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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Vistra Corp (VST) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-25): Designation Low · Gem Score -40 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 11 · Value -81 · Sentiment 14 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $116.53 vs $148.19 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Vistra Corp
VST NYSEVistra Corp is an integrated retail electricity and power generation company based in Irving, Texas. It supplies electricity and natural gas to residential, commercial, and industrial customers across multiple U.S. states through its retail energy business, while also operating a large generation fleet. Its portfolio includes natural gas, nuclear, coal, solar, and battery energy storage assets, supporting both wholesale power sales and customer-focused energy services. Vistra Corp also provides commodity risk management, fuel procurement, and fuel logistics services, and it manages asset closure activities for retired facilities. The company plays a significant role in the U.S. utilities market by combining power generation with direct retail energy delivery.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.18
Total Equity: $5.11B
Shares: 345,656,067
Total Debt: $18.84B
Cash: $785.00M
EBITDA: $3.89B
Total Debt: $18.84B
Cash: $785.00M
Revenue: $17.74B
Revenue: $17.74B
Revenue: $17.74B
Total Equity: $5.11B
Tax Rate: 15.9%
Equity: $5.11B
Total Debt: $18.84B
Cash: $785.00M
Current Liabilities: $11.81B
Long-Term Debt: $17.04B
Total Debt: $18.84B
Total Equity: $5.11B
Shares: 345,656,067
Shares: 345,656,067
CapEx: -$2.75B
Shares: 345,656,067
Stock Price: $148.19
Net Income: $944.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:49pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.1B | $13.7B | $14.8B | $17.2B | $17.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Operating Income | -$1.5B | -$1.2B | $2.7B | $4.1B | $1.9B |
| Net Income | -$1.3B | -$1.2B | $1.5B | $2.7B | $944.0M |
| EBITDA | $238.0M | $419.0M | $4.2B | $5.9B | $3.9B |
| EPS | $-2.69 | $-3.26 | $3.63 | $7.16 | $2.22 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-2.69 | $-3.26 | $3.58 | $7.00 | $2.18 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:32pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $455.0M | $3.5B | $1.2B | $785.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $7.9B | $11.1B | $11.6B | $8.1B | $9.2B |
| Total Assets | $29.7B | $32.8B | $33.0B | $37.8B | $41.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.8B | $10.3B | $9.8B | $8.4B | $11.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | $14.4B | $16.3B | $17.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $21.4B | $27.9B | $27.6B | $32.2B | $36.4B |
| Total Equity | $8.3B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.6B | $5.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.0B | -$3.6B | -$2.6B | -$454.0M | -$12.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:49pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$206.0M | $485.0M | $5.5B | $4.6B | $4.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$1.3B | -$1.7B | -$2.1B | -$2.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$1.2B | -$816.0M | $3.8B | $2.5B | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$3.1B | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | $1.2B | $2.5B | $1.5B | -$78.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$290.0M | -$302.0M | -$313.0M | -$305.0M | -$306.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$471.0M | -$1.9B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $915.0M | -$834.0M | $3.0B | -$2.3B | -$400.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:49pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.7% | +7.7% | +16.5% | +3.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +22.3% | +326.1% | +53.4% | -53.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +3.7% | +221.7% | +78.1% | -64.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +76.1% | +893.6% | +42.3% | -34.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:33pm (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-22 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-20 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-22 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-19 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-18 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-20 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-20 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-20 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-18 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-19 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-19 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-19 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-20 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-21 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-19 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-20 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-21 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-21 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-15 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-15 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:17Even the bull case prices 27% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 91%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($148.19) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +26% | 13.3% | $108.30 | -27% |
| Base — stabilizes | +18% | 11.6% | $74.66 | -50% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 9.8% | $50.25 | -66% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -21% | 5.9% | $13.47 | -91% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: VST is trading at $148 with a $50B market cap on TTM earnings that have deteriorated sharply. FY2024 NI was $2.66B; FY2025 collapsed to $944M despite revenue growing from $17.22B to $17.74B. That's operating margin compression from 23.7% to 10.8% — a stunning give-back in a supposed "power scarcity" regime. The quarterly trajectory is genuinely confusing: Q3-2024 printed $1.89B NI on $6.29B revenue (30% margin), then Q1-2025 was a $268M loss, then Q1-2026 rebounded to $1.03B NI on $5.64B (18.2%). This volatility is characteristic of merchant power with hedge book mark-to-market noise, not a stable utility. Balance sheet is stretched: $18.84B debt against $785M cash and $5.11B equity (D/E 3.69x, current ratio 0.78). ROIC is 6.9% — below any reasonable cost of capital for a 3.7x-levered entity. FCF of $1.32B against a $50B market cap is a 2.6% FCF yield.
