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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Williams Companies, Inc. (WMB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-24): Designation Low · Gem Score -40 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -3 · Value -71 · Sentiment 32 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $42.76 vs $71.85 at analysis
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The Williams Companies, Inc.
WMB NYSEThe Williams Companies, Inc. is an energy infrastructure company focused primarily on the transportation, gathering, processing, and marketing of natural gas and natural gas liquids in the United States. Headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the company owns and operates an extensive network of pipelines and related midstream assets that connect key supply basins with major demand centers, including power generators, utilities, industrial users, and local distribution companies. Its operations are organized across segments such as interstate natural gas transmission, Gulf of Mexico infrastructure, and gathering and processing businesses in regions like the Northeast, Rocky Mountains, Texas, and the Mid-Continent. Williams also provides natural gas and NGL marketing, storage, and transportation services, helping market participants manage supply, demand, and logistics. Through these activities, The Williams Companies, Inc. plays a central role in the North American natural gas value chain, supporting reliable energy delivery and underpinning both residential and commercial energy consumption.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.14
Total Equity: $15.00B
Shares: 1,225,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $63.00M
EBITDA: $6.54B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $63.00M
Revenue: $11.95B
Revenue: $11.95B
Revenue: $11.95B
Total Equity: $15.00B
Tax Rate: 23.6%
Equity: $15.00B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $63.00M
Current Liabilities: $6.11B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $15.00B
Shares: 1,225,000,000
Shares: 1,225,000,000
CapEx: -$4.89B
Shares: 1,225,000,000
Stock Price: $71.85
Net Income: $2.62B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 3:53am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $10.6B | $11.0B | $10.9B | $10.5B | $12.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $2.6B | $3.0B | $4.3B | $3.3B | $4.2B |
| Net Income | $1.5B | $2.0B | $3.2B | $2.2B | $2.6B |
| EBITDA | $4.5B | $5.0B | $6.4B | $5.6B | $6.5B |
| EPS | $1.25 | $1.68 | $2.61 | $1.82 | $2.14 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.24 | $1.67 | $2.60 | $1.82 | $2.14 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:42am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.7B | $152.0M | $2.2B | $60.0M | $63.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $4.5B | $3.8B | $4.5B | $2.7B | $3.2B |
| Total Assets | $47.6B | $48.4B | $52.6B | $54.5B | $58.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.0B | $4.9B | $5.8B | $5.3B | $6.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $33.5B | $34.4B | $37.7B | $39.7B | $43.6B |
| Total Equity | $14.1B | $14.0B | $14.9B | $14.8B | $15.0B |
| Retained Earnings | -$13.2B | -$13.3B | -$12.3B | -$12.4B | -$12.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 3:53am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.9B | $4.9B | $5.9B | $5.0B | $5.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.2B | -$2.3B | -$2.5B | -$2.6B | -$4.9B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.7B | $2.6B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $1.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$151.0M | -$933.0M | -$1.6B | -$2.2B | -$1.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.3B | -$1.1B | $2.1B | $648.0M | $2.1B |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.0B | -$2.1B | -$2.2B | -$2.3B | -$2.4B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$9.0M | -$130.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.5B | -$1.5B | $2.0B | -$2.1B | $3.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 3:53am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.2% | -0.5% | -3.7% | +13.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +14.7% | +42.8% | -22.5% | +25.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +35.1% | +55.1% | -30.0% | +17.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +12.4% | +27.0% | -12.9% | +17.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:42am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-12 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-12 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-07 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-08 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-09 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-10 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-08 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-09 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-09 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-09 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:18Even the bull case prices 38% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 55%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($71.85) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +8% | 29.0% | $44.77 | -38% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 25.2% | $36.10 | -50% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 21.4% | $28.56 | -60% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -1% | 27.7% | $32.26 | -55% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11Data-center electricity load converts into firm, long-dated gas transport demand on the Transco and Northeast corridors, and Williams monetizes it through reservation charges plus incremental expansion projects priced off scarce existing rights of way rather than new greenfield routes.
