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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for NRG Energy, Inc. (NRG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-25): Designation Low · Gem Score -25 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 29 · Value -69 · Sentiment 35 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $64.56 vs $134.29 at analysis
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reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
NRG Energy, Inc.
NRG NYSENRG Energy, Inc. is an integrated energy company that produces, sells, and distributes electricity and energy services across key U.S. markets. The company operates through segments including Texas, East, West/Services/Other, Vivint Smart Home, and Corporate Activities, reflecting a mix of power generation, retail energy supply, and home services. NRG Energy serves residential, commercial, and industrial customers with electricity and related energy solutions, often bundled with value-added services such as home protection and smart home offerings through its Vivint Smart Home segment. Its portfolio spans conventional generation assets and retail brands that compete in deregulated power markets, particularly in Texas and the Eastern United States. Headquartered in Houston, Texas, NRG Energy plays a significant role in providing reliable power and customer-centric energy services, acting as a key intermediary between wholesale power markets and end users.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.01
Total Equity: $1.68B
Shares: 199,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.71B
EBITDA: $3.25B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.71B
Revenue: $30.71B
Revenue: $30.71B
Revenue: $30.71B
Total Equity: $1.68B
Tax Rate: 23.8%
Equity: $1.68B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.71B
Current Liabilities: $8.03B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.68B
Shares: 199,000,000
Shares: 199,000,000
CapEx: -$1.15B
Shares: 199,000,000
Stock Price: $134.29
Net Income: $864.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:48pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $27.0B | $31.5B | $28.8B | $28.1B | $30.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $20.5B | $27.4B | $26.5B | $22.1B | $24.8B |
| Gross Profit | $6.5B | $4.1B | $2.3B | $6.0B | $6.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.2B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $3.6B | $4.1B |
| Operating Income | $3.3B | $2.0B | $384.0M | $2.4B | $1.8B |
| Net Income | $2.2B | $1.2B | -$202.0M | $1.1B | $864.0M |
| EBITDA | $4.1B | $2.7B | $1.5B | $3.8B | $3.3B |
| EPS | $8.93 | $5.17 | $-1.12 | $5.14 | $4.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.93 | $5.17 | $-1.12 | $4.99 | $4.01 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:32pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $250.0M | $430.0M | $541.0M | $966.0M | $4.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $10.8B | $16.2B | $9.7B | $9.0B | $13.1B |
| Total Assets | $23.2B | $29.1B | $26.0B | $24.0B | $29.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $7.9B | $13.0B | $9.5B | $8.8B | $8.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.1B | $8.1B | $10.9B | $10.9B | — |
| Total Liabilities | $19.6B | $25.3B | $23.1B | $21.5B | $27.5B |
| Total Equity | $3.6B | $3.8B | $2.9B | $2.5B | $1.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $464.0M | $1.4B | $820.0M | $1.5B | $2.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:48pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $493.0M | $360.0M | -$221.0M | $2.3B | $1.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$269.0M | -$367.0M | -$598.0M | -$472.0M | -$1.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $224.0M | -$7.0M | -$819.0M | $1.8B | $766.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.1B | $0 | $731.0M | $3.2B | $6.7B |
| Dividends Paid | -$319.0M | -$332.0M | -$381.0M | -$405.0M | -$411.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$48.0M | -$606.0M | -$1.2B | -$935.0M | -$1.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.8B | $1.1B | -$1.5B | $524.0M | $3.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:48pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.9% | -8.6% | -2.4% | +9.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -37.0% | -43.9% | +162.5% | -1.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -39.6% | -81.0% | +531.3% | -23.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -44.2% | -116.5% | +656.9% | -23.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -35.7% | -43.0% | +153.3% | -15.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 11:33pm (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-01 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-02 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-03 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-01 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-01 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-03 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-01 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-01 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-30 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-31 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-31 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-31 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-28 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-31 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-31 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-29 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-29 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-31 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-29 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-30 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-20 23:36Recovery pays +68%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 79%. Ratio 0.9:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($134.29) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +19% | 10.4% | $225.15 | +68% |
| Base — stabilizes | +13% | 9.1% | $161.30 | +20% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 7.7% | $112.39 | -16% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +14% | 1.3% | $28.69 | -79% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: NRG's quarterly revenue is genuinely accelerating (Q1 2026 $10.26B is the highest print in the file, up from $8.59B a year prior — 19% YoY), but earnings quality is collapsing. Q1 2026 NI of $125M on $10.26B revenue is a 1.2% margin versus 8.7% in the year-ago quarter — a 6x compression at the bottom line despite top-line growth. Trailing four quarters of NI sum to roughly $839M, giving a real TTM P/E closer to 34x, matching the reported 33.5x. Annual 2025 NI of $864M was down 23% from 2024's $1.13B, and 2023 posted a $202M loss. This is not "traditional utility" earnings — it's merchant power with wild swings (see Q3 2024's -$767M single-quarter loss). ROIC of -46% is a red flag the synthesis underweights; ROE of 51% is a leverage-and-buyback artifact against a tiny $1.68B equity base, not operational excellence.