The synthesis DCF of $69.40 is directionally right but I'd challenge its precision. If you annualize the Q1-2026 run-rate ($1.03B × 4 = $4.1B, roughly matching 2024 peak), you get ~$12 EPS and a still-rich 12x P/E — but that assumes Q1's 18% margin holds, which the 2025 collapse says it won't. A blended normalized earnings power probably sits at $2.0–2.5B NI, giving $6–7.50 EPS. At a fair utility-plus-growth 18–22x, that's $110–160 — closer to current price than the synthesis suggests. The synthesis is treating FY2025 as normal; it may be the trough. That's the contrarian case.
But the contrarian case has real holes. First, the insider tape: seven sales versus three awards in a 30-day window, and zero open-market buys — management isn't backing up the truck at $148. Second, the "AI/data center demand" narrative is doing enormous work: the narrative-economics layer correctly flags that ~52% of the price is story. If Talen, Constellation, and VST are all being repriced as hyperscaler counterparties, the marginal buyer is a momentum tourist, not a utility analyst. Third, the pre-flight note about the 33% drawdown from peak is important — the market has already started to question the thesis, and a 3.7x D/E balance sheet in a rising real-rate world is not where you want to be caught long. Fourth, dividend yield is 0.6% with a 32% payout — this is not being valued as a utility, so the utility comps don't rescue it.
I partially agree with the synthesis but think $69 fair value is too punitive — it assumes 2025 is the run-rate, ignoring that Q1-2026's rebound suggests earnings power is closer to $3–4B than $944M. My fair value lands at $95–115 using normalized $2.25B NI at 18x, or a DCF with 6% terminal growth and 8% WACC. That's still a 25–35% downside from $148, so directionally the "overvalued" verdict holds — just less dramatically. The stock is priced for a regime shift (data center demand + capacity tightness) that may partially materialize but is being extrapolated too aggressively. Insider selling, deteriorating FCF CAGR (-40.9%), and a fragile balance sheet argue against paying up here. I'd wait for either (a) a re-rating to $100–110 where the AI-demand optionality is cheaper, or (b) confirmation in Q2/Q3-2026 that the 18% margin is sustainable, not a hedge-book artifact. The narrative durability being only "moderate" is the tell — this thesis works until wholesale power prints one soft quarter, then it doesn't.
GPT Reading
The market is paying a growth-and-scarcity multiple for a business whose reported earnings have plainly not earned it. At $148, Vistra is worth about $50 billion against 2025 net income of just $944 million, or roughly 68x earnings, with EV/EBITDA near 17.5x and price/book around 10x. That would be aggressive even for a clean secular grower; for a leveraged independent power producer with $18.84 billion of debt, $785 million of cash, negative working capital optics via a 0.78 current ratio, and highly variable quarterly profitability, it looks stretched. The underlying operating record is not one of smooth compounding. Revenue rose only from $17.22 billion in 2024 to $17.74 billion in 2025, a 3% gain, while operating income fell from $4.08 billion to $1.91 billion and net income dropped from $2.66 billion to $944 million. That is not a temporary rounding error; it is a reminder that this business is exposed to commodity spreads and timing effects that can make one year look exceptional and the next look ordinary.
The recent quarter was strong on its face and explains why bulls remain engaged: Q1 2026 revenue jumped to $5.64 billion from $3.93 billion and net income swung to $1.03 billion from a $268 million loss. But I think the market is capitalizing that rebound too generously. Set against the last eight quarters, Vistra’s earnings power still looks lumpy rather than durably re-rated: margins ranged from -6.8% to 30.0%, with 2024’s September quarter producing an outlier $1.89 billion of net income on $6.29 billion of revenue. If one uses 2024 as the normalized base, the stock is expensive on earnings durability; if one uses 2025, it is wildly expensive; and if one annualizes the latest quarter, one is implicitly assuming unusually favorable power-market conditions persist. The cash flow statement is better than the income statement, but not enough to rescue valuation. Operating cash flow of $4.07 billion in 2025 is solid, yet capex of $2.75 billion left only $1.32 billion of free cash flow, which is a sub-3% FCF yield on the current market cap before considering debt. For a capital-intensive, leveraged utility-like generator, that is not cheap.
