For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Roku, Inc. Class A Common Stock (ROKU) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-22): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 28 · Value -50 · Sentiment 74 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Roku, Inc. Class A Common Stock
ROKU NASDAQRoku, Inc. Class A Common Stock represents ownership in Roku, a company that develops a television streaming platform and related connected-TV products. Roku’s core business centers on its streaming operating system, which helps viewers discover and access movies, series, live news, sports, and other digital content across smart TVs and streaming devices. The company also operates an advertising-supported streaming platform and provides tools that help content publishers and advertisers reach streaming audiences. In addition to software and platform services, Roku sells streaming players, Roku-branded televisions, audio products, smart home products, and related accessories. Roku serves consumers and advertising partners in the U.S. and international markets, making it a significant participant in the connected-TV ecosystem and digital media distribution.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.59
Total Equity: $2.66B
Shares: 150,912,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.59B
EBITDA: $39.98M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.59B
Revenue: $4.74B
Revenue: $4.74B
Revenue: $4.74B
Total Equity: $2.66B
Tax Rate: 5.9%
Equity: $2.66B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.59B
Current Liabilities: $1.24B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.66B
Shares: 150,912,000
Shares: 150,912,000
CapEx: -$5.28M
Shares: 150,912,000
Stock Price: $158.31
Net Income: $88.36M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 1:31am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $4.1B | $4.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.7B |
| Gross Profit | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $2.1B |
| Operating Income | $235.1M | -$530.9M | -$792.4M | -$218.2M | -$5.6M |
| Net Income | $242.4M | -$498.0M | -$709.6M | -$129.4M | $88.4M |
| EBITDA | $260.5M | -$499.9M | -$739.1M | -$169.7M | $40.0M |
| EPS | $1.83 | $-3.62 | $-5.01 | $-0.89 | $0.60 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.71 | $-3.62 | $-5.01 | $-0.89 | $0.59 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 1:00am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $1.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.4B |
| Total Assets | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $729.6M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $80.0M | $0 | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| Total Equity | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.7B |
| Retained Earnings | -$90.0M | -$588.0M | -$1.3B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 1:48am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $228.1M | $11.8M | $255.9M | $218.0M | $483.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$40.0M | -$161.7M | -$82.6M | -$5.1M | -$5.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | $188.0M | -$149.9M | $173.2M | $213.0M | $478.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$136.8M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$95.1M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$5.0M | -$10.0M | -$80.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$150.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 1:31am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.1% | +11.5% | +18.0% | +15.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +2.3% | +5.7% | +18.6% | +14.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -325.8% | -49.3% | +72.5% | +97.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -305.5% | -42.5% | +81.8% | +168.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -291.9% | -47.8% | +77.0% | +123.6% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-12 02:04A +1σ run of quarters pays -85%; a −1σ run costs 88%. Ratio -1.0:1 (μ 17.9%, σ 4.6% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.8 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($158.31) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +32% | 9.5% | $41.75 | -74% |
| Base — stabilizes | +22% | 8.2% | $27.50 | -83% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +11% | 7.0% | $17.62 | -89% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +14% | 6.8% | $18.92 | -88% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +23% | 6.8% | $24.03 | -85% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +13% | 6.8% | $18.56 | -88% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-04 01:59The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The trajectory here is genuinely striking and I want to lead with what the models are underweighting: Roku's net income went from -$27.4M in Q1 2025 to $164.2M in Q2 2026 — that's a $190M swing in five quarters on revenue that grew from $1.02B to $1.35B. Trailing four-quarter net income is now roughly $355M ($164+$86+$81+$25), not the $88M annual figure the P/E is anchored on. That reframes valuation materially: at $23.5B market cap, forward P/E on annualized recent quarters is closer to 65x, not 268x. FCF of $478M on essentially zero capex ($5.3M) yields ~4.9% FCF yield — this is not a "pre-profit platform" anymore, and the pre-flight classification is stale by two quarters. EV/sales of 4.6x on 15-17% revenue growth with expanding margins is not obviously egregious for a platform.
That said, the synthesis and thesis-evaluation are right to flag the ceiling. Q2 2026's 12.1% net margin looks like a genuine inflection but also a suspiciously clean print — I'd want to see whether it's driven by ad revenue mix shift, one-time items, or comp-lapping the Shopify/Walmart deal ramp. Gross margin of 43.8% is structurally capped by device losses; the platform segment carries the whole model, and platform revenue growth has been decelerating even as total revenue accelerates (a subtle warning the "decelerating quarterly trend" note gestures at). The bear case that Amazon Fire TV and Google TV are structurally better-capitalized distribution rivals is real — Roku's OS neutrality is a feature until Amazon decides to subsidize Fire TV hardware to zero, which they can and periodically do. The 78 vs 86 bull/bear mass split in thesis eval feels about right directionally.
