Business Description
Pagaya Technologies Ltd. is a financial technology enterprise operating across Israel, the United States, and the Cayman Islands. The company specializes in developing and implementing its proprietary artificial intelligence systems and associated software platforms. These advanced solutions are designed to assist its diverse range of partners – including rapidly growing fintech companies, traditional financial institutions, auto finance providers, and brokers – in originating various loans and other financial assets. Founded in 2016, Pagaya Technologies Ltd. is headquartered in Tel Aviv, Israel.
Business History
Generated: Jun 9, 2026 6:45pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:42pm (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.04
Total Equity: $480.02M
Shares: 83,097,227
Total Debt: $888.59M
Cash: $288.35M
EBITDA: $81.70M
Total Debt: $888.59M
Cash: $288.35M
Revenue: $1.26B
Revenue: $1.26B
Revenue: $1.26B
Total Equity: $480.02M
Tax Rate: -38.2%
Equity: $480.02M
Total Debt: $888.59M
Cash: $288.35M
Current Liabilities: $78.57M
Long-Term Debt: $888.59M
Total Debt: $888.59M
Total Equity: $480.02M
Shares: 83,097,227
Shares: 83,097,227
CapEx: -$13.90M
Shares: 83,097,227
Stock Price: $14.80
Net Income: $81.39M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:50pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $445.9M | $685.4M | $772.8M | $1.0B | $1.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $232.3M | $451.1M | $508.9M | $597.7M | $749.2M |
| Gross Profit | $213.5M | $234.3M | $263.9M | $406.9M | $512.2M |
| Operating Expenses | $219.4M | $485.8M | $288.3M | $340.1M | $288.4M |
| Operating Income | -$5.8M | -$251.5M | -$24.4M | $66.8M | $223.8M |
| Net Income | -$91.2M | -$302.3M | -$128.4M | -$401.4M | $81.4M |
| EBITDA | -$33.7M | -$308.7M | -$44.5M | $67.9M | $81.7M |
| EPS | $-4.27 | $-7.65 | $-2.14 | $-5.66 | $1.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:43pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $190.8M | $309.8M | $186.5M | $187.9M | $288.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $246.5M | $419.8M | $303.4M | $351.5M | $441.6M |
| Total Assets | $590.3M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $28.7M | $128.0M | $74.9M | $195.5M | $78.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | $37.9M | $92.8M | $324.0M | $516.9M | $888.6M |
| Total Liabilities | $105.9M | $279.7M | $542.6M | $849.5M | $990.6M |
| Total Equity | $308.3M | $553.5M | $559.7M | $326.5M | $480.0M |
| Retained Earnings | -$111.9M | -$414.2M | -$542.6M | -$944.0M | -$862.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:50pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $49.8M | -$40.0M | $9.6M | $66.5M | $238.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$6.6M | -$22.4M | -$20.2M | -$23.2M | -$13.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $43.2M | -$62.4M | -$10.6M | $43.3M | $224.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$14.1M | $105.5M | $0 | -$9.2M | $-159,000 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $198.7M | $134.6M | -$114.5M | $4.0M | $81.8M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:43pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.3B $1.3B – $1.3B
|
$1.5B $1.4B – $1.5B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.9B $1.9B – $1.9B
|
| EBITDA |
-$118.8M -$121.4M – -$117.9M
|
-$133.2M -$136.1M – -$129.5M
|
-$151.4M -$153.2M – -$149.6M
|
-$170.5M -$170.5M – -$170.5M
|
| Net Income |
$73.6M $71.2M – $76.0M
|
$114.3M $110.6M – $118.0M
|
$160.7M $155.5M – $165.9M
|
$231.8M $224.3M – $239.3M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:50pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +53.7% | +12.8% | +30.0% | +25.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.7% | +12.6% | +54.2% | +25.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -4,229.6% | +90.3% | +373.9% | +234.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -231.7% | +57.5% | -212.5% | +120.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -815.7% | +85.6% | +252.5% | +20.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 6:49pm (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-02 | Vieira Cory | M-Exempt | 5,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-02 | Vieira Cory | S-Sale | 2,140.00 | $15.01 | $32,121 |
