Business Description
Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a consumer packaged goods food company in North America. The company operates in four segments: Grocery & Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice. The Grocery & Snacks segment primarily offers shelf stable food products through various retail channels in the United States. The Refrigerated & Frozen segment provides temperature-controlled food products through various retail channels in the United States. The International segment offers food products in various temperature states through retail and foodservice channels outside of the United States. The Foodservice segment offers branded and customized food products, including meals, entrees, sauces, and various custom-manufactured culinary products packaged for restaurants and other foodservice establishments in the United States. The company sells its products under the Birds Eye, Duncan Hines, Healthy Choice, Marie Callender's, Reddi-wip, Slim Jim, Angie's BOOMCHICKAPOP, Duke's, Earth Balance, Gardein, and Frontera brands. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra Brands, Inc. was founded in 1861 and is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 1:45pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:42pm (9d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.41
Total Equity: $8.93B
Shares: 478,300,000
Total Debt: $8.07B
Cash: $68.00M
EBITDA: $1.97B
Total Debt: $8.07B
Cash: $68.00M
Revenue: $11.61B
Revenue: $11.61B
Revenue: $11.61B
Total Equity: $8.93B
Tax Rate: 0.3%
Equity: $8.93B
Total Debt: $8.07B
Cash: $68.00M
Current Liabilities: $4.32B
Long-Term Debt: $6.23B
Total Debt: $8.07B
Total Equity: $8.93B
Shares: 478,300,000
Shares: 478,300,000
CapEx: -$389.30M
Shares: 478,300,000
Stock Price: $12.58
Net Income: $1.15B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:05pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.2B | $11.5B | $12.3B | $12.1B | $11.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $8.0B | $8.7B | $9.0B | $8.7B | $8.6B |
| Gross Profit | $3.2B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.4B | $1.5B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $1.6B |
| Operating Income | $1.8B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $852.8M | $1.4B |
| Net Income | $1.3B | $888.2M | $683.6M | $347.2M | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | $2.2B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $2.0B |
| EPS | $2.67 | $1.85 | $1.43 | $0.73 | $2.41 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:01pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $79.2M | $83.3M | $93.3M | $77.7M | $68.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.7B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $3.1B |
| Total Assets | $22.2B | $22.4B | $22.1B | $20.9B | $20.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.5B | $4.4B | $3.2B | $4.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.3B | $8.1B | $7.1B | $7.5B | $6.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $13.6B | $13.6B | $13.2B | $12.4B | $12.0B |
| Total Equity | $8.6B | $8.8B | $8.7B | $8.4B | $8.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $6.3B | $6.6B | $6.6B | $6.3B | $6.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:05pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.5B | $1.2B | $995.4M | $2.0B | $1.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$506.4M | -$464.4M | -$362.2M | -$388.1M | -$389.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | $961.7M | $712.9M | $633.2M | $1.6B | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $160.9M | $100,000 | $3.2M | $0 | -$153.8M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$298.1M | -$50.0M | -$150.0M | $0 | -$64.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$474.1M | $3.1M | $10.6M | -$16.2M | -$9.7M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:58pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$11.1B $11.1B – $11.2B
|
$11.3B $11.3B – $11.3B
|
$11.4B $11.4B – $11.4B
|
$11.5B $11.4B – $11.6B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
| Net Income |
$753.9M $704.5M – $850.1M
|
$848.5M $765.9M – $917.2M
|
$878.7M $814.6M – $986.3M
|
$934.7M $927.7M – $942.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:05pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.1% | +6.4% | -1.8% | -3.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -10.7% | +15.0% | +2.1% | -9.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -24.2% | -20.1% | -20.7% | +60.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -31.6% | -23.0% | -49.2% | +231.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -12.8% | -13.0% | -14.1% | +35.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:05pm (9d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | Brase John P | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-14 | Mulligan John J | P-Purchase | 17,500.00 | $14.31 | $250,402 |