To capture that load Williams is drifting from pure toll-taker into generation-adjacent projects (behind-the-meter power for compute campuses), which swaps contracted annuity cash flow for construction, dispatch, and counterparty risk in exactly the segment where hyperscaler plans change fastest.
Whether new AI-linked capital lands as firm long-term take-or-pay transport and tolling contracts or as merchant/quasi-merchant power exposure. The observable is the contract disclosure on each announced power and expansion project: term length, credit of counterparty, and whether return is fee-based or spread-based.
FERC certificates, eminent-domain-backed rights of way, an interconnected mainline into the densest demand corridors, and storage plus compression already sited near where power is needed - none of which cheaper software or capital abundance can conjure on a five-year timeline.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Williams entirely through the demand curve for electricity and therefore for gas: compute buildout raises baseload requirements in regions where renewables plus storage cannot yet firm supply, and the marginal firming fuel moves through pipes Williams already owns and cannot easily be duplicated. Direct AI substitution risk on the business itself is negligible - the monetized unit is reserved physical capacity, not information processing - and internal AI use (predictive maintenance, compressor and hydraulic optimization, permitting document work) is a modest cost and uptime benefit against a capex-dominated cost base. The real AI question is capital allocation quality: whether Williams contracts the new load on terms that keep the bond-like return profile, or funds speculative capacity and power ventures whose value depends on load forecasts made by customers with no obligation to show up.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside The genuinely scarce asset is not gas but land plus gas plus permitted interconnection in one place; Williams can rent that adjacency to compute campuses at prices unrelated to gas transport tariffs, turning right-of-way real estate into a second, higher-margin revenue unit.
Downside An AI-demand narrative can pull forward capex into a build cycle whose contracts are shorter than the assets; free cash flow already compressed to about 1.01B in 2025 on 11.95B of revenue, so a stretch of uncontracted spend would attack the very annuity characteristic the equity is valued for.
Outcome range spread 48 · unresolved
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: revenue went $2.65B → $3.05B → $2.78B → $3.05B → $2.92B → $3.20B → $3.03B → $3.05B across the last eight quarters. That's not decelerating — it's seasonal with a clear step-up in 2025-2026. NI has actually inflected hard: $486M in Q4'24 to $827M in Q2'26, a 70% jump. TTM net income is roughly $3.07B versus the reported 2025 annual of $2.62B, so the "$87.88B market cap / 33.6x P/E" math looks stale — on TTM earnings this is closer to 28-29x. Still not cheap, but the synthesis DCF anchor at $48 is doing violence to a business whose earnings are accelerating, not decaying. The "earnings CAGR -9.3%" figure is contaminated by the 2023 $3.18B print (which included one-time items); the trajectory from 2024 forward is clearly up.
The synthesis verdict of "overvalued by 33%" and the market-forces "consuming cash at an alarming rate" claim both deserve pushback. Yes, 2025 FCF was $1.01B against $4.89B capex — but that's the whole midstream playbook: you spend capex now on Transco expansions, Northeast G&P, and LNG-adjacent projects that come online with 15-20 year take-or-pay contracts. ROIC of 21.5% and ROE of 17.5% are strong for an infrastructure asset, and operating margin at 35% is expanding, not compressing. The "margins compressing" claim contradicts the tape: net margin went from 17.7% (Q4'24) to 27-28% in the last two quarters. The pre-flight and narrative layers get it more right — this is a dividend-income compounder with LNG/AI optionality, and the anchored moderate-intensity read is fair.
The contrarian case, though, is real and I won't wave it away. At 7.4x EV/revenue and 13.4x EV/EBITDA, WMB trades at a genuine premium to ENB, KMI, and OKE. The 93% payout ratio leaves zero cushion — a single project delay or rate case setback forces either a dividend freeze or more debt (and debt_to_equity of "0" is obviously a data error; Williams carries ~$27B of long-term debt, which the file is missing entirely, and this is a material omission for a levered midstream name). Current ratio of 0.53 confirms the balance sheet is working capital-tight. If 10-year yields back up to 5%+, a 2.85% yielding bond-proxy with 5% revenue CAGR gets repriced fast — the KMI 2015 dividend cut is the reference trauma. And the insider file showing one 2,000-share sale is uselessly thin; I'd want to see the full Form 4 history before calling insider activity "neutral."
