Business Description
Match Group, Inc. is a global leader specializing in the provision of online dating and relationship services. Its extensive portfolio encompasses prominent platforms such as Tinder, Match, Meetic, OkCupid, Hinge, Pairs, PlentyOfFish, and OurTime, in addition to a variety of other niche applications. Founded in 1986, the company's base of operations is located in Dallas, Texas.
Business History
Generated: Jun 12, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.53
Total Equity: -$253.50M
Shares: 262,475,000
Total Debt: $3.97B
Cash: $1.03B
EBITDA: $999.21M
Total Debt: $3.97B
Cash: $1.03B
Revenue: $3.49B
Revenue: $3.49B
Revenue: $3.49B
Total Equity: -$253.50M
Tax Rate: 17.8%
Equity: -$253.50M
Total Debt: $3.97B
Cash: $1.03B
Current Liabilities: $1.01B
Long-Term Debt: $3.55B
Total Debt: $3.97B
Total Equity: -$253.50M
Shares: 262,475,000
Shares: 262,475,000
CapEx: -$56.77M
Shares: 262,475,000
Stock Price: $34.57
Net Income: $613.45M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:07am (22h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $839.3M | $960.0M | $954.0M | $991.3M | $948.4M |
| Gross Profit | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Operating Income | $851.7M | $515.0M | $916.9M | $823.3M | $872.5M |
| Net Income | $277.7M | $361.9M | $651.5M | $551.3M | $613.4M |
| EBITDA | $428.0M | $566.6M | $1.0B | $951.6M | $999.2M |
| EPS | $1.01 | $1.28 | $2.36 | $2.12 | $2.53 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $815.4M | $572.4M | $862.4M | $966.0M | $1.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.2B | $882.4M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Total Assets | $5.1B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.2B | $556.4M | $531.8M | $549.5M | $1.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.3B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.7B |
| Total Equity | -$203.8M | -$359.9M | -$19.5M | -$63.7M | -$253.5M |
| Retained Earnings | -$8.1B | -$7.8B | -$7.1B | -$6.6B | -$6.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:07am (22h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $912.5M | $525.7M | $896.8M | $932.7M | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$80.0M | -$49.1M | -$67.4M | -$50.6M | -$56.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $832.5M | $476.6M | $829.4M | $882.1M | $1.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$859.9M | -$25.7M | -$11.6M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$482.0M | -$546.2M | -$752.7M | -$788.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | $76.2M | -$243.0M | $289.9M | $103.6M | $61.8M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.6B $3.5B – $3.7B
|
$3.8B $3.8B – $3.8B
|
$4.1B $4.0B – $4.2B
|
$4.3B $4.2B – $4.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.6B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$1.9B $1.9B – $1.9B
|
| Net Income |
$817.8M $747.7M – $887.8M
|
$946.7M $817.8M – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.3B $1.3B – $1.4B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:07am (22h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.9% | +5.5% | +3.4% | +0.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +4.0% | +8.1% | +3.2% | +2.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -39.5% | +78.0% | -10.2% | +6.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +30.3% | +80.0% | -15.4% | +11.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +32.4% | +84.6% | -9.0% | +5.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:05am (22h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 71.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 12,849.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 540.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 17,850.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | F-InKind | 6,574.00 | $36.13 | $237,519 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | F-InKind | 9,357.00 | $36.13 | $338,068 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 12,849.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 17,850.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 540.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rascoff Spencer M | M-Exempt | 71.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Hosseini Hesam | M-Exempt | 8,854.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Hosseini Hesam | M-Exempt | 267.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Hosseini Hesam | M-Exempt | 8,854.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Hosseini Hesam | F-InKind | 3,590.00 | $36.13 | $129,707 |
| 2026-06-01 | Hosseini Hesam | M-Exempt | 267.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Eigenmann Philip D | M-Exempt | 11.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Eigenmann Philip D | M-Exempt | 2,007.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Eigenmann Philip D | F-InKind | 694.00 | $36.13 | $25,074 |
| 2026-06-01 | Eigenmann Philip D | M-Exempt | 55.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Eigenmann Philip D | M-Exempt | 1,845.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 12, 2026 3:00am (22h ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-07 | $0.20 | 2026-05-03 | 2026-07-07 | 2026-07-21 |
| 2026-04-07 | $0.20 | 2026-02-02 | 2026-04-07 | 2026-04-21 |
| 2026-01-06 | $0.19 | 2025-11-03 | 2026-01-06 | 2026-01-21 |
| 2025-10-03 | $0.19 | 2025-08-04 | 2025-10-03 | 2025-10-17 |
| 2025-07-03 | $0.19 | 2025-05-07 | 2025-07-03 | 2025-07-18 |
| 2025-04-03 | $0.19 | 2025-02-04 | 2025-04-03 | 2025-04-17 |
| 2025-01-06 | $0.19 | 2024-12-11 | 2025-01-06 | 2025-01-21 |
| 2018-12-04 | $2.00 | 2018-11-06 | 2018-12-05 | 2018-12-19 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a tighter story than the model committee acknowledges. Revenue is flat-to-stalling: $3.49B in 2025 vs $3.48B in 2024 is 0.2% growth, and the most recent quarter ($863.9M in Q1 2026) is actually below Q3 2025 ($914.3M) and roughly flat against Q2 2025 ($863.7M). Quarterly net income is bouncing between $117M and $209M with no clear trend — the 23.9% margin in Q4 2025 looks like a tax/one-time benefit rather than operating leverage, since op margin for the full year sits at 25.0% and Q1 2026 reverted to 19.3%. What is real and underrated: FCF of $1.02B on an $8.06B market cap is a 12.7% FCF yield, capex is trivial ($57M on $3.49B revenue, ~1.6%), and the 72.8% gross margin is intact. This is a cash cow with a stalled top line, not a deteriorating one — at least not yet.
