in operating leverage: gross profit went from $4.08B in 2022 to $1.98B in 2025, taking gross margin from about 49.0% to 33.1%, while operating income all but disappeared at $84M in 2025 versus $2.54B in 2023. That is not a business merely “pausing”; it is a business whose utilization and pricing have both deteriorated materially. The recent quarters show some stabilization — revenue improved from $1.45B in 2025-04 to $1.47B, $1.55B, $1.53B, $1.51B, then $1.60B in 2026-07 — but this is stabilization at a much lower plateau than 2024, when quarterly revenue was still $1.72B to $1.76B.
What stands out most is the mismatch between current valuation and current earnings economics. Using the latest annual numbers, ON trades at 5.1x sales, 4.0x book, and over 41x EBITDA, with a P/E near 258x because net income fell to just $121M in 2025. I would not use that P/E literally, but it usefully signals how little earnings support the stock currently has. Even if you normalize away the ugly quarters with losses, the trailing run-rate is not cheap: over the last four reported quarters with data from 2025-10 through 2026-07, net income totals about $630M on roughly $6.19B annualized revenue, an approximately 10% net margin. Put a generous 20x multiple on a cyclical semi name earning $600M-$700M and you do not get to $29B equity value. The balance sheet is fine — $2.15B cash against $3.00B debt, current ratio 4.5x — and cash generation is better than accounting earnings, with 2025 operating cash flow of $1.76B and free cash flow of $1.42B. But that cash flow strength is exactly where I get cautious: when operating income is $84M but operating cash flow is $1.76B, working capital release and non-cash items are doing a lot of the heavy lifting. That is helpful in a downturn, not proof that underlying earnings power deserves a growth multiple.
I also think the rule-based “high-growth profitable” framing is simply stale relative to the actual trend. This is not a high-growth story today. Recent revenue is still down 15.4% year over year, and the latest quarter’s net income of $226.8M is down more than 40% from the $379.9M and $401.7M quarters seen in late 2024 despite a modest sequential rebound in sales. That tells you margins have not remotely recovered to prior-cycle levels. If ON can only earn mid-teens net margins at $1.6B quarterly revenue while peak quarters previously earned low-20s margins at $1.7B-$1.8B revenue, the market should be questioning whether the old profitability structure returns in full. At $74.8, investors are paying for a recovery not just in revenue but in gross margin, operating margin, and confidence. I can support some premium to trough numbers because semis are cyclical; I cannot support a price that already discounts a near-complete rebound when the evidence so far is only “less bad.”
The best case against my view is straightforward and respectable. ON did generate $1.42B of free cash flow in 2025, net debt is only about $850M, and quarterly revenue appears to have bottomed, with the latest $1.60B quarter up from the $1.45B trough. If that revenue line keeps climbing toward the $1.7B-$1.8B zone while margins rebuild, earnings can recover fast because this business historically showed very strong operating leverage: annual net income was $2.18B as recently as 2023 and $1.57B in 2024. On that history, today’s valuation could look far less demanding if 2027 earnings move back above $1.5B. A bull would also say that the ugly 2025 annual operating margin of 1.4% is distorted by one-off charges, consistent with the two deeply negative quarterly net income prints of -$486.1M and -$33.4M embedded in an otherwise profitable sequence. I weigh that argument less heavily because even excluding the worst outliers, the business is still earning far below prior levels, and semis rarely deserve to be valued on best-ever margins during a demand reset.