Net: I partially dissent from the synthesis. The $48 fair value is too punitive because it appears to trust a broken earnings CAGR and ignores the Q1-Q2 2026 inflection; my own back-of-envelope on TTM earnings of ~$3.1B growing 8-10% with a 22-24x multiple (justified for tier-1 midstream with LNG tailwinds) lands at $62-68, not $48 and not $72. So the stock is modestly overvalued — maybe 8-15% — not 33% overvalued. The market-forces "high-risk uncertain-return" framing overstates the risk for a fee-based business with contracted cash flows; the real risk is duration/rate risk on a bond-proxy, not operational. I'd be a buyer under $62, a holder in the $62-70 zone, and a trimmer above $75. The synthesis is directionally right (not cheap) but the magnitude is wrong, and it's ignoring the earnings acceleration that's visible in the last three prints. Also flag: the missing total debt figure is the single most important gap in this file and no verdict should be issued without it — a real analyst pulls the 10-Q before committing capital here.
GPT Reading
At $71.85, WMB is being valued less like a plain-vanilla midstream utility and more like a scarcity asset with visible growth. The operating performance is good enough to justify a premium, but not this much premium. The raw numbers show a business that has clearly improved since 2024: annual revenue rose from $10.50B in 2024 to $11.95B in 2025, operating income from $3.34B to $4.20B, and net income from $2.23B to $2.62B. The last four quarters are stronger still: trailing revenue is about $12.2B and trailing net income about $3.07B, with quarterly net margins stepping up from 19.6%-23.0% in mid/late 2025 to 27.1%-28.5% in the first half of 2026. That is real improvement, not just narrative. But the market cap is $87.9B, implying roughly 28-29x trailing earnings, 7.2x trailing sales, and a rich midstream-style multiple against EBITDA as well. For a company whose multi-year revenue CAGR is only 4.7% and whose earnings CAGR over the stated period is negative, that valuation already assumes today’s margin expansion is durable and that growth projects will land cleanly.
What stands out most to me is the disconnect between accounting earnings strength and actual residual cash generation. 2025 operating cash flow was $5.90B, which is solid, but capex consumed $4.89B, leaving just $1.01B of free cash flow. On an $87.9B equity value, that is barely above a 1% FCF yield. This matters because the stock is also marketed as an income vehicle, yet the dividend yield is only 2.85% and the payout ratio is 93.3%. In other words, investors are not being paid like owners of a slow-growing cash machine; they are paying up for anticipated future cash flow that is not yet evident in reported free cash flow. The balance sheet snapshot does not help the case much either: just $63M of cash, a current ratio of 0.53, and a debt-to-equity figure that is clearly unusable as reported, which means I have to lean even harder on what is observable—thin post-capex cash generation and an expensive equity multiple.
The optimistic reading is that 2026 is showing the inflection the market has been waiting for. First-half 2026 revenue of $6.08B is up versus $5.83B in first-half 2025, and first-half net income of $1.69B is up sharply from $1.24B. If those margins are sustainable, then trailing earnings may still understate normalized earnings power. But even giving credit for that, I have trouble getting comfortable with a company priced at nearly 6x book and over 13x EV/EBITDA when its value proposition is supposed to be durable, contracted, infrastructure-like cash flow. Those are excellent assets, but excellent assets can still be overowned and overpriced. My read is that the market has capitalized the LNG/data-center/natural-gas demand story ahead of the cash receipts.
