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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Dollar General Corp. (DG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-22): Designation Watch · Gem Score -8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -2 · Value -12 · Sentiment 39 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $136.35 vs $122.89 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Dollar General Corp.
DG NYSEDollar General Corp. is a discount retailer that operates a large network of small-format stores serving everyday shopping needs across the United States. The company focuses on affordable, convenient merchandise for households seeking value and accessibility, especially in communities where quick trips and local stores are important. Its product assortment includes food, snacks, cleaning supplies, paper goods, health and beauty items, basic apparel, housewares, seasonal products, and private-label brands alongside nationally recognized consumer names. Dollar General also supports community-oriented retail formats and serves a broad customer base through stores designed for easy shopping and frequent visits. Headquartered in Goodlettsville, Tennessee, Dollar General Corp. plays a significant role in the consumer staples retail market by providing essential goods in a convenient, neighborhood-oriented format.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.85
Total Equity: $8.51B
Shares: 220,814,000
Total Debt: $4.58B
Cash: $1.14B
EBITDA: $3.25B
Total Debt: $4.58B
Cash: $1.14B
Revenue: $42.72B
Revenue: $42.72B
Revenue: $42.72B
Total Equity: $8.51B
Tax Rate: 23.0%
Equity: $8.51B
Total Debt: $4.58B
Cash: $1.14B
Current Liabilities: $6.96B
Long-Term Debt: $4.57B
Total Debt: $4.58B
Total Equity: $8.51B
Shares: 220,814,000
Shares: 220,814,000
CapEx: -$1.24B
Shares: 220,814,000
Stock Price: $122.89
Net Income: $1.51B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 5:13am (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $34.2B | $37.8B | $38.7B | $40.6B | $42.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $23.4B | $26.0B | $27.0B | $28.6B | $29.6B |
| Gross Profit | $10.8B | $11.8B | $11.7B | $12.0B | $13.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $7.6B | $8.5B | $9.3B | $10.3B | $10.9B |
| Operating Income | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $2.2B |
| Net Income | $2.4B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $1.1B | $1.5B |
| EBITDA | $3.9B | $4.1B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $3.2B |
| EPS | $10.24 | $10.73 | $7.57 | $5.12 | $6.87 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $10.17 | $10.68 | $7.55 | $5.11 | $6.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 5:00am (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $344.8M | $381.6M | $537.3M | $932.6M | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $6.3B | $7.6B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $7.9B |
| Total Assets | $26.3B | $29.1B | $30.8B | $31.1B | $31.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.0B | $5.9B | $6.7B | $6.9B | $7.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.2B | $7.0B | $6.2B | $5.7B | $4.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $20.1B | $23.5B | $24.0B | $23.7B | $22.5B |
| Total Equity | $6.3B | $5.5B | $6.7B | $7.4B | $8.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.5B | $1.7B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $4.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 5:23am (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.9B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.1B | -$1.6B | -$1.7B | -$1.3B | -$1.2B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.8B | $424.0M | $691.6M | $1.7B | $2.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | $1.4B | $1.5B | -$770.2M | -$1.7B |
| Dividends Paid | -$392.2M | -$493.7M | -$518.0M | -$519.0M | -$519.5M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.5B | -$2.7B | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.0B | $36.7M | $155.7M | $395.3M | $205.9M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 5:13am (22d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +10.6% | +2.2% | +5.0% | +5.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.3% | -0.9% | +2.5% | +9.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +3.3% | -26.5% | -29.9% | +28.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +0.7% | -31.2% | -32.3% | +34.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +5.0% | -18.7% | -18.5% | +21.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 5:00am (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-07 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-07 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-06 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-07 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-08 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-08 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-07 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-08 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-09 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-08 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-08 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-06 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-10 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-10 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-30 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-03 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-01 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-04 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-03 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-04 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:42A +1σ run of quarters pays +6%; a −1σ run costs 35%. Ratio 0.2:1 (μ 4.8%, σ 3.0% floored by absolute, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 11.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($122.89) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +7% | 9.2% | $263.77 | +115% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 8.0% | $212.65 | +73% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 6.8% | $167.82 | +37% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +3% | 4.2% | $110.22 | -10% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +8% | 4.3% | $130.43 | +6% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +2% | 3.1% | $79.34 | -35% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-31 05:34The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly print first: DG just delivered $11.29B revenue and $550M net income at a 4.9% margin — that's the highest quarterly margin in the eight-quarter series and follows a clean sequential recovery from the 1.9% margin trough in early 2025. Earnings YoY on the latest quarter is +34% ($550M vs $411M), and TTM net income is roughly $1.70B versus the $1.13B reported for FY2025. On $27.1B market cap, that's ~16x trailing earnings on a business that just re-accelerated. The "earnings CAGR -4.6%" cited in momentum is a backward-looking artifact of the FY2023→FY2025 margin collapse ($2.42B → $1.13B NI); the trajectory has clearly inflected. FCF of $2.39B against $27B cap is a ~8.8% yield — not trap territory.