| 2026-04-14 | LENNY RICHARD H | P-Purchase | 25,000.00 | $14.34 | $358,500 |
| 2026-03-02 | MARSHALL RUTH ANN | A-Award | 1,629.30 | $19.18 | $31,250 |
| 2026-03-02 | Satriano Pietro | A-Award | 3,228.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-02 | Mulligan John J | A-Award | 3,228.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-18 | Satriano Pietro | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-02-18 | Mulligan John J | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2025-12-01 | MARSHALL RUTH ANN | A-Award | 1,768.53 | $17.67 | $31,250 |
| 2025-11-03 | Napier Melissa C. | A-Award | 27,589.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-04 | Napier Melissa C. | S-Sale | 13,011.00 | $17.19 | $223,659 |
| 2025-10-17 | Napier Melissa C. | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2025-10-17 | Napier Melissa C. | 11,820.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2025-10-07 | BROWN THOMAS K | P-Purchase | 10,000.00 | $18.72 | $187,200 |
| 2025-07-24 | McGough Thomas M | A-Award | 11,419.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-07-24 | McGough Thomas M | F-InKind | 5,059.00 | $19.30 | $97,639 |
| 2025-07-20 | McGough Thomas M | M-Exempt | 46,251.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-07-20 | McGough Thomas M | F-InKind | 19,682.00 | $19.07 | $375,336 |
| 2025-07-19 | McGough Thomas M | F-InKind | 4,422.00 | $19.07 | $84,328 |
| 2025-09-02 | MARSHALL RUTH ANN | A-Award | 1,664.89 | $18.77 | $31,250 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:58pm (9d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-30 | $0.35 | 2026-03-30 | 2026-04-30 | 2026-06-03 |
| 2026-01-27 | $0.35 | 2025-12-18 | 2026-01-27 | 2026-02-26 |
| 2025-10-30 | $0.35 | 2025-09-30 | 2025-10-30 | 2025-11-26 |
| 2025-07-30 | $0.35 | 2025-07-09 | 2025-07-30 | 2025-08-28 |
| 2025-04-28 | $0.35 | 2025-04-02 | 2025-04-28 | 2025-05-29 |
| 2025-01-27 | $0.35 | 2024-12-12 | 2025-01-27 | 2025-02-27 |
| 2024-10-31 | $0.35 | 2024-10-01 | 2024-10-31 | 2024-11-27 |
| 2024-08-01 | $0.35 | 2024-07-11 | 2024-08-01 | 2024-08-29 |
| 2024-04-29 | $0.35 | 2024-04-11 | 2024-04-30 | 2024-05-30 |
| 2024-01-29 | $0.35 | 2023-12-14 | 2024-01-30 | 2024-02-29 |
| 2023-11-01 | $0.35 | 2023-10-04 | 2023-11-02 | 2023-11-30 |
| 2023-07-28 | $0.35 | 2023-07-13 | 2023-07-31 | 2023-08-31 |
| 2023-04-27 | $0.33 | 2023-04-12 | 2023-04-28 | 2023-06-01 |
| 2023-01-27 | $0.33 | 2022-12-21 | 2023-01-30 | 2023-03-02 |
| 2022-11-02 | $0.33 | 2022-10-04 | 2022-11-03 | 2022-12-01 |
| 2022-08-02 | $0.33 | 2022-07-22 | 2022-08-03 | 2022-09-01 |
| 2022-04-28 | $0.31 | 2022-04-14 | 2022-04-29 | 2022-06-01 |
| 2022-01-28 | $0.31 | 2021-12-08 | 2022-01-31 | 2022-03-02 |
| 2021-10-29 | $0.31 | 2021-09-29 | 2021-11-01 | 2021-12-01 |
| 2021-08-02 | $0.31 | 2021-07-13 | 2021-08-03 | 2021-09-02 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting with the raw tape: TTM revenue is roughly $11.18B (sum of last four quarters), down from $11.61B FY25 and $12.05B FY24 — so the topline is still bleeding ~3-4% annually with no inflection. The Nov-2025 quarter carried a $663.6M net loss, which on $2.98B revenue screams impairment/goodwill writedown on the brand portfolio — exactly what you'd expect if management is finally marking Hunt's/Birds Eye to a more honest carrying value. That writedown is itself the bear thesis made concrete on the income statement. Strip it out and the underlying quarters print 6-9% net margins, consistent with FY25's 9.9% net margin and $1.36B operating income. FCF of $1.30B on a $6.22B market cap is a 20.9% FCF yield — that is the entire bull case in one number.
The synthesis model's $22 fair value is arithmetically defensible but credulous. It treats $1.3B FCF as a perpetuity-eligible cash stream while ignoring that (a) the balance sheet shows $68M cash against undisclosed but large debt — Conagra carries roughly $8B in long-term debt from the Pinnacle acquisition, current ratio 0.71, and the synthesis itself flagged "interest coverage dangerously low"; (b) the 6.25% dividend yield consumes ~$700M/yr, leaving only ~$600M for deleveraging against a debt stack that needs to be refinanced at materially higher rates than the 2018-2020 paper it's replacing; and (c) revenue CAGR is negative and there is no visible catalyst for reversal. A melting FCF stream discounted properly is worth substantially less than $22. The Market Forces model calling this a "value trap executing financial engineering" is closer to the truth than the DCF, though it overstates the malice — this looks more like ordinary managed decline than fraud.
