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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Intuit Inc. (INTU) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Watch · Gem Score +7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 72 · Value -37 · Sentiment 2 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $380.92 vs $316.07 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Intuit Inc.
INTU NASDAQIntuit Inc. provides comprehensive business and financial management solutions tailored for small businesses, self-employed individuals, consumers, and professionals. Operating through key segments including Small Business and Self-Employed, Consumer, Credit Karma, and ProTax, the company delivers essential tools for everyday financial needs. The Small Business and Self-Employed segment features QuickBooks online services and desktop software for financial management, payroll processing, payment solutions, time tracking, bill pay, checking accounts, and financing options, alongside Mailchimp for marketing automation and customer relationship management. The Consumer segment offers TurboTax for retail tax preparation. Credit Karma provides personal finance insights, while ProTax supplies Lacerte, ProSeries, ProFile, and ProConnect Tax Online for professional tax services, electronic filing, and bank products. Intuit Inc. distributes its products via direct sales, multichannel experiences, mobile apps, and partner channels, serving a broad spectrum of users in the financial technology sector. Founded in 1983 and headquartered in Mountain View, California, Intuit Inc. plays a pivotal role in empowering efficient financial operations across diverse markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.67
Total Equity: $19.71B
Shares: 283,000,000
Total Debt: $5.97B
Cash: $2.88B
EBITDA: $5.10B
Total Debt: $5.97B
Cash: $2.88B
Revenue: $18.83B
Revenue: $18.83B
Revenue: $18.83B
Total Equity: $19.71B
Tax Rate: 20.0%
Equity: $19.71B
Total Debt: $5.97B
Cash: $2.88B
Current Liabilities: $10.37B
Long-Term Debt: $5.97B
Total Debt: $5.97B
Total Equity: $19.71B
Shares: 283,000,000
Shares: 283,000,000
CapEx: -$84.00M
Shares: 283,000,000
Stock Price: $316.07
Net Income: $3.87B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:42pm (39d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.6B | $12.7B | $14.4B | $16.3B | $18.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.9B |
| Net Income | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.9B |
| EBITDA | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $3.8B | $5.1B |
| EPS | $7.65 | $7.38 | $8.49 | $10.58 | $13.82 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.56 | $7.28 | $8.42 | $10.43 | $13.67 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:25pm (39d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $2.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $5.2B | $5.0B | $5.6B | $9.7B | $14.1B |
| Total Assets | $15.5B | $27.7B | $27.8B | $32.1B | $37.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.7B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $7.5B | $10.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.0B | $6.4B | $6.1B | $5.5B | $6.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.6B | $11.3B | $10.5B | $13.7B | $17.2B |
| Total Equity | $9.9B | $16.4B | $17.3B | $18.4B | $19.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.3B | $13.6B | $15.1B | $17.0B | $19.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:42pm (39d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.3B | $3.9B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $6.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$53.0M | -$157.0M | -$210.0M | -$191.0M | -$84.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.2B | $3.7B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $6.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$3.1B | -$5.7B | -$33.0M | -$83.0M | -$184.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$338.0M | $4.7B | -$1.0B | -$4.2B | -$500.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$646.0M | -$774.0M | -$889.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.0B | -$1.9B | -$2.0B | -$2.0B | -$2.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.9B | $178.0M | -$145.0M | $4.2B | $2.4B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:42pm (39d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +32.1% | +12.9% | +13.3% | +15.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +2.8% | +22.2% | +15.6% | +35.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +0.2% | +15.4% | +24.3% | +30.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +3.5% | +19.7% | +14.8% | +34.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:26pm (39d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-09 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-09 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-09 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-09 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-10 | $1.04 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-10 | $1.04 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-10 | $1.04 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-10 | $1.04 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-10 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-09 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-09 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-05 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-07 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-06 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-09 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-08 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-08 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-07 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-07 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-11 02:04A +1σ run of quarters pays -8%; a −1σ run costs 42%. Ratio -0.2:1 (μ 14.9%, σ 4.2% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($316.07) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +23% | 24.5% | $338.58 | +7% |
| Base — stabilizes | +15% | 21.3% | $238.35 | -25% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 18.1% | $163.75 | -48% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +19% | 23.4% | $291.63 | -8% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 18.4% | $182.65 | -42% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The quarterly print pattern is Intuit's tax-season seasonality, not acceleration: April quarters are always the monster (Q3 fiscal, TurboTax peak) — $8.56B/35.8% margin in Apr-2026 vs $7.75B/36.4% in Apr-2025 is +10.5% revenue growth with 60bps margin compression at the seasonal peak. That's a deceleration from the 15.6% "recent YoY" figure the momentum module quotes, which is being flattered by easy comps in the small non-tax quarters (Oct-2024 had a weirdly weak $197M NI, Jul-2024 was slightly negative). Strip the noise and you have a business growing revenue low-double-digits with operating margins in the mid-20s — exactly what a $86B/23x PE mature software franchise should look like. FCF of $6.12B on ~$18.8B revenue is a 32.5% FCF margin, genuinely elite, and capex of $84M is a rounding error — this is a capital-light annuity.