Where I dissent from the models: the market-forces "neutral" and thesis "-8" read strike me as too bearish given the cash flow reality. $478M FCF against $23.5B market cap, $1.59B cash, zero debt, and a demonstrably improving operating trajectory is not a "priced for perfection" setup — it's priced for continued execution, which is different. The insider activity is almost entirely August 14 awards (grants, not open-market purchases or unusual sales), so labeling it "neutral" is correct but the one 7,000-share sale against 366,000 shares of awards is noise, not signal. The contrarian argument against my own more constructive read: revenue CAGR of 16.6% is decelerating from the 25%+ era, and if Q2's margin was juiced by seasonal ad strength or a favorable content-cost comp, then annualizing $164M quarterly NI is exactly the mistake bulls made in 2021 before the stock went from $490 to $40. The 2021 print of $242M NI was followed by three years of deep losses — this company has faked profitability before.
My read: fair value is $140-180 based on ~20x forward FCF assuming $600M run-rate FCF and mid-teens growth for two more years before deceleration to ~8%. At $158 that's roughly fair, with upside skew if Q3 confirms the margin inflection isn't a head-fake and downside to $110 if platform revenue growth drops below 10% or Amazon/Google make aggressive OS moves. I partial-agree with the synthesis "high conviction required" framing but dissent from the implicit skepticism — the data has moved faster than the models have updated. This is not a short; it's a hold-with-conviction-on-Q3-print. New money should wait for the next earnings; existing holders shouldn't trim on valuation alone when FCF yield is approaching 5% and accelerating. The tell will be Q3 2026 platform revenue growth and gross margin — if platform gross margin holds above 55% and platform revenue grows >12% YoY, the bull case compounds; if either slips, the multiple compresses fast.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not the headline P/E or the “platform” narrative, but the speed and quality of the profit inflection. Roku has gone from quarterly net losses of -$9 million, -$35.5 million, and -$27.4 million through late 2024/early 2025 to positive net income every quarter since mid-2025, culminating in $164.2 million on $1.35 billion of revenue in the latest quarter, a 12.1% net margin. That is a real operating turn, not a rounding-error annual profit. Revenue is still growing at a healthy clip too: from $1.06 billion in 2024-09 to $1.35 billion in 2026-06, and latest-quarter growth versus the year-ago quarter is about 22% ($1.35 billion vs. $1.11 billion). Annual revenue rose from $4.11 billion in 2024 to $4.74 billion in 2025, up 15.3%, while operating loss collapsed from -$218.2 million to essentially breakeven at -$5.6 million. Just as important, this is not a balance-sheet story masquerading as a business story: Roku has $1.59 billion of cash, no debt, and generated $483.7 million of operating cash flow and $478.4 million of free cash flow in 2025.
The market is therefore directionally right to reward Roku as more than a “pre-profit” asset. A business at roughly 4.6x EV/revenue with 44% gross margins, no leverage, and clear incremental margin improvement is not automatically expensive if the model is proving it can scale. The latest four quarters sum to about $5.0 billion of revenue and roughly $355 million of net income, which means the trailing earnings power is already far above the annual 2025 number that makes the 268x P/E look absurd. On that run-rate, the real earnings multiple is closer to the mid-60s, still rich but no longer detached from reality for a company growing revenue in the mid-teens to low-20s and expanding margins rapidly. If Roku can sustain even a 10-12% net margin on a $5.5-6.0 billion revenue base over the next couple of years, the earnings power starts to justify a premium multiple.
That said, I still come out cautious at $158 because the stock is being valued on the assumption that this margin ramp continues with relatively little interruption. At a $23.5 billion market cap, investors are already capitalizing Roku at nearly 50x 2025 free cash flow and around 5x sales for a business whose annual operating margin was still negative in 2025 and whose long-term normalized economics are not proven. The key tension in the numbers is that gross margin was 43.8% in 2025, which is good but not exceptional enough on its own to guarantee software-like margin structure; Roku still needs disciplined opex and favorable ad monetization to convert that into durable double-digit operating margins. The latest quarter’s 12.1% net margin is impressive, but one or two stronger ad quarters can make a cyclical business look more structurally profitable than it is. For me, fair value is below the current quote unless Roku can show that the last three quarters are the new base rather than a favorable phase.