What stands out most is the disconnect between headline “mature earner” framing and the actual risk profile. Mature earners do not usually carry debt/equity of 3.69, trade at 10x book, and see earnings CAGR at -20.5% while free cash flow CAGR runs -40.9%. Return metrics are only adequate, not premium enough to justify that valuation: ROE of 18.5% looks fine until you remember equity is just $5.11 billion supporting a nearly $50 billion market value and a much larger debt stack; ROIC of 6.9% is the more sober number. If this were being valued like a conventional utility on stability and yield, the 0.61% dividend would be absurdly low. If it is being valued like a structural growth power platform tied to AI/data-center demand, then I need to see cleaner sustained earnings expansion than 2025 delivered. Instead, I see a company whose share price appears to be discounting a best-of-both-worlds future: elevated power prices, dependable capacity scarcity, successful capex deployment, and no meaningful policy or commodity reversal.
The best counterargument is that 2025 was the trough, not the norm, and the latest quarter may be the first proof point. On that view, the $1.03 billion earned in Q1 2026 matters more than the weak 2025 full year because Vistra’s earnings are inherently seasonal and market-driven, and investors are paying for forward scarcity economics rather than trailing GAAP noise. There is substance to that. Revenue is re-accelerating, operating cash flow remains robust, and 2024 demonstrated the portfolio can throw off enormous profit in favorable markets. A bull would also note that annual revenue has climbed from $12.08 billion in 2021 to $17.74 billion in 2025, while losses in 2021-2022 gave way to strong profits in 2023-2024, suggesting a structurally improved asset mix and market position rather than mere luck. If power demand from electrification and data centers remains tight in Vistra’s key markets, today’s multiple may be less crazy than trailing earnings imply.
I still weigh it differently because too much of the investment case requires elevated market conditions to persist while leverage and capital intensity leave limited room for disappointment. The recent insider tape is also one-way selling, which is not decisive but is inconsistent with the idea that the stock is obviously cheap after its drawdown. To change my mind, I would need to see two or three more quarters that convert the Q1 2026 surge into a credible run-rate — specifically, annualized earnings power comfortably above $3 billion, free cash flow moving toward $2.5-$3.0 billion despite capex, and evidence that 2025’s margin compression was a true anomaly rather than the baseline when spreads normalize. Short of that, this looks like a good company with a stock price still reflecting peak optimism.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of extreme earnings volatility dressed up as a structural growth compounder. Vistra printed $2.66B in net income on $17.22B revenue in 2024, then watched NI collapse 64.5% to $944M in 2025 even as revenue ticked up 3% to $17.74B—operating income halved from $4.08B to $1.91B. That is not the profile of a business that has locked in a new higher plateau; it is a merchant power and retail operator still hostage to wholesale price swings, weather, and hedging outcomes. Q1 2026’s $5.64B revenue and $1.03B NI (18.2% margin) looks impressive in isolation, but it sits against a Q1 2025 loss and a Q3 2024 blowout of $1.89B NI that has not been repeated. Trailing P/E of 68x, P/B of 10x, and EV/EBITDA of 17.5x are pricing the AI/data-center scarcity narrative as if 2024 peak earnings power is the new floor rather than a cyclical high. Meanwhile free cash flow fell to $1.32B after $2.75B of capex, FCF CAGR is −40.9%, and the balance sheet carries $18.84B of debt against $5.11B of equity and only $785M of cash—a 3.7x debt-to-equity ratio and a 0.78 current ratio that leave little room for execution miss or rate pressure.
The quantitative models’ overvalued call at a composite fair value near $70 is directionally correct and understates how fragile the multiple is. Even if one annualizes the strong Q1 2026 run-rate, the business has never demonstrated four consecutive quarters of that profitability, and ROIC of 6.9% with ROA of 2.3% does not support a 10x book multiple. Insider activity is uniformly sales—tens of thousands of shares disposed across May–June 2026 with no open-market buys—which is consistent with management treating elevated prices as an exit rather than a signal of undervaluation. Revenue CAGR of 9.6% over the longer window is real, but it has not translated into durable earnings or FCF growth; the 2025 operating margin compression to 10.75% and net margin of 5.3% show the earnings power the market is capitalizing simply is not yet stable.
The strongest case against this read is that Vistra’s nuclear fleet plus retail integration is a genuine scarce asset in a market where data-center load growth is structural and multi-year, not cyclical. Believers will correctly note that 2025 was a trough year for power prices and that the Q1 2026 rebound, accelerating quarterly revenue trend, and $4.07B of operating cash flow demonstrate the cash engine is intact. They will argue a 19x multiple on 2024 peak earnings is not outrageous for a pure-play beneficiary of grid tightness, and that DCF anchors built on normalized mid-cycle margins systematically undervalue optionality on sustained elevated spark spreads and capacity payments. That argument has coherence; the narrative is anchored rather than cult-like, and nuclear baseload with a captive retail book is a better mousetrap than pure merchant gas. I weigh it less heavily because the premium already embeds flawless delivery of that thesis—roughly half the $148 price is story per the narrative layer—while leverage, declining FCF, and the demonstrated ability of earnings to fall two-thirds in a single year create asymmetric downside if power prices merely normalize rather than stay elevated forever.