| 2026-06-02 | Vieira Cory | M-Exempt | 5,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-10-16 | DAS SANJIV | M-Exempt | 22,916.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-17 | Rosen Tami | S-Sale | 9,720.00 | $15.14 | $147,161 |
| 2026-04-01 | Vieira Cory | A-Award | 28,571.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Yulzari Yahav | A-Award | 185,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | DAS SANJIV | A-Award | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Krubiner Gal | A-Award | 185,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Perros Evangelos | A-Award | 175,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Pardo Avital | A-Award | 185,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Perros Evangelos | M-Exempt | 22,766.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Perros Evangelos | S-Sale | 13,004.00 | $11.34 | $147,465 |
| 2026-04-01 | Perros Evangelos | M-Exempt | 22,766.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | DAS SANJIV | M-Exempt | 23,750.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | DAS SANJIV | S-Sale | 9,702.00 | $10.99 | $106,625 |
| 2026-03-12 | DAS SANJIV | M-Exempt | 23,750.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | Perros Evangelos | M-Exempt | 20,625.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | Perros Evangelos | S-Sale | 8,425.00 | $10.99 | $92,591 |
| 2026-03-12 | Perros Evangelos | M-Exempt | 20,625.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went $242.6M → $249.3M → $275.7M → $282.7M → $317.7M → $339.9M → $321.0M → $317.9M. That's not "accelerating 26% growth" — that's a sequence that peaked in Q3 2025 and has now printed two consecutive sequential declines. YoY comps are still strong (Q1'26 $317.9M vs Q1'25 $282.7M = +12.4%), but the deceleration is real and the synthesis layer glosses over it. Net income trajectory is more flattering — $7.9M → $16.7M → $22.5M → $34.3M → $24.7M — but Q1'26 also stepped down. So we have a company where both the top line and bottom line just rolled over sequentially, and the prior-year comp (the $237.9M Q4'24 loss) was almost certainly a credit-reserve / fair-value mark cleanup that makes the YoY swing look more dramatic than the underlying business warrants.
The Pre-Flight write-up calling this a "pre-profit-platform" and Synthesis calling it "Reasonable Premium" at 1.0x sales / 13x P/E both miss what Pagaya actually is. This is not a software platform — it's a credit risk-transfer business that originates consumer loans through partner lenders and packages them into ABS. Revenue is largely fee income tied to loan volumes, and "net income" is heavily exposed to fair-value marks on retained risk. The 40.6% gross margin and 17.7% operating margin look software-like on the surface, but the $238M of operating cash flow against $81M of net income suggests large non-cash items (likely fair-value adjustments and stock comp — note the ~775,000 shares awarded April 1, 2026, which is massive dilution for a $1.2B cap). Market Forces is closer to right than Synthesis here: earnings quality is the central question, not the multiple.
A careful contrarian — and I think the bear case is stronger than the consensus models suggest — would point out that Pagaya's whole model is levered to consumer credit performance and ABS market appetite. We're entering this read with credit losses normalizing higher across subprime and near-prime, and the company's "profitability inflection" coincided exactly with a benign 2025 credit window. The insider activity is also worse than "unusual selling" — it's 775K shares awarded in a single day on April 1, 2026, followed by sales. That's compensation-driven supply, and at $14.80 with ~83M shares outstanding implied by the cap, those awards alone are ~1% dilution in one tranche. The balance sheet tile is missing total debt and equity entirely, which for a company that warehouses loans and issues ABS is a critical gap — you cannot underwrite Pagaya without knowing on-balance-sheet credit exposure. The "5.6x current ratio" is meaningless for this business model.
