Business Description
Builders FirstSource, Inc., through its various subsidiaries, operates as a key supplier of construction resources across the United States. The company is involved in fabricating and distributing a wide array of building materials, prefabricated components, and specialized construction services, catering to a diverse clientele that includes professional homebuilders, subcontractors, renovation experts, and individual consumers. Its extensive product range encompasses foundational lumber and sheet goods, such as dimensional timber, plywood, and oriented strand board, primarily used for on-site residential framing. Furthermore, Builders FirstSource manufactures factory-assembled elements like wood and steel floor and roof trusses, wall panels, stair units, and engineered wood products. Complementing these, the company supplies windows, both internal and external door assemblies, various interior and exterior finishing trims, and bespoke items marketed under the Synboard brand. Additionally, the firm provides gypsum, roofing, and insulation solutions, including wallboards, ceiling materials, joint compounds, and finishes. Its offerings also extend to siding, metal, and concrete products, featuring vinyl, composite, and wood siding options, alongside exterior trims, other exterior finishes, metal studs, and cement-based items. Beyond these materials, Builders FirstSource furnishes other building essentials like cabinetry and hardware, and delivers value-added services such as comprehensive turn-key framing, shell construction, design consultation, and expert installation. Founded in 1998, the enterprise initially operated as BSL Holdings, Inc. before formally changing its name to Builders FirstSource, Inc. in October 1999. The company's corporate headquarters are situated in Dallas, Texas.
Business History
Generated: Jun 12, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.91
Total Equity: $4.35B
Shares: 111,822,000
Total Debt: $5.10B
Cash: $181.75M
EBITDA: $1.38B
Total Debt: $5.10B
Cash: $181.75M
Revenue: $15.19B
Revenue: $15.19B
Revenue: $15.19B
Total Equity: $4.35B
Tax Rate: 15.1%
Equity: $4.35B
Total Debt: $5.10B
Cash: $181.75M
Current Liabilities: $1.57B
Long-Term Debt: $4.97B
Total Debt: $5.10B
Total Equity: $4.35B
Shares: 111,822,000
Shares: 111,822,000
CapEx: -$362.60M
Shares: 111,822,000
Stock Price: $78.57
Net Income: $435.20M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:07am (22h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.9B | $22.7B | $17.1B | $16.4B | $15.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $14.0B | $15.0B | $11.1B | $11.0B | $10.8B |
| Gross Profit | $5.9B | $7.7B | $6.0B | $5.4B | $4.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.5B | $4.0B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.6B |
| Operating Income | $2.4B | $3.8B | $2.2B | $1.6B | $786.3M |
| Net Income | $1.7B | $2.7B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $435.2M |
| EBITDA | $2.9B | $4.2B | $2.7B | $1.6B | $1.4B |
| EPS | $8.55 | $16.98 | $12.06 | $9.13 | $3.91 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $42.6M | $80.4M | $66.2M | $153.6M | $181.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $4.0B | $3.5B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $2.9B |
| Total Assets | $10.7B | $10.6B | $10.5B | $10.6B | $11.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.7B | $5.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.9B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $6.3B | $6.9B |
| Total Equity | $4.8B | $5.0B | $4.7B | $4.3B | $4.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $540.0M | $703.5M | $460.2M | $24.1M | $153.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:07am (22h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.7B | $3.6B | $2.3B | $1.9B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$227.9M | -$340.2M | -$476.3M | -$380.6M | -$362.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.5B | $3.3B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $853.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.1B | -$628.0M | -$238.7M | -$344.1M | -$1.1B |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.7B | -$2.6B | -$1.8B | -$1.5B | -$414.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$381.2M | $37.8M | -$14.3M | $87.5M | $28.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$14.8B $14.6B – $15.0B
|
$15.6B $15.4B – $16.0B
|
$16.6B $16.6B – $16.7B
|
$17.3B $16.7B – $17.8B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.1B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.2B
|
$2.3B $2.3B – $2.3B
|
$2.4B $2.3B – $2.4B
|
| Net Income |
$475.4M $419.7M – $531.1M
|
$687.6M $602.0M – $773.2M
|
$878.6M $707.5M – $1.0B
|
$933.7M $886.3M – $964.2M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:07am (22h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.2% | -24.8% | -4.1% | -7.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +32.4% | -22.4% | -10.5% | -18.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +57.9% | -42.3% | -26.7% | -50.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +59.3% | -44.0% | -30.0% | -59.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +44.8% | -35.5% | -41.7% | -13.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:05am (22h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | Herron Stephen J | G-Gift | 850.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Hiller Michael | G-Gift | 900.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Boydston Cory Jacobs | A-Award | 409.00 | $76.26 | $31,190 |