The strongest case against my caution is straightforward: the business may have already crossed the threshold where conventional “wait for proof” valuation discipline becomes too conservative. Annual numbers understate the present. Going from -$792.4 million operating loss in 2023 to -$218.2 million in 2024 to essentially breakeven in 2025 is dramatic, and the 2026 quarterly sequence of $85.7 million then $164.2 million of net income suggests substantial operating leverage is now visible. Free cash flow quality also looks strong because capex is tiny, just $5.3 million in 2025, so a large share of incremental gross profit can flow through. If the company is becoming a capital-light ad/platform compounding machine, then 5x revenue is not demanding at all; it could even prove cheap in hindsight. I weigh that less heavily because I want to see a full-year operating margin firmly positive before paying a platform-winner multiple, especially in an ecosystem where much larger players can pressure distribution and ad economics.
What would change my mind is specific and near-term. If Roku can print another two quarters above $1.3 billion of revenue with net margins staying in the high-single-digits or better, and if full-year revenue pushes comfortably above $5.2 billion with operating income clearly positive rather than near zero, then I would accept that the inflection is durable and that $158 is supportable. Conversely, if growth slips back toward low teens while quarterly net margin falls back to 3-5%, the stock is too expensive and should trade more like 3.5-4.0x revenue, implying something closer to $115-135. Right now the business is better than the simplistic bear case, but the stock still asks you to underwrite too much perfection too early.
Grok Reading
The raw trajectory is unambiguous and better than the still-ugly annual multiples suggest. Roku went from $3.48B revenue and a $710M net loss in 2023 to $4.74B and +$88M net income in 2025, then printed four consecutive quarters of expanding profitability culminating in the June 2026 quarter: $1.35B revenue, $164M net income, and a 12.1% net margin. That is not a one-time accrual blip; sequential net margins marched from –2.7% to 0.9% to 2% to 5.8% to 6.9% to 12.1%. Free cash flow of $478M on only $5M of capex and a debt-free balance sheet with $1.59B cash confirms the platform economics are finally showing up in cash, not just non-GAAP slides. Revenue CAGR of 16.6% and recent YoY of 15.2% remain respectable for a company this size, and the gross margin near 44% gives real operating leverage if the ad-load and ARPU story continues. The story the numbers tell is a scaled CTV OS that has crossed the fixed-cost threshold and is now converting incremental ad dollars at high marginal rates.
Where the market and the models over-reach is in treating that inflection as already priced for Facebook-like terminal economics. At $158 and a $23.5B enterprise, you are paying 5.0× trailing sales and roughly 49× trailing FCF for a business whose trailing annual operating margin is still essentially zero and whose ROIC is negative. The 268× P/E and 543× EV/EBITDA are mathematically meaningless near the zero-earnings line, but they correctly signal that almost all of the equity value sits in the assumption that net margins climb from today’s low-single-digits run-rate toward the mid-teens while revenue keeps compounding mid-teens. That is a coherent bull case, not a proven one. Growth is already decelerating in the secondary signals, the installed base is maturing, and the same quarterly print that delivered 12% margins also sits inside a competitive set (Amazon Fire, Google TV, vertical streamers) that can and does undercut on both hardware subsidies and ad pricing.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: ignore the trailing P/E noise and underwrite the run-rate. Annualize the latest two quarters and you are looking at something closer to $5.2B+ revenue and $500M-plus of net income with FCF already at $478M and rising; apply a 25–30× FCF multiple to a clean-balance-sheet platform compounder and $158 is not obviously expensive if margins stabilize in the low-to-mid teens and the CTV ad wallet shift has another five years of runway. Active accounts are still growing, the OS remains the default neutral layer for many OEMs, and the operating deleverage that crushed 2022–2024 has reversed faster than most bears expected. A smart opponent would also note that insider activity is noise (awards and one small sale) rather than distribution, and that $1.59B of cash removes any near-term financing overhang. I weigh this less heavily because the 15% growth rate already embeds a lot of that wallet shift, the competitive set is better capitalized, and 5× sales with decelerating top-line leaves little room for a growth miss or a margin stall at 6–8% instead of 15%.