The prior models are directionally right but internally inconsistent. The rule-based classifier tagging this "dividend_income" at a 1.36% yield is simply wrong — that yield doesn't clear a T-bill, let alone anchor an income thesis, and payout ratio of 47.6% on volatile earnings means the dividend is not the story. Pre-flight calling it "traditional" contradicts the merchant-generation reality: NRG is a Texas power/retail hybrid whose earnings track ERCOT spark spreads and weather, not rate-base returns. The debt_to_equity of 0 in the canonical block is clearly a data error — NRG carries roughly $10B+ in long-term debt historically; EV/EBITDA of 7.3x versus EV/revenue of 0.77x implies meaningful net debt in enterprise value that "total debt: —" is hiding. Any analyst taking that zero at face value is mispricing the equity's risk. The synthesis fair value of $63 and the narrative layer's $63 DCF converge, which is suspicious agreement — they may be sharing inputs.
The contrarian case the models underplay: NRG's stock ran from ~$45 in early 2023 to a $190 peak, and the current $134 is still 3x the 2023 base. That move was powered by (1) the AI/datacenter power-demand thesis for ERCOT, (2) aggressive buybacks shrinking the share count against a small equity base, and (3) genuine capital return discipline. If Texas load growth from hyperscaler datacenters is real and durable, merchant generators with existing dispatchable capacity are structurally scarce assets, and 7.3x EV/EBITDA is not expensive for that optionality — it's cheap. The bull case isn't M&A takeout; it's that NRG's generation fleet becomes a strategic asset as ERCOT peak demand outruns new-build capacity through 2028. That said, Q1 2026's margin collapse to 1.2% suggests the current spread environment is already normalizing unfavorably, which cuts against the bull thesis in real time.
I partially agree with the synthesis but think $63 is too low — it's anchoring on a mid-cycle DCF that ignores the ERCOT scarcity premium that's structurally real, not just narrative. The insider activity confirms neutral-to-negative tone: two open-market sales (31,145 shares) versus zero open-market buys, with the rest being option exercises and tax-withholding — insiders are monetizing, not accumulating. Combined with -23% earnings YoY, deteriorating margins across the last four quarters (8.7% → -1.5% → 2.0% → 0.9% → 1.2%), and a 33x multiple that requires flawless execution, the risk/reward is skewed negative at $134. Fair value is probably $85-95, not $63 and not $134 — the DCF undershoots strategic asset value, but the market price overshoots on ERCOT-datacenter enthusiasm that hasn't yet shown up in reported margins. I'd sell into strength above $140, wait for a print that either confirms margin recovery (back above 6% net) or capitulation toward $90.
GPT Reading
At $134, NRG is being valued like a cleaner, steadier compounder than the income statement actually shows. The business has scale and real cash generation, but the earnings profile is far too erratic to justify a 33.5x trailing P/E and nearly 16x book when 2025 net income was only $864 million on $30.7 billion of revenue, a 2.8% net margin. What jumps out most is not growth but instability: annual revenue moved from $31.5 billion in 2022 to $28.8 billion in 2023, $28.1 billion in 2024, then $30.7 billion in 2025, while net income swung from $1.22 billion to a $202 million loss, back to $1.13 billion, then down again to $864 million. That is not a utility-like glide path. Even more concerning, quarterly results show revenue strength without corresponding earnings conversion: the latest quarter did $10.26 billion of revenue, up strongly from $8.59 billion a year earlier, yet net income collapsed from $750 million to $125 million and margin fell from 8.7% to 1.2%. A company with that kind of revenue/earnings disconnect should not command a premium earnings multiple.