Where I part company with the synthesis "undervalued at $357 fair value": the composite is leaning on a revenue CAGR (14.5%) and earnings CAGR (27.4%) computed off a five-year window that includes the Credit Karma acquisition (closed late 2020) and Mailchimp (2021) — inorganic revenue that will not repeat. Organic growth is closer to 10-12% and will compress as TurboTax faces IRS Direct File expansion (now in 25 states as of 2025) and as QuickBooks pricing hikes — which have driven a meaningful share of SMB segment growth — hit a ceiling. The Market Forces module's flag on the 1.73x accrual ratio deserves more weight than the synthesis gives it: with $6.21B OCF against $3.87B NI the cash conversion looks fine at the headline, but the accrual quality flag suggests reported earnings are running ahead of underlying cash economics on a working-capital-adjusted basis. That matters at 23x.
The contrarian case the models underweight: INTU has already de-rated from ~$807 to $316 (-61%) — the market has done a lot of the work of pricing in Direct File risk, AI disruption of tax prep (why pay $89-200 for TurboTax when GPT-5-class models can do a W-2 return for free?), and SMB softness. At 23x PE and 4.75x sales for a 32% FCF-margin franchise with $6B+ annual FCF, this is no longer priced as a hyper-growth platform — it's priced as what it is. The narrative module gets this right (anchored, minimal intensity). But "priced correctly for what it is" is not the same as "undervalued." The insider activity is entirely awards and option exercises — this is compensation flow, not conviction buying, and the "Net Insider Buying" tag in secondary signals is misleading; I see zero open-market purchases in the print.
I dissent partially from the synthesis $357 fair value — that number is overweighting inorganic historical growth. My read: fair value $300-340 on a 20-22x multiple of forward ~$17 EPS, putting current $316 within the fair-value band, not meaningfully cheap. The upside case requires either (a) Credit Karma re-accelerating into a genuine fintech platform (unproven after four years of ownership), (b) AI-driven ARPU expansion in QuickBooks actually showing up in numbers (Intuit Assist monetization is still speculative), or (c) multiple re-rating back toward 30x on macro tailwinds. None are base case. Downside case is Direct File takes 15-20% of the paid TurboTax funnel over three years and the multiple compresses to 18x — that's $250. Risk/reward is roughly symmetric around here, which is what "fairly valued" means. I'd want $270 or lower to build a position and would trim above $360.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the stock price and the supplied valuation ratios do not fully agree, and that matters because the model stack is leaning on those ratios. At $316 and an $86.5B market cap against FY2025 net income of $3.87B, the equity is trading at roughly 22-23x trailing earnings, which matches the reported P/E. Against $6.12B of free cash flow, it is about 14x FCF. For a company that has grown revenue from $9.63B in FY2021 to $18.83B in FY2025, nearly a 19% annualized pace over four years, while lifting operating income from $2.50B to $4.92B and net income from $2.06B to $3.87B, that is not an expensive multiple. The quarterly run-rate is also healthy: the last four quarters sum to about $20.9B of revenue and $5.34B of net income, implying the current price is closer to 16x trailing quarterly annualized earnings if those numbers are clean. Even allowing for tax-season seasonality, the business is not behaving like a no-growth legacy asset.
The core story in the numbers is a high-quality software franchise still compounding at a very respectable rate with extraordinary cash conversion. FY2025 revenue grew 15.6% year over year, operating income grew 35.5%, and net income grew 30.7%. Free cash flow of $6.12B on $18.83B of revenue is a 32.5% FCF margin, and capex was only $84M, so this is a software model that throws off real owner earnings rather than accounting earnings flattered by capitalized spend. Balance sheet risk is modest: $5.97B debt versus $2.88B cash leaves about $3.1B net debt, trivial relative to annual FCF. ROIC at 17.3% and ROE near 19.6% support the idea that this is still an excellent allocator of capital within a durable moat. The quarter ending April 2026 was especially strong at $8.56B of revenue and $3.06B of net income, up from $7.75B and $2.82B a year earlier; even in a seasonal business, that shows the peak season remains intact.