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of slight sequential revenue improvement; it would be proof that earnings power is truly re-forming. Specifically, I would want to see quarterly revenue sustain above $1.70B for at least two quarters and net margin recover back above 18%, which would imply something closer to $300M+ quarterly net income without the help of one-off items. On the annual view, I would need confidence that ON can again produce at least $1.5B of net income or $2.0B+ of EBITDA on a durable basis; then a $29B market cap becomes arguable. Conversely, if revenue rolls over again below $1.5B or free cash flow weakens materially once working-capital tailwinds fade, the stock should de-rate further. My base case today is that ON is a decent company priced as though the hard part of the recovery is already behind it, when the numbers say otherwise.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a classic semiconductor peak-to-trough collapse, not a high-growth compounder. Revenue fell from $8.33B in 2022 to $6.00B in 2025 (−28%), with 2024 already down to $7.08B; the trailing four quarters sit in a $1.45–1.60B band and the latest print of $1.60B only barely arrests the slide. Gross profit halved from $4.08B to $1.98B, gross margin compressed from the high-40s to 33%, and operating income imploded from $2.54B (2023) to $84M (2025). Net income went from $2.18B to $121M; the annual net margin is now 2.0% and ROE/ROIC/ROA all print under 1.6%. That is why the trailing P/E of 258 and EV/EBITDA of 41 are noise—earnings are near zero—while the more honest multiples (P/S 5.1, EV/revenue 5.3, P/B 4.0) still price the equity as if the 2022–23 earnings power is latent rather than impaired. Free cash flow of $1.42B on only $341M capex looks heroic until you remember the working-capital release that accompanies a 15% revenue contraction and inventory drawdown; the FCF CAGR of +88% is therefore not a quality signal, it is a cyclical artifact. Balance-sheet hygiene is fine ($2.15B cash, $3.0B debt, D/E 0.39, current ratio 4.5), so solvency is not the issue—the issue is that a $29B market cap is being asked to underwrite a business whose economic profit has essentially vanished.
The prior models’ $15–18 fair-value range is directionally correct in calling the stock expensive, but it embeds a permanent-impairment assumption that may be too severe if automotive and industrial power demand merely troughs rather than structurally resets. Still, even a generous mid-cycle rebuild—$7B revenue, mid-teens operating margin, ~$800M net income—supports only low-to-mid $40s on a 20× multiple; the current $74.80 price therefore requires both a full return to prior peak margins and continued SiC/EV share gains that the last eight quarters simply do not show. Quarterly net margins have bounced from −34% to +14%, which is encouraging stabilization, yet absolute revenue remains 15% below the year-ago run-rate and the company is still lagging sector peers. Insider activity is noise (routine awards plus two 30k-share sales). The narrative premium—electrification chokepoint, silicon-carbide gating technology, AI data-center power—is carrying virtually the entire gap between a DCF anchored near $16 and the tape at $75; that story is now colliding with OEM vertical integration, slower EV unit growth, and intensifying SiC competition.
The strongest contrary case is that semis are violently cyclical, ON’s trailing trough earnings overstate the damage, and $1.4B of FCF plus a clean balance sheet give the company years of runway to wait for the next up-cycle in auto and industrial. If gross margin can climb back above 40% and SiC content per vehicle continues to rise, a $7–8B revenue recovery at 18–20% operating margins would justify $60–70 and make today’s price merely early rather than wrong. I weigh that case lightly because the 2025 gross-margin collapse to 33% and the operating-margin wipeout look only partly cyclical; mix shift and pricing pressure appear structural, and the market is already paying 5× sales for a business still shrinking at a mid-teens rate. A smart opponent citing peak-cycle FCF multiples or “just wait for the auto rebound” is ignoring that the rebound is already partially in the price while the competitive set has gotten harder.