Where I disagree with the model stack: the "pre-flight" classifier calling this a "pre-profit-platform" is simply wrong — MTCH has printed >$550M of net income for four consecutive years and >$1B of FCF. The Market Forces module's "leverage-heavy capital structure" claim is unsupported in the file (total debt is blanked, but the 1.42 current ratio and $1.03B cash don't scream distress; the negative book value reflects buybacks, not insolvency — MTCH has aggressively repurchased shares, which is why P/B is negative and ROE prints as -2.86). That's a capital-return feature, not a red flag. The Synthesis "fair value $40.57" and Narrative module's "-14.8% discount to DCF" are directionally consistent with my own back-of-envelope: 8x FCF for a 72% gross margin business with optionality on Hinge (growing double-digits within the portfolio) and Tinder stabilization is cheap on absolute terms, even granting zero growth.
The contrarian-to-the-contrarians case: every model is anchored on "Tinder saturation" as the dominant narrative, but the financials don't yet show terminal decline — they show a plateau. FCF CAGR of 11.1% against revenue CAGR of 1.8% is the signature of a business pulling margin and buyback levers, which works until it doesn't. The real bear case isn't valuation, it's that Hinge's growth eventually fails to offset Tinder's MAU decay and FCF rolls from $1.02B toward $750M over three years — at which point 12.7% yield becomes 9% on a lower price. The insider activity is uninformative (all M-Exempt option exercises and F-InKind tax withholdings — zero open-market buying signal in either direction; the models calling this "neutral" got it right by default). The data gaps that matter: no debt figure, no segment breakdown of Tinder vs Hinge vs Match.com revenue, and the quarterly deceleration flag (Q3→Q4→Q1 going $914M→$878M→$864M) deserves more weight than "Good Revenue Confidence" suggests — that's a 5.5% sequential decline over two quarters, not noise.
Net: I dissent from "fair value" and lean toward the Synthesis's signal-adjusted $40.57 as a floor, not a midpoint. A business generating 12.7% FCF yield with 73% gross margins, even with zero revenue growth, is worth 10-12x FCF, or $40-48/share. The market's "value trap" framing requires actual FCF erosion that hasn't shown up yet — Q1 2026 operating performance is in line with 2024, not below it. The asymmetry favors longs: downside to ~$28 (8x a hypothetically impaired $700M FCF) vs upside to $45+ on stabilization. I'd disagree with Market Forces' "likely value trap" verdict — that's a forecast dressed as an observation. Wait for the Q2 2026 print to confirm whether the sequential revenue decline is FX/seasonal or structural; if revenue holds above $850M and Hinge growth is disclosed at >25%, this re-rates to $42-45.
GPT Critique
In my independent analysis of Match Group, Inc., I see a company with strong free cash flow (FCF) generation but facing concerning stagnation in revenue growth. The company reported $3.49 billion in revenue for 2025, a marginal increase from $3.48 billion in 2024, indicating an anemic growth rate of 0.2%. The most recent quarterly revenue of $863.9 million in Q1 2026 shows a decline from Q3 2025’s $914.3 million. This quarterly deceleration is a red flag and suggests the need for caution regarding the sustainability of their revenue base. Despite this, Match Group's FCF remains robust at $1.02 billion, yielding a substantial 12.7% return on its current market cap of $8.06 billion, underscoring its identity as a cash-generating entity with a high gross margin of 72.8%.
I agree with Opus's assertion that the "pre-profit-platform" classification is inaccurate for Match Group. As highlighted, Match has consistently generated over $550 million in net income annually for the past four years, solidifying its status as a mature, profitable enterprise. However, I diverge from Opus regarding the company's capital structure concerns. While Opus dismisses the leverage-heavy claim due to a lack of debt data, the negative book value does raise questions about the financial strategy focused on share buybacks. This approach could suggest a lack of better investment opportunities, potentially hinting at a strategic dead end if revenue growth remains stagnant.
