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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ferrari N.V. (RACE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Watch · Gem Score -11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 87 · Value -76 · Sentiment 50 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Ferrari N.V.
RACE NYSEFerrari N.V. is a luxury automotive company focused on the design, engineering, production, and sale of high-performance sports cars. Its current portfolio includes sports cars, special series models, limited-edition hypercars, one-off vehicles, and track-oriented cars, supported by a range of spare parts, engines, and after-sales services. The company also extends its brand through apparel, accessories, licensing, and selected lifestyle activities, creating a broad premium ecosystem around the Ferrari name. Ferrari N.V. serves customers and dealers across major international markets through an exclusive global distribution network, with manufacturing and engineering centered in Maranello, Italy. Founded in 1947 and headquartered in Maranello, Ferrari N.V. remains a prominent name in the global luxury performance car market, combining automotive craftsmanship, customization, and brand prestige across consumer and specialty segments.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Ferrari N.V. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 9 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-02-19, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.34
Total Equity: $4.52B
Shares: 178,321,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.69B
EBITDA: $3.20B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.69B
Revenue: $8.25B
Revenue: $8.25B
Revenue: $8.25B
Total Equity: $4.52B
Tax Rate: 22.5%
Equity: $4.52B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.69B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $4.52B
Shares: 178,321,000
Shares: 178,321,000
CapEx: -$560.05M
Shares: 178,321,000
Stock Price: $410.27
Net Income: $1.84B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.9B | $5.9B | $6.9B | $7.7B | $8.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.4B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.0B |
| Gross Profit | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $3.9B | $4.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Operating Income | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B |
| Net Income | $958.9M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| EBITDA | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| EPS | $5.19 | $5.90 | $7.98 | $9.78 | $10.35 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.19 | $5.88 | $7.96 | $9.76 | $10.34 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $1.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.9B | $4.6B | $4.6B | $5.8B | $5.6B |
| Total Assets | $7.9B | $9.0B | $9.3B | $11.0B | $11.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $5.4B | $6.0B | $5.7B | $6.9B | $6.6B |
| Total Equity | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $4.1B | $4.5B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$406.7M | -$401.4M | -$440.6M | -$556.7M | -$560.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$216.2M | $109.4M | -$363.9M | $809.2M | -$401.3M |
| Dividends Paid | -$185.0M | -$288.0M | -$379.3M | -$507.8M | -$614.2M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$21.1M | $51.7M | -$308.1M | $715.9M | -$316.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +19.3% | +17.2% | +11.8% | +7.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +11.7% | +21.6% | +12.5% | +10.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +14.1% | +31.8% | +16.7% | +11.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +12.3% | +34.3% | +21.6% | +4.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +15.8% | +28.5% | +12.1% | +8.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (57d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-20 | $4.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-22 | $3.44 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-22 | $2.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-24 | $1.99 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-19 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-19 | $1.04 | — | — | — |
| 2020-04-20 | $1.23 | — | — | — |
| 2019-04-23 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2018-04-23 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2017-04-24 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2016-05-23 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Ferrari's raw numbers are objectively pristine: 5-year revenue CAGR of 13.7% ($4.93B → $8.25B), operating income nearly doubling ($1.24B → $2.44B), operating margins expanding from 25.1% to 29.5%, net margins now 22.4%, and ROIC of 67%. FCF was $2.15B in 2025, with capex modest at $560M. Balance sheet shows $1.69B cash, $4.52B equity, and the FMP tag says zero debt (implausible for an auto OEM with financing operations — likely a data artifact; Ferrari carries roughly €2-3B of gross debt against its financial services book). The trajectory is unambiguously that of a luxury compounder, not an auto cyclical. But recent YoY has decelerated hard: revenue +7%, earnings +4.9% — well below the 5-year averages and nowhere near what a 40x P/E requires.
