Business Description
The Clorox Company manufactures and markets consumer and professional products worldwide. It operates through four segments: Health and Wellness, Household, Lifestyle, and International. The Health and Wellness segment offers cleaning products, such as laundry additives and home care products primarily under the Clorox, Clorox2, Scentiva, Pine-Sol, Liquid-Plumr, Tilex, and Formula 409 brands; professional cleaning and disinfecting products under the CloroxPro and Clorox Healthcare brands; professional food service products under the Hidden Valley brand; and vitamins, minerals and supplement products under the RenewLife, Natural Vitality, NeoCell, and Rainbow Light brands in the United States. The Household segment provides cat litter products under the Fresh Step and Scoop Away brands; bags and wraps under the Glad brand; and grilling products under the Kingsford brand in the United States. The Lifestyle segment offers dressings, dips, seasonings, and sauces primarily under the Hidden Valley brand; natural personal care products under the Burt's Bees brand; and water-filtration products under the Brita brand in the United States. The International segment provides laundry additives; home care products; water-filtration systems; digestive health products; grilling products; cat litter products; food products; bags and wraps; natural personal care products; and professional cleaning and disinfecting products internationally primarily under the Clorox, Ayudin, Clorinda, Poett, Pine-Sol, Glad, Brita, RenewLife, Ever Clean and Burt's Bees brands. The Clorox Company sells its products primarily through mass retailers; grocery outlets; warehouse clubs; dollar stores; home hardware centers; drug, pet and military stores; third-party and owned e-commerce channels; and distributors, as well as a direct sales force The company was founded in 1913 and is headquartered in Oakland, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 1:51pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:47pm (9d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.56
Total Equity: $321.00M
Shares: 124,287,000
Total Debt: $2.49B
Cash: $167.00M
EBITDA: $1.39B
Total Debt: $2.49B
Cash: $167.00M
Revenue: $7.10B
Revenue: $7.10B
Revenue: $7.10B
Total Equity: $321.00M
Tax Rate: 23.6%
Equity: $321.00M
Total Debt: $2.49B
Cash: $167.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.92B
Long-Term Debt: $2.48B
Total Debt: $2.49B
Total Equity: $321.00M
Shares: 124,287,000
Shares: 124,287,000
CapEx: -$220.00M
Shares: 124,287,000
Stock Price: $88.53
Net Income: $810.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:35pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.3B | $7.1B | $7.4B | $7.1B | $7.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.1B | $4.6B | $4.5B | $4.0B | $3.9B |
| Gross Profit | $3.2B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.0B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $1.2B | $719.0M | $823.0M | $723.0M | $1.2B |
| Net Income | $710.0M | $462.0M | $149.0M | $280.0M | $810.0M |
| EBITDA | $1.2B | $937.0M | $564.0M | $723.0M | $1.4B |
| EPS | $5.65 | $3.75 | $1.21 | $2.25 | $6.56 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:29pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $319.0M | $183.0M | $367.0M | $202.0M | $167.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Total Assets | $6.3B | $6.2B | $5.9B | $5.8B | $5.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.7B | $5.4B | $5.6B | $5.3B | $5.1B |
| Total Equity | $411.0M | $556.0M | $220.0M | $328.0M | $321.0M |
| Retained Earnings | $1.0B | $1.0B | $583.0M | $250.0M | $432.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:36pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.3B | $786.0M | $1.2B | $695.0M | $981.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$331.0M | -$251.0M | -$228.0M | -$212.0M | -$220.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $945.0M | $535.0M | $930.0M | $483.0M | $761.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$85.0M | $0 | $0 | $17.0M | $128.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$905.0M | -$25.0M | $0 | $0 | -$332.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$555.0M | -$138.0M | $182.0M | -$161.0M | -$37.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:29pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$7.5B $7.4B – $7.7B
|
$7.8B $7.8B – $7.8B
|
$8.0B $7.8B – $8.1B
|
$8.2B $8.0B – $8.3B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.6B
|
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.6B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.8B