| 2026-06-01 | Renz Maria | A-Award | 426.00 | $76.26 | $32,487 |
| 2026-06-01 | OLEARY JAMES | A-Award | 491.00 | $76.26 | $37,444 |
| 2026-06-01 | ALEXANDER MARK A | A-Award | 409.00 | $76.26 | $31,190 |
| 2026-06-01 | CHRISTOPHE CLEVELAND A | A-Award | 491.00 | $76.26 | $37,444 |
| 2026-06-01 | LEVY PAUL S | A-Award | 1,049.00 | $76.26 | $79,997 |
| 2026-06-01 | Hayes William B | A-Award | 508.00 | $76.26 | $38,740 |
| 2026-06-01 | Charles Dirkson R | A-Award | 409.00 | $76.26 | $31,190 |
| 2026-06-01 | Steinke Craig Arthur | A-Award | 491.00 | $76.26 | $37,444 |
| 2026-05-18 | O'Brien Matthew Coley | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-14 | LEVY PAUL S | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Hayes William B | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Renz Maria | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | ALEXANDER MARK A | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | CHRISTOPHE CLEVELAND A | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Rush David E | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Boydston Cory Jacobs | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | MILGRIM BRETT N | A-Award | 2,558.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw trajectory here is uglier than the synthesis lets on. Quarterly revenue has gone from $4.46B (Q2'24) → $4.23B → $3.82B → $3.66B → $4.23B → $3.94B → $3.36B → $3.29B (Q1'26), with net income collapsing from $344M to a $47M loss over the same eight quarters. Margins inverted: 7.7% net in mid-2024 to -1.4% now. That's not "cyclically depressed" — that's an active deterioration through Q1'26 with no visible inflection. Annual NI: $2.75B (2022) → $1.54B → $1.08B → $435M (2025), and the TTM run-rate based on the last four quarters is roughly $292M, meaning the "29.6x P/E" is on a still-falling E. On forward earnings closer to $200-250M if Q2'26 stays negative, the multiple is 35-40x. That isn't a cheap cyclical; that's a cyclical priced for recovery that hasn't started.
I disagree with the Valuation Synthesis verdict of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" in the bullish direction. The synthesis frames the market as pricing -10% perpetual FCF decline, but FCF actually fell from peak to $853M in 2025 and is likely tracking sub-$500M TTM given the Q1'26 loss. EV/EBITDA of 11.2x on TTM is not screaming cheap for a distributor whose EBITDA is mid-cycle-rolling-into-trough. The Pre-Flight note that the stock trades at "18x trough earnings" actually argues against the bull case — paying 18x trough for a cyclical with no rate-cut catalyst and housing starts stuck is fair, not generous. Meanwhile Market Forces flags "probable covenant violations and dilutive restructuring" — that's a serious claim contradicted by $1.22B OCF and $853M FCF in 2025, plus a 1.86 current ratio. The balance sheet tile is missing total debt, which is the single most important number for a cyclical distributor; without it, the distress call is unsupported speculation. I'd dissent from Market Forces too — this looks stressed, not distressed.
The contrarian argument cuts both ways and I'll take the bear side against the Narrative layer's "steady-compounder" framing. BLDR is not a compounder; it's a lumber-and-truss distributor whose 2021-2022 earnings were inflated by once-in-a-generation lumber price spikes and COVID-era housing demand. Normalizing to pre-2021 earning power (roughly $400-700M NI), the stock at $78 and an $8.45B market cap is trading at 12-20x mid-cycle — which is reasonable but not cheap, and offers no margin of safety if housing starts stay at 1.3M into 2027. The bull thesis requires both (a) rate cuts driving a starts recovery and (b) BLDR holding share against Home Depot Pro and regional consolidators while value-added prefab scales. Insider activity is mostly awards and gifts, not open-market buys — the "Net Insider Buying" tag is misleading; awards aren't conviction signals. The data is also stale-feeling: a Q1'26 print with a loss demands knowing what management said about Q2 guidance, and that's absent.
GPT Critique
My independent analysis of Builders FirstSource, Inc. (BLDR) paints a picture of a company experiencing significant cyclical pressures, with revenue and net income facing a stark decline over recent quarters. From a peak quarterly revenue of $4.46B in Q2 2024, the numbers have decreased to $3.29B by Q1 2026, with an alarming net income drop from $344.1M to a loss of $47.4M. This is indicative of more than just cyclical depression; it suggests active financial deterioration. The annual revenue trajectory shows a decline from $22.73B in 2022 to $15.19B in 2025, while operating income and net income have both sharply decreased — a concerning trend that indicates significant headwinds that BLDR has yet to overcome.
I agree with Claude Opus's assertion that BLDR's current valuation is not aligned with the fundamentals, particularly when considering its P/E ratio of 29.6x based on trailing twelve months, which could be misleading given the ongoing decline in earnings. The EV/EBITDA ratio of 11.2x seems high for a company in the midst of a downturn, especially one reliant on cyclical factors such as housing starts and lumber prices. Opus correctly challenges the bullish "Disconnected from Fundamentals" verdict, as the evidence suggests the company is not priced cheaply for a cyclical recovery, especially given the lack of a visible catalyst for growth in the near term.