The best counterargument is strong. A bull would say WMB should not be screened on current FCF because this is a build cycle: the $4.89B capex number depresses free cash flow today but should create years of tariff-backed, fee-based earnings tomorrow. They would also point to ROIC of 21.5%, ROE of 17.5%, operating margin of 35.1%, and the sharp earnings improvement in the last three quarters as evidence that these are not speculative projects attached to a weak base business. On that view, a high P/E is the wrong metric because depreciation and timing effects distort economic earnings, while the strategic value of irreplaceable gas infrastructure in a tightening power and LNG market deserves a scarcity premium. I respect that case, and it is why I am not aggressively bearish here. But I still weigh it differently because the premium is already very large relative to what has actually shown up in owner cash flow, and because “bond-like annuity with growth” stocks tend to de-rate quickly when growth proves merely good rather than exceptional.
What would change my mind is straightforward: if the next few quarters confirm that 2026’s first-half margin jump is not a temporary spike and the company can convert that into materially better free cash flow after capex, then the current price becomes easier to defend. Specifically, I would want to see annualized net income sustain above $3.2B, operating cash flow move clearly above $6.5B, and capex moderate enough to lift free cash flow toward at least $2.0B-$2.5B without sacrificing growth. That would still not make the stock cheap, but it would make the premium more rational. Conversely, if revenue keeps growing in the low-teens while margins slip back toward the low-20s and FCF remains around $1B, the stock is vulnerable to a meaningful multiple reset.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a midstream operator that is executing operationally while the equity is priced as if the growth story is already contracted. Annual revenue climbed to $11.95B in 2025 from $10.50B the prior year, and the last four reported quarters have held a tight $2.92–$3.20B band with net margins expanding sharply—from 19.6% in mid-2025 to 27–28.5% in the first half of 2026, delivering $827M and $865M of net income in the two most recent quarters. Operating margin of 35% and ROIC of 21.5% confirm this is a high-quality fee-based franchise, not a commodity trader. That quality, however, is already fully reflected and then some: a 33.6x P/E, 7.4x sales, and 13.4x EV/EBITDA on a business whose revenue CAGR is 4.7% and whose longer-term earnings CAGR is still negative at –9.3%. The valuation synthesis fair value near $48 is directionally right; at $71.85 the stock embeds roughly a 50% premium to the cash-flow baseline for volume upside that has not yet shown up in contracted utilization.
The cash-flow statement is the clearest contradiction to the bull case. Operating cash flow of $5.90B looks robust until capex of $4.89B collapses free cash flow to $1.01B—an FCF yield under 1.2% on an $88B equity value, with FCF CAGR running at –45.8%. A 93% earnings payout ratio funding a 2.85% dividend leaves almost no retained cash after the growth spend, and the balance sheet shows only $63M of cash against a sub-1.0 current ratio. Debt figures are incomplete in the feed, but midstream economics and the cash burn imply leverage is doing real work. Recent revenue confidence is flagged as low and decelerating at the quarterly level; the market is therefore paying a scarcity multiple for LNG-export and AI-power optionality while the company is still in the heavy-build phase that has not yet converted into durable FCF expansion.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is the recent earnings inflection and the strategic positioning. Net income has stepped up meaningfully—$2.62B in 2025 versus $2.23B in 2024, with trailing-quarter margins at cycle highs—and recent earnings YoY of +17.7% plus revenue YoY of +13.8% argue the trough is behind. ROIC above 21% and sector-leader status mean incremental growth projects can earn attractive returns if LNG trains and data-center gas demand materialize on schedule. A smart opponent would also note that fee-based midstream with long-term contracts deserves a premium to commodity E&P, that EV/EBITDA of 13.4x is less extreme than the P/E once growth capex rolls off, and that the narrative (natural gas as bridge fuel, FERC-advantaged pipes) has multi-year durability rather than meme fragility. Those points justify a higher multiple than a no-growth utility—but not 34x earnings and a near-zero FCF yield while payout sits at 93%.