Opus is correct in identifying the real risk as the potential failure of Hinge to compensate for Tinder's plateauing growth. The sequential revenue declines from Q3 to Q1 deserve attention beyond the optimistic "Good Revenue Confidence" label. This trend suggests that the market's "value trap" narrative might not be entirely unfounded if the anticipated growth from Hinge does not materialize as expected. The lack of open market insider transactions further supports a cautious stance, as it indicates limited internal confidence in the stock's undervaluation narrative.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the potential regulatory risks and competitive pressures from newer entrants, which could further erode Match Group's market position. Additionally, the reliance on high FCF yields might be overly optimistic if revenue growth fails to pick up, leading to potential downward valuation adjustments if investors start pricing in a prolonged stagnation or decline.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses are telling a consistent story: Lens 1 at +21 says this is a legitimately strong business — 29% FCF margins, clean accruals, real net share shrinkage at ~3.7% per year — but a stagnating one with uncomfortable leverage. Lens 2 at 0 says the market basically knows this, and the ~15% gap to a high-$30s deserved value is the minimum acceptable discount, not a gift. I'm not going to pretend a 15% margin of safety on a no-growth, levered consumer internet name is a pound-the-table setup. It isn't.
So here's the play: I open a starter position around 1/3 of target weight here at $34.57 — I'm getting paid a real FCF yield, buybacks are accretive at this price, and the earnings quality lets me sleep. I add a second tranche at $30 and back up the truck to full weight at $27, which is roughly the EPV floor and where the bear case (Tinder bleed continues, Hinge decelerates) is finally priced in. I do NOT chase above $38 — the signal-adjusted FV is ~$40 and I'm not paying near fair for 0.4% revenue growth. What flips me aggressive earlier: a quarter showing Tinger payer stabilization or Hinge re-accelerating — that re-rates the quality score and the whole thesis. What gets me out: net debt creeping up while FCF falls below $900M, because then the leverage stops being academic. Target sizing at full conviction: ~3% position. Today: ~1%.
Match runs a genuinely high-quality P&L: gross margins held at 72.8% in 2025, operating margins at 25%, and FCF grew from $832M (2021) to $1.02B (2025). Earnings quality looks clean — OCF/NI of 1.91x, negative accruals (-8.2% of assets), and a Beneish M-score of -3.09 all point to real, cash-backed earnings rather than accounting sugar. The company is a net buyer of its stock (diluted share count fell from 304.8M to 262.5M, a -3.7% CAGR), with buybacks running 2.3x SBC — per-share value is being concentrated.
The drag is twofold. First, growth has flatlined: revenue went from $3.36B (2023) to $3.49B (2025), essentially zero growth over two years in what should be a scaled consumer internet franchise — a warning on the durability of the core dating moat (Tinder fatigue is the obvious suspect, though that needs filing-level confirmation). Second, the balance sheet carries net debt of -$2.94B against $1.03B cash, and Altman Z of 0.69 sits in distress territory — for an asset-light business that's largely a function of leveraged-buyback financial engineering rather than imminent solvency risk, but it means there's no cushion if FCF wobbles. Insider activity is routine vesting/withholding, no signal.
Net: high-quality earnings and capital return discipline, mediocre growth, levered capital structure. A solid business, not a fortress.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Tinder vs Hinge vs other-brand revenue/paying-user trends — is Hinge offsetting Tinder decline, or is the whole portfolio plateauing?
- Debt maturity schedule and interest coverage — confirm $2.94B net debt is term-loan/notes with comfortable maturity ladder
- Reason for 2022 operating margin compression to 16.2% (impairment? marketing reset?) to judge whether it could recur
- Customer/payer concentration and ARPU trends by brand
- Activist/Elliott involvement and any commitments around capital return or strategic review
The e2e composite FV of $45 and signal-adjusted FV of $40.57 bracket a deserved value somewhere in the high-$30s to low-$40s for a strong-but-stagnating cash machine. The DCF at $53.83 looks generous given 0.4% revenue growth and saturation risk in core Tinder — I'd discount that toward the EPV floor of $27.36, which itself is too punitive for a business throwing off this much FCF. Splitting the difference and crediting the clean earnings quality, I land on deserved value around $38-42, versus the $34.57 print.
That's a ~10-20% gap — enough to call it modestly cheap, not enough to call it a steal. What's priced in: the market clearly believes Tinder is structurally challenged and that buybacks alone won't carry the equity. What has to go right to justify higher: Hinge needs to keep scaling, Tinder needs to stop bleeding payers, and leverage needs to not become a story. None of that is heroic, but none is guaranteed either. For a leveraged, low-growth consumer internet asset, a 15-20% discount to fair is the minimum I'd want — we're right at that threshold.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Tinder payer count trajectory in latest quarter — stabilization vs continued decline
- Hinge revenue growth and contribution margin
- Net leverage and refinancing schedule on the debt stack
- Buyback pace and whether management is leaning in at current prices
- Forward guidance on total revenue growth and margin