On my independent read, the synthesis DCF at $221 fair value feels too punitive and the thesis engine's "market implies 28% FCF CAGR" framing is a straw man. At $410 with $2.15B FCF, that's a 3.0% FCF yield on a business compounding FCF at 18% historically with a fortress brand — you don't need 28% growth to justify this, you need ~10-12% FCF growth for a decade plus a terminal luxury multiple (Hermès trades at 50x earnings on lower ROIC). A more honest reverse-DCF: 10% FCF CAGR for 10 years, 3% terminal, 8% discount → roughly $340-360 fair value. So the stock is expensive, but $250 is probably too bearish; the models are anchoring on auto-comps when the market is (correctly, in my view) applying a luxury-comp multiple.
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the market-forces module flags "existential EV transition risk" — I think this is backwards for Ferrari specifically. Ferrari's buyers are collectors, not commuters; the ICE/hybrid mystique is a feature, and Ferrari's stated EV rollout is deliberately slow and low-volume. That's not a threat, it's the moat. The thesis evaluation's top bear ("volume cap makes 28% FCF growth arithmetically implausible") is correct arithmetically but attacks a number the market isn't actually underwriting — Ferrari has grown revenue 13.7% CAGR without meaningfully raising volume, via mix and price. The real bear case is more mundane: at 40x earnings and 22x EV/EBITDA, you're paying a full luxury multiple with zero margin of safety, and the recent 7% revenue growth suggests the pricing/mix flywheel is normalizing toward mid-single-digits. That's the actual risk — not EVs, not China, but multiple compression from 40x to 28x on a modest growth slowdown, which alone is a 30% drawdown.
A contrarian would also note: net margin expansion has plateaued (22.4% vs 22.8% in 2024 — flat), and the incremental margin on the last $540M of revenue was only about 26% (op income up $260M on $540M revenue). That's decent but not the accelerating operating leverage the multiple demands. Insider activity isn't shown, and the "insufficient_data" quarterly trend flag is a real gap — I can't verify whether Q3/Q4 2025 showed re-acceleration or further deceleration, which is the swing variable. I partially agree with the synthesis (overvalued) but dissent on magnitude: fair value is closer to $330-360, not $250. The narrative layer's "$250 fundamentals + $160 story premium" split overweights the DCF and underweights that Ferrari's fundamentals genuinely warrant a luxury multiple, not an auto multiple. Buying here requires believing pricing power holds through a wealth-cycle downturn — plausible but not a bargain. I'd want $320 or lower to start a position, and would trim above $450. Current price is a hold-if-you-own-it, don't-chase-if-you-don't.
GPT Reading
Ferrari is one of the cleanest businesses in global consumer cyclicals, but the stock is asking investors to pay a luxury-goods multiple for what is still, economically, a low-volume manufacturer. The operating performance is undeniably elite: revenue rose from $4.93B in 2021 to $8.25B in 2025, a 13.7% annualized climb over four years, while operating income nearly doubled from $1.24B to $2.44B and net income from $959M to $1.84B. Margins have not just held, they have expanded: gross margin moved from 51.3% to 51.7%, operating margin from 25.2% to 29.5%, and net margin from 19.4% to 22.4%. Free cash flow of $2.15B on $8.25B of revenue is a 26% FCF margin, which is extraordinary for anything connected to autos. This is a phenomenal company.
The problem is that the equity already capitalizes Ferrari as if these exceptional economics can persist with very little friction and with enough growth to justify a $71.5B market cap. At $410, the stock trades at 39.7x earnings, 8.9x sales, and 21.8x EV/EBITDA. Against 2025 free cash flow, the equity is at roughly 33x FCF. Those are not “great business” multiples; those are “great business plus years of near-perfect execution” multiples. Yet recent growth is already settling into a more normal range: 2025 revenue growth was 7.0% and earnings growth was just 4.9%, well below the multi-year CAGR figures. If I take the latest year at face value, the market is paying almost 9x revenue for a company growing high single digits with a self-imposed volume ceiling. Ferrari can keep lifting mix, personalization, and pricing, but arithmetic eventually matters when units are deliberately constrained.