I think the “mature earner” label is directionally right but too conservative in what it implies for valuation. Mature software with low-single-digit growth deserves a low-20s P/E. Intuit is not showing low-single-digit growth. The post-2024 quarterly progression from $3.18B to $3.28B to $3.96B to $7.75B to $3.83B to $3.89B to $4.65B to $8.56B points to a larger base still growing double digits, not a flatlining franchise. If the company can do around $21B+ of revenue and something like $5B+ of net income on the current trajectory, then $86B equity value looks closer to a quality-compounder discount than a full multiple. The supplied “traditional” framing also understates how sticky QuickBooks and related workflows are; the economics look more like mission-critical SMB infrastructure than generic application software, and the margin profile backs that up.
The best bear case is not valuation but durability of the tax and small-business moat. The quarterly pattern reminds you how dependent Intuit still is on tax season: one quarter contributes an outsized share of annual profits, which amplifies regulatory or competitive shocks. If IRS free-filing efforts or AI-assisted tax prep attack TurboTax’s pricing power, a 35%-plus spring margin can compress fast. On the SMB side, you can argue growth has been acquisition-assisted and price-led, not purely volume-led, and that the low single-digit sequential progression from $3.83B to $3.89B outside peak season is not evidence of a re-accelerating engine. A skeptic would also point out that if the “annual” P/E is 23x while the last four quarters imply something lower, there may be normalization issues in the earnings base, and the market may be correctly discounting peak-ish profitability. I weigh these concerns seriously, but the raw cash generation still makes the stock hard to call expensive unless one assumes a sharp structural slowdown very soon.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next full year lands materially below the current run-rate—say revenue growth falling under 8% while operating margin slips back toward 24-25% and FCF stalls around $6B—then today’s multiple is fair at best and the market is already looking through the peak. Likewise, evidence that the April quarter’s profitability is eroding, especially if tax-season net income drops below $2.7B on similar revenue, would suggest the moat is weakening. On the other hand, if Intuit converts this momentum into a $21B-$22B revenue year with net income over $4.5B and keeps FCF above $6.5B, I would expect the stock to deserve at least the high-$300s, and probably more.
Grok Reading
Intuit at $316 is a cash-compounding franchise the market has over-punished after de-rating it from a growth-platform story to a mature earner. TTM revenue is already running near $20.9B with TTM net income of roughly $4.58B, so the stock trades at under 19x trailing earnings and about 14.6x the $6.12B of free cash flow generated in fiscal 2025. That FCF came on only $84M of capex and converted far above the $3.87B of reported net income, while operating margin sits at 26% and net margin at 20.5%. Revenue is still growing 15.6% year-over-year and earnings 30.6%, with the April 2026 tax quarter alone delivering $8.56B revenue and a 35.8% net margin. Multi-year revenue CAGR of 14.5% has produced 27.4% earnings CAGR, showing clear operating leverage as the formerly break-even summer and fall quarters have climbed into double-digit net margins. At 23x stated PE, 4.75x sales and 18x EV/EBITDA, with ROE near 20%, net debt under $3.1B and a 1.5% dividend covered by a 31% payout, the multiple embeds almost no credit for continued mid-teens growth or further margin expansion. The valuation work pointing to $325–358 is directionally correct; $316 is simply too cheap for this quality of recurring cash flow.
The seasonal pattern is intact and still improving: the three non-tax quarters that once printed mid-single-digit or negative margins now contribute meaningful profit, and Credit Karma plus the QuickBooks ecosystem continue to expand wallet share without wrecking the balance sheet (debt-to-equity 0.30, current ratio 1.36). Fundamentals, not narrative, are setting the price—narrative intensity is minimal and the stock is anchored, exactly as a steady compounder should be.