|
| Net Income |
$771.8M $723.7M – $796.8M
|
$814.2M $743.4M – $992.8M
|
$866.7M $842.7M – $881.9M
|
$907.8M $882.7M – $923.7M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:35pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -3.2% | +4.0% | -4.0% | +0.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -20.4% | +14.3% | +4.8% | +5.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -41.3% | +14.5% | -12.2% | +62.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -34.9% | -67.7% | +87.9% | +189.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -22.6% | -39.8% | +28.2% | +91.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:35pm (9d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-05 | Breber Pierre R | P-Purchase | 5,000.00 | $85.82 | $429,124 |
| 2026-04-01 | Bellet Luc | F-InKind | 244.00 | $103.63 | $25,286 |
| 2026-03-31 | WILLIAMS CHRISTOPHER J | A-Award | 265.37 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-13 | WILLIAMS CHRISTOPHER J | A-Award | 212.64 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | WEINER RUSSELL J | A-Award | 325.68 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-13 | WEINER RUSSELL J | A-Award | 172.36 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Shattock Matthew J | A-Award | 506.61 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-13 | Shattock Matthew J | A-Award | 191.29 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Breber Pierre R | A-Award | 325.68 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-13 | Breber Pierre R | A-Award | 27.05 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Plaines Stephanie | A-Award | 265.37 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-13 | Plaines Stephanie | A-Award | 72.73 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-13 | Hyder Chris T | F-InKind | 41.00 | $108.73 | $4,458 |
| 2026-03-13 | Grier Stacey | F-InKind | 32.00 | $108.73 | $3,479 |
| 2025-12-31 | WILLIAMS CHRISTOPHER J | A-Award | 272.74 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | WILLIAMS CHRISTOPHER J | A-Award | 1,637.86 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-06 | WILLIAMS CHRISTOPHER J | A-Award | 227.03 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | WEINER RUSSELL J | A-Award | 334.72 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | WEINER RUSSELL J | A-Award | 1,637.86 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-06 | WEINER RUSSELL J | A-Award | 179.14 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:29pm (9d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-22 | $1.24 | 2026-02-24 | 2026-04-22 | 2026-05-08 |
| 2026-01-28 | $1.24 | 2025-11-18 | 2026-01-28 | 2026-02-13 |
| 2025-10-22 | $1.24 | 2025-09-16 | 2025-10-22 | 2025-11-06 |
| 2025-08-13 | $1.24 | 2025-07-30 | 2025-08-13 | 2025-08-29 |
| 2025-04-23 | $1.22 | 2025-02-25 | 2025-04-23 | 2025-05-09 |
| 2025-01-29 | $1.22 | 2024-11-19 | 2025-01-29 | 2025-02-14 |
| 2024-10-23 | $1.22 | 2024-09-17 | 2024-10-23 | 2024-11-07 |
| 2024-08-14 | $1.22 | 2024-07-30 | 2024-08-14 | 2024-08-30 |
| 2024-04-23 | $1.20 | 2024-02-28 | 2024-04-24 | 2024-05-10 |
| 2024-01-23 | $1.20 | 2023-11-14 | 2024-01-24 | 2024-02-09 |
| 2023-10-24 | $1.20 | 2023-09-20 | 2023-10-25 | 2023-11-09 |
| 2023-08-08 | $1.20 | 2023-07-27 | 2023-08-09 | 2023-08-25 |
| 2023-04-25 | $1.18 | 2023-02-14 | 2023-04-26 | 2023-05-12 |
| 2023-01-24 | $1.18 | 2022-11-15 | 2023-01-25 | 2023-02-10 |
| 2022-10-25 | $1.18 | 2022-09-20 | 2022-10-26 | 2022-11-10 |
| 2022-07-26 | $1.18 | 2022-07-12 | 2022-07-27 | 2022-08-12 |
| 2022-04-26 | $1.16 | 2022-02-15 | 2022-04-27 | 2022-05-13 |
| 2022-01-25 | $1.16 | 2021-11-16 | 2022-01-26 | 2022-02-11 |
| 2021-10-26 | $1.16 | 2021-09-21 | 2021-10-27 | 2021-11-10 |
| 2021-07-27 | $1.16 | 2021-06-02 | 2021-07-28 | 2021-08-13 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: revenue is essentially flat at $1.67B for three of the last four quarters, with the Sep-2025 dip to $1.43B looking like a genuine demand/inventory air pocket (the cyberattack hangover) rather than seasonality — fiscal Q1 2024 was $1.76B, so that's a real ~19% YoY drop. The rebound to $1.67B in Dec-2025 and Mar-2026 with margins recovering to 9.4% and 11.2% suggests stabilization, not acceleration. The "earnings CAGR 133%" and "earnings YoY 189%" in the momentum block are arithmetic artifacts of comparing against a depressed FY2023 base ($149M NI) — useless as a forward signal. Real underlying picture: ~$7.1B revenue plateau for five straight years, gross margin recovered from 36% (FY23) to 45% (FY25), which is the actual story. That margin recovery is mostly done.