I dissent from the Synthesis "Reasonable Premium" verdict and side closer to Market Forces. The bull math — 27.8% revenue CAGR, FCF positive $224M, 13x earnings — looks compelling in isolation, but (a) growth just decelerated for two straight quarters, (b) earnings quality is suspect given the magnitude of 2024's reversed losses, (c) the 2025 profit print rode a friendly credit tape that may not repeat, and (d) dilution is aggressive. On normalized earnings — say, haircutting NI by 30-40% for fair-value optimism and adding back realistic SBC — you're closer to $50-55M of true owner earnings, which puts the stock at 22-25x normalized, not 13x. At 1.0x sales the multiple looks cheap only if you believe this is a software platform; if it's a specialty credit facilitator, peers trade at 0.5-0.8x sales. Fair value is probably $11-13, not $20+. The chart from $45 to $15 isn't irrational pessimism — it's the market correctly re-rating a credit-cycle-exposed business away from a software multiple. I'd want to see two more quarters of stable sequential revenue, clarity on on-balance-sheet risk retention, and insider buying (not awards-and-sells) before touching it.
GPT Critique
Pagaya Technologies Ltd. presents a compelling investment consideration with a narrative that can be interpreted from several angles. From the raw data, the company shows a notable turnaround from significant losses in 2024 to profitability in 2025 with net income of $81.4 million. This is a noteworthy shift, and the company also boasts a robust operating cash flow of $238.6 million, indicating a positive cash generation capability. However, revenue appears to have peaked in Q3 2025, with a slight decline in subsequent quarters, suggesting a potential deceleration in growth momentum. The company's margins have improved, but the sustainability of these margins in the face of potential market headwinds remains uncertain. The lack of transparency regarding total debt and equity on the balance sheet is concerning, especially for a company involved in credit risk transfer and asset-backed securities (ABS).
I find myself in agreement with Claude Opus's assertion that Pagaya is not purely a software platform but rather a credit risk-transfer business. The revenue model, heavily reliant on loan volumes, aligns more closely with a financial services company than a tech-driven platform. Opus correctly highlights the vulnerability of this model to credit market fluctuations and the importance of understanding on-balance-sheet credit exposure. The sequential revenue decline noted by Opus, along with the aggressive insider selling and dilution through share awards, raises red flags about the company's earnings quality and management's confidence in sustained performance.
Opus argues that the company's recent profitability may be overstated due to non-cash items and fair-value adjustments, and I concur with this skepticism. The insider activity, particularly the awarding of 775,000 shares in April 2026, suggests dilution risk that could undermine shareholder value. Moreover, Opus's point about the need for clarity on Pagaya's balance sheet, particularly concerning credit exposure, is crucial for a comprehensive evaluation of the company's financial health.
A skeptic could argue that both Opus's and my views may underestimate the potential for Pagaya to leverage its AI capabilities to enhance its platform's scalability and profitability. Skeptics might suggest that the company's strategic positioning as a fintech infrastructure provider could offer long-term growth opportunities despite current challenges. They could also argue that the current market pricing reflects a cautious approach rather than a complete dismissal of Pagaya's potential.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Lens 1 at -46 tells me this is a genuinely improving but mediocre-quality fintech masquerading as software — the op-margin swing from -37% to +18% and $225M FCF are not fake, but loan-conduit accounting (OCF/NI 0.46x), $600M net debt, Altman in distress, and a share count that 5x'd in four years keep it firmly out of compounder territory. Lens 2 at -58 confirms what my gut said: the market has already priced the inflection. At ~1x sales and ~5.5x equity FCF it looks cheap on a sticker, but EV/FCF is closer to 8x and per-share deserved value is a downward-moving target while dilution runs ~50%/yr. There is no margin of safety, and the insider tape — 39 sells, 0 buys, executives dumping on vest — is the tell from the people who know the cap table math best.