The contrarian-to-the-contrarians read: at 4.8x EV/FCF (roughly $10B EV / $1.3B FCF), the market is pricing in not just decline but accelerating decline plus a dividend cut. Buffett-adjacent value buyers (Berkshire added KHC-adjacent names, and the insider P-Purchases on 4/14/2026 at 42,500 shares combined are real open-market buys, not awards) are betting that even a -3% revenue trajectory with stable ~25% gross margins throws off enough cash to return >100% of market cap within 5 years. The honest question is dividend sustainability: $0.35/qtr × ~478M shares ≈ $670M, covered 1.9x by FCF — tight but not broken. If management cuts the dividend 30% to accelerate deleveraging, the stock probably drops to $10-11 short-term but the equity becomes structurally safer. That's the asymmetry. The accelerating quarterly revenue trend the secondary signals flag is noise — Q3 FY26 at $2.79B is just seasonal vs Q2's $2.98B, not a real inflection.
I dissent from the synthesis "fair value $22" verdict and side closer to Market Forces, but not all the way. Fair value is $15-17, not $22 and not $11. The models are double-counting: the DCF treats FCF as durable, the narrative layer admits the brands are eroding, and nobody is haircutting the FCF stream for the refinancing wall and category decline simultaneously. At $13.01 you're getting paid a 6.25% dividend to wait, with ~15-30% upside to a more honest fair value and downside cushioned by the FCF yield — but only if the dividend holds and debt gets refinanced without a covenant scare. This is a position-sizing question, not a conviction question: small starter at $13, add aggressively only below $11 or after a dividend reset clears the overhang. The insider buying is a real tell but two purchases don't make a thesis.
GPT Critique
Upon reviewing the raw data for Conagra Brands, Inc., the numbers paint a picture of a company grappling with declining revenue and fluctuating margins. The quarterly revenue has been oscillating, with no clear upward trajectory, settling at $2.79B in the latest quarter. The net income margins have swung from a dismal -22.3% to a healthier 9.2%, indicating underlying volatility, likely due to one-off writedowns or restructuring charges. The annual revenue trend shows a consistent decline from $12.05B in 2024 to $11.61B in 2025, reinforcing a negative growth story. However, the free cash flow stands out, with a robust $1.3B, representing an 11% yield on revenue. This high cash flow conversion is a silver lining, suggesting operational efficiency despite top-line pressure. The debt situation is precarious, with a current ratio of 0.71, indicating limited short-term liquidity, and the absence of disclosed total debt figures suggests potential refinancing challenges ahead.
Opus argues that Conagra is a "modestly undervalued melting ice cube," estimating a fair value of $15-17. I concur with the premise that Conagra is experiencing managed decline, as evidenced by the -2.7% revenue CAGR and negative recent revenue growth. However, I disagree with Opus's fair value estimate. The market's valuation reflects not just decline but significant structural challenges, including high leverage and potential refinancing issues. While Opus acknowledges the $6.25% dividend yield and insider purchases as bullish signals, I believe these factors are overshadowed by the looming debt refinancing and potential for a dividend cut. The synthesis's $22 fair value seems overly optimistic given the negative growth trajectory and the pressure on margins from both operational and financial restructuring needs.
I agree with Opus on the importance of Conagra's free cash flow yield, which at 20.9% is compelling. This yield supports the idea that the stock is not without merit at its current price, providing some downside protection. However, I diverge on the narrative surrounding the dividend sustainability. Opus suggests that a dividend cut could stabilize the equity longer term, which aligns with my view that immediate financial health is paramount over sustaining generous payouts. The market's headwind narrative aligns more with the reality of a company facing sector-wide challenges and eroding brand strength, rather than a simple valuation oversight.
A careful skeptic of both Opus's and my views might argue that the market's pricing is fully rational, reflecting the risks of a persistently declining sector, the structural shift towards fresh and organic foods, and the potential for increased margin pressure from digital distribution channels. They might contend that any valuation beyond current pricing underestimates the severity of these headwinds and overestimates management's ability to navigate them effectively without further financial re-engineering.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell the exact story I want to hear before buying a value name: Quality at -22 says this is a tired, levered, no-growth packaged-food operator — fine, I'm not paying for growth. Valuation at +48 says the market is pricing it like the brands are melting, with a 21% equity FCF yield and ~11x EV/FCF that gives me a 25-40% margin of safety against a haircut $17-19 deserved value. I don't need a turnaround, I just need 'not a disaster,' and the clean earnings quality, real $1.3B FCF, shrinking share count, and insider buying tell me the cash is real. The $8B debt is the whole reason this is cheap and also the whole reason it could stay cheap or break — that's the crux.
