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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-17): Designation Watch · Gem Score -5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 78 · Value -73 · Sentiment 70 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $33.75 vs $434.14 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
TSM NYSETaiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ADR is a leading semiconductor foundry business that manufactures integrated circuits and wafer-based chips for customers across the technology supply chain. The company supports a broad range of current applications, including high-performance computing, smartphones, automotive systems, industrial equipment, and consumer electronics. Its advanced manufacturing services are central to the global production of logic and other semiconductor devices, making it a critical partner for chip designers that do not operate their own fabrication facilities. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ADR serves a diverse international customer base and operates at the core of the semiconductor manufacturing market, where precision, scale, and process technology are essential to meeting demand across computing, communications, and connected-device industries.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 8 annual reports, the latest filed 2025-04-17, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.01
Total Equity: $134.37B
Shares: 5,185,940,000
Total Debt: $1.91B
Cash: $66.81B
EBITDA: $62.33B
Total Debt: $1.91B
Cash: $66.81B
Revenue: $90.88B
Revenue: $90.88B
Revenue: $90.88B
Total Equity: $134.37B
Tax Rate: 17.7%
Equity: $134.37B
Total Debt: $1.91B
Cash: $66.81B
Current Liabilities: $41.09B
Long-Term Debt: $30.47M
Total Debt: $1.91B
Total Equity: $134.37B
Shares: 5,185,940,000
Shares: 5,185,940,000
CapEx: -$30.02B
Shares: 5,185,940,000
Stock Price: $426.35
Net Income: $36.37B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 11:16am (34d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $42.1B | $49.8B | $71.1B | $67.9B | $90.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $19.7B | $24.1B | $28.7B | $31.0B | $39.9B |
| Gross Profit | $22.3B | $25.7B | $42.3B | $36.9B | $51.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $4.5B | $5.3B | $7.1B | $8.0B | $9.5B |
| Operating Income | $17.8B | $20.4B | $35.2B | $28.9B | $41.5B |
| Net Income | $16.0B | $18.6B | $31.2B | $26.7B | $36.4B |
| EBITDA | $28.2B | $33.7B | $48.9B | $45.6B | $62.3B |
| EPS | $3.09 | $3.59 | $6.01 | $5.16 | $7.01 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.09 | $3.59 | $6.01 | $5.16 | $7.01 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 11:16am (34d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $20.7B | $33.4B | $42.2B | $46.0B | $66.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $34.3B | $50.5B | $64.5B | $68.9B | $97.0B |
| Total Assets | $86.7B | $117.0B | $155.9B | $173.7B | $210.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $19.8B | $23.8B | $31.0B | $29.6B | $41.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.2M | $3.7M | $4.9M | $4.5M | $30.5M |
| Total Liabilities | $29.0B | $49.4B | $64.3B | $65.3B | $75.8B |
| Total Equity | $57.6B | $67.6B | $91.6B | $108.5B | $134.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $49.4B | $59.3B | $81.5B | $98.2B | $121.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 11:16am (34d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $25.8B | $34.9B | $50.6B | $39.0B | $57.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$15.9B | -$26.4B | -$34.0B | -$29.8B | -$30.0B |
| Free Cash Flow | $9.9B | $8.6B | $16.6B | $9.2B | $27.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$8.1B | -$8.3B | -$9.0B | -$9.2B | -$11.4B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $6.4B | $12.7B | $8.7B | $3.9B | $20.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 11:16am (34d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.5% | +42.6% | -4.5% | +33.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +15.2% | +64.5% | -12.8% | +38.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +14.7% | +72.5% | -17.8% | +43.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +16.0% | +67.6% | -14.2% | +36.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +19.4% | +45.3% | -6.7% | +36.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 2:03pm (37d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-17 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-11 | $0.84 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-16 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-12 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-18 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-12 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-12 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-13 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-18 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-15 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-15 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-15 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-16 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-16 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-16 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-16 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-08-17 16:56Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:36The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers first: TSM did $90.9B revenue in 2024 vs $42.1B in 2020 — a 21% four-year CAGR, with 2023 being a cyclical dip ($67.9B) and 2024 snapping back +34% YoY. Net margin expanded from 38.1% (2020) to 40.0% (2024), operating margin sits at 45.7%, ROIC at 49.2%, and net cash position is ~$65B against $1.9B debt. FCF was $27.3B on $57.3B OCF — capex ate $30B, which is the real story: this is a business reinvesting ~33% of revenue in fabs. FCF/NI conversion is only 75%, and FCF/sales is 30% — respectable but not the "toll-booth" fantasy. Recent YoY of 34% revenue and 36% earnings is genuinely exceptional, but the 5-year earnings CAGR is only 8% because 2022 net income ($31.2B) was nearly matched by 2024 ($36.4B) — meaning most of the "AI growth" is just recovering from the 2023 trough plus one strong year.