The balance between cash flow support and equity valuation is where the stock looks most stretched. NRG produced $1.91 billion of operating cash flow and $766 million of free cash flow in 2025, which is real, but against a $28.3 billion market cap that is only about a 2.7% FCF yield. For a business with commodity exposure, volatile quarterly profitability, and no obvious secular volume runway in the numbers provided, that is thin. The low P/S of 0.87 and EV/EBITDA of 7.3x can make the stock look optically reasonable, but utilities and power names are not paid on revenue; they are paid on durable distributable earnings and cash flow. Here, gross profit was basically flat to down year-on-year in 2025 at $5.95 billion versus $6.03 billion in 2024 despite higher revenue, and operating income fell from $2.42 billion to $1.85 billion. So the company had to work harder for less profit. That is the opposite of operating leverage, and it argues for compression, not a premium.
I also do not buy the “income” framing as a defense of valuation. The dividend yield is only 1.36%, nowhere near enough to create a hard floor under the shares, and the payout ratio of 47.6% is acceptable but not especially compelling if earnings remain this unstable. The headline ROE of 51.4% is not a sign of exceptional economics here; with only $1.68 billion of equity against a $28 billion market value, book is so thin that returns on equity are mechanically inflated. In other words, the 15.9x P/B is not evidence of a franchise deserving a software-like premium; it is evidence that book value is not carrying much of the valuation load. The zero debt-to-equity figure is almost certainly an accounting or data classification artifact given the nature of the business, so I would not reward the stock for an apparently pristine capital structure on this dataset alone.
The best argument against my bearish read is that the market may be looking through a temporary earnings trough and capitalizing a more normalized cash earnings stream than GAAP net income suggests. There is some evidence for that. Revenue has re-accelerated, with the latest quarter up about 19% year over year, and despite ugly quarter-to-quarter net income swings the company has remained solidly cash generative. EV/EBITDA at 7.3x is not demanding if one believes EBITDA is the right anchor and that 2025’s lower operating income reflects transitory hedging, weather, or retail power timing effects rather than structural margin erosion. The latest four quarters still sum to roughly $239 million of net income if you annualize just the reported sequence mechanically, which looks terrible, but that number is distorted by this business’s periodic volatility; bulls will say normalized earnings power is closer to the 2024 run-rate. If they are right, today’s P/E is a bad lens and the stock is less expensive than it screens.
What would change my mind is simple: I need to see revenue growth convert back into earnings and free cash flow at a level that supports this price. Specifically, if the next two quarters can sustain operating margins closer to 8% rather than 1-2%, and if annualized free cash flow moves convincingly above $1.5 billion, then a mid-to-high single-digit EBITDA multiple could justify a stock in this range. I would also want confirmation that the latest quarter’s 1.2% net margin was an aberration, not the new normal. Without that, paying $134 for a business that just printed $125 million on $10.26 billion of quarterly revenue is paying for a recovery that has not shown up in the numbers.
Grok Reading
The numbers on NRG tell a story of a low-margin, highly cyclical power producer being valued like a growth compounder. Full-year 2025 revenue of $30.71B grew a modest 9% from 2024’s $28.13B, yet net income fell from $1.13B to $864M and operating income compressed from $2.42B to $1.85B—an operating margin of just 6.0% and a net margin of 2.8%. Quarterly results swing violently: a $750M profit in Q1 2025, a $104M loss in Q2, then sub-2% margins through early 2026 even as the top line spiked to $10.26B. Free cash flow of $766M against a $28.3B market cap implies a 2.7% FCF yield after $1.15B of capex; that is thin cover for a capital-intensive generator. The balance sheet is the real tell—only $1.68B of equity against $4.71B cash produces a 15.9x P/B and a cosmetic 51% ROE, while ROIC sits at an alarming –46%. A 33.5x P/E on declining earnings is simply incompatible with 3% revenue CAGR and negative economic returns.
EV/EBITDA of 7.3x and EV/revenue of 0.77x look less extreme and explain why some screens do not scream “bubble.” Those multiples, however, capitalize an earnings base that has already rolled over 23% year-on-year and show no evidence of durable margin recovery. Gross margin has stagnated near 19%, far below the 24% printed in 2021, and the Vivint overlay continues to dilute what was once a cleaner generation-and-retail model. Insider activity is net selling, the dividend yield is a meager 1.4% with a 48% payout, and the equity cushion is so thin that any further write-down or commodity spike would amplify book-value destruction. At $134 the market is paying roughly double the ~$63 composite fair value the cash-flow work implies; the premium is almost pure narrative—M&A optionality and “fallen angel” mean-reversion—rather than demonstrated cash generation.