On the balance sheet, the missing debt figure is a problem the models glossed over. P/B of 46x and ROE of 28% with only $167M cash on a $7.1B revenue base implies a highly levered, buyback-shrunken equity base — Clorox carries roughly $2.5B of long-term debt and negative tangible book. Current ratio 0.84 is tight but normal for staples. FCF of $761M on an $11.4B market cap is a ~6.7% FCF yield, and the 4.06% dividend yield consumes roughly $500M, leaving thin cushion for buybacks or debt paydown if margins slip 200bps. The insider "P-Purchase" of 5,000 shares (~$470K) on May 5 is a single small open-market buy — the "Significant Insider Buying" tag is overstated; the rest are routine awards and tax withholdings.
Where I disagree with the model stack: the Market Forces "value trap" call and the Synthesis "slight upside" call can't both be right, and the Narrative layer's framing that fundamentals do all the work at $92 fair value is the most honest read. But I'd push back on the fair value itself. A flat-revenue staples business with 11% net margins, 6.7% FCF yield, and a 4% dividend at 15x TTM earnings is priced roughly fairly for what it is — but TTM earnings benefit from the Jun-2025 quarter's $332M print (16.7% margin), which looks like a peak, not a run-rate. Normalize to ~$700M NI and you get 16x forward, which is full for a no-growth name. The bear case the Market Forces model articulates (private label share loss, secular category decline in surface cleaners post-COVID) is real and not yet visible in the print because pricing has masked volume softness — that's the contrarian flag the models underweight.
Net: I dissent mildly from the synthesis "slight upside" and side closer to Market Forces, but without the value-trap drama. This is a fairly-priced mature dividend payer where the margin recovery tailwind is largely captured at $94, and the next 12 months depend on whether volume stabilizes or grinds lower. The 29% drawdown from highs already prices in skepticism; further downside requires an actual volume/margin disappointment, which the Q3 FY26 print at 11.2% margin doesn't yet show. Upside requires either (a) a real revenue inflection above 2% organic, which the trajectory doesn't support, or (b) multiple re-rating, which won't happen without growth. The 4% dividend is the floor; total return likely 5-7% annualized from here, not the 10%+ a "slight upside" verdict implies. Not a sell, not a buy — a hold for income accounts only, and I'd want $80-85 before adding for total return.
GPT Critique
From my analysis of the raw data, Clorox is currently navigating a period of stabilization rather than growth. The quarterly revenue figures show a notable consistency, maintaining around $1.67B for three of the last four quarters, with the exception of a dip to $1.43B in September 2025. This suggests a recovery from a temporary downturn rather than an underlying growth trend. The net margins have bounced back from a low of 5.6% in September 2025 to 11.2% by March 2026, which indicates some recovery in profitability, but the significant uptick in earnings from FY2023 to FY2025 is more an artifact of a low baseline rather than a substantive growth indicator. Clorox's annual revenue has been effectively static around $7.1B over the past few years, emphasizing a plateau in its revenue-generating capabilities.
I concur with Opus on several points regarding the company's financial health and market position. Opus correctly identifies the margin recovery as largely complete, with further improvements unlikely without significant changes in market conditions. I also agree with the assessment of the balance sheet, where the absence of a debt figure masks the leverage issues implied by a high P/B ratio and a strong ROE, which are unsustainable without addressing the underlying debt structure. The mention of a 6.7% free cash flow yield aligns with my own view that, while Clorox generates solid cash flow, the dividend yield of 4% leaves a limited buffer for strategic maneuvers like substantial buybacks or debt reduction.
However, I diverge from Opus's skepticism on the synthesis verdict of "slight upside." While Opus views this as contradictory to the Market Forces' "value trap" narrative, I see them as complementary. The slight upside could be attributed to Clorox's ability to maintain its dividend amidst stable cash flows, which is attractive in a low-growth environment. The potential for market mispricing due to external factors like inflation or commodity price shifts could also offer minor upside potential. Nonetheless, Opus's caution about the limitations in Clorox's growth prospects is warranted, particularly with the competitive pressures from private labels and shifting consumer behaviors post-pandemic.
A careful skeptic of both views might argue that the focus on short-term margin recovery overlooks longer-term strategic initiatives or potential market expansions that Clorox could undertake. They might also suggest that the narrative around private label competition is overstated, given Clorox's strong brand equity and historical resilience in consumer staples.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses are telling a coherent story, not a conflicting one. Quality at +39 says this is a clean, cash-generative staple — FCF ~$731M/yr, OCF/NI ~3x, buybacks 382% of SBC, and a real 2025 margin snap-back — but not a fortress (net debt $2.3B, flat revenue for five years). Value at -63 says the market already knows all of that: signal-adjusted FV $92 vs price $94, EPV floor $68, and the only bullish input is an anchored-PE I'd also throw out. Paying $94 for $92 of deserved value on a Solid-not-Wide-Moat business with a leveraged balance sheet is just dead money with downside if input costs roll over again.