Where I diverge slightly from Opus is in the consideration of the company's financial resilience. The Market Forces analysis suggests potential covenant violations and restructuring risks, which seems speculative without detailed debt figures. Given the company's $1.22B in operating cash flow and $853.3M in free cash flow in 2025, BLDR appears to maintain a level of financial stability that contradicts the notion of impending distress. Thus, while the company is undoubtedly stressed, it may not be on the brink of financial distress as severe as implied.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the potential for a housing market rebound driven by macroeconomic shifts or unexpected policy changes that could catalyze new growth for BLDR. They might also point out that the company's scale and integration in the prefabrication and lumber distribution markets could enable it to capture market share from smaller competitors, thus supporting its valuation despite current financial headwinds.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses don't actually disagree — they're telling me the same story from different sides. Quality at +16 says this is a legitimately well-run distributor with elite, share-count-halving capital return and clean accounting; value at -65 says I'm being asked to pay full freight for that quality at exactly the wrong point in the cycle, with operating margin already collapsed from 16.6% to 5.2% and a $64 composite FV vs $78.57 tape. Paying a 23% premium on trough-ish earnings for a leveraged housing-cycle bet — with $4.9B net debt funding the buyback — is the textbook late-cycle trap, no matter how much I admire the buyback math.
My play: no position at $78. I put BLDR on the priority watchlist and do nothing until it prints a 6-handle. Starter position (about a third of target weight) at $64, which is the composite FV and gives me alignment with the value lens. Add another third at $58 and the final third at $52 — a forced housing-scare drawdown is exactly the setup where the elite buyback compounds per-share value fastest, so I want to be scaling in, not one-shotting. I flip aggressive (full weight, faster) if we get a rate-cut catalyst with the stock already in the low $60s. I stay sidelined and let it run if it grinds to $90+ on a housing-reacceleration narrative without a real earnings inflection — chasing a +16 quality name into a richer multiple is not the trade. Bottom line: right business, wrong price, be patient.
BLDR is a mature, cash-generative building products distributor whose underlying earnings power is in clear cyclical decline: revenue has fallen from $22.7B (2022) to $15.2B (2025), operating margin compressed from 16.6% to 5.2%, and net income collapsed from $2.75B to $435M over the same span. FCF remains positive at $853M but is roughly a quarter of the 2022 peak ($3.26B), confirming this is a housing/construction-cycle business, not a structurally impaired one. Earnings quality is clean — OCF/NI of 1.67x, accruals at -6% of assets, Beneish M of -2.92 — so the deteriorating numbers are real, not cosmetic.
Capital allocation is the standout strength. Diluted share count has been crushed from 203.5M (2021) to 111.8M (2025), a -13.9% CAGR, with buybacks running 35x SBC. Per-share value has been aggressively concentrated even as the absolute earnings shrink — 2025 EPS math benefits materially from a ~45% lower share count vs. 2021. The trade-off is balance sheet: net debt of ~$4.92B against only $182M cash and Altman Z of 2.48 (grey zone) means management is funding the buyback in part with leverage during a downcycle, which is a deliberate bet on the housing recovery.
Insider behavior is modestly constructive — net buying $4.6M vs $0.6M selling over 12 months, though the recent tape is dominated by routine awards and gifts rather than open-market conviction buys. Overall: a well-run cyclical with clean books and aggressive per-share value creation, constrained by leverage and an unfavorable phase of its end-market cycle.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom — how much of the $4.92B net debt comes due within 24 months
- Customer/end-market concentration: single-family vs multi-family vs R&R exposure
- Whether buyback pace has continued at 2025 cadence or moderated given leverage
- Segment-level margin disclosure — is value-added/manufactured products holding up better than commodity distribution
- Lumber price normalization impact vs. true volume decline in the revenue drop
- Goodwill/intangibles balance from BMC merger and any impairment risk if downcycle extends
The e2e composite fair value of $64.01 lines up with the bear framing — the market is paying a ~23% premium to DCF on a cyclical distributor whose operating margin has collapsed from 16.6% to 5.2%. Earnings quality is clean, so there's no haircut to apply, and the Solid quality grade plus elite buyback program justify some premium to a pure-cycle DCF — but not 23% when the cycle is actively biting. A deserved value in the high-$60s to low-$70s feels defensible; $78.57 doesn't.
What's priced in: a soft-landing/housing-reacceleration narrative plus continued aggressive buybacks compounding per-share value. What has to go right: rates ease, starts inflect, and BLDR's scale advantage holds against backward integration risk from large builders. None of that is heroic individually, but all of it is required to grow into the price. There is no margin of safety here — this is a 'pay full price for a well-run cyclical at the wrong point in the cycle' setup.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward guidance on single-family starts exposure and value-added (prefab/components) mix vs commodity lumber
- Pace and authorization size of remaining buyback — accretion math depends on it
- Any commentary on large-builder insourcing of components
- Gross margin trajectory in latest quarter — is the 5.2% op margin the trough or still descending?