Where I diverge from the models: Market Forces calling this a "deteriorating value trap with unsustainable cash flow" is directly contradicted by the numbers on the page. Operating margin went from 3.1% (FY25) to 5.2% (FY26) and quarterly net margin doubled from 1.9% to 4.9% over four quarters. That's not deterioration — that's a margin recovery in progress. The bear thesis (shrink, wage inflation, low-end consumer stress) was the 2023-2024 story; the 2025-2026 prints show management getting cost structure back under control. Meanwhile the Synthesis "fair value $127" and Narrative "anchored steady compounder with negligible premium" reads look much closer to reality. The two AI layers are contradicting each other and Market Forces is the stale one.
The contrarian pushback worth taking seriously: operating margin of 5.2% is still well below the 8.8% DG ran in FY2022 and the 8.5% average pre-COVID. If the terminal margin is 5-6% rather than 8%+, then normalized earnings are ~$1.7-2.0B, not the $2.4B peak — and 17x on that is not cheap for a business with 5% revenue growth, saturating US store footprint (~20K locations), and structural exposure to a customer cohort losing SNAP benefits and facing sticky food inflation. Debt/equity of 0.54 with $4.58B debt against $1.14B cash isn't alarming but it's not fortress either; the current ratio of 1.13 is tight for a retailer. And gross margin at 30.7% is 200bps below the 32-33% they used to run — the shrink and markdown problems aren't fully solved. A skeptic would also note capex of $1.24B is running well below the $1.7-1.9B DG spent during the aggressive build-out years, meaning some of the FCF strength is under-investment that will reverse.
Net read: I disagree with Market Forces and side with Synthesis/Narrative. This is a mature cash generator mid-recovery, not a value trap. At $122.89 with $27B cap, 16x recovering earnings, 8.8% FCF yield, 1.9% dividend, and ROIC of 14%, the risk-reward is roughly balanced but leans slightly favorable if you believe operating margin can hold 5-6% (which the last three quarters support). Fair value probably sits $125-140 depending on whether you credit further margin recovery toward 6%+; downside to $95-100 if the Q3/Q4 print shows margin rollover and shrink returns. The stock is not a screaming buy — the easy money was from $70 lows to here — but calling it overvalued or a trap ignores the trajectory in the actual filings. I'd own it as a defensive sleeve, not chase it.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not a broken retailer but a retailer climbing out of a profit hole faster than the headline “mature earner” framing suggests. Revenue has kept grinding higher from $34.22B in FY2022 to $42.72B in FY2026, a solid 5% annualized pace for a supposedly saturated discount chain, while the more important story is the snapback in earnings power after the ugly 2025 reset. Net income troughed at $1.13B in FY2025, recovered to $1.51B in FY2026, and the quarterly cadence since then is better still: net margin moved from 1.9% in the two late-2024/early-2025 quarters to 3.8%, then 2.7%, then 3.9%, 4.1%, and 4.9% most recently. On the last four reported quarters, net income totals about $1.70B on roughly $43.6B of revenue, already above the FY2026 annual run rate. That matters because a stock at $122.89 trading on a stated 17.9x trailing P/E may actually be closer to the mid-teens on a normalized forward earnings base if this margin recovery holds.
The cash flow statement also argues against the more dramatic “value trap” characterization. FY2026 operating cash flow was $3.63B and free cash flow was $2.39B after $1.24B of capex; against a $27.11B market cap, that is an 8.8% FCF yield. Debt is manageable at $4.58B with $1.14B cash and $8.51B equity, so this is not a balance-sheet stress story. The valuation stack is undemanding for a defensive chain with positive traffic resilience: 0.64x sales, 9.4x EV/EBITDA, and under 18x depressed trailing earnings. If Dollar General merely sustains something like a 4.0%-4.5% net margin on a $43B-$45B revenue base, earnings power looks more like $1.7B-$2.0B than the depressed FY2025-FY2026 average; that would support a fair value above today’s price, especially for a business still producing double-digit ROIC and high-teens ROE in a difficult retail environment.
The key contradiction I see in the supplied takes is that they simultaneously acknowledge a negligible gap to fair value and describe the company as a “deteriorating value trap” with “unsustainable cash flow generation.” The raw numbers do not support that language. Cash flow looks very sustainable relative to net income, not less: $2.39B of FCF versus $1.51B of net income in FY2026. Nor is the business obviously deteriorating right now; the latest quarter posted $11.29B of revenue, up from $10.73B in the comparable quarter a year earlier, while net income rose from $411.4M to $550.3M. This is exactly what an operating recovery looks like in retail: modest top-line growth plus margin repair. The market seems to be pricing DG as if 3%-4% net margins are the ceiling, but the recent trajectory suggests the business can push toward the high end of that range and maybe above it without heroic assumptions.