I would flip to constructive on a clean break above $1.5B quarterly revenue with net margins holding double-digits for two more quarters, or on any sustained re-acceleration of revenue growth back above 20% YoY that proves the TAM is still under-penetrated. Conversely, two quarters of sub-10% revenue growth or net margins rolling over below 5% while the multiple stays elevated would confirm the stock is priced for a dominance that the competitive structure will not deliver.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business has visibly inflected on cash: FCF went from -$150M in 2022 to $478M in 2025, and net income crossed into the black at $88M after three years of GAAP losses totaling ~$1.3B. Liquidity is a genuine strength - $2.32B net cash, Altman Z of 9.12, and accruals at -10.2% of assets with OCF/NI of 0.87x point to clean, cash-backed earnings. Revenue has compounded from $2.76B (2021) to $4.74B (2025), roughly 14% CAGR, so the top line is durable even as growth decelerates. The concerns are structural. Gross margin has eroded from 51% (2021) to 43.8% (2025) and shows no recovery, consistent with the mix shift away from higher-margin platform economics or intensifying content/ad-tech competition. Operating margin is still essentially zero (-0.1% in 2025) despite the revenue base nearly doubling - operating leverage has been disappointing. SBC at 7.5% of revenue is heavy, and buybacks offset only 9.1% of it, so diluted shares grew from 141.7M to 150.9M (~1.6% CAGR) - not destructive but not disciplined either. Insider tape shows 12 sales / 0 buys and Anthony Wood's sizable gifting and award activity - neutral but not confidence-inspiring at this inflection. Net read: a financially safe, cash-generative platform business that has not yet proven it can compound operating profit.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment gross margin split (Platform vs Devices) to isolate whether Platform margins are actually stable or eroding
- Customer/advertiser concentration in the Platform segment
- Trajectory of Platform ARPU and active accounts vs streaming hours to test monetization health
- SBC vesting cliffs and any large equity refresh grants tied to CEO/founder Anthony Wood
- Any content-licensing or capacity commitments that could pressure future FCF
Roku trades at $158.31 for a $23.5B market cap on a business that just crossed into positive FCF but still runs a zero operating margin and four consecutive years of GAAP losses. Back out the roughly $2.3B net cash and the market is paying about $21B for a platform whose gross margin has compressed ~7 points since 2021. To justify that, you need to believe Roku captures a disproportionate share of the CTV ad dollar migration while fending off Fire TV, Google TV and Apple TV - the e2e read that it is 'priced for dominance' matches what I see. That is a possible outcome, not a probable one at this price. Deserved value on a solid-but-not-elite platform with flat op margins and slowing growth is closer to the mid-$120s to mid-$130s in my head - a mid-teens EV/sales business only if ad take-rate expands, otherwise low-teens. At $158 the margin of safety is negative; you are paying for the bull narrative already. Not egregiously overvalued - the cash cushion and real FCF inflection keep it out of the 'overvalued' bucket - but there is no gap to exploit here. This is a hold-your-nose-and-wait price, not a buy price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Platform gross margin trajectory quarter over quarter - is the 7-point compression reversing
- Ad ARPU and monetized video ad impression growth vs streaming hours - take-rate expansion is the whole bull case
- Operating expense discipline - is opex leverage translating FCF into GAAP profit
- Guidance on international monetization, which is currently a drag
- Any disclosure on concentration among top advertisers
The non-fundamental pressure on ROKU is decisively positive right now. The stock just printed a 3-year high, crossed the 20-day, and is up roughly 60% over the past year - momentum tape is fully engaged, and with beta 2.04 the mildly risk-on regime lands harder here than on the average name. Narrative flow is layered and reinforcing: bullish EPS revisions (Zacks #1), a fresh product push into OLED reframing Roku from pure-OS to platform-plus-hardware, and a live M&A rumor (Netflix shortlist chatter, echo of the June 20% pop on sale talks) providing a persistent takeout bid under the stock.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether Netflix/M&A speculation concretizes or fades - a denial would cut a leg out
- Any advertiser or CTV competitor commentary that revives the commoditization bear thesis
- VIX regime shift - a spike above 20 would hit beta-2 names first
- Whether sell-side upgrades follow the EPS revisions or start to lag price
The secular shift of TV viewing and ad budgets from linear to connected TV is the dominant force, and it is still mid-innings: CTV ad spend continues to grow faster than total ad spend, which is a tailwind that does not require Roku to win anything new. Roku's structural position is as a neutral toll booth — it neither funds content nor profits on hardware, so it captures a slice of everyone's distribution. The counterforce is that the OS layer is strategically valuable to far better-capitalized parties (Amazon, Google, Samsung), who will happily run it at zero margin. Macro is a headwind on the ad cycle (4.79% 10y, flagged headwinds), which throttles near-term CPMs but does not change the migration. Net: the world is moving toward Roku's business, while the competitive structure of its layer erodes pricing power over time.
When we made this prediction on Sep 4, 2026, ROKU was $156.24. We expect it to be $142.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $120.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.