I would flip toward neutral or constructive if free cash flow recovers above roughly $3B annually as the current capex wave converts to cash (i.e., FCF margin sustaining in the mid-20s rather than high single digits), if forward contracted volume disclosures show LNG and power-demand takeaway filling incremental capacity by 2027 without further outsized spend, or if the stock retraced into the low-to-mid $50s where the dividend and contracted cash flows would clear a reasonable cost of capital. Until one of those arrives, the premium is a narrative call the fundamentals have not earned.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Williams runs a mature interstate gas pipeline and gathering business with remarkably steady economics: revenue in a $10.5B-$12.0B band across five years, operating margin expanding from 24.8% in 2021 to 35.1% in 2025, and net income roughly $2.2B-$3.2B. OCF/NI of 2.27x and accruals of -5.4% of assets indicate earnings are backed by cash, consistent with a depreciation-heavy pipeline model. Share count is essentially flat (diluted CAGR 0.1%, 1.22B to 1.23B) and SBC is trivial at 0.8% of revenue, so per-share value is not being eroded by issuance.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted average cost of debt - how exposed is the capital structure to refinancing risk?
- 2025 capex composition - is the FCF drop from growth projects (Transco expansions, LNG-linked) or maintenance creep?
- Distribution coverage ratio and payout policy given FCF fell to $1.01B
- Customer/counterparty concentration on major pipelines (Transco, Northwest)
- Any off-balance-sheet JV debt or preferred equity that Altman Z may understate
The composite fair value of $44.41 and signal-adjusted $48.12 both sit roughly 33% below the $71.85 price, and the three methods triangulate tightly: DCF $47.44, anchored PE $51.41, EPV floor $31.33. Even the most generous method (anchored PE) implies ~28% downside. Earnings quality is clean, so no haircut is warranted, but nothing in the quality lens argues the deserved value should jump 50% to meet the tape. Quality grade of Solid raises deserved value modestly, not to $72.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Contracted vs uncontracted share of forward LNG/data-center volume growth in guidance
- Cause of 2025 FCF drop - one-time capex cycle or structural
- Rate-case outcomes on Transco and other regulated segments
- Distribution coverage and leverage covenants under current capex plan
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with a subdued VIX at 15.5, and while 4.65% 10y yields are a headwind for rate-sensitive names, WMB's low 0.62 beta blunts most of that market-level pressure. What actually moves this stock is its narrative: an indispensable-gas-pipeline compounder levered to two of the market's favorite themes right now (LNG export supercycle and AI data-center power demand). That story is currently in favor, even if intensity is only moderate and cult factor is low, and the fresh Q2 print with the Momentum acquisition and Blackstone partnership feeds directly into it. Recent 13.8% momentum vs 4.7% long-term confirms the tape is rewarding the name. The counterweight is that the narrative already carries a large premium to DCF, so incremental positive news is priced in and any crack in the LNG/AI-power storyline would sting. Analyst tone around midstream is constructive but not euphoric. Net: a real but measured tailwind - not a mania, more a bond-proxy-with-a-growth-story bid.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any slippage in LNG export project timelines or FIDs that would crack the supercycle narrative
- Data-center power-demand estimates being revised lower or shifting toward nuclear/renewables
- Sector rotation out of midstream into higher-beta energy or growth
- Rate-cut path - a decisive move lower in the 10y would strengthen the bond-proxy bid
- Analyst target revisions post-Q2 and any downgrades on valuation
AI reaches Williams entirely through the demand curve for electricity and therefore for gas: compute buildout raises baseload requirements in regions where renewables plus storage cannot yet firm supply, and the marginal firming fuel moves through pipes Williams already owns and cannot easily be duplicated. Direct AI substitution risk on the business itself is negligible - the monetized unit is reserved physical capacity, not information processing - and internal AI use (predictive maintenance, compressor and hydraulic optimization, permitting document work) is a modest cost and uptime benefit against a capex-dominated cost base. The real AI question is capital allocation quality: whether Williams contracts the new load on terms that keep the bond-like return profile, or funds speculative capacity and power ventures whose value depends on load forecasts made by customers with no obligation to show up.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Expansion project returns on capital
- Permitting timelines for new capacity
- Premiums paid for existing capacity
- Weighted average contract tenor
- Recontracting rates on Transco
- Share of revenue that is fee-based
- Northeast and Southeast gas burn for power
- LNG feedgas volumes on Transco
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 11, 2026, WMB was $71.85. We expect it to be $64.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $52.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.