My play: zero position today. I put CLX on the watchlist with a hard bid in the high $70s — the stated 'attractive below $78' lines up with where the EPV floor and a real margin of safety converge. If it trades into $78–82 on a tape-wide staples flush or a single bad quarter on private-label trade-down, I start a 1% starter and scale to 3% on a print into the low $70s. Above $90 I do nothing; between $82 and $90 I might nibble 50bps if there's a clean catalyst (guide-down overreaction), but I'm not chasing. The insider purchase is too small to change the math. This is a 'great patience, mediocre price' setup — the discipline is to wait for the second lens to turn green, not to talk myself into paying full freight because the first lens is fine.
Clorox is a textbook mature_earner: revenue has been essentially flat at $7.1–7.4B for five years (2021: $7.34B → 2025: $7.10B), but the franchise throws off real cash — FCF averaged ~$731M/yr and OCF/NI is 2.99x. Earnings quality is genuinely clean: Beneish M of -2.46, accruals at -8.3% of assets, and Altman Z of 3.36 all corroborate that reported numbers are backed by cash. The 2022–2024 stretch was ugly (gross margin collapsed to 35.8% in 2022, net income fell to $149M in 2023), but FY2025 shows a real operational snap-back: GM 45.2%, OpM 16.6%, and net income $810M — the best of the five-year window.
Capital discipline is a positive. Diluted share count edged down (-0.6% CAGR) with buybacks running 382% of SBC, and SBC itself is a modest 1.1% of revenue — per-share value is being concentrated, not leaked. The blemish is the balance sheet: net debt of $2.32B against only $167M liquid cash means there is no cushion, just reliance on the steady FCF stream. Insider activity is constructive but small — one $429K open-market purchase by Breber in May 2026 is the only directional buy of size; the rest is routine awards and tax withholdings, so the 'significant insider buying' framing is a bit overstated.
This is a high-integrity, well-run staples business with a recognizable brand moat and proven cash conversion, but flat top-line, the 2022–2024 margin trough (likely cost inflation + the 2023 cyberattack impact — worth verifying), and a leveraged balance sheet keep it from being elite. Solid, not fortress.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Confirm drivers of the 2022–2024 margin trough (commodity/freight inflation vs. the 2023 cyberattack disruption) and whether FY2025 normalization is sustainable
- Maturity ladder and fixed/floating mix on the $2.3B+ net debt
- Segment-level organic volume vs. price/mix — is FY2025 recovery price-led or volume-led?
- Pension/OPEB and lease obligations not reflected in headline net debt
- Customer concentration with mass retailers (Walmart, Costco, Target) and private-label competitive pressure on bleach/wipes
- Status of the Better Health VMS divestiture / portfolio reshaping and impact on go-forward revenue base
The composite FV of $103.64 sits ~10% above the $94.14 price, but the signal-adjusted FV of $92.32 is actually 2% below today's quote. The DCF ($98) and signal-adjusted number cluster tightly around the mid-$90s, which is where the stock trades. The anchored-PE output of $150 is a clear outlier — it assumes peak-multiple normalization on recovering earnings and should be heavily discounted; the EPV floor of $68 is the more useful bookend and tells you what you're paying for growth/brand premium above a no-growth baseline.
What's priced in: continued margin recovery toward management's targets, low-single-digit organic growth, and steady buybacks — i.e., the bull case mostly. There's no embedded disaster, but there's also no discount for the real risks the bear flags (private-label trade-down, channel mix pressure, flat five-year revenue). With a Solid (not Wide-Moat) quality grade and net debt rather than a cash cushion, the deserved value sits in the low-to-mid $90s, which is exactly where it trades.
Margin of safety is effectively zero. You're paying ~$94 for ~$92–$98 of deserved value depending on how much credit you give the recovery. That's a hold-quality price, not a buy-quality price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY26 organic growth and margin guidance — is the recovery toward ~44% gross margin tracking or stalling?
- Private-label share trends in bleach, bags, and dressings — any acceleration would compress the deserved multiple
- Free cash flow conversion vs reported EPS to confirm the high earnings-quality signal holds
- Net debt trajectory and pace of buybacks — capital return is part of the bull case