The strongest case against my read is straightforward: historical margin compression has been severe, and there is no evidence yet that Dollar General is returning to the old 2022-2023 earnings model. Operating income was $3.33B in FY2023, then collapsed to $2.45B in FY2024 and $1.71B in FY2025 before partially recovering to $2.20B in FY2026. Even if recent quarters are better, the business is still far below prior peak profitability. Gross margin in FY2026 was 30.7%, roughly flat to slightly soft versus prior years, so much of the recent recovery may be cost control rather than a structural merchandising improvement. A smart bear would also note that low-income consumers remain stretched, current ratio is only 1.13, and a discount chain with limited moat can get trapped between wage inflation, shrink, and price competition. If the recent 4.9% net margin quarter proves seasonal rather than durable, then 18x trailing earnings is not cheap enough for a no-growth, no-moat retailer.
What would change my mind is evidence that the margin rebound stalls below 4% or reverses while sales continue to grow only low-single digits. If over the next two to three quarters net income drops back toward the $300M-$400M range on roughly $11B quarterly revenue, then the current optimism about normalized earnings is wrong and the stock deserves to sit near or below today’s multiple. Conversely, if quarterly net margins keep landing in the 4.5%-5.0% area and annual FCF remains above $2.2B, the market will likely have to re-rate DG closer to 11x-12x EBITDA or a mid-to-high teens multiple on a $7.50-$8.50 EPS power, which points meaningfully above $123.
Grok Reading
The quarterly tape is doing something the annuals and the bearish market-forces overlay both understate. Dollar General just printed $11.29B of revenue and $550M of net income at a 4.9% margin—the cleanest quarter in the entire series—after a trough that bottomed at 1.9% margins and sub-$200M NI in late 2024/early 2025. Sequentially, margins have marched 1.9% → 1.9% → 3.8% → 3.8% → 2.7% → 3.9% → 4.1% → 4.9%. That is not noise; it is an operating recovery. Annual revenue compounded to $42.72B (+5.2% y/y) while free cash flow hit $2.39B on $3.63B of operating cash against only $1.24B of capex, so the cash machine never actually broke even as earnings did. At $122.89, the stock screens at 17.9x trailing earnings, 9.4x EV/EBITDA, 0.64x sales, with ROE still 17.8% and ROIC 14.2% on a balance sheet carrying $4.58B of debt against $8.51B of equity and $1.14B of cash. For a mature discounter throwing off mid-single-digit top-line growth and restoring mid-teens returns, that multiple is pricing the trough, not the run-rate.
The contradiction worth catching is between the Market Forces “deteriorating value trap” label and the actual numbers. Earnings CAGR is still −4.6% because it is anchored to the $2.4B peak years of FY2022–23; recent earnings are +34% y/y and the last four quarters already annualize closer to $1.7B of NI and climbing. Gross margin held 30.7% even through the worst of the shrink and wage pressure, and the payout ratio of 34% on a 1.9% yield leaves ample room to keep compounding while funding the rural store base. The valuation synthesis landing near $120–128 is directionally right that there is no narrative premium—narrative intensity is minimal, cult coefficient low—but it is lagging the margin inflection visible in the two most recent prints. A business generating $2.4B of FCF at a ~$27B enterprise is not structurally impaired; it is a mature earner exiting a self-inflicted operating trough.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward and has data behind it. Peak operating income was $3.33B in FY2023 and is only $2.20B in the latest annual; net income is still ~37% below the $2.42B high-water mark, so “recovery” could just be mean-reversion to a permanently lower plateau of 3.5–4% net margins rather than a path back to 6%+. Revenue CAGR of 5.1% is real but unspectacular, same-store productivity is not broken out here as re-accelerating, and the customer set—lower-income rural households—faces genuine macro wage and transfer-payment headwinds that the secondary signals flag explicitly. EV/EBITDA of 9.4x is not distressed; if margins stall and growth stays at 4%, a 16–17x earnings multiple on flat EPS is fair, not cheap, and the stock has already bounced with the last two NI prints. A smart opponent would also note debt service and lease obligations behind the modest 0.54 debt-to-equity print, plus the risk that further wage inflation or shrink re-acceleration caps the operating-margin ceiling well below historical levels. I weigh those points as real constraints on upside magnitude, not as invalidation of the direction: the cash flow quality and the sequential margin path still dominate a static “lower forever” framing.