What stands out most is the tension between Ferrari’s quality and its scalability. The balance sheet is pristine, with $1.69B cash and effectively no debt in the data, equity of $4.52B, and cash conversion that is genuinely best-in-class: operating cash flow of $2.71B comfortably exceeds net income of $1.84B. ROE of 40.8% and ROIC of 66.8% are spectacular, but they also partly reflect an asset-light luxury positioning and a relatively small equity base, not a business that can reinvest unlimited capital at those returns. This matters because the current valuation only works if Ferrari can continue compounding earnings at something like low-to-mid teens for a long time without margin slippage from electrification, product mix shifts, or regional demand softness. Maybe it can, but the latest year’s 7% revenue growth and sub-5% earnings growth say the stock is already trading on the next leg of optimism, not on present operating momentum.
The strongest pushback is obvious and serious: Ferrari has earned the right to be valued differently from other automakers because it is not managed like one. Scarcity is the product, not a constraint accidentally imposed by capacity. A business that can sell identity, customization, and exclusivity can keep taking price above inflation even without major unit growth, and the historical numbers support that claim. From 2021 to 2025, revenue increased 67% while gross profit increased 68%, operating income 97%, and free cash flow appears to have scaled even faster. If investors are really buying a luxury franchise with unmatched brand equity, then 39x earnings is expensive but not absurd in the same way it would be for BMW or Mercedes. The zero-debt posture and 33% payout ratio also mean Ferrari has considerable resilience and optionality. I weigh this argument less heavily because today’s multiple leaves little room for the inevitable periods when luxury demand, China exposure, product cadence, or the EV transition produce merely “good” instead of “pristine” results.
What would change my mind is straightforward: if Ferrari can show that 2025’s deceleration was temporary and re-accelerate to sustained double-digit revenue growth while keeping operating margin around 30% and FCF margin above 24%, the current premium becomes easier to defend. Specifically, I’d want to see annual revenue move from $8.25B to above $9.2B within a year or two, net income compounding back into the low-teens range, and free cash flow pushing materially beyond $2.5B without balance-sheet deterioration. Conversely, if revenue growth remains around 6-8% and earnings growth stays mid-single-digit while the stock holds near 40x earnings, then the valuation is simply too rich for a mature franchise, however elite.
Grok Reading
Ferrari’s numbers describe a rare industrial compounder that has executed nearly flawlessly: revenue climbed from $4.93B in 2021 to $8.25B in 2025, net income from $959M to $1.84B, and free cash flow reached $2.15B on only $560M of capex, with zero reported net debt and $1.69B cash. Gross margin at 51.7%, operating margin 29.5%, net margin 22.4%, ROIC 66.8% and ROE 40.8% are luxury-goods economics bolted onto a volume-capped auto chassis. The operating story is pricing power and personalization, not unit growth; the scarcity model is working. What stands out equally, however, is deceleration against a still-premium multiple: recent revenue growth slowed to 7% and earnings to 4.9%, while the stock sits at 39.7× earnings, 8.9× sales and 21.8× EV/EBITDA on a $71.5B capitalization. FCF yield is roughly 3.0%. At a mid-single-digit to high-single-digit growth trajectory, that multiple embeds a permanence of scarcity premium and margin expansion that the arithmetic of ~10,000 cars a year cannot easily deliver. The quantitative models’ ~$250 fair-value anchor is directionally right; the gap to $410 is narrative, not cash-flow support.
The strongest counter-argument is that Ferrari is no longer being priced as an automaker at all. Believers correctly note that post-2020 wealth creation, waiting lists, and personalization mix have produced pricing power that looks more like Hermès than like Porsche, and that FCF CAGR of 18% over the last stretch proves the model still has torque. A smart opponent would also cite the fortress balance sheet, the 33% payout that still leaves ample reinvestment, and the fact that luxury multiples routinely detach from DCF for multi-year stretches when brand mystique is intact. Those points are real. I weigh them as already in the price: a 40× multiple on a mature earner with a self-imposed volume ceiling and an unresolved EV brand-transition risk is not a margin of safety; it is a claim that the cult narrative will compound faster than the 9–10% unit economics historically support. Cyclical luxury demand and China fragility remain under-discounted after fifteen years of easy wealth effects.