The strongest counter-argument is that 2024–25 represent trough conditions in Texas power spreads and that EV/EBITDA in the low-7s already embeds a reasonable private-market bid for the generation fleet and retail book. A strategic buyer or infrastructure fund could justify $150-plus on replacement-cost or customer-lifetime-value math, and the debt-light reported balance sheet plus $4.7B cash give NRG optionality peers lack. Recent revenue acceleration (Q1 2026 at $10.3B) and “above-sector” secondary signals could mark the start of operating leverage if heat-driven load and retail churn improve. I weigh this lightly because the same data set shows ROIC deeply negative, earnings quality deteriorating, and no tangible bid having appeared despite the stock’s slide from $190. Optionality is not cash flow; until spreads or a deal actually materialize, the 113% premium to DCF remains speculation.
I would reverse to neutral or better only on two concrete developments: trailing-twelve-month operating margin sustained above 9% with FCF above $1.5B, or a credible strategic transaction announced above $120 per share that validates the takeout math.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
NRG's business quality reads as sound and improving after a rough patch. Revenue has oscillated between $27B and $31.5B over five years, but the profitability line tells the real story: gross margin collapsed from 24.1% (2021) to 8% (2023) with a $202M net loss and $-819M FCF, then rebounded to 19.4% GM and 6% OpM in 2025 with $864M net income and $766M FCF. Earnings integrity checks are clean - OCF/NI of 1.18x, accruals only 0.4% of assets, Beneish M at -2.55 - so the recovery appears real rather than accrual-driven. Liquidity is strong with $4.71B net cash and self-funding operations, though Altman Z at 2.19 sits in the grey zone, consistent with a capital-intensive power business carrying real leverage.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Gross debt level and maturity ladder underpinning the grey-zone Altman Z
- Drivers of the 2023 collapse - hedging losses, weather events, or Vivint acquisition integration
- Customer/geographic concentration in retail electricity (Texas/ERCOT exposure)
- Sustainability of 2024-2025 margin recovery vs. commodity tailwinds
- Any convertibles, preferreds, or off-balance-sheet obligations not visible in the trajectory
The e2e work triangulates to a composite FV of $61.27 and signal-adjusted $62.94, with DCF at $43.29 and an EPV floor at $79.25. Even the most generous of those anchors (EPV $79) sits ~41% below the $134.29 tape, and the DCF is a third of the price. That is a wide, consistent gap across methods, and earnings quality is clean so there is no upward haircut adjustment to rescue the valuation. Quality is Solid but not exceptional (score 29), and 2023 showed the business can still print an 8% gross margin and burn $819M FCF - not the profile that deserves a premium to intrinsic. To justify $134 the market must be capitalizing a durable step-up in Texas power economics, AI/data-center load growth, and continued aggressive buybacks at these prices - a coherent bull case, but one that is already fully in the tape. The gap is too wide to call fair; it is rich, though not egregiously so given the buyback optionality and infrastructure-bid floor.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Latest guidance on 2025-2026 free cash flow and buyback pace - does management still see the stock as undervalued at $134?
- Contracted vs merchant generation mix and any signed data-center PPAs that would durably lift deserved value
- Vivint Smart Home segment economics - is it now contributing or still a drag on consolidated FCF?
- Whether the DCF inputs use normalized or trough margins - a $43 DCF vs $79 EPV suggests very different assumptions worth reconciling
The tape is barely neutral (regime +22, VIX 16) so macro is not doing much either way, but NRG's 1.2 beta plus utility-sector rate sensitivity (10y at 4.68%) is a mild drag on any pure-yield read. That drag is being overwhelmed by an active narrative shift: NRG has quietly rotated from 'stranded fossil generator' to 'Texas power supplier levered to AI data-center demand,' and the news flow (new 456MW Wharton gas capacity commercial, dividend paid, buybacks, Q2 setup) is feeding that story. Momentum confirms it - recent 9.2% run vs 3.2% long-term CAGR, price sitting at $134 well above any DCF anchor near $63, which is textbook narrative-ahead-of-fundamentals.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q2 print reaction - does the AI/data-center commentary get louder or does management pour cold water on it
- Any sell-side upgrade cycle citing data-center power demand (would extend the narrative)
- ERCOT / Texas power price prints - the story needs tight power markets to hold
- Whether momentum stalls if 10y pushes back above 4.8-5.0%
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.