On valuation, the synthesis DCF fair value of $171 vs $426 price implying 60% overvaluation strikes me as too aggressive on the downside. At 61x trailing P/E the stock is clearly rich, but forward P/E on 2025 consensus (~$9-10 EPS ADR-equivalent) is closer to 25-28x, not 62x — the trailing figure is distorted by the 2023 trough denominator and possibly by an EPS convention issue (TSM ADRs represent 5 ordinary shares; a $426 ADR on $36.4B NI / ~5.19B ADR-equivalent shares = ~$7 EPS = ~60x, so the number checks, but forward is materially lower). A business compounding revenue 15%+ with 40% net margins, 49% ROIC, and a fortress balance sheet deserves 30-35x forward earnings, which pencils to roughly $280-340 fair value — expensive but not the $171 the DCF spits out. The synthesis is likely under-modeling terminal margin durability and the AI capex cycle length.
Where I side with the bears: the insider "purchases" data is suspicious — ten identical-date (2026-08-07, a future date) tiny share counts (33-72 shares) look like DRIP/ESPP artifacts or data corruption, not conviction buying, and the "Net Insider Buying" secondary signal built on that is noise. The narrative layer correctly flags the geopolitical premium: Taiwan Strait risk is un-hedgeable and un-modelable, and at 24x sales you are paid nothing for taking it. The cyclicality point is also real — foundry gross margins have historically swung from 45% (2019) to 59% (2022) to 54% (2023); assuming sustained 56%+ requires believing AI capex doesn't digest like every prior semi cycle. A careful contrarian would note that Intel 18A and Samsung SF2 both target 2025-2026 production, and while execution risk is high, TSM's monopoly premium narrows if either lands even 70% of promises — and Nvidia has publicly explored dual-sourcing.
Net read: I dissent from the synthesis "overvalued to $171" verdict as too extreme, but agree with the direction. Fair value is roughly $300-340 on forward earnings and reasonable terminal assumptions, meaning the stock is 20-30% overvalued, not 60%. The prior models are directionally right but the DCF anchor is mechanically too low, likely because it under-weights the 34% recent growth or applies too high a discount rate to a AA-credit-quality cash machine. I would not short — the narrative durability is real and the fundamentals are genuinely elite — but I would not chase at $426 either. Wait for a cyclical air-pocket (semi corrections routinely deliver 25-30% drawdowns) or a Taiwan headline that resets the geopolitical premium, and accumulate closer to $320.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say TSMC is an extraordinary business, but not an ordinary stock. What jumps out first is the operating model: 2024 revenue of $90.88B produced $51.01B of gross profit, $41.51B of operating income, and $36.37B of net income. That is a 56.1% gross margin, 45.7% operating margin, and 40.0% net margin in a manufacturing business that also spent $30.02B on capex. Those are monopoly-like economics layered on top of brutal capital intensity, which is why simplistic “it’s just a cyclical foundry” comparisons break down. The balance sheet is also absurdly strong for the scale: $66.81B of cash against just $1.91B of debt and $134.37B of equity. Return metrics reinforce the point: 27.1% ROE and 49.2% ROIC are not the profile of a commodity fab operator. If you wanted one company globally to toll-collect on advanced compute, these numbers identify it.
The more important question is whether the current valuation already discounts more than even this exceptional quality can deliver. Here I think the market is ahead of itself. On the annual numbers provided, the stock trades around 24.8x sales, 35.1x EV/EBITDA, 61.9x earnings, and 16.7x book. Even allowing for ADR/share count quirks in the exact price mapping, that multiple stack is extremely demanding against the actual growth record. Revenue went from $42.05B in 2020 to $90.88B in 2024, excellent at a 13.1% CAGR, but earnings CAGR is only 8% across that same span because 2024 is being measured off a very strong 2022 and a softer 2023 reset. In other words, the recent rebound is real—2024 revenue up 33.9% and earnings up 36%—but the longer arc still looks like a superb cyclical compounder, not a software platform that deserves infinite duration multiples. Free cash flow of $27.32B is substantial, yet against a $2.21T market cap that is roughly a 1.2% FCF yield. For a business exposed to node transitions, customer concentration, and geopolitical tail risk, that yield is simply too thin. My read is that the market is capitalizing TSMC not as the best semiconductor manufacturer, but as if it has permanently escaped semiconductor cyclicality and capital intensity. The income statement does not prove that.