I would flip to neutral or constructive only on two hard prints: (1) two consecutive quarters of year-over-year revenue growth together with gross margin back above 40%, and (2) explicit evidence that SiC design-win share is expanding rather than being designed around by large OEMs. Absent those, the stock remains a narrative-premium instrument trading at roughly 2× a normalized recovery value.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ON is a structurally profitable semiconductor business (SiC, power, sensing) that has just lived through a violent down-cycle. Revenue slid from a $8.33B peak in 2022 to $6.00B in 2025, gross margin collapsed from 49.0% to 33.1%, and operating margin went from 30.8% in 2023 to 1.4% in 2025 — net income cratered from $2.18B to $121M. That is a textbook cyclical unwind, not a broken business, but the operating-leverage-in-reverse is severe and shows limited pricing power in this segment of the cycle. Cash generation held up remarkably: FCF was $1.42B in 2025 on $121M of GAAP net income, OCF/NI of 3.96x, and accruals of -5.6% of assets — earnings quality on the mechanical checks is clean (Beneish -3.05, Altman Z 5.47). Capital discipline is a genuine strength. Diluted shares fell from 448M (2022) to 412M (2025), a -1.9% CAGR, with buybacks running 473% of SBC and SBC itself modest at 2.4% of revenue. Liquidity is adequate ($2.55B cash) though the company carries slight net debt (-$457M), so the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a fortress. Insider tape is mildly negative: zero open-market buys and ~$17.8M of sales over 12 months, including the CFO Thad Trent selling 90K shares in three tranches in April 2026 — routine-looking but not a vote of confidence at trough earnings.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- SiC/automotive backlog and design-win commentary to gauge whether 2025 is trough or continued decline
- Utilization and inventory levels driving the 33.1% GM print, and management's fab consolidation plans
- Customer concentration (Tesla, other EV OEMs) given the auto/power exposure
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant terms behind the modest net debt position
- Whether the 2025 net income includes restructuring/impairment charges masking underlying operating profit
- 10b5-1 plan status for CFO Trent's April 2026 sales cluster
The e2e composite fair value sits at $18.22 (DCF $17.92, EPV floor $19.90) versus a $74.80 print - a ~76% overvaluation on the model. I discount the absolute magnitude because both DCF and EPV are anchored on trough earnings (operating margin collapsed from ~30% to ~1%), so they under-credit normalized power/analog earning power. But even doubling or tripling EPV to reflect a mid-cycle rebuild ($40-60) still leaves the stock above deserved value with no margin of safety. The $29B market cap is pricing a full cyclical recovery plus continued EV/SiC secular growth as a near-certainty.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward guidance on gross/operating margin recovery cadence and SiC utilization
- Automotive design-win pipeline and any signs of OEM insourcing (Tesla-style) eroding share
- Inventory correction progress and channel days at large distributors
- Buyback pace and net share count trend versus SBC dilution
- Segment mix: SiC revenue growth and margin vs legacy silicon
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with a quiet VIX, which normally would be a tailwind for a beta-2.02 semi name. But the pressure that matters here is name-specific: the platform-monopoly / SiC-EV story that levitated ON has lost intensity, momentum is deeply negative (-14.8% CAGR, -24pp over 3 years), and the June Synaptics all-stock deal delivered a -23.7% single-day gut punch that is still coloring the narrative around capital allocation and strategic focus. That is the dominant force on this tape. Analyst tone is mixed-constructive (BofA flagging semis including a broader chip basket as enhanced buys, management claiming auto has bottomed and AI datacenter is accelerating), which provides a partial offset but not a rescue. Higher rates (10y 4.66%) and a stretched market PE add a low-grade valuation headwind to a name the bear case already frames as priced on fantasy. Net: the story is fading faster than the tape is lifting, and a 2x-beta cyclical with a broken narrative arc leans headwind, not tailwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the auto-bottom claim is corroborated by peer commentary (STM, NXP, MCHP) in the next print
- Sell-side target revisions post-Synaptics deal closing progress
- AI-datacenter revenue disclosure -- does ON get a piece of the narrative that is lifting other names
- Whether SiC pricing / design-win news flow stabilizes or continues to soften
The world ON sells into is being rewired twice at once: vehicles are adding power and sensing content regardless of whether EV unit forecasts hit, and AI datacenters are converting from 54V to 800V distribution, which drags high-voltage power silicon out of the automotive-only box and into a second, faster-cycling demand pool. Against that, the manufacturing of that silicon is being commoditized from China at speed — SiC in particular is following the classic path from scarce specialty to price-competed commodity within a few years of ramp. The net: real volume growth, contested unit economics. Macro rates keep the industrial and renewable legs subdued. The correct picture is a company exiting a brutal destocking cycle into a structurally larger but structurally lower-margin market.
When we made this prediction on Aug 28, 2026, ON was $72.18. We expect it to be $53.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 28, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.