My play: open a starter position now at $13.01 — call it 1.5-2% of the book — and set a scale-in plan to take it to a full 3-4% position on any move into the $11-12 range, where the FCF yield gets absurd. I'm not pounding the table because the quality score is genuinely poor and leverage means I can't size this like a compounder; this is a value/mean-reversion trade with a 4.3% dividend paying me to wait. I trim or exit if (a) FCF drops below ~$1.0B for two consecutive years, signaling the fade is real, or (b) the stock re-rates to $17-18 and the margin of safety closes. Catalysts that flip me aggressive: a credible debt paydown plan, a brand divestiture, or strategic interest. I'm not married to this — it's a cigar butt with a few good puffs left, priced accordingly.
Conagra is a classic mature packaged-food earner: revenue has gone essentially nowhere over five years ($11.18B in 2021 → $11.61B in 2025), gross margins compressed from 28.4% to 25.9%, and operating margin has been volatile, sliding from 15.9% (2021) to a trough of 7.1% (2024) before recovering to 11.8% in 2025. Net income roundtripped from $1.30B to $347M and back to $1.15B — not the steady compounding profile you want from a defensive consumer staple. Free cash flow generation, however, is genuine and durable: $1.30B in 2025, with OCF/NI of 2.24x and negative accruals (-2.8% of assets) confirming earnings are backed by cash, not accounting.
The balance sheet is the real constraint. Net debt of ~$8B against only $68M of liquid cash, with $1.83B of short-term debt due imminently — Altman Z of 1.46 sits in the formal distress zone, though the model overstates risk for an asset-light brand portfolio with steady FCF. Capital allocation is disciplined on the dilution axis: diluted shares fell from 487.8M to 478.3M (-0.5% CAGR), SBC is just 0.4% of revenue, and buybacks exceed SBC by 2.3x. So per-share value is being protected, but virtually all free cash is going to debt service and the dividend rather than growth or deleveraging at speed.
Insider behavior is a modest positive: three open-market P-purchases in the last ~12 months (Mulligan $250K, Lenny $359K, Brown $187K) against a single small Napier sale of $224K right after a stock award — that sale is effectively a tax/diversification trim, not a directional signal. Directors and the CFO buying with their own money while margins are pressured is constructive.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Refinancing schedule and rates on the $1.83B short-term debt and total debt stack — fixed vs. floating mix
- Brand-level revenue trajectory: which categories are losing share (private-label pressure on frozen/snacks?)
- Volume vs. price contribution to the 2025 revenue decline — is pricing power exhausted?
- Dividend coverage and stated capital allocation priority between deleveraging, buybacks, and the dividend
- Any goodwill/intangible impairment risk given the 2024 operating margin collapse
- Pension and lease obligations not captured in headline net debt
Composite FV is $23.37 and signal-adjusted $22.01, implying ~69% upside from $13.01. I don't take that at face value — anchored-PE ($24.52) and EPV ($22.22) both assume the current ~$1.3B FCF stream is durable, and the Quality lens flags flat revenue, margin compression, and $8B net debt. Haircut deserved value 25-30% for terminal decline risk and you still land around $15-17, comfortably above today's price.
The market is pricing CAG like the brands are melting ice cubes: $6.2B market cap on $1.3B FCF is a ~21% FCF yield, and EV/FCF including the $8B debt is still ~11x — not demanding for a business with real (if stagnant) cash generation and pricing power in shelf-stable categories. Earnings quality is clean (no haircut needed there), so the cash is real. What's priced in is essentially zero growth forever and continued margin erosion; you don't need a turnaround to make money here, just stabilization.
This isn't a fat-pitch deep value — the debt load and secular headwinds are real and cap the multiple. But at $13 the margin of safety against a reasonable $17-19 deserved value is ~25-40%, which qualifies as undervalued rather than merely fair.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance on organic revenue growth and gross margin recovery trajectory
- Debt paydown pace and refinancing rates on the $8B stack
- Volume vs price mix — is pricing power still offsetting volume declines or rolling over?
- Any brand impairment charges or divestiture signals in segment disclosures
- Capex guidance — is maintenance capex creeping up and eroding the $1.3B FCF figure?