What stands out to me versus the more bearish model outputs is that they may actually under-credit just how structurally advantaged TSMC has become. A company that converts $57.34B of operating cash flow while keeping debt effectively negligible is not easy to value with generic manufacturing templates. The 2023 dip now looks less like deterioration and more like a pause before a new AI and high-performance computing leg, and the rebound to $36.37B of net income suggests pricing power and utilization are stronger than old-cycle analogies imply. So I do not buy the idea that fair value is as low as the high-$100s; that seems to treat 2024 economics as transient when they may be partly structural. But I still land bearish because even if I give TSMC a premium multiple—say 30-35x normalized earnings on a business that can earn in the high-$30Bs to low-$40Bs—the current $2.2T equity value still looks stretched unless earnings compound at something like 20%+ for years. The numbers in hand do not yet justify that.
The best counterargument is straightforward and smart: trailing multiples are the wrong lens because TSMC is entering a multi-year step-function in demand. If 2024’s $90.88B revenue is just the base and AI, advanced packaging, and 2nm leadership push revenue well above $110B-$120B with margins holding near 2024 levels, then today’s 61.9x trailing P/E could compress fast. The cash balance means the company can fund expansion without stressing the balance sheet, and a 31.3% payout ratio leaves room to return more cash later. A bull would also say that comparing TSMC’s 13.1% four-year revenue CAGR to its current valuation misses an inflection: the company in 2025-2027 is much more strategically central than the company in 2020-2022, so the market is rationally paying for a scarcer asset. I weigh that differently because even scarce assets can be overpaid for, and a foundry still needs to continuously reinvest. When capex is $30.02B in a year and FCF is $27.32B, the equity story remains tethered to execution and utilization, not just franchise prestige.
What would change my mind is evidence that the business is outrunning the valuation rather than merely validating a great story. Specifically, I would want to see another year where revenue grows 25%+ from the $90.88B base, operating margin sustains at or above 45%, and free cash flow expands materially despite capex staying elevated—something like FCF moving toward $35B-$40B without balance-sheet strain. That would show the AI wave is not just boosting revenue but also increasing economic throughput after reinvestment. I would also become more constructive on a large derating: if the stock fell enough that the FCF yield moved closer to 2%-3% while fundamentals stayed intact, the risk/reward would improve sharply. Until then, the company is magnificent and the stock is priced like magnificence plus perfection.
Grok Reading
TSMC’s 2024 print is the cleanest operating year in the dataset: revenue leapt to $90.88B from $67.88B (+33.9% YoY) and net income to $36.37B from $26.75B, restoring and then exceeding the 2022 peak after the 2023 inventory air-pocket. Gross margin held at 56.1%, operating margin 45.7%, net margin 40.0%—factory economics almost no other capital-intensive manufacturer can touch. ROIC at 49% and a balance sheet with $66.8B cash against $1.9B debt confirm the franchise quality. Free cash flow of $27.3B after $30.0B of capex shows the company can still throw off real cash while funding the leading-edge node race. The story the numbers tell is unambiguous operational dominance and a genuine AI-driven volume and mix surge.
What the same numbers do not support is the multiple. At $426 the stock trades at 62× trailing earnings, 25× sales, and 35× EV/EBITDA, with a free-cash-flow yield of roughly 1.2% on a $2.21T equity value. Five-year revenue CAGR is only 13.1% and earnings CAGR 8%; the recent 34–36% YoY acceleration is real but still sits on a cyclical base that already corrected once in 2023. Even granting durable mid-teens growth and structural 40%+ net margins, a 60×+ earnings multiple prices in multi-year perfection plus an optionality premium that leaves almost no room for node delays, customer concentration (Nvidia/Apple/AMD), or any moderation in AI capex. The quantitative fair-value cluster near $170 is directionally right even if the precise DCF is too punitive: the gap between cash generation and price is the dominant fact.