What flips the verdict is concrete: two more quarters that fail to hold net margins above ~4.5%, or a full-year FY2027 guide that embeds operating margin stuck at or below 5% with SSS flat-to-down, would confirm the lower-plateau bear case and make $123 fully valued to expensive. Conversely, a print showing net margins pushing through 5.5% with FCF still above $2.2B would force a re-rating toward the mid-teens earnings power the old peak implied and make the current multiple look clearly light.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Dollar General is a mature, self-funding discount retailer growing revenue steadily from $34.2B (2022) to $42.7B (2026) - roughly 5.7% CAGR - while generating $2.39B of FCF in the latest year and OCF/NI of 1.7x with -3.1% accruals, indicating clean earnings conversion. Share count has been reduced from 235.8M to 220.8M (-1.6% CAGR) with buybacks running 1500x SBC, so per-share value is genuinely being concentrated rather than optically inflated. Altman Z of 2.57 sits in the grey zone, and net debt of $3.44B against $1.14B cash means the balance sheet is a constraint, not a fortress. The concerning story is the operating margin trajectory: 9.4% (2022) to 8.8% to 6.3% to 4.2% (2025), then a partial recovery to 5.2% in 2026. Net income fell from $2.42B to $1.13B before recovering to $1.51B - still well below the 2023 peak. Gross margin also compressed from 31.6% to 29.6% before bouncing to 30.7%. This is not a company in distress, but the earnings power is structurally lower than three years ago, suggesting competitive/cost pressures (shrink, labor, mix) that management has only partially addressed. FCF recovery to $2.39B is the most encouraging signal.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the 2026 margin recovery is driven by shrink normalization, price/mix, or one-time items per the 10-K MD&A
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants given the $3.44B net debt position
- Same-store sales vs. new-store contribution to revenue growth
- Management commentary on labor, shrink, and back-to-basics initiatives and their durability
- Capex trajectory and whether FCF strength reflects sustainable capex or deferred investment
The composite fair value of $127.59 and signal-adjusted $120.19 bracket the current $122.89 price within roughly 4% either way - the definition of fair. The methods spread tells the real story: DCF at $145.33 assumes margin recovery continues and unit economics normalize, anchored PE at $141.80 leans on historical multiples that predate the 2022-2025 margin compression, and EPV floor at $77.89 shows what you own if current depressed earnings are the new steady state. The truth sits in the middle, which is exactly where the stock trades. Earnings quality is high (no haircut needed) and the Company-Quality lens grades this Solid but structurally weaker on operating leverage - that argues against paying the DCF upside case. What is priced in: a partial margin recovery from the 2026 inflection, continued unit growth, and no further comp deterioration. That is a reasonable but not conservative set of assumptions. There is no visible margin of safety here - you are paying deserved value for a mid-tier compounder with a real recent wobble. I would want the EPV floor closer to reality (price nearer $100) before calling it cheap, and I would call it rich above ~$140.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Q/Q gross margin trajectory - is the 2026 recovery extending or one-off
- SSS trend and traffic vs ticket decomposition
- shrink and wage line items in the next print
- capex guidance and store-opening ROIC disclosure
- any change in share-repurchase pace
The story around DG just got a shot in the arm: Q2 beat with same-store sales +3.5%, margin expansion, raised full-year guide, and UBS explicitly calling the turnaround 'credible' and 'sustainable.' The news flow is unusually clustered and one-directional - dollar stores gaining share as grocers stumble, higher-income shoppers trading down to DG, and Cramer framing DG as the winner versus DLTR on the same print day. That is a live, if quiet, positive narrative shift on a name whose archetype is 'steady compounder, minimal intensity' - so incremental good news lands hard because expectations were flat.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side target revisions actually move up post-print or stay static (would confirm/deny the UBS-led re-rate)
- Follow-through in dollar-store channel checks over the next 4-6 weeks - does the trade-down cohort stick
- Any sign the stock fades the beat the way Cramer flagged, indicating crowded positioning
- Rate path - a sharp drop in 10y would rotate flows away from defensives like DG
The macro setup is unusually favorable to DG's demand side and unfavorable to its cost side. A pressured consumer with 4.67% long rates and sticky food inflation pushes trips toward small-format value, and trade-down from higher-income households is real — that is why revenue stays reliably positive. But the same world lets scaled omnichannel players (Walmart, Aldi, delivery aggregators) convert price investment and digital convenience into share, which is exactly the 3.6pt category gap. The structural question is not whether people shop value formats — they will — but whether the 20-minute rural convenience moat holds as delivery economics improve and grocery hard-discount expands. Meanwhile tariff and wage inflation compress the very margin recovery that is currently carrying earnings. Net: a defensible, cash-generative business in a growing category, growing slower than that category, with a finite self-help earnings runway.
When we made this prediction on Aug 31, 2026, DG was $126.31. We expect it to be $131.75 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $100.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence UNSETTLED
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
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