What would flip the verdict is concrete evidence that personalization and brand extension can sustain mid-teens FCF growth without volume inflation—specifically, next two years of revenue growth re-accelerating above 12% with gross margin holding or expanding through the first meaningful EV mix, or a clear path to FCF above $3B while the multiple compresses no further than the mid-20s. Absent that, the stock is priced for perfection the franchise is structurally capped from delivering.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has grown from $4.93B (2021) to $8.25B (2025), a ~14% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 51.3% to 51.7% and operating margin from 25.2% to 29.5% — operating leverage is real and durable, consistent with a scarcity-managed luxury brand. Net income nearly doubled from $959M to $1.84B, and FCF doubled from $1.07B to $2.15B, with OCF/NI at 1.43x and accruals at -6.1% of assets — earnings are cash-backed, not accrual-inflated. Altman Z of 8.57 places the balance sheet firmly in the safe zone.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Order book length and deposit balances in the 10-K/20-F to confirm demand visibility
- Capex trajectory around the EV transition and effect on future FCF
- Geographic and customer concentration (China, US) in segment disclosures
- Any related-party or F1/licensing revenue dynamics
- Buyback authorization size and pace vs SBC issuance detail
At $410.75 the market caps Ferrari at ~$71B against a composite FV of $221 and a signal-adjusted FV of $250 - implying the stock trades 60-85% above deserved value on the synthesis, with -39% headline downside. The DCF ($235) and anchored-PE ($285) bracket a deserved range in the $230-285 zone even after crediting the luxury-goods multiple; EPV floor of $129 confirms there is essentially no valuation support from current earnings power alone. The $410 price only pencils if you assume Ferrari sustains Hermes-like multiples in perpetuity while growing volumes, ASPs, and margins from already-elite levels - a stack of heroic assumptions.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Order book length and 2025-26 delivery guidance - the core scarcity thesis
- Personalization/ASP mix trend in latest quarter
- China region revenue trajectory
- Capex and FCF conversion through the EV transition (Elettrica launch)
- Any hint of production cap loosening that would break the scarcity narrative
The pressure on RACE right now is net positive but narrative-dependent. The market is in a mild risk-on regime (score +47, VIX 15.5, S&P near highs), which is a supportive backdrop for a name whose entire premium is a sentiment construct. Ferrari trades as a Hermes-style scarce-luxury cult, and that archetype is exactly what runs well when the tape is calm and buyers are comfortable paying up for 'irreplaceable' compounders. Beta of 0.6 means macro shocks land softly here, so the higher-rates / stretched-PE macro headwind is muted relative to higher-beta cyclicals. Narrative intensity is strong with high cult coefficient, durability only moderate - the story is intact but not bulletproof. Analyst/news flow is quiet and neutral-to-mildly-positive (value-screen comps, an 'overlooked auto upside' piece); nothing is challenging the luxury framing, and no downgrade cycle or narrative crack is visible in the 72h flow. Momentum is strong-positive with low realized vol, which itself feeds the cult bid - low drawdowns reinforce the 'own it forever' framing. Net: a moderate tailwind. The real risk is not today's tape but that the premium is 64% above fundamentals-anchored fair value, so any crack in the luxury narrative (China luxury data, EV-transition doubt, a soft delivery print) would flip this lens quickly. Right now, none of those cracks are showing.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- China UHNW luxury demand prints (Hermes, LVMH, Richemont) as a read-through on the scarcity thesis
- Any analyst downgrade or target cut that reframes RACE as 'auto' rather than 'luxury'
- EV transition commentary from management or press - a durability test for the cachet story
- VIX break above 20 or S&P rolling - would remove the calm-tape support
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for RACE — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.