My play: no position at $14.80. I'm not shorting it either — the operating momentum is real and a story-driven squeeze is plausible. I want it in the mid-$11s or lower before I'll open a starter (~50bps), and I'd only scale to a full 2% position if I see two things: (1) explicit guidance or evidence that share-based comp is decelerating meaningfully, and (2) a second consecutive quarter of OCF tracking GAAP NI above ~0.8x. Catalysts that flip me aggressive earlier: a debt paydown / refi that takes Altman out of distress, or a clean ABS print that validates the conduit economics. Catalysts that send me to the sidelines permanently: another equity raise, or any sign the FCF print was a working-capital one-off. Until then this is a watchlist name, not a book name.
Pagaya is showing a real business inflection: revenue scaled from $446M (2021) to $1.26B (2025), gross margin recovered to 40.6%, operating margin flipped from -36.7% in 2022 to +17.7% in 2025, and the company posted its first GAAP net income ($81.4M) alongside $224.7M of FCF. That is not cosmetic — the operating leverage is visible and cash generation is now real, which validates the 'self-funding' tag.
The quality problems sit elsewhere. Diluted shares went from 16.3M (2021) to 83.1M (2025) — a >5x increase, ~50% CAGR — meaning per-share economics dramatically lag the headline business. Altman Z of 1.54 (distress) and net debt of -$600M reflect that this is structurally a credit-/ABS-linked balance sheet, not a software fortress despite the GICS label. OCF/NI at 0.46x and accruals at -21.4% of assets warrant scrutiny of how loan-related assets/fair-value marks flow through earnings. Insider tape is one-way: 39 sells, 0 buys, with executives selling immediately on vest — consistent with comp monetization, not conviction.
Net: the operating business is improving fast and is no longer a cash sinkhole, but the dilution math, the credit-style balance sheet, and the accounting opacity keep this well short of a 'high-quality' designation.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Composition of OCF vs NI — how much of 2025 NI is fair-value gains on risk-retention/loan assets vs cash fees
- Nature and recourse of the $600M+ debt — is it corporate or non-recourse ABS/warehouse?
- SBC dollar amount and run-rate (module shows 0% which is implausible given award activity); true ongoing dilution rate from RSU/option overhang
- Customer/partner concentration on the funding side (ABS investors) and origination side (bank partners)
- Credit performance of retained interests — delinquency/loss trends in network loans
- Whether the 50% share CAGR includes the de-SPAC step-up; normalized go-forward dilution rate
At $14.80 and a ~$1.23B market cap, PGY trades at roughly 1x sales on $1.26B revenue and ~5.5x trailing FCF of $225M — optically cheap on cash flow, but the e2e composite flags a 'Reasonable Premium' and the earnings-quality lens warns OCF/NI of only 0.46x means GAAP earnings are not converting to durable cash the way headline numbers suggest. Strip the haircut and the deserved equity value is closer to the current price than to a multi-bagger fair value. Layer in ~$600M net debt and Altman distress, and the enterprise value is materially higher than the equity cap implies — the business has to keep executing just to service that stack.
The killer for the price-vs-value gap is dilution: a share count that 5x'd in four years and is still compounding ~50%/yr means per-share deserved value is a moving target downward. Even if EV grows 20-30%/yr, per-share fair value barely moves. That's why the platform-monopoly bull narrative — even if half right — doesn't translate into obvious cheapness here. The market appears to already credit the operating inflection; what it isn't crediting is a clean, de-risked balance sheet or shareholder-friendly capital structure, and neither is on offer.
Net: this is a fair-to-slightly-rich quote on quality-adjusted numbers. I'd want a real discount — mid-$11s or lower — before the asymmetry tilts.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward share count guidance and any planned secondaries / convert conversions — dilution is the swing variable
- Recurring vs one-time components in 2025 FCF — is $225M a run-rate or a peak?
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant cushion given Altman distress reading
- Take-rate / unit economics disclosure on the lending platform — bull vs bear hinges on whether margins hold
- Off-balance-sheet loan exposure / risk retention from the conduit structure