The sharpest counter-argument is that the market’s skepticism is rational. An accrual ratio flagged at 1.73x raises earnings-quality questions even if FCF is strong; much of the recent growth may be price rather than volume, and TurboTax—still the profit engine of the April quarter—faces real structural threats from IRS direct-file expansion and generative-AI tax tools over a three-to-five-year horizon. The stock’s collapse from the prior $807 region shows how quickly a 50x+ multiple evaporates when the growth narrative cracks; if revenue growth settles into high single digits, 23x becomes full, not cheap. Insider “buying” is also illusory—the recent Form 4s are almost entirely equity awards and option exercises, not open-market purchases. I discount these risks because current growth has not decelerated, FCF conversion remains pristine, QuickBooks switching costs are still high, and the regulatory/AI threats have been discussed for years without yet denting the 15%+ top-line run rate or the 35%+ tax-season margins.
I would reverse to neutral or bearish if the next two quarters show revenue growth falling below 10% year-over-year, if off-season net margins roll over, or if unit data or management commentary confirms meaningful TurboTax share loss to free government or AI alternatives. A decisive break below $280 on company-specific news would also signal the market is correctly pricing a permanent growth step-down.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue nearly doubled from $9.63B (2021) to $18.83B (2025), a ~18% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from ~20-22% in the middle years back to 26.1% in 2025 and net income rose from $2.06B to $3.87B. FCF scaled from $3.20B to $6.12B, and OCF/NI of 1.77x with accruals at -7.2% of assets indicates earnings are backed by cash, not accounting artifacts. Altman Z of 4.82 places the balance sheet firmly in the safe zone despite net debt of ~$3.09B against only $2.88B liquid cash - the leverage is a mild constraint, not a risk, given $6B+ annual FCF.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment concentration - how much of growth and profit comes from Credit Karma/Mailchimp acquisitions vs organic TurboTax/QuickBooks
- Customer/product concentration risk in Small Business and Consumer segments
- Debt maturity schedule and terms behind the $3B+ net debt position
- Whether the 2025 operating margin re-expansion to 26.1% reflects durable operating leverage or one-time cost actions
- AI competitive risk to TurboTax franchise from IRS Direct File and generative-AI tax tools
The composite fair value of $324.77 sits ~3% above the $316.07 price, and the signal-adjusted $357.66 implies ~13% upside - modest, not a bargain. The anchored-PE of $346 is directionally consistent with a high-quality mature software compounder trading around 30x earnings; the DCF at $414.82 is the outlier and likely bakes in generous terminal growth for a mid-teens grower facing IRS Direct File and a maturing SMB TAM. The EPV floor of $123 is a reminder that stripped of growth, the business is worth far less than today's price - i.e. you are paying for continued compounding, and most of it is already in the tape. Quality is strong (72) and earnings quality is clean, which supports a premium multiple and raises deserved value, but strong quality is not itself a mispricing. The bull case (sticky QuickBooks SaaS, Credit Karma/Mailchimp cross-sell) is well understood; the bear case (regulatory tax-prep risk, ~32x on mid-single-to-teens growth) is also priced in. Net: the market has this one roughly right. I want a real discount to the anchored-PE, not a rounding error, before this is interesting.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY guidance for QuickBooks Online growth and Credit Karma revenue trajectory
- Consumer Group (TurboTax) unit and ARPU trends vs IRS Direct File adoption data
- Stock-based comp as % of revenue and its effect on true FCF conversion
- Any one-time items (Mailchimp integration, restructuring) inflating margin narrative
INTU's narrative is the definition of low-intensity: a steady compounder with a durable moat and no cult following. That means the tape and news flow move the stock more than any single story arc. The macro backdrop is genuinely neutral (VIX 16, S&P near highs, regime +22), and with beta ~1 INTU absorbs the tape rather than amplifying it. Higher rates and a 26.9x market PE are a mild headwind for a ~32x software name, but nothing acute right now. Recent flow is mixed-to-slightly-constructive: Q3 print was strong (15% GBS growth), AI restructuring is being framed positively by media, and momentum reads strong_positive. Against that, the May -20% gap on the workforce cut and TurboTax softness still lingers as a scar, and a certified Canadian class action adds a small overhang. Analyst tone is not screaming, and the bear framing (IRS free-file threat, mature growth, full multiple) is a persistent low-grade drag rather than an active de-rating. Net: no dominant force in either direction - a balanced read with a very slight tailwind lean from the improving AI/restructuring narrative offset by valuation-sensitivity to rates.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether analyst target revisions are drifting up post-Q3 or staying flat
- TurboTax season setup commentary and any IRS Direct File expansion news
- Progress or settlement signals on the Ontario class action
- Whether the AI-restructuring narrative gains intensity (upgrades citing margin expansion) or fades back to background
- Rate path - a 10y break above 5% would meaningfully press the multiple
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.