What would flip the verdict is four consecutive quarters of net margins sustaining above 12–15% with FCF converting at a rate that pushes trailing FCF yield above 5%, or concrete multi-year data-center PPAs large enough to re-rate the earnings base toward $3B+ of sustainable NI. A material debt paydown that brings debt-to-equity under 2x and current ratio above 1.0 would also reduce the fragility discount I am applying.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Vistra has undergone a genuine operational turnaround. Revenue climbed from $12.1B (2021) to $17.7B (2025), and operating margin swung from -12.5% in 2021 to +23.7% in 2024 before normalizing to 10.7% in 2025. Net income moved from -$1.27B (2021) to +$2.66B (2024), and FCF has been solidly positive for three straight years ($3.78B, $2.49B, $1.32B). OCF/NI of 1.89x and accruals of -6.7% of assets point to high earnings quality — reported profits are backed by cash. Share count has shrunk from 482M to 346M diluted (-8% CAGR), with buybacks running ~1490% of SBC; per-share value is being concentrated, not eroded, and SBC is a trivial 0.6% of revenue. The offset is the balance sheet: net debt of $18.1B against just $785M liquid cash (1.6% of market cap), $1.80B short-term debt exceeding cash on hand, and an Altman Z of 1.32 in the distress zone. FCF of $1.32B comfortably services current obligations, but leverage means the company is dependent on continued power-market economics and refinancing access — the balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion. Insider tape shows 7 sells and 0 opens in the last year (~$8M), consistent with routine post-vest liquidation rather than a red flag, but no conviction buying either.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and refinancing schedule for the $1.80B short-term debt and beyond
- Hedging book and forward power-price exposure driving the 2025 margin compression
- Nuclear/gas fleet capacity factors and any customer concentration (hyperscaler PPAs) in the 10-K
- Whether 2024 peak earnings reflected one-time capacity/ancillary revenue or a repeatable rate environment
- Covenants on the debt stack and interest coverage headroom
Every valuation lens points the same direction: composite FV $73.81, signal-adjusted FV $69.40, DCF $89.29, EPV floor $55.46, anchored P/E $61.18. Against a $148.19 price, the tightest read is DCF (still ~40% below price) and the harshest is EPV (~63% below). Even generously anchoring on the DCF, there is no margin of safety - you are paying nearly 2x the deserved value on the most optimistic method and ~2.4x on the composite. The Solid quality read lifts deserved value modestly, but $18B net debt and a distress-zone Z-score cap how far I will stretch the multiple; this is not a fortress that earns a premium.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- forward power curve assumptions embedded in guidance vs current ERCOT/PJM strips
- capex program pacing and returns on nuclear/gas expansions
- refinancing schedule and cost given the $18B debt stack
- any long-dated hyperscaler PPAs that would de-risk the merchant tail
Sentiment on VST is net positive but fragile. The dominant narrative - integrated IPP as the picks-and-shovels play on AI data-center power demand and grid reliability - is a strong, moderately durable story that has powered the whole IPP cohort (VST, CEG, TLN) into premium multiples. At $148 vs a $69 DCF anchor, roughly half the price is narrative, which means sentiment IS the stock right now, not fundamentals. That is a tailwind while the story holds and a cliff if it cracks. With beta 1.41 and a utility label that no longer trades like a utility, VST behaves like a high-beta growth name tied to AI capex sentiment. The macro tape is mildly constructive (neutral-positive regime, VIX 16, S&P near highs), which supports story stocks; rates at 4.68% are a background drag on utilities but have been overwhelmed by the AI-power thesis for over a year. Near-term, a Zacks note flagging that VST does NOT have the right setup for an earnings beat next week is a specific, dated headwind into the print, and momentum has decelerated (3% recent vs 9.6% long-term CAGR), suggesting the easy narrative-driven rerating is behind it. Offsetting that, a fresh Lone Pine (Mandel) 13F highlight puts VST in a curated 'macro thesis' basket, which is the kind of smart-money validation that reinforces the cult-adjacent bid.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Aug earnings print reaction - does a miss or in-line get bought or sold
- Any hyperscaler PPA / data-center power deal news for VST or peers CEG/TLN
- Signs of narrative fatigue in the IPP cohort (relative strength vs CEG, TLN)
- Analyst target revisions post-print
- Power-price forward curves in ERCOT/PJM
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. No usable fair-value anchor — composite, DCF and anchored-PE are all absent from valuation-synthesis. Typical for pre-profit / narrative-platform names where those methods don't apply.