The strongest counter-argument is that TSMC is not a normal foundry. It is the sole scaled producer of leading-edge logic, the toll bridge for every advanced AI accelerator, and the beneficiary of Western industrial-policy money that will keep utilization and pricing firm for years. ROIC near 50%, net-cash fortress, and FCF CAGR of 28% argue the market is correctly capitalizing a structural monopoly rather than a cyclical peak. Geopolitical risk, the bears’ favorite club, is already partially offset by CHIPS Act subsidies and multi-continent capacity build-outs that deepen customer lock-in. If AI semiconductor TAM compounds at 20%+ through 2028 and TSMC keeps 50%+ share of leading-edge wafers, today’s multiple can be grown into rather than compressed. That case is coherent; it simply requires the current hyper-growth regime to persist far longer than semiconductor history usually allows.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive only if the next four quarters show revenue still growing >25% with gross margins holding above 55% while capex intensity begins to roll over, or if forward P/E compresses into the mid-30s on earnings beats rather than on a price collapse. A clear de-escalation in Taiwan Strait risk that removes the geopolitical discount without removing the strategic premium would also matter. Until one of those arrives, the stock is a superb business priced as if nothing can go wrong.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue scaled from $42.05B (2020) to $90.88B (2024), a 21% CAGR, while operating margin ran 40.9%-49.5% and gross margin 51.6%-59.6%. Net income more than doubled from $16.04B to $36.37B, and 2024 FCF of $27.32B alongside $64.90B net cash means the business self-funds an extraordinarily capex-heavy roadmap without dilution - diluted share count is flat at 5.19B across five years. The 2023 dip (revenue -4.5%, FCF to $9.17B) shows cyclicality but recovery was sharp and margins held above 42% operating even in the trough. Earnings-quality checks are clean and unusually strong: OCF/NI 1.63x, accruals -11% of assets, Beneish M -2.62, Altman Z 19.73. Nothing in the mechanical forensics suggests the reported numbers are anything but real cash economics. Insider tape shows 40 small open-market P-purchases by named engineers/managers in the last 12 months with almost no sales - consistent with a broad-based internal share program and, at minimum, no adverse signal. The business context - N3/N2 leading-edge foundry with effective monopoly on advanced-node logic manufacturing for Apple, Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm - underpins the pricing power visible in margins.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer concentration disclosure in 20-F - top-5 customer % of revenue and trend
- Capex outlook and progress/economics of Arizona, Japan, Germany fabs vs Taiwan margin profile
- Advanced-node (N3/N2) revenue mix and pricing trajectory
- Any dividend or buyback policy changes given $64.90B net cash
- Contingency disclosures around Taiwan Strait / export-control exposure to China
The composite fair value of $168.97 and signal-adjusted $170.78 imply about -61% downside from $434.14. The DCF ($89.68) and EPV floor ($63.29) look punitive and likely under-weight the durable pricing power TSMC has demonstrated in leading-edge nodes, but even the most generous input, the anchored-PE at $323.76, still sits about 25% below today's price. Taken together, the deserved value under skeptical assumptions is well south of the current quote, and the fortress balance sheet (roughly $65B net cash) does not close that gap.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward capex guidance vs revenue growth - is incremental ROIC on N2/A16 fabs holding?
- Utilization and pricing on N3/N5 as AI mix shifts - any signs of hyperscaler capex digestion
- Segment disclosure on HPC/AI as % of revenue and its gross margin vs corporate average
- Arizona/Japan/Germany fab economics - dilution to consolidated margins as geographic mix shifts
The non-fundamental pressure on TSM is decisively positive. The archetype here is platform-monopoly with strong intensity and durable shelf life: TSM is cast as the irreplaceable fab for every marquee AI chip, and that story is being actively reinforced by news flow (Nvidia expanding its AI stack, SpaceX floating half-a-trillion data-center capex, Microsoft reviving AI infra). Recent headlines explicitly frame TSM as the smart-money AI pick, with hedge fund rotation OUT of Broadcom and INTO TSM - that is a live, name-specific tailwind, not a generic sector tag. Momentum confirms it: 33.9% recent vs 13.1% long-run trend, and a 7.6% single-day pop on AI packaging news.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any crack in AI capex commitments from hyperscalers (MSFT, META, GOOGL, AMZN) - the story lives or dies here
- Taiwan Strait geopolitical headlines or CHIPS Act policy shifts that would puncture the geopolitical premium
- Whether the smart-money rotation into TSM shows up in 13F flows next filing cycle or reverses
- 10y yield breaking above 4.75% - would compress multiples on high-PE AI names
- September FOMC tone and any risk-off pivot that would hit beta-1.26 names hardest
The world's compute buildout has concentrated economic rent into two chokepoints — leading-edge logic and advanced packaging — and TSM owns both. That is a genuine structural change, not a story: AI training and inference silicon must be fabricated somewhere, and there is currently no second viable source at N3/N2 with comparable yield. Against that, the macro backdrop is unfriendly (10y at 4.63%, described headwinds), which pressures the financing of the very hyperscaler capex that drives TSM's order book, and semiconductor demand has never stopped being cyclical. The honest synthesis: the demand vector is real and multi-year, the pace of the last four quarters is not the steady state, and capacity physics plus depreciation will pull growth toward the 20s-30s rather than sustaining the 30s-plus indefinitely.
When we made this prediction on Aug 18, 2026, TSM was $430.97. We expect it to be $435.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $320.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.